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
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aboth's Vineyard

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1844-1924

BY

SUMNER WELLES

netime Chief of the Latin-American Division of the Department of State of the United States and

AMERICAN COMMISSIONER

to the Dominican Republic from 1922 to 1925

With a Foreword by

THE HON. L. S. ROWE

Director General of the Pan-American Union

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In Two Volumes

Vol. I

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To the indomitable love of liberty
of
the Dominican People
this book is dedicated.

"And Naboth said to Ahab, The Lord forbid it me, that I should give the inheritance of my fathers unto thee." I. Kings, 21, v. 3.

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FOREWORD

L. S. ROWE, PH.D.

R a number of years students of Latin American ffairs have been awaiting an authoritative history Dominican Republic. The excellent work of Judge rich is out of print. Moreover, this work was writfore the recent significant changes in the Dominican lic which witnessed the reëstablishment of constitugovernment. The termination of military occupay the United States marked a distinct step in the pment of American foreign policy, and it is most tant therefore that the successive steps leading to withdrawal should be presented to the public and ally to students of our Latin American policy.

Welles, both by reason of experience and equipis the person indicated to perform this service. The tant part which he played as United States Comner to supervise and carry into effect the plan of ation, combined with his exceptional acquaintance Latin American affairs, places him in an extraorly favorable position to perform this task. Not only e possess a thorough acquaintance with every detail subject, but he combines therewith a sympathetic standing of the Dominican viewpoint which was of nable value to our Government in the solution of a lt and delicate situation.

here is anything lacking in this work, it is the fact he author, with becoming modesty and self-efface-

ment, has failed to set forth the important part whic
played in the reëstablishment of constitutional gov
ment in the Dominican Republic and the skill with w
the Dominican reorganization plan was carried out.

Mr. Welles has placed every student of Latin Amer
affairs under obligations by his admirable and painsta
study of the history and development of the poli
institutions of the Dominican Republic.

34466 13 COP. 3

INTRODUCTION

1.

XISTENCE in the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo
n the earlier years of the latter half of the 18th cen-
had a flavour of romance not equaled, nor perhaps
ached, in the other colonies of the New World, how-
ttle the residents of the colony may have realized it.
material prosperity of the French half of the Island,
forming the Republic of Haiti, had focused upon
attention of Europe, whereas the long years of
panish colony's gradual decline in commercial rank
the days when the Discoverer of America, Don
bal Colón, had been its Governor, and since the
when Spanish Santo Domingo had been the center
ain's empire, had caused the Old World to forget the
settlement of the New World as it slumbered in its
ful backwater of the blue Caribbean.

nmunication between Santo Domingo and the
r country was limited by royal decree to the Span-
iling vessels which ever less frequently crossed the
from Spain, or to the occasional galleons plying
en Spain's richer West Indian colonies, Cuba and
o Rico, and the port of Santo Domingo. At the
ning of the last decade of the 18th century, the
ation of the Spanish portion of the Island had dwin-
o some 125,000 inhabitants, of whom only approxi-
y 40,000 belonged to the ruling caste, 60,000 being
and the remainder an indeterminate group of
toes and quadroons. The 19,000 square miles of the
h colony were parcelled out in great plantations,
ging in most part to absentee landlords. Much of
ountry was arid and had not been rendered suitable
ultivation by irrigation as had been done by the

French across the boundary. In the earlier years of
colony, the chief source of its wealth had been its m
of gold and copper, and when the surface workings
been exhausted, the mines had one by one been al
doned, and by the beginning of the 18th century the
onists were engaged solely in agriculture. The produc
of sugar, which had commenced early in the 16th
tury in Santo Domingo before sugar was grown in
other part of the New World, had gradually incre
in importance. Sugar planters had developed their fi
along the southern coast as well as in the north near
French frontier, wherever exportation of their proc
was comparatively easy. The remoteness from all r
or waterways rendered the planting of sugar in the
mensely fertile valleys of the central plateau, know
the Cibao, impracticable, and the lands about Santiag
los Caballeros were therefore used for grazing or for
planting of the crops needed for the requirement
each plantation.

The roads which had earlier been built were littl
little, as the poverty of the colony increased, encroa
upon by the fast-growing vegetation of the tropics,
the great distances between the residences of the ow
of adjacent plantations made it difficult for the pla
to see one another with any frequency, except in
dry seasons when their heavy coaches could tr
with less danger of being mired, along the mu
trails.

The head of each plantation was virtually a dict
responsible only unto himself. The difficulty in the m
of communication alone prevented the colonial gov
ment from maintaining any effective supervision ove
colonists, and although the promulgation of legisl

ribing the rights and duties of the colonists as regards nother, their relations to the colonial government heir treatment of their slaves, was frequent, the s for the most part were practically unobserved. assed tranquilly. One day followed another monoto-. The sun was always shining, except for the half- long showers of the rainy season, or except for the or three days' long cyclone which came every few The cooler months of the dry winter season were ed by the moist heat of the spring and summer. rney to the neighbouring plantation was an excite- ; a longer journey to the capital or to Santiago de aballeros was epoch-making; a journey to Spain by nter's family might perhaps be undertaken once in time, but most of the Spaniards passed their lives eir own plantations, and native indolence and the tive-destroying tropical climate made these lotus- not only content with their lot but supremely erent to what was going on in the rest of the l.

n and women matured early. The chief event in a life was her marriage at fifteen or sixteen to some bouring planter's son. After that, her sole interest er sole occupation was the care of her children and upervision of the household slaves. If the yield was rable, money was plentiful, but there was little to it on. The interest of the men of the family was red upon the plantation, riding across the fields from e to sunset to make sure that the half-breed super- was extracting the necessary amount of labour from aves during the planting season, or, after the crop een harvested, journeying to the nearest port to be that it was advantageously sold. Newspapers were

unknown. Local news took months to travel. From Sp
perhaps once a year might come letters bearing news
events in far off Europe.

In the cities and towns life was not far different.
the capital city, Santo Domingo, numbering some 30,0
souls more or less, there was perhaps the only approach
the more varied existence of a continental city of th
days. The city planned by the Comendador Ovando
within thirty years of its construction acquired, with
increasing prosperity of the colony, such traits of m
nificence, and such imposing edifices had been built, t
the Emperor Charles V was told that the palaces of
Governor-General and of the Archbishop in Santo D
mingo were far more magnificent than the imperial r
dences he posssessed in the many cities of his Europ
dominions. The tradition of luxury remained, but the co
parative insignificance into which the colony later s
had deprived the city by the end of the 18th century
much of the glamour of the great days of its commer
hegemony. Its location at the center of the southern sug
producing area retained for it a certain measure of co
mercial life, but its chief importance lay in the fact t
it continued to be the residence of the Governor-Gen
and of the Real Audiencia, the seat of the Archbishop,
the headquarters of the military establishment, which
the latter part of the 18th century comprised two
companies of Spanish veterans. The old city walls
stood in their entirety. Within, facing the Ozama Ri
stood the ancient palace of the Governor-General.
cabildo formed one side of the central square. The pal
of the Archbishop, a short block away, and the cathed
modelled by order of the Emperor Charles V upo
Roman basilica, with other ancient and beautiful ex

s of ecclesiastical architecture, comprise the list of the ildings of major importance.

The streets of the city were narrow and winding, and houses, as was customary in Spanish colonial architec-re, presented, to the street, walls unadorned save by in-equent balconies and the wrought-iron grilles across the ple windows. These latter, unglazed, were barred, as n as night had fallen, by massive wooden shutters. The uses were adapted, so far as possible, to permit the free culation of air during the daylight hours. It was only er sunset, due to the universal belief that the night was unhealthful, that each aperture was hermetically led. Within the houses, which were generally of but and seldom of two floors, the life of the family was sed in the patio, or central court, and in the rooms ening thereon. In the living rooms the walls were white-shed, ungarnished by hangings or other decoration.

The social life of the capital consisted largely, as it has til recent times, of the stroll in the central plaza when day's work was done, and the evening breezes blew in m the Caribbean to cool the city of the burning rays the sun. It was then that friends met to discuss the nts of the day, and the ladies of the city had the oppor-ity to see one another. The evening walk in the plaza the High Mass on Sundays on feast days afforded tically the only opportunities for social intercourse.

During the daytime, except to go to mass, no women position passed through the streets. When they appeared ublic, the Spanish women wore but one universal cos-e—a short black silk skirt, with a mantilla of the same r falling from their heads below their waists. Beneath mantilla could occasionally be seen the thin chemise ransparent gauze which was the sole covering of their

breasts. For the general monotony of the feminine dress the vivid colors of the picturesque costume of the men identical with that worn in Spain during the period, com pensated to some extent.

In the best houses and among the wealthiest families th contrast of splendour and poverty was startling to th occasional visitor. The furniture, imported from Spain or modelled in native woods from Spanish designs, bor all the profusion of carving or of gilding and rococo orna ment demanded by Spanish taste of the 18th century The ladies of the richer class and the masculine member of their families, when they received visitors in thei homes, were alike garbed with lavish display, while th slaves who served them, even those who waited upon th ladies, were dressed in rags, and are reputed by writers o the time to have been filthy "to the most disgustin degree."

Entertainments were few and far between, althoug occasionally the Governor-General or the members o the Audiencia might offer a reception to the city's mo distinguished families. Social lines were rigorously drawn and the population was divided by common acceptanc into classes beyond the limits of which the individu might rarely pass. The white resident or official of th highest class was always addressed as Señor Don, th poorer white as Don; the freedman of independent pos tion in whose veins some drops of African blood wer believed to flow, merely as Señor. All others in the colon were classed together as being unworthy of any distinc tive forms of address. Social intercourse between th classes so distinguished was non-existent.

In the northern plain of the Cibao, the city of San tiago de los Caballeros had gained importance as the resu

the destruction of the towns of Concepción de la Vega, erto de Plata and Monte Cristi through earthquake and e, and in the latter part of the 18th century was nearly ual in population to the capital, although it lacked the lected glory which Santo Domingo possessed as the seat the royal establishment. There were no other towns of portance and it is probable that neither Azua, Puerto ta, Monte Cristi, Cotuy nor La Vega numbered more an 5,000 inhabitants each.

Life ran along smooth paths. If the colony possessed ne of the stupendous magnificence, none of the com-rcial prosperity, none of the febrile activity of its nch neighbour, neither did there exist in it that feeling suspense, that sinister sensation of the imminence of ne impending catastrophe, which is sometimes noted in writings of travelers to French St. Domingue, where parse 40,000 French colonists were holding in the most ect servitude more than half a million slaves fresh from jungles of western Africa.

n the earlier years of the Spanish colony, manual labor been undertaken by the native Arawaks whom the niards had, immediately after Columbus's first settle-nt, forced into slavery. Unaccustomed labor, pestilence revolt were the contributing causes to the exterminа-n within a century of the native Indian tribes, and rican slavery had been introduced on a small scale into h the French and Spanish colonies before the close of 17th century. Its introduction into the Spanish lands never, however, been on the extraordinary scale of in the French colony, where the conditions of slavery arently were not conducive to the rapid propagation he Africans, and where, as a result, the great majority laves working on the plantations were negroes brought

from Africa and where slaves of the second generation were considered a rarity. Abuses on the part of the master towards his slaves in the Spanish colony were undoubtedly of no infrequent occurrence, but it is evident that they were not the matter of course which they were in French Santo Domingo. This, and the fact that a greater proportion of the slaves in the Spanish colony had been born and bred upon their owners' plantations, prevented that hatred of master by slave which was so noticeable on the French plantations.

Neither was there in the Spanish colony the extreme discrimination against the mulatto or quadroon which existed in the colony under French control. In Spanish Santo Domingo, while there was no social contact between the freedman of mixed blood and the whites, there was no evidence of the racial antipathy towards them which existed in French territory.

Communication between the two colonies on the Island was infrequent, and in 1790, the Spanish colonists, secure as they believed in their terrestrial paradise, and pleasantly exhilarated by the news of an unexpected rise in the price of sugar, had no suspicion that the storm clouds already high on the horizon at the other end of the Island could darken their own tropical sky, nor that the hurried drive of the King of France and his family from Versailles to Paris was the first warning that, before many years had passed, their own prosperous plantations would be totally destroyed, and that they themselves, when death did not overtake them first, would be exiles in strange lands.

2.

In 1789, the decree forced upon the French nobility and clergy providing for the renewed representation of the

rd Estate in the Estates General gave rise to gen-
satisfaction among the inhabitants of French St.
mingue. Dissatisfaction with the administration of the
me Government had been rife for many years, and
arently only the Governor of the colony, M. DuChil-
, opposed the action of the Provincial Assembly in
struing the decree as including the French colonies as
as the territory of France itself. As the result of this
rpretation, eighteen deputies were elected and sent
ediately to participate in the deliberations of the
tes General, of whom six were admitted in represen-
on of the colony. Thereupon the mulattoes and negro
dmen, urged on by the society recently formed in
s known as "Les Amis du Nègre," claimed participa-
in the direction of colonial affairs. The proclamation
ugust 20th, known as the declaration of the "rights of
," increased the agitation commenced by the men of
to obtain their political emancipation. Then, and
only, did the colonists who had so blithely accepted
arlier decree of the Estates General begin to rue their
ion to beg for representation in the French Assembly.
struggle of the races had commenced.

was only then that the greater portion of the whites
o one side their local jealousies to unite in confront-
he dangers with which their class was threatened.
mulattoes were as one in pressing for the political
ntages of which they were ambitious. Both groups,
s and mulattoes, were antagonistic, of necessity, to
nother, and equally opposed to the advancement of
umerous negro freedmen. The situation became so
that in a brief time numerous local disorders had
red. When the news of these disturbances reached
e, it caused the General Assembly momentarily to

recede from its former position, and to declare that th rights of representation granted by the decree of 178 applied solely to the inhabitants of the territory of Franc itself. The terms of this new decree provoked much i feeling, and the speeches delivered in the Provinci Assembly, meeting in St. Marc, assumed so radical character that the Governor-General decreed the dissolu tion of the Assembly, accusing the members of havin conceived the project of declaring the independence o the colony from the mother country. The inhabitants o the northern portion of the colony supported the Gov ernor; the inhabitants of the rest of the colony rose i defense of their announced rights. Civil war was imm nent when the Provincial Assembly determined to avo the conflict by sending eighty-five of its members t France to justify the action which they had taken befo the National Assembly. The Governor and the inhabitan of the colony were anxiously awaiting the verdict to b rendered by the National Assembly when an incide occurred significant in the light of later events.

A young mulatto named Ogé, who had been educat in Paris, and who, when the revolution broke out, h become the favourite of the Abbé Grégoire and throu his influence a prominent member of "Les Amis d Nègre," sailed secretly for the colony, believing that that his caste required was his leadership to secure t advantages which they were demanding. After reachi the colony he addressed a letter to the Governor, accusi him of having ignored the decree of the National Asse bly establishing the "rights of man," and threatening th unless the privileges of the whites were at once granted all freedmen of the colony the mulattoes would obt them for themselves by force of arms. The rebellio

ılattoes were at once attacked by the Governor's troops
d dispersed, while Ogé and a few of his companions who
d taken refuge on Spanish territory were handed over
the Spanish authorities to the Governor of the French
ony. Ogé and his principal supporter were executed
er their bodies had been slowly broken upon the wheel.
While the mulattoes were crushed for the moment, the
ıth of their leaders provoked them to further revolt,
d when these outbreaks were again put down, the exe-
ion by the Governor of the ringleaders in the second
urrection had a far more disastrous effect, in that it
ated such revulsion in Paris as to cause the promulga-
n of a decree by the French National Assembly declar-
that all individuals born of free parents in the colony
re thenceforth to have the same rights and privileges as
nch citizens themselves.

The receipt of this decree in St. Domingue caused gen-
despair on the part of the white population. The
onists determined to take into their own hands that
tection of their privileges and of their property which
Colonial Government, now headed by a new Gov-
or-General, Blanchelande, was obviously unable to
rd them. The white colonists proceeded at once to
deputies to a new Assembly convoked to meet in
gane on August 9th, determined to resist at any cost
National Assembly's ultimate decree. The mulattoes
n revolted, but the Assembly, believing that it now
matters firmly in hand, paid small heed to the report.
n suddenly, on August 23rd, the storm broke.
n a plantation at Noé, probably as the result of a
spread conspiracy, seven or eight slaves killed the
r of the plantation and his administrators. Before
lay was over, they had been joined by the negroes

from adjacent plantations who had likewise slaughtere their masters, and had set fire to the houses and to th cane fields. The conflagration, commencing in the north spread to the east and to the south. The owners of th plantations, who had known the animosity between th mulattoes and the blacks, and who had seen that none o the negroes had taken part in the successive revolts o the mulattoes, had become unduly confident. They wer totally unprepared. As soon as night had fallen and th planters and their families had retired to their homes, th revolting slaves encircled the houses, to which they the set fire. The white men were killed first; they were im potent against the overwhelming number of the black The women and children were reserved for a worse fat and then, often after indescribable torture, were likewis put to death. The frightfulness of those early days of th terror of 1791 is beyond our modern imagining.

Notwithstanding the lack of means of communicatio due to the disturbed state of the colony, the reports sprea by those few slaves who remained loyal to their master or by the handful of whites who had succeeded in escap ing from the general slaughter in the north, must soo have reached the planters of the south and west. Isolat in the midst of the black hordes whom they and the fathers had brought to the country, flight was hardly po sible. Each night, when the short twilight of those stear ing days of tropical midsummer came to its close, th must have feared that the moment had come for th own destruction. Each dawn brought with it the unce tainty whether they would survive until another nigh A few, hunted like animals, escaped to Port-au-Prince a to the Cape, where protection by the French troops w still afforded them. Already a panic-stricken flight fr

country had commenced, and families escaped to the ited States or to the neighbouring West Indian islands, by far the greater part of the colonists of the north st were murdered in their homes. For days and weeks horizon, as an eye-witness has described, was a "wall ire from which continuously arose thick vortices of ke, and huge black columns which could be likened to those frightful storm clouds which roll onwards rged with thunder and with lightnings."

3.

During the years 1791 and 1792, life in the Spanish ny continued placidly, without the slightest sign that colonists feared the spread of the horrors in the French ny to their own lands. It is true that the Government pain, when word reached it of the servile revolt which taken place in French St. Domingue, ordered a regi- t from Puerto Rico to reinforce the garrison at Santo ingo, and that the Captain-General of the Spanish ny, Don Joaquín Garcia, took steps to strengthen the isons on the frontier between the two colonies at bón and at San Rafael; but apart from these measures e is no evidence that the rebellion in the western half he island perturbed to any considerable extent the ls of the Spanish planters.

is probable that the feeble attempts of the first Civil missioners sent by the French National Assembly to stressed colony to reconcile royalists to a just appre- n of the "rights of man," and to persuade Jacobins e their colored brothers, provoked amusement rather anxiety among the Spaniards. After the arrival in mber, 1792, at Cap François, of the second set of Commissioners, headed by the sinister and corrupt

Sonthonax, the Spanish officials, however, began to expre
a sentiment of lively contempt, and evident alarm, at th
French Commissioners' policy of currying favour with th
blacks, but it was not until the astonishing news reache
Santo Domingo that the National Assembly of Franc
had declared war on Spain because of the Spanish King
refusal to recognize the Government responsible for th
murder of his cousin, that general dread arose, and a pos
tive realization was created of the dangers which threa
ened their own colony.

War was declared on March 7, 1793. The militia
Santiago de los Caballeros and of other of the Cibao tow
was organized, and was ordered by the Captain-General
the frontier, but the French Commissioners were far to
occupied with their attempt to reconcile the irreconcilab
elements in the French colony to project as yet any offe
sive against the Spaniards. During the revolts of the tw
preceding years, many of the French royalists had take
refuge in the impenetrable forests of the high mountai
along the border. Here they had obtained the support of
considerable following of former slaves, whose leaders, d
gruntled by the policy of the French Commissione
determined, strangely enough, to link their fortunes wi
those of their former masters. The white royalists were
negligible quantity, but the value of the support of t
negro leaders was at once recognized by Garcia. Throu
the medium of Don Juan Vásquez, the priest of Dajabó
an understanding was soon arrived at whereby the tw
supreme generals of these negroes, Biassou and Jean Fra
çois, agreed to coöperate with the Spanish troops, n
only in repulsing any attack which the French mig
direct across the Spanish frontier, but likewise in maki
constant raids on French territory, intended to harry

nch and render it more difficult for them to undertake
concerted measures. The satisfaction with which the
nish authorities viewed the adherence to their colours
the negro chieftains may be judged from the fact that
the request of the Captain-General of Santo Domingo,
Spanish Government accorded some of the negroes not
y high decorations but likewise high rank in the Mili-
y Establishment of Spain. Among these latter, promi-
nt as the chief lieutenant of Jean François, was the
torious Toussaint L'Ouverture.

Hostilities between the Spaniards and the French con-
ued to be desultory. The intervention of England,
ich resulted in the landing of an invading force of
tish troops on the southern peninsula of the French
ony, made it more than ever impossible for the French
undertake any offensive against the Spaniards and their
ro allies. By the spring of 1794, the fortunes of the
obin Commissioners seemed desperate. In the north, the
nch troops, a fragment only of their former number,
e entrenched in Port de Paix. The moment seemed
ortune for the Spaniards to take the offensive them-
es, and the project was conceived by Don Joaquín
cia of invading the northern region of the French
ny and of capturing the city at the Cape, the strong-
position then held by the French. In such a plan, the
icipation of the negro troops was deemed indispen-
e, but no sooner had the plan been communicated to
negro chieftains than dissension broke out among
n. Toussaint L'Ouverture, who had schemed for many
ths without success to supersede Jean François in the
m of the Spaniards, selected this opportunity to nego-
with General Laveaux, who commanded the French
son at Port de Paix, for the rank and emoluments

accorded by the Spaniards to Jean François. Toussaint' overtures were accepted with delight by the French gen eral, and in May of that year Toussaint, with 4,000 of h negro troops, went over to the French, murdering th Spanish officers associated with him, as well as ever Spanish soldier upon whom he came.

The Marqués de Armona, referring to Toussaint, onl a few days before his desertion had written to his col leagues in Santo Domingo that "in this world God ha never entered a soul more pure." But this estimate of th aged negro ex-coachman can more excusably be condoned on the ground of Armona's ignorance of future event than can that of our own orator, Wendell Phillip cherished by Abolitionist audiences of the fifties, wh declaimed in one of his most applauded discourses:

"Fifty years hence, when truth gets a hearing, the Mu of History will put Phocion for the Greeks and Brut for the Romans, Hampton for England, Lafayette f France, choose Washington as the bright, consumma flower of our earlier civilization, and John Brown the ri fruit of our noon-day; then, dipping her pen in the sun light, will write in the clear blue, above them all, the nam of the soldier, the statesman, the martyr, Toussai L'Ouverture."

The treachery of Toussaint disorganized completely t plans for the Spanish offensive, and abandoning the po tions which they had already won, the Spanish troo retired to the boundary line to adopt again defensi tactics.

There had been little enthusiasm among the Spani colonists for the war, and when word was received th peace negotiations were in progress between the Hon

ernment and that of France, general content was ex-
sed. But when the terms of the Peace of Bâle, signed
22, 1795, were announced to the inhabitants of
ish Santo Domingo, no earthquake could have
ught greater consternation. The Spanish monarch,
complete disregard of the subjects of whose loyalty
ad never had reason to complain, had without hesita-
authorized the ratification of the treaty which pro-
d that the Spanish colony of Santo Domingo should
eded to France and should be governed by the authori-
of French St. Domingue.

he terrestrial paradise was now thoroughly convulsed.
oon as word reached them of the latest developments,
tation owners who had not moved from their haci-
s for years rolled down in their coaches to the capital
nplore the Captain-General and the Audiencia to take
steps which might persuade the king to modify the
s of the treaty. Plan after plan was proposed, dis-
d, rejected. Deputies were sent to Spain without avail.
Roume, a member of the first Civil Commission sent
he Assembly to the French colony, was already in
rid negotiating the details of evacuation with the
ish authorities. Change of nationality and exposure
ne new theories of government so disastrously at-
ted in the French colony seemed intolerable, but to
of the Spanish colonists even more intolerable seemed
bandonment of their homes and the lands on which
families had lived for generations, and the journey
w countries. Some of them, however, preferred exile
ench rule, and migrated to Louisiana, to Cuba, Puerto
and Maracaibo, but the reports which gradually fil-
back to the colony of the hardships which they had
ntered and the ill-treatment to which they had been

exposed determined the majority to remain on their properties to await what the future might bring forth.

After his preliminary conference in Madrid had reached a successful conclusion, Roume set sail for Santo Domingo where he arrived in April, 1796, to complete arrangements for the transfer of the Spanish colony to the French authorities. His negotiations with the Spanish colonial officials were prolonged, although Bayajá, the headquarters of the Spanish forces in the north, was turned over formally to General Laveaux on June 16th of that summer. Toussaint L'Ouverture, whose influence was constantly increasing, now persuaded the French Directoire, in which supreme authority in France had by now been vested, to permit his troops to occupy also Bánica and Las Caobas. The consternation of the Spanish inhabitants may be imagined at this turn of events. Deserted by their king, they were to be exposed to the ruthless domination of the negro leader directly responsible for the murder two years before of their own officers and troops.

Good fortune favoured the colonists temporarily, however, in the arrival of a new British expeditionary force at Môle St. Nicolas under the command of General Howe. The attention of Toussaint was necessarily diverted for the time being from his project of occupying Spanish territory. This momentary respite, however, did not greatly benefit the colonists. The uncertainty of their situation had almost entirely destroyed their means of livelihood. What slight commerce still existed had been brought to a standstill by the rapid increase of piracy in the Caribbean, now permitted by England, indignant at the negotiation of the Treaty of Bâle and more indignant at the notorious "family pact" signed by Godoy at Perignon on August 18, 1796. Produce shipped from the shores

o Domingo was almost invariably seized by the pirates, were becoming bold to the point of even making fre- t incursions along the Dominican coast, which the authorities were powerless to check. The situation such that during the next two years almost all the ish families of fortune, notwithstanding their reluc- e, one by one determined to abandon their homes. creasing poverty, lack of discipline, and above all the ual realization by the Spanish slaves of the success ved by their brothers on French soil, created such st among the negroes in Santo Domingo that it cul- ted in an armed uprising by the blacks on the plan- n of the Marqués de Iranda at Boca Nigua, near the al, which was, however, crushed by the determined ures employed by the owner's nephew, who was act- s administrator of the plantation. This uprising was wed by others which, while they were likewise quickly ked, increased the general despair of the colonists.

4.

is probable that Toussaint L'Ouverture had early eived the idea of the construction of a negro state prising the entire island, for when the British retired itely in 1798 from the French colony they had ed an agreement with Toussaint providing for the uation of the positions held by them, and their recog- h of the Island of "Haiti," its Indian name, as a neu- nd independent state. Protesting, at the same time, valty to France, Toussaint now called upon Commis- Roume to terminate his negotiations for the occu- n of the Spanish colony under the Treaty of Bâle, equested authority himself to undertake its occupa- n behalf of the French Republic. Roume evidently

suspected the negro's intentions, since he delayed as long as he could his reply to Toussaint's demands. Hoping for a compromise which might cause less distress to the Spanish inhabitants, and which would create less opposition to the transfer of authority, Roume finally ordered the French Commander-in-Chief to appoint General Agé, an intelligent quadroon, to proceed to the capital of the Spanish colony, with white troops, to perfect the arrangements for the occupation. Upon the arrival of General Agé in Santo Domingo, the entire population of the city addressed a petition to the cabildo, imploring a postponement of the final transfer of authority until deputies representing the colonists could be sent to Paris and Madrid to explain the local situation, and to make a last appeal for a revocation of the orders issued by the Spanish Crown.

The petition was approved both by the Captain-General and by the Ayuntamiento, and in consequence Don Joaquín Garcia notified the French Commissioner that General Agé's request that the city be immediately turned over to the French authorities could not be granted until an opportunity had been afforded the colonial delegate to make this final plea. The populace of the city, suspicious that a secret understanding was being arrived at notwithstanding the assurances given them by the Captain-General, thereupon attempted to assault General Agé in the Monastery of Santa Clara where he was residing; and it was only through the personal intervention of General Garcia, who took General Agé in his own coach without the city walls, that the French general was enabled to reach French territory in safety.

The situation had become so tense that Roume, while ratifying the decree issued for the immediate transfer of sovereignty, proceeded to Port-au-Prince, and sent at

ent to the Directoire urging that the occupation be stponed, and that Toussaint be prevented in any event om his purpose of undertaking the occupation himself. The prolonged absence of Roume from the French col- y had made it easier for Toussaint to attain the posi- n of supremacy which he had long coveted, and taking law into his own hands, as soon as he was aware of the resentations which Roume had made, he first threw latter into prison, and then shipped him summarily to United States. At once he renewed his plans for the itary occupation of the Spanish colony, and addressing etter to Don Joaquín Garcia in which he demanded mediate satisfaction for the insult offered by the Span- populace to the French Government in assaulting neral Agé, he despatched two armies against Santo mingo, one by the passes of the south under the com- nd of his brother, Paul L'Ouverture, and the other ough the north under the command of his nephew, neral Moyse.

The cordiality of the relations between the Spanish horities in Santo Domingo and the French officials who already been sent there is evidenced by the fact that y were all present, with those few of the Spanish ilies who still remained, at a ball on Christmas eve- g, when the horrifying news was brought that the g dreaded invasion of Toussaint L'Ouverture had menced.

h the north, a few regular troops and the local militia e speedily destroyed by the negro army of General rse; in the south, the garrison of the capital and the militia, numbering altogether barely 1500 men, er the joint command of the Spanish General Nuñez the French General Chanlatte, put up a brave fight

against the invaders near the River Nizao, but were utterly routed, and forced to retire to Haina. The negro armies, prevented only by their orders to march with the utmost rapidity from undertaking the annihilation of the civilians and the destruction of their homes and fields, joined forces at Boca Nigua, where Toussaint established himself in the house of the Marqués de Iranda. Continued resistance against the invading armies it was realized was impossible, and in order to prevent the assault of the capital by the negro troops, with all its attendant horrors, Don Joaquín Garcia was forced to enter into negotiations with Toussaint for surrender.

On the 27th of January, 1801, Toussaint L'Ouverture entered Santo Domingo at the head of his troops. Picture him as he rode through the narrow streets, followed by his numerous aides-de-camp, decked out with as much gold lace as they could muster, bearing themselves, like their leader, with simian self-importance. All of the officers on the staff were powdered and queued like their commanding general, and attempted to ape the expression of pompous determination depicted on the countenance of Toussaint, which in his case his noticeably prognathous jaw rendered easy. Behind them the common soldiers straggled, dressed in rags or in any incongruous garments they had been able to lay their hands on during the march, and brandishing a strangely assorted variety of weapons, ranging from the more usual machete to the rarer matchlock. Toussaint at once proceeded to the Casa Consistorial, where he received from the Captain-General the keys of the city. Thereupon the French tricolor was hoisted upon the fortress of the Homenaje and a salute of twenty-one rounds was fired. From there, after the delivery of a harangue to the assembled Spaniards urging

em to be content that they had now become Frenchmen nationality, the negro general proceeded to the cathed- to attend a solemn Te Deum. Established in a seat of nour in the chancel of the cathedral, his bloodshot eyes ling with religious ecstasy, Toussaint there relaxed his id pose, prostrating himself low before the Sacrament, he sang in a loud voice the sacred canticles which he l learned by heart.

The interests of the "martyr and statesman" eulogized Wendell Phillips appear, however, not to have been nfined solely to religion nor to statecraft, since on the following the taking possession of the capital, orders re given for all the inhabitants of the city to assemble the central square, the men on one side and the women the other. After the reading of the proclamation nouncing the immediate emancipation of the slaves, ussaint proceeded with a few companions to pass the mbers of the feminine sex in review, and the General used himself for some time by passing from one to the er of the women, prodding with his cane those better oured by nature, and indulging in coarse pleasantries olting to the Spanish women. On the following day, onsignment of female members of the population was t to Toussaint's headquarters at Boca Nigua.

The flight of Spanish families from the colony, which already assumed such large proportions prior to the ro invasion, now became an exodus. From all parts of colony those families who were able to do so fled the ntry, abandoning all their possessions, and embarking the nearest Spanish ports on sailing vessels, schooners, ing smacks, and even in some cases in rowboats. An t was consequently promptly issued by Toussaint, pro- ting the emigration of any inhabitants of the Spanish

colony other than the families of the Spanish officials, who were permitted to sail from Santo Domingo on February 22nd. For some time Toussaint considered the general slaughter of all the white inhabitants of the colony. It is reported that the wife of Paul L'Ouverture spent several nights upon her knees beseeching the Almighty that her brother-in-law be dissuaded from that intention. Her prayers appear to have been efficacious, for no general order for assassination was issued, although, naturally enough, the savages under Toussaint's command perpetrated innumerable atrocities.

On February 5th, a decree dividing the Spanish colony into districts, and convoking the election of deputies to participate in the deliberations of a Central Assembly to be held in Port-au-Prince, was promulgated; and the following days brought forth a succession of decrees on divers subjects, ranging from a decree containing the prohibition to the inhabitants to sell their lands without authorization of the municipal authorities, to a decree commanding them to cultivate sugar, coffee, cotton, and cacao, and forbidding them to cultivate yams and plantains. As soon as these tasks had been completed, Toussaint departed from the Spanish capital, leaving his brother Paul, as Governor of Santo Domingo, and General Clerveaux in Santiago de los Caballeros, as Governor of the North. He himself had previously made a tour of the Spanish colony, proceeding as far as Samaná, during which his reception appears to have been particularly cordial on the part of the clergy. From there he returned to Santo Domingo, apparently solely in order to issue a decree prohibiting the colonists from exporting mahogany; and pausing subsequently at the Cape to order the execution of his nephew, General Moyse, and thirty of the latter's

llowers for insubordination, he continued to Port-au-
ince to supervise the deliberations of the Central Assem-
, which was already in session, and to which had been
cted five delegates from the former Spanish colony.

The new constitution adopted by this body, signed on
ugust 29, 1801, which ignored the authority of France,
med Toussaint Governor for life and Chief of the
mies, and provided by various articles for the oblitera-
n, as well, of all that had previously remained of the
anish methods of administration.

The following spring, the report reached Toussaint that
ace would soon be concluded between France and her
rmer enemies at Avignon, and that it was the intention
Bonaparte, as soon as peace had been restored, to send
arge expeditionary force to the Dominican colony to
stablish French control within its confines. The newly-
ated Governor took at once what measures of precau-
n he could in preparation for the impending struggle
supremacy, and fortifying to the best of his ability the
ongholds of the western half of the island, he proceeded
ce more to the former Spanish capital to assure
nself of the loyalty of the subordinates whom he had
t in control of the east. Traveling by way of the Cibao,
reached Santo Domingo January 3, 1802.

While satisfied apparently with the personal devotion
his lieutenants, it could not escape him that dissatisfac-
n with their lot was general among the Spaniards, and
t they would prefer any government rather than the
tatorship which he had attempted to impose. On this
ef and final visit to the Spanish colony, Toussaint threw
de all pretense of conciliating the Spanish elements, and
tructions were given by him to commence a reign of
ror, which his officers were by no means reluctant to

carry out. During the preceding months, the greater por-
tion of the Spanish troops with the superior officers had
left the island, but lack of facilities for embarkation had
rendered it impossible for the Spanish garrison in the
fortress at the capital to sail as yet for Puerto Rico.
Depriving them of their arms, and surrounding them with
negro troops, Toussaint forced these unfortunate Spanish
soldiers to march towards French territory when he him-
self left Santo Domingo on January 26th.

The immense French squadron, bearing the First Con-
sul's brother-in-law, General Leclerc, and the expedition-
ary force sent to reconquer the colony, had arrived at
Samaná during the days that Toussaint was in Santo
Domingo, and while the latter was hastening back to the
west, General Leclerc had already despatched General
Ferrand by land, with a large force, to recapture the
Cibao, and General Kerverseaux, with three vessels of the
fleet, to proceed around the eastern shore to regain Santo
Domingo. The news of the despatch of Kerverseaux, and
the receipt of the report that General Ferrand had routed
the negroes from the Cibao, brought a ray of hope to the
distressed Spaniards in the capital, and a successful con-
spiracy headed by Colonel Juan Barón, concerted with the
knowledge of General Kerverseaux, enabled the latter to
force the capitulation of Santo Domingo as early as Feb-
ruary 20th. The city was only evacuated, however, after
three days of intense fighting in which many of the mad-
dened inhabitants lost their lives, some of them as the
result of last-hour atrocities perpetrated by the negro
officer, Jean-Philippe Daut, who ignored the orders of
his commanding officer, Paul L'Ouverture. The negro
invaders, after their defeat, attempted on their return
march to Port-au-Prince to induce the negroes on Spanish

l to rise and join with them against the French. Their orts were generally unsuccessful, however, and such few ttered attempts at insurrection as took place were eedily put down as the result of the effective measures repression taken by Kerverseaux.

The tragic march of the Spanish troops of Santo omingo taken as hostages by Toussaint L'Ouverture me at length to an even more tragic conclusion. When oussaint received word of the capitulation of Santo omingo, which he correctly interpreted as the begin- ng of the end of his high hopes, in a spirit of cold- ooded revenge he gave orders at Verrettes that the fenseless Spaniards be butchered en masse by his troops. e full extent of this atrocity was later known through handful of stragglers from the Spanish lines who, seeing me of the Haitian soldiers wearing the ragged uniforms their companions, guessed what had taken place, and re fortunate in escaping, after incredible hardships, to turn eventually to their homes in the Spanish colony.

But Toussaint's own time had nearly come. Betrayed by principal followers, Dessalines and Christophe, he was ally seized by General Leclerc and sent to France. A ar later, dreaming, perhaps, in the delirium of the illness his last days, of the blazing sun and the blue sky of the and which he was not to see again, he died in prison ong the cold mists and barren mountains of the Swiss ontier.

5.

Since the destruction of the Assyrian hosts, there has en perhaps no more dramatic catastrophe than that hich overwhelmed Leclerc's proud army. An officer of monstrated brilliancy, General Leclerc arrived in French

St. Domingue bearing the most detailed and minute in-
structions from his brother-in-law, the First Consul, for
the recapture of the island. While the negroes put up a
stout resistance, they were no match at first for the expe-
ditionary force; but the French had not reckoned with an
unconquerable foe which was soon to declare itself against
them. With the rains of the spring, yellow fever appeared
among their ranks. By midsummer the French forces had
been decimated. By autumn their defeat became a rout. In
November General Leclerc, whose letters to the First
Consul written during the six months of the campaign
constitute some of the most tragic documents of history,
was himself fatally stricken, and a month later the French
abandoned for the last time their richest colonial possession.

The withdrawal of the French from the western half
of the island, and the immediate proclamation by the
negro chieftains of Dessalines as Governor for life of inde-
pendent Haiti, created a renewed and even more abject
panic among the inhabitants of the former Spanish col-
ony. However, for a time at least, a strong man arose in
their defense, and stemmed the tide of negro supremacy
which otherwise would at once have swept over the entire
island. The saviour was the French General, Ferrand.

Realizing that a renewal of hostilities between France
and England would prevent Bonaparte from making, for
some time to come at least, any further attempt to recon-
quer the colony, he determined to save Spanish Santo
Domingo at least for his country. Disregarding the order
sent him to withdraw his troops from the island and to
return to France, he gathered together the sparse force
originally under his own command, with a few remnants
of the troops which had been fighting under General
Leclerc, and induced, as well, a few refugees to return

om Santiago de Cuba to swell their number. Learning at his colleague, General Kerverseaux, was wavering as e result of the disasters which had befallen Leclerc, he mself evacuated the Cibao, and by forced marches ached Santo Domingo in the last days of 1803. Finding erverseaux unwilling to join in the project he had con- ived, he declared himself, on January 1, 1804, Governor the Spanish colony, and forcing Kerverseaux to em- rk for Puerto Rico, General Ferrand assumed supreme mmand.

As soon as the French troops had left the Cibao, the rthern provinces had been at once overrun by troops nt from the Cape by Dessalines, who appointed a mulatto rn near Santiago, named José Tavares, Governor of ntiago. This attempt at negro domination was readily pelled by Ferrand, who, as soon as he had rendered his sition in the capital secure, sent troops to Santiago, here the Haitian soldiers and the Governor imposed by essalines were easily defeated.

The chaos which existed in Haiti after the evacuation the French made it impossible for Dessalines at once to rn his attention towards the accomplishment of his plan r consolidating the whole island under his government. eneral Ferrand was enabled, therefore, for a brief twelve onths, to devote a portion of his efforts towards the nelioration of the condition of the colonists, who were ced, after the tragedies of the preceding ten years, by rvation. As the result of the several struggles which had ken place, agriculture had come to a standstill. No means r shipping the colony's produce existed, and in fact there as no produce to ship. Realizing that the prime neces- y of the colony was labour, since the decrees of Toussaint nancipating the slaves had deprived the majority of the

plantation owners of the means whereby they migh
restore their fields to a productive condition, the new
Governor soon issued a decree permitting the Spanish
residents for a period of twelve years to indulge in the
traffic in slaves, limiting this period, however, in the case
of foreigners to only six years. The same decree
provided that all prisoners taken in engagements with
the Haitian troops were likewise to be considered slaves
Prompt steps were taken for the construction of an aque-
duct to bring water to the capital from the River Higüero
The crippling taxes previously imposed were remitted
Stimulus was given in every possible way to the planter
Plans were devised for the renewal of commerce with the
United States in the export of native woods. A great port
to be known as "Napoléon," was projected in Samaná
In every way possible Ferrand attempted to meet the
requirements of the Spanish colonists, and went so far in
his efforts to better their condition and to gain their sup-
port that he succeeded in obtaining from Bonaparte the
promulgation of a decree which authorized the continu-
ance in the colony of the Spanish code, and which estab-
lished a bi-national colonial court, the Spanish section to
hear the cases arising between Spanish inhabitants, and
the French section to hear solely cases in which French
subjects were involved.

The most distinguished of the Spaniards among the
native inhabitants were selected to participate in the colo-
nial administration, the Governor determining to rule his
Spanish subjects through the medium of their fellows.
Economic conditions reacted quickly to the impulse created
by General Ferrand's energy, and within the year many
colonists returned to their homes and plantations from
abroad, and all signs pointed to the realization of Ferrand

rous colony. But the opti-
he confidence which he had
the colonists, did not take
ions of the Haitian Governor,

6.

At the outbreak of the negro insurrection, Jean-Jacques essalines had been a slave on the plantation of a free gro, whose name he had assumed and whose property had seized as soon as the insurrection afforded the slave e opportunity of murdering his master. Like the ma-rity of the negroes prominent in the servile rebellion, essalines had been born in the forests of West Africa, d had been brought to the French colony when he was eady in his first youth. The savage surroundings of his rliest days were doubtless responsible for his impene-able ignorance, his cruelty, and the sway which super-tions maintained over him, but only a congenital de-avity can account for the fiendish blood lust which has ade his name notorious for a century and a quarter. here was no perverted horror of which he was not pable, nor devious torture which his brain did not devise, d his career, from the date when he first participated in e negro revolt to the day of his death, when he was uck down outside Port-au-Prince by one of his own our, was that of a butcher in a human shambles.

In the early days of the insurrection, Dessalines joined e followers of Biassou. He early obtained the benevolent erest of his chief by the welcome surprise which he was abled to offer him soon after joining his troops. A large mber of white prisoners, men, women, and children, d been captured by the negroes on their plantations,

and the captives had been
resses held by Biassou's troo
at the fortress was anticipate
vised the murder of each of the
a distinct and agonizing death. H
the heads should be struck from t
upon the posts of the stockade surrounding
taste in decoration seems so to have drawn to him the sym
pathy of Biassou, that immediately after this accomplish
ment he was given prominent command in the regiment

After the betrayal of the Spaniards by Toussain
L'Ouverture, Dessalines became Toussaint's right-han
man and carried out many of the latter's more blood
thirsty projects, needless to say to the entire satisfactio
of his chief. Far less crafty than Toussaint, and with litt
of the latter's astuteness and ability in dissembling his re
intentions, he was distinguished by a greater fixity of pur
pose and by an utter incapacity for any feeling of pity
any instinct of mercy. His passion for blood showed itse
not only in his slaughter of the whites, but also in th
destruction of members of his own race, as well as in th
joy of killing animals when human victims were lackin
Descourtilz records that his wife was at times able to di
suade him from some of the murders which he ha
ordained, but the successful intervention of the good lad
appears to have been due more to Dessalines' desire to ri
himself of her importunities, which wearied him, than t
her ability to awaken in him any spark of humanity.

After his association with Toussaint, and the opportu
nities so afforded him for observation of the customs an
the dress of the French officers, Dessalines, like Toussain
L'Ouverture, undertook to dress himself in the height o
the fashions of the Directoire. His snuffbox, which h

nmenced to carry at that time, became notorious in r years. Almost invariably before determining an exe- ion, Dessalines would open the snuffbox and inspect small mirror with which the inside of the cover was nished. Should there be any moisture on the mirror, the ject of execution would be temporarily at least aban- ed; should the mirror, however, be dry, the augury uld be interpreted as a demand by nature for the shed- g of more blood, and the signal would quickly be given the victim to be led to his death. Since the loose acco in the box necessarily, except in the most humid ther, absorbed all the moisture within the box, the ror was almost inevitably dry, and the superstition btless proved a satisfactory one to the owner of the gic snuffbox.

After the exile of Toussaint, Dessalines naturally ugh assumed chief place among the other negro chief- s, and the evacuation of the colony by General hambeau after Leclerc's death made his proclamation Dictator for life a foregone conclusion. In the procla- ion of the indivisibility of the whole island, as Haiti, January 1, 1804, Dessalines was but carrying out the ect which Toussaint had long had in mind, and the ee of General Ferrand permitting the enslaving of ives obtained by the Spanish colonists on the Haitian tier afforded the Haitian Dictator a welcome pretext making his proclamation effective.

s soon as the rumours of Dessalines' plans were con- ed to General Ferrand by the masters of some British American vessels, who had learned of them at Cape ian, preparations were at once made to repel the atened invasion. The city of Santo Domingo con- ed approximately 6,000 non-combatants, in addition

to the garrisons quartered there. Supplies of food wer with difficulty, obtained, but arms and ammunition we lacking, and only the regular troops were granted mu kets, the militia being armed largely with pikes ar machetes. The few pieces of artillery in the possession the Governor were mounted on the tower of La Merce and on the heights of the convents of the Jesuits and San Francisco, on the fortress, and on the roof of the ars nals in San Fernando and San Carlos. Fortifications we rendered stronger around the city walls.

His lack of resources and his inability to muster a suff cient number of men to strengthen the militia of th Cibao, determined the Governor to concentrate his effor for defense on the fortification of the city of San Domingo. It was realized in advance that the regul troops in Azua, and the militia in the Cibao under th command of Colonel Serapio Reinoso de Orbe, would to an inevitable death in their attempt to stem the torre soon to pour across the Haitian frontier.

On February 16, 1805, Dessalines left Cape Haitian b way of Port de Paix and Gonaives. Following the pla successfully carried out by Toussaint in his earlier invasi of the Spanish colony, the Haitian army was divided in two parts; one portion was to sweep from the nor through the Cibao; the other, proceeding through th southern provinces, was to meet the northern army ou side the walls of Santo Domingo, the two armies conce trating there to capture the capital. The southern arm commanded by Dessalines and by the mulatto Pétio encountered but slight resistance. Las Matas de Farfán w occupied on February 24th. Three days later, a small nun ber of heroic Spaniards who attempted to delay th onward march of the Haitian army were utterly d

oyed, their commanding officer, captured after he had n wounded, being hideously tortured before he was mitted to die. Azua and Baní were occupied without exchange of a shot, and on March 5th, the southern ay reached the capital.

The army of the north, under Christophe, encountered ore stubborn resistance. The inhabitants of the smaller ns in the north of the colony fled before the invading des to the protection of the fortifications made along River Yaque by Colonel Reinoso de Orbe. In the ggle which took place near La Emboscada, the im- nsely superior numbers of the Haitians rendered the stance of the Spaniards of short duration. The great ority, including their valiant colonel, perished in that .

antiago was occupied by Christophe on Monday of nival week, February 25th. The Haitians, rendered lant by their easy victory, commenced an orgy of bration by consuming the stores of tafia which they nd in that city. They then turned their attention to , loot and murder, and when these pastimes palled, to more refined pleasures afforded by torture. The greater of the inhabitants had taken refuge in the church. of these were slaughtered, and the priest officiating at Mass, Don José Vasquez, was burned alive, the sacred ks and vestments furnishing the fuel. The church f, piled high with the mutilated bodies of the dead, then consumed by the flames. Search was made from se to house, and the fugitives who had escaped detec- in the early hours of the massacre were now dragged to more prolonged agonies than those they would have ountered had they met their death when the assault took place. Children, whose bodies had first been

mutilated, were literally torn to pieces; men and wom were slowly sliced to bits with machetes. The body of o victim was first mutilated by strokes of the machete, a then lighted cartridges were placed in the wounds, un at length the bleeding mass had been torn to shreds by t exploding cartridges. When no more victims could found, the march continued; and the following d dawned upon a scene of the most ghastly desolatic When they returned, the few inhabitants who had su ceeded in escaping found the bodies of the members the cabildo, who had all been taken captive by Christopl naked and mutilated, dangling from the balcony of t Casa Consistorial.

Christophe's troops passed on through the Cibao Santo Domingo, repeating on a smaller scale in each tov and village the scenes which had taken place in Santia and so arrived to rejoin the forces of Dessalines two da after the southern army had reached the outskirts of t capital.

For three weeks the siege continued. The Haitians occ pied the outposts at San Carlos, and with the captu of Pajarito commanded the left bank of the Ozama. appeared for a time as if the capital was doomed. T food supply ran short, but was eked out with additio supplies which General Ferrand fortunately obtained fr a French vessel arriving opportunely from Martinique. few sorties were made unsuccessfully, and the inhabita of the city had begun to resign themselves to the ine itable, when upon awakening one morning they fou anchored in the roadstead the imposing fleet commanc by Admiral Missiessy, sent by the newly proclaimed E peror Napoleon to harass British shipping in West Ind waters. The fleet had sailed with all haste to Sa

mingo when the news was received by the Admiral of invasion of the colony.

Admiral Missiessy at once took steps to assist Ferrand. ops were landed to swell the forces of the local garri- Much needed supplies and ammunition were pro- d, and with the help so afforded, plans were immedi- y made to defeat the besieging armies. A column of ich and Dominican troops, under the command of same Colonel Juan Barón who had so distinguished self in the earlier Haitian invasion, made a sally, on the rnoon of March 28th, and succeeded in overcoming Haitians at San Carlos, although Colonel Barón was ed in the encounter and Captain Moscoso, the second command, was forced to retire. However, the proof s afforded the Haitians of the indomitable spirit of inhabitants of the capital, and the realization that the plies and reinforcements received from the French adron would render the early capture of the capital robable, compelled Dessalines to raise the siege.

On the morning of the 29th of March, the defenders Santo Domingo found the Haitians commencing to cuate their positions. The evacuation soon became a , and General Ferrand, sending strong columns in suit of the fleeing Haitians, was able to do consider- damage to their rear. Lack of organization, however, vented General Ferrand's forces from continuing their suit for any considerable distance, and the inhabitants he south and of the Cibao, who had just commenced eturn to their homes from the mountains and for- where they had taken refuge, were abandoned once e to the mercy of the retiring Haitians. If any com- son is possible, the horrors of the Haitian retreat were se than the atrocities of the invasion.

Dessalines, maddened by this defeat to which he h
been subjected, gave orders that utter devastation shou
mark the passage of his retiring armies. The army of t
south, on the march back, was now commanded by Pétic
one of the few admirable figures of the servile revolt, w
countermanded the orders of his superior, and was respo
sible for limiting the excesses of his own soldiery.

Dessalines himself undertook to retreat with the arr
of the north. Spreading the report, through a few tra
orous members of the Spanish colony who had attach
themselves to him, that Ferrand had capitulated, and th
the Haitian troops were now returning as conquerors
their own territory, Dessalines sent word to the leadi
inhabitants in each town through which he was to p
that the conquering general wished to treat the coloni
as friends, and orders were given that festivals be prepar
to celebrate the new era of peace and fraternity. In vi
of the experience which they had undergone so recen
at the hands of the Haitians, it appears incredible that
inhabitants could have been so readily deceived. In Co
cepción de la Vega, 900 of the inhabitants were tak
prisoners and forced to accompany the Haitians on th
retreat. In Moca, on April 3rd, the townspeople, 500
number, assembled in the church to attend a soler
Te Deum of thanksgiving for the peaceful intentions
their supposed conquerors, were all mercilessly slaug
tered, only a few small children escaping by being co
cealed under the skirts of their dead mothers. Wh
remained of Santiago was utterly destroyed. Even tow
like Monte Cristi, which lay to one side of the route tak
by Dessalines on his return to Haiti, were not immu
for detachments were sent from the main body of troo
to destroy them and to murder their inhabitants. The f

the prisoners taken at La Vega, whose numbers had n increased as the retreat continued, was, if possible, re cruel. Numbers from time to time were murdered he retreat went on. Many of the women were divided ong the officers of Dessalines' or Christophe's staffs. en the survivors, more dead than alive after their ced marches through the devastating heat of the almost enetrable cactus jungles of the desert lands of Monte ti Province, reached the Cape, they were set to work Christophe at the construction of his famous Citadel. this task they did not long survive, and only a few itives ever succeeded in escaping to Dominican terri- to relate the horrors which they had undergone.

7.

he determination of Ferrand to build up a colony thy of the new French Empire seems to have been dered only stronger by the setback which had resulted m the invasion of Dessalines. Napoleon, informed by miral Missiessy of the brave resistance which Ferrand put up, disregarding his previous disobedience, con- ed him in his post as Governor of the new colony, him reënforcements, and procured for him financial dits in the United States. The Governor at once re- ed his plans for the development of the economic sperity of the colony. Refugees were called back. ry possible incentive was given to the increase of agri- ure, and to the fostering of commerce with the United es. Garrisons were established in all the principal towns. jects of irrigation were commenced; construction of ls was undertaken, and for three years the colony erwent a period of peace, during which the French ernor attempted, by every means within his power, not

only to increase the prosperity of his Spanish subjects bu
also to conciliate them to French sovereignty.

The phenomenon to which the three years of Ferranc
enlightened and progressive administration now gave birt
is the most significant in the earlier history of the Domi
ican people; significant in that there were now sown th
seeds of the desire for change which were later to come
such tragic fruition in the bloody revolutions and th
shifting governments of more modern times; indicative
well of the passion for independence, and the unwillin
ness to brook foreign intervention, which alone have en
abled the Dominican people to maintain their politic
integrity notwithstanding the manifold dangers whic
have repeatedly threatened it. No sooner had the color
settled down to enjoy the period of peace which the dete
mination of the French alone had rendered possible;
sooner had time softened a little the memories of the ho
rors which the country had undergone; no sooner had th
colonists been afforded the opportunity to replant the
wasted fields and rebuild their ruined houses, than th
spirit of revolt against the French domination became rif

There were two prime factors in this movement—th
first, the sentimental sympathy with which the colonis
viewed the struggle of the Spaniards in Old Spain to res
the conquering armies of Napoleon; the second, the beli
that the enmity of the Haitians was not directed again
the Spanish colonists, but against the French who no
controlled Santo Domingo, and the conviction that shou
the French be forced to relinquish their control of th
colony, an understanding could be reached with th
Haitians whereby the two sections of the island wou
respect their mutual independence. The first factor
readily comprehensible. Ties with the mother count

ere still strong, and it was natural that the Spanish colo-
sts should resent the attempt of the Emperor Napoleon
destroy the independence of Spain, and that they should
nsequently now resent the French administration which
ey had so recently welcomed. From the viewpoint of
ter years, the second factor is one more difficult to
nderstand. It appears strange that the Spanish colonists
uld so soon forget the miseries which they had under-
ne at the hands of the Haitians, and could so readily
lieve that the Haitian chieftains, whose yoke they had
ith such difficulty succeeded in rejecting, would so soon
andon their determination to dominate the entire island.
is true that Dessalines had by now met his death, and
at Pétion was ruling as President in Port-au-Prince; but
hristophe was still reigning in his Citadel of the Cape as
verlord of Northern Haiti, and it was not to be supposed
at the relative humanity of Pétion could forever restrain
e ferocity of those who had installed him, and far less
at any sudden change of heart had seized the monster
the Cape at whose hands almost every family in the
ibao had suffered personal injury.

The spirit of revolution against France was, however,
neral. It was chiefly fostered by Don Juan Sánchez
amírez, a native-born colonist of Cotuy who had emi-
ated from the country in 1803, returning in 1807 when
nditions in the colony made it seem probable that he
uld resume with success the lumber business in which
was engaged. Ferrand appears to have had a high opin-
n of the capacity of Sánchez Ramírez, since upon his
turn to the colony he was offered by the Government
e post of Comandante de Armas of Cotuy. The offer
as not accepted, and Sánchez Ramírez, finding his desire
rid the colony of French domination supported by his

more intimate friends, commenced in the summer of 180 the definite task of fomenting a revolution.

During the summer months he was joined in the con spiracy by Padre Morilla, Vicar of the Seybo; Don Manue Carvajal of Higuey; Padre Moreno, Vicar of Bayaguana Padre Vicente de Luna, Vicar of Santiago; Don Francisc de Frias, Comandante de Armas in San Francisco d Macorís, and by the commanders of the garrisons in Cotu and La Vega. The only rebuff of importance which Sán chez Ramírez encountered in his conspiracy came fron Don Augustín Franco, Colonel of the Governor's troops i the Cibao, who remained loyal to General Ferrand, and i fact communicated to the latter the suspicions engendere by the overtures of Sánchez Ramírez. Ferrand, sure of th strength of his Government, believing apparently that th prosperity which his administration had brought to th colony and that his invariable consideration for his Span ish subjects made any revolt against him impossible, treate the reports which he received from Franco with scepti cism, and paid but little heed to the other warnings of lik nature which he received.

The overconfidence of the Governor made it possibl for the conspiracy to spread with the utmost rapidity Negotiations were undertaken by Sánchez Ramírez wit the Governor-General of Puerto Rico, from whom th promise of support was obtained should a revolution b attempted. General Ciriaco Ramírez and his brother-in law, Don Manuel Jiménez, agreed to support the revolu tion in the southern Dominican provinces.

When General Ferrand at last grasped the gravity o the situation the revolution had already commenced. O October 26th, the revolution was officially proclaimed b Don Juan Sánchez Ramírez near Seybo. There the revolu

nary leader raised the Spanish flag, and proclaiming rnando VII, King of Spain, as the natural sovereign of e colony, at the head of a small group of horsemen he ok possession of the town of Seybo in the name of the volution, and imprisoned Don Manuel Peralta, Ferrand's presentative.

The energetic steps which General Ferrand now took to ell the revolt were at first successful in the south. But revolutionists, who had now succeeded in creating a neral uprising throughout the country, obtained munins both from Pétion and Christophe, and likewise reived reënforcements from Puerto Rico. They were even ore greatly encouraged by the assistance brought them the British frigate *Franchise,* commanded by Captain shwood. The success with which his Government had en able at first to crush the rebels in the south determined General Ferrand to command in person a column t out from Santo Domingo against the troops under on Juan Sánchez Ramírez, who had established themves in a spot known as Palo Hincado, not far from ybo. Sánchez Ramírez had succeeded in gathering toher troops to the number of some 600 men. The troops ded by General Ferrand were slightly less in number. e encounter took place near where the lines of the volutionaries had established themselves, and the victory the latter was overwhelming. Many of the French icers were killed in the engagement, and General Ferd, seeing the rout of his troops, fled towards Santo mingo with only two companions, closely pursued by a dy of fifty of the revolutionaries under the command of on Pedro Santana. Ferrand, realizing that his defeat plied the destruction of all his own hopes, and the finite failure of his ambition to maintain the French flag

over Santo Domingo, committed suicide at Guaquía. Hi body was found there by Santana, who struck off th head and bore it in triumph to Seybo, where the revolu tionists were celebrating their victory. The news of Fer rand's defeat and death caused consternation in Sant Domingo, where General Dubarquier, the second in com mand to Ferrand, now assumed the Governorship of th colony.

Sending emissaries to advise the delegates of the revolu tion throughout the colony of the initial success of thei plans, Sánchez Ramírez called the delegates to assembl at Bondilla. There, on December 13, 1808, the Pact o Bondilla was signed by the chief leaders of the revolution who proclaimed their allegiance to Fernando VII an selected Don Juan Sánchez Ramírez as Governor of Sant Domingo.

The siege of the capital by the revolutionists was at onc undertaken, but notwithstanding the material assistanc afforded them by the intervention of British troops com manded by General Carmichael, General Dubarquier wa able to hold the city of Santo Domingo until July 9th o the following year. On that date, representatives of th revolutionists and of the British troops signed an agree ment of capitulation with an envoy of Dubarquier, an the revolutionaries with their British allies entered th capital two days later. After coming to an agreement wit the revolutionaries whereby British subjects and Britis colonists were to be accorded favoured treatment, Car michael sailed for Jamaica bearing with him as prisone the few last remaining French officers and men.

8.

Sending an envoy at once to Spain to bear the news o the successful efforts of the colonists to free themselv

om France, to protest their loyalty to the Spanish rown, and to beg the assistance of the Spanish Govern- ent, Sánchez Ramírez settled down to a survey of the uation. The first measure decreed by the new Governor s the exile of all French subjects from the colony; the cond was the creation of *ayuntamientos* in all the towns any importance.

Encouragement was given the new Governor and his ociates by the news which they soon received of the thusiastic reception which their envoy had met in Spain. wing to the sequestration at the time of Fernando VII Napoleon, control of the Spanish Government was sted in the members of the Junta Central de Sevilla, and the Council of Regency, which governed in the name the King until such time as his release might be effected. two edicts issued by the Junta Central de Sevilla and e Council of Regency, January 12, 1810, and April 29, 10, the colony was welcomed back to the sovereignty of ain. The promise was officially made to the colonists that garrison of Spanish troops would be maintained in Santo omingo for the protection of the colony; that trade tween the colony and the mother country, as well as th the other Spanish colonies, would be practically free r fifteen years, and that only nominal taxes would be posed on Dominican commerce for a period of ten years. l restrictions which had previously existed limiting the lonists to the production of particular crops were cinded, and financial assistance was assured them. The ministration of justice in the colony was once more ced under the control of the Real Audiencia of Caracas. on Juan Sánchez Ramírez was confirmed in the post to hich he had been raised by his fellow-citizens, and was ren the additional titles of Intendente and Captain-

General, and Don José Nuñez de Cáceres was name Lieutenant-Governor, Auditor de Guerra and Asesor Ge neral. A Royal Commissioner was sent to the colony in th person of Don Francisco Javier Caro, a native Dominica who had been a member of the Junta Central de Sevill

It is an astonishing fact that at the very moment whe freedom from the control of Spain was being sought b many of the other Spanish colonies of the American Con tinent, when revolutions were breaking out in Buenc Aires, Venezuela, Nueva Granada, and Mexico, when th cry of "liberty and independence" was being eloquentl proclaimed by Bolívar, and the death knell of the perio of Spain's colonial expansion had already sounded, th colony of Santo Domingo, in freeing itself from Franc should have demanded its return to the Government o Spain.

At first the colonists had no reason to regret the decisio reached by the signers of the Pact of Bondilla. The mor progressive elements in Spain were temporarily in contr of her Government, and the Constitution of 1812, late proclaimed in Santo Domingo, gave added assurance tha the period of reform and democracy inaugurated in Spai itself would be shared by the colonies. Under the ne Constitution, the colony was given representation in th Spanish Cortes, and Don Francisco Javier Caro was electe as the colony's first representative. But these hopes o autonomy proved to be short lived, since the Treaty o Valencey between Napoleon and Fernando VII permitte the latter to return to Madrid. The King's first step wa to abrogate all the acts taken in his name by the Counc of Regency and by the Junta Central de Sevilla, and th colonists were dismayed to find that all the progressiv measures taken by the Spanish Government since th

ony's return to the Spanish flag were now at one blow erthrown, and that a policy of reaction had been under- ken identical to that which existed prior to the French olution.

There now began the period commonly known by the minicans as the reign of "España boba," or "Silly ain." The struggle of the reconquest had left the colony a disastrous condition. The brief epoch of prosperity, ich the last years of Ferrand's rule had inaugurated, had nished, and the government of Sánchez Ramírez had no ne to improve economic conditions. Upon his death 1811 Sánchez Ramírez was succeeded as Governor a Spanish reactionary of the old school named Urutia, ose interests were concentrated in his own personal vantage, and in the securing of salaried positions for his npatriots and for those of the colonists who catered to n. Little, if any, heed was taken of the general well- ng of the colony, and the men who had participated in struggle of Palo Hincado were consequently ignored, utia being surrounded with returned exiles or with niards who had undergone none of the hardships of the ceding years.

Morillas, in his "Noticias," says that the commercial life the ports was dead except in Puerto Plata, where acco in small quantities was still shipped to Europe, whence a small business in cattle, hides, mahogany, lasses and rum was done with the United States. The duction of coffee and cacao had ceased. On a few scat- ed plantations cane was grown in small quantities, the rcity of labour making the cost of its production almost hibitive. The sugar planters had not the wherewithal to prove the machinery of the factories, and the growing cane and the production of rum were consequently con-

stantly decreasing. The general poverty was so extrem that distinction between classes hardly existed. The abilit of the planter and the ability of the free mulatto to pur chase were on a par; luxury was a thing of the past. In th capital city there were not half a dozen carriages.

From time to time, the dissatisfaction of the more enter prising of the colonists found vent in the elaboration c revolutionary conspiracies, but these were invariably stifle before they had even been hatched. The arrival of Genera Bolívar and his fellow refugees in Haiti, in 1815, gav the Governor of Santo Domingo considerable alarm particularly in view of the elaborate reception an the more welcome material assistance accorded them b President Pétion. In consequence of the arrival of th revolutionaries from South America in the neighbourin country, the Governor proclaimed the general mobiliza tion of the militia of the colony. The early departure o General Bolívar, however, made continued mobilizatio of the local troops unnecessary, and although the Gov ernor in a public proclamation pointed with pride to th rapidity with which the colonists had responded to his cal it is doubtful whether the colonists shared his enthusiasm since the Governor confessed, with regret, his inability t pay them, or even to bear their expenses for maintenanc during the time they were under arms.

The substitution of a more liberal-minded governor fo General Urutia, and the reëstablishment of the Con stitution of 1812 forced upon Fernando VII by th Spanish Insurrection of 1820, improved slightly the con dition of the colonists.

At the same time, however, danger from the west be came once more imminent. Upon the death of Presider Pétion in 1818, General Boyer had been elected Presider

Haiti in his stead. Boyer appears to have adopted the
cy as well as a considerable portion of the strategy of
ıssaint, for no sooner had he been inaugurated than he
secret envoys to the border provinces of the Spanish
ny to foster propaganda among the negro inhabitants
rder to induce them to rise in favour of a union with
ti. When rumours of these attempts reached General
delán, the Governor of Santo Domingo, he somewhat
ely addressed a letter to President Boyer, asking
ther there was any truth in the reports that the Presi-
of Haiti was attempting to foment discord among
subjects of the King of Spain. President Boyer blandly
ied that since such a procedure would be undoubtedly
trary to the law of nations, he naturally could not
ntenance any such efforts on the part of any of his
w-citizens, and further assured the Governor that the
ernment of Haiti held no ambitions for the conquest
dditional territory. These assurances appear to have
accepted at their face value by General Kendelán,
published the exchange of correspondence for the
fit of the Spanish colonists; but when the reports
inued, and more definite information was obtained
the propaganda was being conducted by order of
ident Boyer himself, General Real, who had succeeded
delán as Governor, determined to send his nephew to
-au-Prince to make a more careful investigation of the
h of the rumours. Before General Real could obtain
satisfactory information from his agent, however, he
involved in a new and, to him, more serious difficulty.
or some time past, Don José Nuñez de Cáceres, ap-
ted Lieutenant-Governor of the colony by the Junta
tral de Sevilla in 1801, had in a half-hearted manner
planning with other prominent men in the colony a

conspiracy to free Santo Domingo from the control
Spain and link its destinies with those of the newly form
Republic of Colombia. The time now appeared opportu
to Cáceres to bring the movement to a head, and on N
vember 30, 1821, the freedom of the colony from
sovereignty of Spain was proclaimed in the city of San
Domingo. General Real gave in readily enough; he
tempted no resistance, and was in short order packed
to Spain. The provincial deputies constituted themselve
Junta Provisional de Gobierno, naming Don José Nuñ
de Cáceres as "Political Governor" and President of
Independent State of "Spanish Haiti." At the same tim
new Constitution was drafted, declaring that the State
Spanish Haiti had become an integral portion of the Fe
eration of Colombia, and an envoy was sent, in the per
of Dr. Antonio Pineda, to the President of Colom
demanding the admittance of Spanish Haiti in the C
lombian Federation, and urging that assistance be gi
the new state in maintaining its freedom. At the sa
time an envoy was sent to President Boyer to propose
conclusion of a treaty of amity, whereby the Hait
Government would accord formal recognition to
independence of "Spanish Haiti."

The opportunity was one which Boyer naturally did
lose. Before Pineda had time to reach Colombia, where
absence of Bolívar would have rendered his mission fru
less in any event, the Haitian President, on January
1822, issued a proclamation declaring that the Dominic
people had formally submitted to the laws and Co
stitution of the Haitian Republic, and in order to ren
these verbal assurances doubly sure, two days later Bo
mobilized the Haitian army for the purpose of occupyi
the Dominican territory once more.

The march of the Haitian armies in this new invasion not delayed. As soon as word reached Santo Domingo the turn of affairs, the ineffable Cáceres addressed a clamation to his fellow-citizens counselling them to re- e the invading hordes with courtesy, and "with pacific iments," and exhorting the Dominicans to show the ld how skilled they were in adapting themselves to rs forms of government, since, as he stated, every form overnment "is good, if it grants the inalienable rights berty, equality, personal security and social peace pro- d by nature, all of which it is promised you will ndantly enjoy under the Constitution and laws of ti." On February 6th, President Boyer reached Baní, re plans were drawn up in accord with Nuñez de eres for the entrance of the Haitian President into to Domingo, and three days later Cáceres put into ctise the advice he had given his fellow Dominicans by ding President Boyer, on a silver platter, the keys of city of Santo Domingo.

9.

hat date marks the beginning of a period of eighteen s during which the Dominican colony slept a sleep ch was almost that of death. No sooner had President er returned to Port-au-Prince than he commenced the t, which he consistently continued throughout those years, of stifling every form of culture, and every ure of the Dominicans' proud inheritance, which from to time glimmered feebly in the gloom of the Black upation. The administration everywhere was Haitian- The families who still possessed some slight property grated. Agriculture came eventually to a standstill; merce was non-existent. Public spirit seems to have

sunk so low that only rarely were any sporadic efforts ma to raise the standard of a new rebellion. All forms of i tellectual progress, which had been encouraged in so slight degree during the years of "España boba," perish in the first year of the Haitian Occupation. The U versity closed its doors; the great majority of the churc were left without priests.

The following extract of a report submitted by t British Consul-General in Haiti, and presented by Ca ning to the British Parliament in 1826, provides a grap description of the depths to which Santo Domingo h sunk:

"The whole isle is divided into departments, arrondis ments, and communes. These are all under the comma of military men subject only to the control of the Pr dent, and to them is entrusted exclusively the execution all laws whether affecting police, agriculture or finan There is not a single civilian charged with an extens authority . . . During the past two years trade gradually fallen off and . . . it is supposed that it decreased nearly one half . . . The most important c is the Code Rural, the chief character of which is the forcing of labor. It is a modification of the old Fre regulations sanctioned by the Code Noire, with additio restrictions. The provisions are as despotic as those of a slave system that can be conceived. The laborer may alm be considered as 'adscriptus glebe,' he is deemed a vagr and liable to punishment if he ventures to move from dwelling or farm without license. He is prohibited fr keeping a shop. No person can build a house in the coun not connected with a farm. . . . The Code affixes penalty or fine in some cases, and there is indefinite i prisonment at the option of the justice of the peace. Cu vation would not go on beyond that which daily nece

THE MOUNTAINS OF SAN CRISTÓBAL

might require, except for the Code. The decrease in ɔulation in thirty-three years has been very nearly one-rd of the whole population in 1793 . . . The Govern-ıt has appropriated all the church property to its own . The clergy rely wholly on the fees, two-thirds of ch they are obliged to pay into the Treasury. . . . It ɔt a subject of surprise that morality should be in as low ıage . . . Marriage is scarcely thought of. . . ." [1]

During the years that passed, the island of Santo ningo became more and more isolated from the civilized rld. In a decree dated April 17, 1825, the French King, ırles X, recognized "the entire independence of the vernment of the present inhabitants of the French por-ı of the Island of Santo Domingo," terms which speci-lly excluded from such recognition the former Spanish ɔny. In return for this recognition the Haitian Gov-ment obligated itself to pay to the French Government indemnity of 150,000,000 francs, "destined to repay former colonists who claim indemnification," and to nt French vessels in Haitian ports a preferential rate 0 per cent in the exaction of duties or port dues. Com-rcial relations, however, with France or with any other ɔpean nation were constantly diminishing. Moreover, tions of any character with the new Republics to the th had been estopped by the refusal of the Colombian vernment to receive an Haitian envoy because of er's disregard of the declaration by the Government Santo Domingo that it had adhered to the Federation Colombia.

The determined opposition of the representatives of the e-holding states in the American Congress long pre-

[1] From a report of Charles McKenzie, British Consul-General in Haiti, sub-d September 8, 1826, by the Rt. Hon. George Canning to the Parliament.

vented the maintenance of diplomatic relations betwee
the United States and the Haitian Republic. While Amer
can Commercial Agents were occasionally appointed
Port-au-Prince, the Haitian Government resolutely refuse
to permit such agents to establish themselves in the Spanis
portions of the island, and when in 1837 the United Stat
Government appointed Daniel William Carney as its fir
Commercial Agent to Santo Domingo, President Boye
instructed General Carrié, the Governor of that "Arron
dissement" to arrest him should he attempt to perfor
any official act in that capacity.

If the attention of the American people was directed
all towards conditions in Santo Domingo, it was due to th
interest shown by several of the recently organized abo
tionist societies, which warmly welcomed the invitation
Boyer to assist negroes in leaving the United States
populate the barren lands of the Spanish portion of th
Island. But this enthusiasm soon died out, since a consi
erable number of the emigrants from the United Stat
died shortly after their arrival in the Dominican provinc
of an epidemic of typhus, and since some of the negro
who returned to the United States horrified their Ne
England patrons by dilating upon the conditions of gr
immorality existing among the Haitians. A few of th
former American slaves remained, however, in the Provin
of Samaná, willing apparently to overlook the immorali
of the Haitians, or else agreeably impressed by the climat
There their descendants remain in considerable numbers
the present day.

The systematic oppression of their Haitian overlord
the terror which the methods of repression employ
created among the Dominicans, eventually stifled not on
all semblance of concerted public spirit, but even crush

normal instincts of virile pride in the individual. A iful instance of this fact is found in the correspondence blished on March 4, 1838, in *Le Telegraphe* of Port-au-nce.

Dr. José Maria Caminero, a distinguished resident of nto Domingo, who later served his country, after its eration, as the first Diplomatic Agent of the Dominican public in Washington, had brought suit for divorce m his wife, charging that it was notorious that she had n taken under the "protection" of General Carrié, the itian Governor of his "Arrondissement." Affecting ense at this aspersion upon his father, Carrié's son, who s also his aide-de-camp, published, in the sheet referred a letter calling Dr. Caminero to account for the "sat-action of feeling in these cases as in all others the sacred ligations of a son and of an aide-de-camp towards his her and towards his general," and published as well following humiliating retraction of the charges which had forced Dr. Caminero to address to him:

"Santo Domingo, January 30, 1838,

Monsieur Carrié, fils,

"Santo Domingo.

M. le Capitaine:

'In response to your demand that I throw light upon the rases which I employed in the petition presented to the urt of Cassation for divorce from my wife, Guadeloupe redia, which phrases are as follows:

'The notorious protection of the Supreme Authority of s Arrondissement,' and, 'She counted upon the influence her protector,' I declare to you that I had no intention referring even remotely to the private character, honor, l administration of General Carrié, your father, since accordance with the wise precepts of the Chief of State,

each Commanding Officer of an Arrondissement mus always protect all of the citizens under his jurisdiction.

"I sincerely hope that these explanations will be agree able to you.

"I greet you affectionately.

"CAMINERO"

10.

It was not until 1838 that hope dawned in the futur Dominican Republic. Juan Pablo Duarte, a young Do minican whose father had taken a prominent part in th public life of the colony in the early years of the centur and whom fortune had favoured in those earlier years, ha been sent to Europe to be educated, far removed from th asphyxiating effects of Haitian domination. Duarte re turned to his native land fired with the purpose of freein his fellow-citizens and of restoring his country to a plac in the family of nations.

The impressions made upon Duarte on his arrival ma be imagined when account is taken of the fact that almo his entire life had been spent in the most civilized countri of the modern world. The streets which he remembere filled with members of his own race going about the business, which even "España boba" had not been ab wholly to destroy, were now deserted save for a few negro lounging on the street corners; the Casa Consistorial an the Governor's Palace, where formerly the resplende figures of the Spanish officers and the members of th Governor's staff had been seen, were now occupied by horde of arrogant Haitians; at the entrance to the ci gates, where the Spanish troops were once on guard, no a few ragged Haitian soldiers squatted in the shade, slouched by in bare feet.

But if the material ruin of the country was shocking, ow much more disheartening must have seemed the supine ndifference with which so many of his countrymen re-arded their fate.

Duarte's personality was magnetic, his determination as irresistible, and his creed of "God, Country and iberty" breathed life into the souls of the younger gen-ration at least, for some of the older men had been too ng ground beneath Haitian heel to feel any response.

After months of effort, Duarte at last formed a revolu-onary society known as La Trinitaria. The original mem-ers of the society, numbering nine, met secretly on July 6, 1838, in the house of one of the members, Don Juan idro Pérez, which still stands opposite the Church of the armen. There they solemnly took the oath of allegiance the creed of their leader, and swore to continue he work of obtaining proselytes throughout the country ntil the flag of red and blue quarterings bearing the hite cross, designed by Duarte as the symbol of the new ation, should wave over the independent Dominican epublic.

Once the movement was launched, it met with general sponse. The plan of procedure was so devised that new embers of the conspiracy were kept in ignorance of the ames of all the original members of the revolutionary roup, except that of the member responsible for their own duction. In that manner the danger of the defeat of eir plans was avoided, since betrayal could never involve ore than one of the nine leaders at the same time. The sk of propaganda was not carried on alone by word of outh, but the spirit of revolution was fostered as well by e priest in the confessional and by the master in the secret hool. Amateur theatricals were even devised in which

many of the conspirators took part, in order that patriotic sentiments might be proclaimed to the audiences thus obtained.

For five years Duarte and his fellows worked on unfalteringly, and at length the moment approached for the consummation of their hopes. The despotism of Boyer, absolute as it was in the eastern half of the Island, had at length become intolerable even in Haiti proper. A revolution against him broke out in 1843, commencing in the Haitian town of Jérémie. At the instigation of Duarte, the Dominican revolutionaries secretly lent their moral support to those Haitians involved in the attempt to overthrow Boyer. The revolution consequently gained adherents throughout the Island, and Boyer, at length giving in to the inevitable, fled from Haiti, where he was succeeded as despot by Charles Hérard.

The moment was now believed propitious by the members of the Trinitaria to proceed openly along the path they had set for themselves. On March 24, 1843, Duarte, accompanied by Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, Ramón Mella and numerous leaders among the Dominicans, as well as by several Haitians of the liberal party, marched through the streets of the capital to demand from the Governor, General Carrié, reform of the Constitution and reform in administration. The movement was at first suppressed and its chief leaders were constrained to flee for their lives, but eventually General Carrié was forced to give in, and the desired reforms were officially proclaimed. A step in advance had thus been taken by Duarte, but the Haitian liberals, who had until now supported him, broke away as the result of discord which developed between them and the Dominicans, and the arrival in Santo Domingo of General Hérard, determined to stamp out, at any cost, the

minican cry for independence, caused an abrupt check the plans of the conspirators.

As soon as Hérard arrived in the capital, orders were ued for the arrest of the chief conspirators, whose names now had become generally known. Duarte, Piña and an Isidro Pérez succeeded in escaping from the country. nchez, too ill at the time to travel, was hidden by his nily, and the Haitian general, advised of his sudden th, was fortunately credulous enough to believe the ry, and abandoned further attempts to ascertain his ereabouts. The Santana brothers, Pedro and Ramón, s of Ferrand's opponent, escaped to the Seybo, where y found concealment. For a time, which proved to be brief, plans for the revolution were abandoned. arte reached Curaçao with the intention of proceeding Venezuela, in the vain hope of obtaining foreign assis-ce in carrying out his plans. But before he was afforded opportunity of returning to his country, the ideal for ich he had so long laboured was at last realized.

On February 27, 1844, at ten o'clock at night a band of ne hundred members of the conspirators seized the tress of the Puerta del Conde, whose commanding cer had been suborned by one of the conspirators. Here cry of "Separation, God, Country and Liberty" was ed. Leaving a number sufficient to guard this outpost, conspirators, dividing into smaller groups, succeeded a ruse in obtaining control of the strongholds in the , and on the following day the Haitian commander, neral Desgrotte, was compelled to sign his capitulation. e declaration made by the revolutionary Junta in their otiations with Desgrotte is significant of the inspiration ich Duarte had bestowed upon his countrymen. "The ial," stated the Junta, "of their rights, and the evil

administration of the Haitian Government, have created among the Dominicans the firm and imperishable determination to be free and independent, should it cost their lives and their property, and no menace will be capable of weakening this resolution."

Two days later, Desgrotte and his fellow Haitians retired from the soil of the new Republic, and the history of the independent Dominican Republic had commenced.

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CHAPTER I

THE EARLIEST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

1.

ON February 29, 1844, the last of the Haitian officials left the capital. The Provisional Junta, diminished its membership by the fact that Tomás Bobadilla, nuel Jiménez and Vicente Celestino Duarte had been t to different parts of the Republic to encourage the abitants of the outlying provinces to rise in support of revolution, and to concert with all possible speed plans the formation of a national militia to repel the antici-ed attack from Haiti, declared itself a "Junta Central" direct the destinies of the new nation until the people ld determine upon a form of constitutional govern-nt. This Junta Central, composed of Francisco del sario Sánchez, Ramón Mella, José Joaquín Puello, migio del Castillo, Wenceslao de la Concha, Mariano avarria, and Pedro de Castro y Castro, despatched Juan pomuceno Ravelo to Curaçao to bring Juan Pablo arte to the Republic. On March 14th Duarte arrived Santo Domingo and was received upon his arrival as the ion's idol.

Support of the revolution in the eastern provinces was denced at once, due in large part to the popular prestige the Seybo of Pedro and Ramón Santana. Azua joined r. The early reluctance of its inhabitants was due to the nclination of their local leader, Buenaventura Baez, to port the Junta Central in its determination to proclaim independence of the Dominican provinces rather than follow the course which Baez favoured of seeking a tectorate from France. Divergence in the policies of leading men in the Republic thus early became marked.

The original failure of some of the most influential men in the country to join the revolution proclaimed by the patriots of the Puerta del Conde was caused by their sincere belief that the independence of the country could not be maintained, and by their conviction that separation from Haiti could only be rendered permanent were some foreign power to afford the Dominicans effective protection. For this reason Pedro Ramón de Mena, sent by the Junta Central to the Cibao to obtain the adherence of the northern provinces, met at first with considerable opposition in his mission, but eventually Cotuy, La Vega and Moca, as well as San Francisco de Macorís, were brought into line, and the enthusiasm among the inhabitants of Santiago was finally roused to such a pitch that the Haitian authorities discreetly capitulated and evacuated the strongholds of that city. Soon after, Puerto Plata and other northern towns announced their participation in the revolution, and before the middle of March the Junta Central had obtained the declared support of the whole Republic with the exception of a few small towns near the Haitian border. To grant representation to all parts of the Republic, the membership of the Junta Central was again changed before the first of April, and Juan Pablo Duarte himself after his return to the capital, was appointed a member of the Junta, although Tomás Bobadilla and General Manuel Jiménez were elected its President and Vice President.

The speed with which the provinces rose at the proclamation of separation from Haiti was fortunate, since as soon as Hérard, the President of Haiti, learned that the Dominican Provinces were in revolt, he mustered as large a force as he could raise, and sending an army from the north under the command of General Pierrot, he himself

vaded the Dominican Republic from the south with an ually large force, encountering little resistance until he ached the town of Azua. The army gathered together oppose the invasion of Azua was composed in large part farmers from the Seybo under the command of General dro Santana, who had been ordered by the Junta Cen- l to proceed to Azua with all possible haste. The trained and undisciplined Dominicans fought with the most valour, and succeeded in completely routing the eatly superior numbers of the Haitian hordes. But San- ia, for reasons which were not then explained, and which ve rise in later years to bitter recriminations between nself and Buenaventura Baez, who was at the time one the officers fighting under him, failed to follow up his ctory and retreated to Baní, permitting the Haitians, twithstanding their defeat, to occupy the town of Azua thout further opposition. As soon as news of General ntana's retreat was received by the Junta Central, Gen- l Juan Pablo Duarte was ordered to Baní to coöperate th Santana. Duarte arrived in Baní on March 21st, but er two weeks, during which he found it impossible to rsuade Santana of the necessity of taking the offensive, d obtained small support in his contentions from the nta Central, he was ordered to return to the capital on ground that his presence was necessary in the Govern- nt. In the meantime, the Dominicans in the north under command of General José Maria Imbert were successful repelling the onslaught of the Haitians under General rrot.

After the recall of Duarte to Santo Domingo, Santana tified the Junta Central that he considered it impossible take the offensive against the Haitians until he received ther supplies, and in particular more men and greater

quantities of ammunition. Small engagements occurred from time to time in which the Haitians were worsted but the two armies remained stationary for several weeks until fortune favoured the Republic by the outbreak in Haiti, towards the end of April, of a revolution headed by General Pierrot against the Administration of Hérard. In order to attempt to arrest the revolution within his own boundaries, Hérard abandoned Azua on May 9th, and embarking part of his forces, and retreating at the head of the remainder overland to the Haitian frontier, burned and sacked, in accordance with the best traditions of his predecessors, all towns and villages lying along his path. Now at last Santana was willing to move, and following up the retreating Haitian armies he proceeded at the head of a considerable column to the frontier, where he established garrisons in all of the frontier towns of any importance.

The fundamental differences which had existed ever prior to the revolution between the leading men in the Republic became still more strongly accentuated with the retreat of the Haitian armies from Dominican soil.

On the one hand was the small band of patriots, the liberals, led by Duarte and Mella—whose cry of Liberty and Independence, still re-echoing down the years, alone had made the revolution a living, inspired fact, and who had time and again risked their lives, their families, their property, in the support of their faith that the Dominican people were destined to become a sovereign, an independent nation; on the other, the protectionists—a few timorously seeking that protection from abroad which they feared their own strength could not afford against the dreaded Haitian menace; the many, and among these the more prominent, seeking the security for their property, or the more definite advantages to themselves which the French

ents, the Spanish authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, d the representatives of European commerce had long erted would be ensured by a foreign protectorate, or by nexation to a European Power.

The prime mover in the protectionist policy from its y inception appears to have been Buenaventura Baez— l his life," [1] as Charles Sumner afterwards characterized n, "adventurer, conspirator and trickster, uncertain in nions, without character, without patriotism, without th, looking out supremely for himself, and on any side ording to imagined personal interest . . ." Born about 10, the grandson of the Spanish priest and author, Don tonio Sánchez Valverde, and the son of a mulatto slave l, he was recognized as a legitimate member of a large nily long settled in Azua, possessed of considerable prop- y, and of preponderant influence in the local affairs of Province. Baez had been sent in his early youth to rope to receive those means of education which it was possible for a Dominican student to obtain during the itian Occupation. Upon his return to his own country had served in various offices under the Haitian Govern- nt, and in 1843 was sent as delegate from the Province Azua to the Haitian National Assembly in Port-au- nce. It was at that time that, meeting Adolphe Barrot, n Special Commissioner of France to the Haitian Re- blic, and obtaining facile assurances from the French voy that a Dominican revolution concerted for the pur- e of placing the Dominican Provinces under a French otectorate would receive the active support of France, ez conceived the policy which the vigilance of the Trini- ios at first rendered abortive.

[1] Speech of Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, delivered in the U. S. te March 27, 1871.

Not until long afterwards was it known that, in a rage at the thwarting of his plans by the uprising of February 27th, Baez had sent a secret emissary to Port-au-Prince to warn the Haitian President of the revolt and to advise him of the movements of the revolutionary troops. Baez, ever a shrewd judge of character, was able to gather about him in support of his schemes many of the leaders in the Republic whose firm belief in the promises of the French agents was worthy of a better cause. But that the Government of France was at least interested in developments could not be doubted.

Immediately after the outbreak of the revolution two French war vessels were despatched to Dominican waters under the command of Rear Admiral de Moges. The French Vice-Consul in Santo Domingo, Juchereau de Saint Denis, coöperating to the limit of his ability with Admiral de Moges, had no small part in the decision of Santana to withstand the urgent pleas advanced by Duarte, when the latter was sent by the Junta Central to Baní, to take up the offensive against the Haitian armies; for the French representatives believed that the further the Haitians were permitted by Santana to advance towards the capital, the more disposed would the liberal members of the Junta Central be to seek French protection.

A confidential letter written at this time from Baní by General Santana, who had come to share the protectionist views of Baez, to Tomás Bobadilla, President of the Junta Central, and likewise one of the leading reactionaries, makes Santana's motives very plain. He wrote:

"I am sure that in the troops which are following the Haitians there is a large number of Spaniards (Dominicans); and holding as they do six Spanish towns, they will fight us with our people and at our expense while we a

e same time are ruining ourselves, our efforts paralyzed
d ourselves exhausted in this difficult task of war, par-
cularly when we are not accustomed to it; and that is the
ason why, in my way of thinking, the longer the struggle
sts the more uncertain becomes the victory, . . if, as
e have agreed and discussed so many times, we do not
tain help from across the ocean . . . You are able to
dge the truth of all that which I wish to say to you, and
u have sufficient ability not to delude yourself and to
alize that we should pursue with despatch those nego-
tions which in the opinion of every sound mind alone
n make our victory sure. I will be grateful if you will
swer me giving me definite information concerning the
ate of *those negotiations;* and if by chance they are sta-
nary, take them up again by any means within your
wer, since it is our duty in such crucial moments to
ake every effort *in behalf of the public welfare and in
der to assure the triumph of our policy.*"

As soon as rumours commenced to be current in the
pital regarding the reactionary policy favoured by those
embers of the Junta Central who were acting in concert
th Santana and Baez, the liberals demanded the expul-
n from the Junta of Bobadilla, Dr. José Maria Caminero,
d their adherents. Consequently, on June 9th, a meeting
as called in the fortress of all the leaders prominent in the
ing of the Puerta del Conde. A resolution was there
animously adopted demanding the elimination of the
actionaries from the Junta Central, and, with the support
the troops in the capital, orders were given for the
rest of Bobadilla and Dr. Caminero, as well as of
enaventura Baez, who was then in Santo Domingo.
ose selected for arrest were successful in escaping, due
obably to the warning given them by General Francisco
l Rosario Sánchez, elected President of the Junta Central

in place of Bobadilla, whose allegiance to Duarte's ideal was already wavering. The Junta Central as now reorganized determined to take all measures possible to maintain itself in power, and despatching General Duarte to the Cibao to prevent the fomenting of any plots against its control in the northern provinces, appointed General Sánchez himself to take command of the army in the south, giving orders at the same time that General Santana should be removed from his command "because of his ill-health."

General Duarte reached Santiago June 30th and was acclaimed the popular hero of the revolution. On July 4th he was proclaimed President of the Republic by a commission headed by General Ramón Mella. Duarte, however, while expressing his willingness to accept the Presidency, refused to take office unless elected by the majority of the votes of his fellow-citizens. Support of Duarte had become general throughout the Cibao, when to the consternation of all, information was received that the troops under General Santana had refused to agree to his removal as their commander, and that Santana himself had marched with his army to San Cristóbal, whence he had entered the capital on July 12th. There he had been proclaimed by his own troops "in the name of the Dominican people and of the army" Supreme Chief of the Republic, with the powers of Dictator.

Immediately after his entrance into the capital, Santana threw the leading liberals, including General Sánchez, into prison. Duarte and Mella, who had both withdrawn to Puerto Plata, believing that negotiations begun with Santana would make possible free elections in which the people could for the first time express their choice for the Presidency, were soon after arrested by agents of Santana, and

th their leading followers were brought to the capital the vessel *Separación Dominicana,* from which they ere removed in chains to share with the other liberal ders imprisonment as common criminals in the Torre l Homenaje.

On August 22nd a new Junta Central, appointed from ong the reactionaries by Santana, decreed that "for the fety and tranquillity of the country, it was a prime cessity that punishment be imposed upon all the authors d conspirators of sedition at whose head had figured neral Juan Pablo Duarte; whose object had been to use the fall of the supreme government which had been tablished . . . ; that Generals Juan Pablo Duarte, món Mella, Francisco Sánchez, and their leading suprters had been traitors and faithless to their country and such were unworthy of the positions which they held; at consequently they were removed from them and ndemned to perpetual exile, to suffer the penalty of death ould they ever again set foot on their natal soil." Conquently, shortly afterwards, Sánchez and Mella were nt with other leaders of the liberal party to England, and on September 10th Duarte, with a few comnions, was embarked upon a vessel bound for Gerany.

A policy of reaction thus early triumphed, and the pronents of the absolute independence of the Republic, who one had been responsible for raising the national spirit the Dominican people from the lethargy into which e twenty-two years of subjection to Haitian rule had nk it, were removed from the political stage. It is hardly matter for conjecture that the history of the Republic ould have been far different had it, during the early years its independent life, been governed by a patriot with the

ideals and the purity of purpose manifested by Duarte throughout his life.

Utterly disillusioned by gross ingratitude, disheartened by the rapidity with which the ideals for which he had spent himself were submerged in the tides of corruption and lust for power, he fades—an admirable, a proud figure—from the Dominican scene, to which in life he returned but for a few brief days. It is by the deathless spirit of the man, in the last analysis, that his true greatness must be judged; for Duarte's ideals have not been tarnished, his spiritual voice has not been stilled; and in the moments which were sometimes to occur in after years, when his fellow-citizens, granted respite from the turmoil of internecine war or foreign danger, were enabled to ask themselves where the true interests of their land might lie, it was by the doctrine and by the inspiration of Duarte that they were to attempt to be guided. In the long line of patriots of the Americas who lived and, often, died that the creed of liberty might not perish from the New World, Duarte will ever hold an eminent place.

The few brief months of his public career made manifest that his very lack of personal ambition, and his belief in the innate worth of his fellow-men, would perhaps have incapacitated him from being the ruler that the times demanded. While his ability as an executive he was never granted the opportunity to demonstrate, he probably lacked the practical gift for government required during the years which elapsed before constitutional government was an established fact. But his overwhelming love of country and his eager desire for the well-being of his people cannot be questioned.

During his last days in the Cibao there came to him one evening a group of citizens of Puerto Plata bringing a

clamation telling him that Puerto Plata as one man ported his candidacy for the Presidency. A group of nds stood about him in the dusty street as the leader he delegation read laboriously through the long pages. swift tropical sunset was darkening. Duarte stood t in the fading light—erect—the deep-set eyes under broad forehead glowing with eager emotion—his hand an habitual nervous gesture going to the heavy tache which partly concealed his ascetic smiling lips. en the monotonous reading was done, the leader roused self. In a few phrases he expressed his gratitude for the port tendered, and in these touching sentences, which tain the gist of the man's faith, bade them go their :

Be happy, citizens of Puerto Plata," he said, "and my t will be fully satisfied even without the office which desire I may obtain; but first of all, be just, if you re to be happy, for that is man's first duty; be united, thus you will put out the flame of discord and conquer r enemies, and the fatherland will be free and safe, and r wishes will be gratified; so shall I obtain my greatest mpense, the only one to which I aspire: that of seeing peaceful, happy, independent and free."

hrough the years which followed, years of exile and t, to which in a far country he was at length reduced, crowning sadness of his life may well have been the that he never did see the Dominican people united, py or peaceful, and not even securely independent and

2.

he Junta Central appointed by Santana had issued, on 24th, a decree calling for elections to the Congress.

The elections took place during the last ten days
August, and the representatives elected assembled in Sa
Cristóbal on September 21st, under the Presidency of Do
Manuel Maria Valencia, one of the earliest members of th
Francophile group. Five days later, a delegation of mem
bers of the Junta Central Gubernativa accorded the new
elected Congress the official recognition of Gener
Santana.

Dissension appears to have broken out between th
Dictator and the Congress at the start, since the refusal o
the Congress to approve a loan contract entered into by th
Junta with a British subject caused the Junta Central t
remind it that its faculties were limited to those of draf
ing the first Constitution of the Republic. The Congre
accepted its rebuff meekly enough and limited its discu
sions from then on to those relative to the drafting of th
Constitution, which was finally approved November 6t
In large part, the first Constitution of the Republic w
modeled on that of the United States, such amendmen
being grafted upon that creature of the Anglo-Saxo
genius as were rendered necessary by the Spanish system o
local government to which the country had been original
accustomed. Consequently, ayuntamientos were created
all the communes which existed prior to the Haitian Occu
pation, and the college of electors was entrusted with th
duty in the future of electing the President, the membe
of the Tribunado and of the Consejo Conservador (
House of Deputies and Senate), and the members of th
Provincial Deputations. As soon as the Constitution ha
been approved, the Congress elected General Pedro San
tana President of the Republic for the first two terms, eac
term being of four years.

The Congress, however, had omitted to grant Santan

he Constitution, the dictatorial powers which he de-
d. The latter consequently replied that he was unwilling
ccept the Presidency under those conditions. There-
n, at the instance of Tomás Bobadilla, Santana's leading
chman, the Congress reformed the Constitution, in-
porating in it the famous Article 210, which permitted
President of the Republic, until such time as peace with
ti had been proclaimed, to have full and untrammeled
trol of the military forces of the Republic, and to take
n steps "for the security of the country" as he might
re without responsibility to the Legislative Body. As
n as Bobadilla's amendment had been approved, Santana
pted the Presidency, and on November 13th, 1844,
eared before the Congress in San Cristóbal to take
oath of office as the first President of the Re-
lic.

mmediately after his inauguration, Santana appointed
is Cabinet his closest followers: Manuel Cabral Bernal
ecretary of Interior and Police; Ricardo Miura as Sec-
ry of Finance and Commerce; Tomás Bobadilla as
etary of Justice, Public Instruction and Foreign Rela-
s; and General Manuel Jiménez as Secretary of War
Marine. The members of Santana's Cabinet were
d primarily for their subservience to their chief, and
general opinion held by the populace concerning them
be gathered from a letter addressed by Don Juan
il, Spanish Vice-Consul, early in January, 1845, to the
tain-General of Puerto Rico:

The selection of the Cabinet," he says, "has not been
icularly happy; it may be that circumstances justify
selection of some of the members but there are others
m nothing can justify. . . . In the midst of our many
ssities, what we feel most of all is the lack of men

capable of solving through their own capacity the gr
number of our problems."

Pending a decision as to the most effective means of p
curing some European protectorate, Santana determin
to strengthen his position by seeking the recognition
the United States. For that purpose Dr. José Ma
Caminero, of Carrié correspondence fame, was sent in D
cember, 1844, to Washington to attempt to obtain duri
the last days of President Tyler's Administration offic
recognition of the new Republic from Secretary Calhou
Dr. Caminero's mission appears to have impressed M
Calhoun favourably as being in line with the policy of t
Southern States which he had so long sustained in t
United States Senate. The Secretary of State suggested
the Spanish Minister in Washington, Don Angel Calder
de la Barca, that the United States, France and Spa
should recognize the new Republic, as a means of p
venting the further spread of negro influence in the W
Indies. The suggestion of Mr. Calhoun, however, does n
appear to have met with favour at the Spanish Court, a
no further step was taken towards the recognition of t
new Republic until the Administration of President P
came into being in March, 1845.

Secretary Buchanan, who had learned that Dr. Camine
had stated to the Spanish Minister in Washington that t
Dominicans were desirous of obtaining a Spanish pr
tectorate, determined to send a special agent to the D
minican Republic to advise him of the conditions whi
existed there, and in particular to ascertain whether t
prospect seemed hopeful for the Dominicans to mainta
their independence against the ever threatening dang
from the western portion of the island. Mr. John Hog

GENERAL PEDRO SANTANA

Marqués de las Carreras

selected for the task and arrived in Santo Domingo in
ember of 1845. His investigation of conditions was of
most perfunctory nature. In a despatch to Secretary
ıanan,[1] he indulged in florid eulogies of the geographic
ion, fertility and history of the Dominican Republic,
made scant reference to the ability of the Santana Ad-
stration to maintain itself in power. He estimated the
ılation as being at that date approximately 230,000, of
m he claimed 100,000 were Caucasian, 40,000 negroes,
the rest mulattoes. The financial situation of the
ernment does not appear to have been precarious,
Mr. Hogan reported that while the expenditures
ed the Republic by the intermittent war with
i had obliged it to incur a debt of more than a
ion dollars, the indebtedness had already been wiped
with the exception of some $250,000, from the annual
pts of the treasury. Mr. Hogan likewise expressed his
opinion that the French and British Government,
natural enemies," were engaged in a policy of op-
ng recognition of the new Republic by the United
es.

accordance with his instructions, Mr. Hogan ad-
sed a note to the Minister of Foreign Relations request-
on behalf of his Government a report upon the form
ne Dominican Government, and likewise all informa-
which would tend to throw light on the ability of the
on to maintain its independence. Mr. Hogan surmised
s note that the presence in the Republic of so large a
portion of the coloured race would tend to weaken the
ts of the Dominican Government in its struggle
nst Haiti. This criterion was not shared by the Min-
, who advised the American Agent that

[1] Mr. Hogan to Secretary Buchanan received October 4, 1844.

"It is worthy of note that among the Dominicans p
occupations regarding color have never held much sw
. . Even the very Dominicans who once were slaves ha
fought and would again fight against the Haitians becau
its Government was so evil and so oppressive that it cou
not obtain the support of any class." [1]

In closing his communication to Mr. Hogan, Señ
Bobadilla, with a blithe disregard of the secret negot
tions which were being conducted at Santana's instance
obtain a French protectorate, declared, "When a peop
desires to be free, no earthly power can impede it."

Neither Dr. Caminero's efforts in Washington, nor M
Hogan's recommendations, were sufficiently strong to co
vince Buchanan of the desirability of recognizing the ind
pendence of the new Republic before satisfactory assu
ances had been received that Santana's negotiations f
obtaining a European protectorate, which were known
him, would be unsuccessful. Dr. Caminero consequen
returned to Santo Domingo, having succeeded only
purchasing munitions and clothing for the army, and
arranging for the minting of copper currency for gene
use in the Republic. Prior to his return, Mr. Hogan h
already left the capital.

During the first months of his administration, Santa
occupied himself, so far as the continuation of the w
with Haiti made it possible, with the organization of
Government throughout the country. At his instance, t
Congress passed legislation creating tribunals of the fi
instance and one court of appeals, providing at the sa
time for the observance of the Napoleonic Code. Prima
schools were opened in all the larger cities and towns,
well as high schools in Santo Domingo and Santiago. T

[1] Don Tomás Bobadilla to Mr. Hogan, June 19, 1845.

getary system was introduced, by which the salaries of ernmental officials were fixed in many instances in ex- of what they are in modern times, the salary of the ident being set then at $12,000 per annum, and the ries of his ministers at $3,600. That Santana believed in ternal form of government was soon made very plain is fellow-citizens. Decrees of the most stringent nature e promulgated, providing for government regulation ven the most innocent activities of the populace. On uary 21, 1847, a decree was issued compelling the Co- dantes de Armas and the Alcaldes Comunales in each mune to visit every house within their jurisdiction to rtain the profession and means of livelihood of the bitants; all vagabonds were given eight days within ch to find some honest means of earning their living, he end of which time, if they had not found it, they e to be set to work for a period of three months on lic construction for the Government. Games of chance amusements were prohibited except from six o'clock in evening of the day preceding a holiday until nine ock in the evening of that holiday. No goats might be t within the limits of any city. No citizen was per- ted to move from the city to the country, nor from one lity to another, without previously obtaining permis- of the Jefe Superior Político and the Alcalde Comu- of the commune in which they were living. Finally, he interest of education, each head of a family was ged to place at least one of his children in the public ols.

he iron hand of the first President was likewise not in showing itself. Claiming that he had discovered a against the Government, Santana celebrated February 1845, the first anniversary of the country's indepen-

dence, by the execution of Doña Maria Trinidad Sánch
aunt of General Francisco Sánchez, and of several oth
of the liberals still remaining in the capital, on the pret
that they were traitors to the Republic which they the
selves had been so largely instrumental in creating.

While appearances may have suggested that Gene
Santana was occupying himself solely with plans for t
strengthening of his own administration, and with t
drafting of regulations governing the activities of
fellow-citizens, the cardinal feature of his policy, that
obtaining a protectorate from a foreign power, was nev
far removed from his thoughts. As soon as he perceiv
that the assurances received from France were illusory,
lost no time in turning to Spain.

The Spanish Cabinets, which were at the time alt
nating in power with cinematographic rapidity, w
being constantly pressed by the Spanish authorities in
West Indies, notably the Conde de Mirasol, Capta
General of Puerto Rico, to make no commitments whi
might prevent the Spanish Government, should it la
desire to do so, from regaining the authority over t
Dominican provinces which it had formerly held. T
Spanish representatives in Paris and in London were co
sequently instructed to ascertain whether France and En
land would interpose objections should Spain determi
to extend her authority once more over Santo Domin
Satisfactory assurances having been received, General Sa
tana was duly apprised by emissaries from the Conde
Mirasol that the moment might be propitious for co
mencing negotiations with the Spanish Queen.

Toward the end of February, 1846, a division of
Spanish warships, under the command of Don Pablo
Llanes, appeared in the harbour of Santo Domin

ether popular objection proved too strong, or whether opposition of General José Joaquín Puello, recently ointed to the Cabinet, proved preponderant in the ice rendered Santana by his Ministers, is uncertain, but visit of the Spanish fleet had no more definite result n the announcement made by Santana that the Spanish vernment had at the time no purpose of recovering its mer colony, and that the Dominican Government had n officially advised that Spain was disposed to recognize independence of the Republic. The visit of the Spanish had at least the concrete advantage, from Santana's nt of view, of offering him a pretext for sending with- further delay an embassy to Europe for the ostensible pose of obtaining recognition of the Republic from in, France and England.

Confident that no Dominican better suited as his envoy ld be found than the instigator of the reactionary icy which he himself was pursuing, Santana appointed, April, 1846, Buenaventura Baez, together with José ria Medrano and Juan Esteban Aybar. The envoys were vided with published instructions to go first to Madrid, ere they were to negotiate a treaty of recognition with in, and when that had been accomplished, to proceed, the same purpose, in turn to Paris and to London, and h confidential instructions to obtain a protectorate if sible.

Armed with letters of introduction from the Conde de asol, the embassy arrived in Madrid in the summer of 6. To his surprise, Baez did not find upon his arrival at Spanish Court any patent desire on the part of the nish Government to reassume the responsibilities in to Domingo which had previously caused the Spanish vernment so many difficulties. During fourteen months

the Dominican representatives remained in Madrid, urg ing upon each succeeding Spanish Cabinet the desirabili of extending at least immediate recognition to the Do minican Republic. By October, 1847, they had succeede in obtaining assurances from Cortaza, the Spanish Premi at the time, that Spain would recognize the independen of the Dominican Republic, and would grant the Republ its protection with all the strength of the forces at i command, official announcement to this effect to be pos poned until the authorities in the other Spanish West Indi had been informed of the decision reached. But whe Cortaza's Ministry fell a few days later, and when th new Ministry of the Duke of Valencia did not shar apparently, in so positive a fashion the determinatio expressed by Cortaza, Baez determined to seek better for tune in Paris. He therefore notified the Spanish Goverr ment that the Dominican representatives were leavin Madrid, assuring it, at the same time, that in the opinio of the Dominican emissaries the bonds uniting Spain an her former colony were eternal, and that the affection o the Government of Santana for the mother country coul not be impaired.

Before the negotiations in Madrid had reached the close, Secretary Buchanan, his interest quickened by wha he had learned of them, determined to send another agen to Santo Domingo to ascertain whether the new envo coincided in the recommendations made by Mr. Hogan fo early recognition of the Republic's independence, and t discover whether the project for the Spanish protectorat had proceeded in fact so far as was believed by some o the American diplomatic representatives abroad. Mr Francis Harrison was selected for this purpose and reache Santo Domingo in March, 1847. Since recognition had no

been determined upon, Mr. Harrison, while appointed
nmercial Agent of the United States, was not provided
h personal letters addressed to General Santana and to
Minister for Foreign Affairs by President Polk and by
etary Buchanan. This omission caused both offense and
ppointment, which was officially communicated to Mr.
rison by General Ricardo Miura, appointed by Gen-
Santana Minister for Foreign Affairs after a dispute
veen the President and Tomás Bobadilla had resulted
he latter's temporary exile from the country.

hortly after his arrival Mr. Harrison transmitted his
impressions to Secretary Buchanan:

The country is, so far as I can ascertain, prospering.
depression of their currency is principally affecting
ign merchants, while benefiting native shopkeepers,
ters, and woodcutters, who being always in debt to the
chants have cancelled the same with the depreciated
er. The principal part of the irregular army has been
ved to return to their small farms and wood cuts. They
in consequence have a good crop of tobacco, and the
ogany is becoming more plenty. Relative to their
nces, they have in circulation $3,000,000 in their paper
ency, which is now at an appreciation of eleven cur-
y for one dollar Spanish. In the treasury is $50,000
ish money, but very little currency. The pay of the
ers per month is $4 and an additional $7.50 for rations,
h is not always paid and when not paid is considered
much saved to the nation." [1]

fter his official conversations with the members of the
ernment, Mr. Harrison made a trip overland from
o Domingo to Puerto Plata, informing himself with
derable thoroughness of the conditions which existed

r. Francis Harrison to Secretary Buchanan, March 31, 1847.

in the interior of the Republic. Upon the conclusion of h trip, he communicated again with the Secretary of State

"From the City of Santo Domingo to Cotuy, the coun try is almost uninhabited. The beautiful savannas, whic were formerly covered with cattle, are now but thinl spotted by the same. On the road I passed twelve person La Vega is a town of about 1800 people. The building are comfortable huts, the earthquake of 1843 having de stroyed all the houses that were of stone and bricks. I the District of La Vega are stationed 400 military, an there is in the National Guard of that District 1600 me La Vega is noted for its beautiful women, many of whor have a remarkable regularity of feature and form. San tiago, which previous to the earthquake was principall composed of Spanish built stone and brick houses, all o which were, including the massive built churches, de stroyed by that event. It is partly rebuilt, having no many comfortable brick houses and contains at prese about 4,000 inhabitants. The country between Cotuy an Santiago, including the districts of Moca and Macorís, in a good state of cultivation, producing, besides groun provisions for consumption, all the tobacco that is ex ported from the Island. It is the agricultural district o the Dominican Power, the people being generally indus trious. In this district reside the principal part of the whit population that are not inside the walls of Santo Dominge The cultivation on this side of the Island has much im proved during the last five years and bears a favorabl comparison to the neighborhood of the City of Sant Domingo, the country outside of the walls of that cit being, for want of cultivation, a perfect wilderness. O the south side, under the immediate eye of the Govern ment, the condition of matters and things in general, in stead of progressing is retrograding." [1]

[1] Mr. Francis Harrison to Secretary Buchanan, May 10, 1847.

Mr. Harrison's term of office in the Dominican Republic
s not destined, however, to be of long duration, for he
d of yellow fever, which was raging throughout the
st Indies at the time, a few months after his arrival in
to Domingo, and Mr. Jonathan Elliott was thereupon
ointed Commercial Agent in his place. An estimate of
commercial depression which existed at the time may
gathered from the following remark addressed by Mr.
ott to Secretary Buchanan some months after his ar-
l: "There is very little for an agent to do here, I having
only three schooners in six months." [1]

The dispute with Bobadilla and the exile of the latter
m the country brought with it a general reorganization
Santana's Cabinet, and towards the end of the year,
7, a new Cabinet was appointed as follows: Secretary
Justice, Public Instruction and Foreign Affairs, General
ardo Miura; Secretary of Finance and Commerce, Gen-
José Joaquín Puello; Secretary of Interior and Police,
onel Juan Esteban Aybar, who was to assume office
n his return from his European mission; Secretary of
r and Marine, General Manuel Jiménez. The divergence
ch had existed between the views of the President and
se of General Puello regarding the advantages to be
ained from a Spanish protectorate had already given
to considerable friction. Puello was consequently be-
ed by many of the President's satellites to be identified
the policy of the liberals, and no sooner had he entered
Cabinet than intrigues began against him. The intrigues
ved to be successful in less time, presumably, than even
r authors had dared to hope, since barely a month after
new Ministry had been installed, General Santana ac-
d General Puello of plotting a military uprising against

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Buchanan, August 2, 1848.

the Government. Brought before a military commissio he was sentenced to death, and on December 23rd, wi two others, was summarily executed. The vacancy th created in the Cabinet was filled to Santana's entire sati faction by the appointment of Dr. José Maria Caminer of whose loyalty to the reactionary policy Santana cou have no doubt.

But even though, by means of execution and exil Santana had been able to obliterate all domestic oppositio to the policy which he pursued, it appeared impossible fo him to persuade either France or Spain to assume definitel the responsibilities which he urged upon them. Unsati factory economic conditions, as well as the repressiv policy of his Government, had succeeded in causing, du ing the four years of his Administration, a smoulderin and sullen discontent throughout the country, whic although it had not broken out in open flame, was yet co stantly increasing. Congress, moreover, appeared to Sa tana to be deviating from the path of utter submissio which he had traced for it when he first entered the Pres dency, by insisting that the administration of the financ of the Republic, entrusted by the President to D Caminero after his appointment to the Cabinet, was f from satisfactory, and seemed desirous of sharing with t Executive the decisions as to the financial policy to b pursued.

If Santana was disheartened by the opposition of th Congress, he was frankly dismayed by the success of h Minister for War, General Jiménez, in partially organizin a conspiracy, the object of which was to force his chief t resign the Presidency in his favour. During Santana's bri absence from the capital in the Seybo where he was reco ering from an illness of some months' duration, all th

ops favourable to the President were removed from to Domingo, which was garrisoned by others whom énez had found means to suborn. Upon Santana's rn he found the time had passed when he could have nstood the demands of some of the members of his inet for his resignation.

asing his resignation, however, upon his dispute with gress, General Santana announced his decision to retire n the Presidency, hoping that he would be recalled to er by his fellow-citizens in the not far distant future. n July 31, 1848, he appointed a new Cabinet com- d of Don Felix Mercenario as Secretary of Interior Police, and Don Domingo de la Rocha as Secretary of ice, Public Instruction and Foreign Affairs, retaining Caminero as Secretary of Finance and Commerce and, essarily, General Manuel Jiménez as Secretary of War Marine. Four days later, on August 4, 1848, General ana presented his formal resignation to the Cabinet, ch, under the Constitution, assumed control of the cutive power. He himself left the capital at once and ceeded to his estancia, El Prado, in the Province of o, where he determined to busy himself with the of the cattle and the hogs which he raised there rge numbers until such time as the necessities of the ernment might again demand his attention.

3.

n September 4, 1848, the Congress, convoked by the net for that purpose, elected Santana's Secretary of , General Manuel Jiménez, as President of the Re- ic. On September 8th, General Jiménez took the oath esident before the Congress, retaining without change ana's last Cabinet. Expectation was general that with

the retirement of Santana, Jiménez, who was known to l
indolent by temperament and incapable of the high-hande
policy of his predecessor, would permit the exiled libera
to return to Santo Domingo; but when it was seen tha
he had apparently no intention of deviating in this respec
from the policy laid down by Santana, Congress took
upon itself, by a decree of September 26th, to proclaim
general amnesty, mentioning specifically General Duar
and the other exiled members of the Trinitarios. Once th
was done, the Congress believed that its responsibilities wer
over, and in October adjourned, having first, howeve
adopted the remarkable resolution of granting extraor
dinary powers to President Jiménez until its next sessio

General Jiménez appears to have lacked every qualifica
tion necessary for the Presidency. He was utterly lackin
in executive ability, and was neither interested in th
promotion of any program for the development of th
country's commerce, nor even disposed to take measur
to ward off the ever increasing danger of Haitian invasio
which had been imminent since March, 1847, when Gen
eral Faustin Soulouque had obtained control of the govern
ment in the neighbouring Republic. Jiménez's sole intere
in life after his inauguration appears to have been cock
fighting. According to Mr. Benjamin E. Green, who wa
later appointed American Commissioner by Presiden
Taylor, "His whole time was spent in cleaning, trainin
and fighting cocks, it being frequently necessary to sen
acts of Congress and other official papers to the cock-p
for his approval and signature. Under his rule, everythin
fell into confusion, which state of things was soon mad
known to Soulouque and incited him to the invasion o
the Republic." [1]

[1] Mr. Benjamin E. Green to Secretary Clayton, September 27, 1849.

Jiménez, who had been with difficulty induced by his
ıbinet to leave the pleasures of cockfighting for a
fficient length of time to make a brief official journey
rough the Cibao, was finally persuaded, at the end of
cember, 1848, to decree general mobilization through-
t the Republic, all Dominicans from twelve to sixty
ırs being called to the colours. Fortunately for the
untry, the indolence and indecision of the President were
t sufficient to prevent such patriots as General Ramón
lla, who had returned to Santo Domingo under the
ree of amnesty, and General Duvergé, from amassing
considerable body of men near the Haitian frontier in
e Province of Azua, and consequently when the long-
reatened invasion of the Haitians took place early in
ırch, 1849, sufficient forces were at the disposal of the
vernment to interpose some opposition to the onward
eep of the Haitian armies. The Dominicans, as ever,
ught bravely, but their numbers were not sufficient to
eck for any considerable period the far superior num-
rs of the Haitians, nor had they in their possession
fficient ammunition to maintain their position for any
gth of time. The initial defeats of the Dominicans
ısed panic throughout the Republic, and the fear of an
minent siege of the capital was general in Santo Do-
ngo itself. The situation in the city is described by Mr.
nathan Elliott in despatches to Secretary Buchanan:

'The greatest consternation and alarm prevails here. The
sident of Haiti, Soulouque, is within two days' march
this city with 10,000 blacks. He declares extermination
all whites and mulattoes and has beaten the people of
Republic in every battle. My house is already filled
h frightened females. . . . The Haitian army are close

to us. Almost all of the foremost merchants have packed up their goods and shipped them to the neighboring island before leaving with their families. The town is filled with women and children from the country and famine is to be apprehended. . . . The President has told me that it is his intention to set fire to the place in case they cannot hold out against the Haitians." [1]

It was only after repeated urging that Jiménez could be prevailed upon to go himself to the scene of hostilities in Azua, but his presence there seems to have done little to better the situation or to calm the general apprehensions since upon his return to the capital he found that the Congress, under the leadership of Buenaventura Baez, had, on April 3, issued a decree calling upon General Santana to come to the assistance of the Government with all of the forces which he might obtain in the Province of Seybo. To this decree the President opposed the most strenuous objection, but finally was obliged to give way, and reluctantly despatched Santana, almost unattended, to Baní.

On the way Santana picked up 350 to 500 men. As soon as it became known that Santana had been called out by the Congress, the soldiers who were scattered all over the country seeking their homes, after their initial defeats, returned to join him, so that in a short time his name alone had brought together the dispersed army, and Santana soon found himself at the head of some 6,000 men. From Baní Santana marched to Sabana Buey, operating in conjunction with the forces under the command of General Duvergé. In engagements at El Número and Las Carreras the Dominicans succeeded in routing completely the Haitian armies, which fled in utter disorder across the

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Buchanan, April 13, 1849, and April 24 1849.

ontier, razing to the ground as ever all evidences of vilization with which they came into contact, and leav- g the town of Azua in ashes.

On January 21st, 1849, the long-sought-for recognition d been officially extended to the Dominican Republic by e Governments of France and England. The imminent nger in which the capital had been placed prior to the turn of Santana to the command of the Dominican nies had afforded Buenaventura Baez an unlooked-for portunity to attempt once more to force upon the tion the protectorate of France. The French warship *au* had anchored in the port of the capital on April 17th, d Baez, calling the Congress together in secret session on pril 19th, succeeded in persuading his panic-stricken col- gues to pass a resolution beseeching the French Govern- ent to accept a protectorate over the Republic. A copy the resolution was entrusted to the French Vice-Consul, Place, who embarked the same night on the *Elau* for rt-au-Prince. There he ascertained that the French Con- -General in Haiti was unwilling to assume the respon- ility upon his own initiative of accepting the proposal; d an employee of the French Consulate in Santo Do- ngo who was sent at the same time to Paris found, to e dismay of Place, that the French Government had no parent intention of acceding to the Dominican pro- sals.

The resolution of the Congress did not remain long ret from the British Consul, recently arrived, nor from American Commercial Agent. Sir Robert Schomburgk, British Consul, was in fact so alarmed by the report t he addressed immediately a note to the Minister for reign Affairs inquiring whether the Dominican Govern- nt intended that the Republic should remain free and

independent. On April 24th he was advised, notwithstanding the fact that the Government was then still awaiting a reply from France to its proposals, that the Dominican Republic would undoubtedly continue in the full possession of its independence and sovereignty.

As the result of the control which Baez had succeeded in obtaining over the Congress, relations between Baez and the President soon reached the breaking point. For the time being, all idea of maintaining the independence of the Republic appears to have been abandoned by the leading men in the country. The doctrines of the liberals were in the discard. Baez's predilection for France was now evident to all; while Santana's efforts to obtain the protection of Spain had long been rumoured. Deserted by the major portion of his army, which was now under the command of Santana, and in open opposition to the Congress, which was under the sway of Baez, Jiménez determined to attempt to secure assistance from the United States. In May 1849, the American Commercial Agent communicated the following information to Secretary Buchanan:

"The Haitian army under Soulouque has been beaten and routed at all points. A special messenger was despatched by French steamer from here to St. Thomas and from thence to France bearing despatches asking that Government to accept and confirm the protectorate. Lord Palmerston's purpose is to oppose the aid to be given by the French. The British Consul, Sir Robert Schomburgk, also offered to obtain the aid of England. The object of both parties is to get possession of the Bay of Samaná, one of the finest in the West Indies, of fine resources for a naval depot either in time of peace or war. The President requested a private interview with me, asking me for the protection of the United States and if I thought the United States

uld allow this Republic to annex itself. I think it prob-
e that a delegation will be sent from here to Wash-
ton, whose object will be to obtain the recognition of
ir independence by our Government." [1]

Events were proceeding with too great rapidity, though,
have permitted assurances from Secretary Clayton to
e been of much avail to the President—even had they
n forthcoming, Jiménez was doomed.

On May 12th, the Congress summoned the President
ore it to request from him an explanation of the lack of
parations made by the Government to repel the Haitian
ack. In the course of the discussions which ensued
olvers and swords were drawn, without the occurrence,
vever, of any casualties, and on the following day the
ngress, protesting against the "coercion" of the Execu-
e, removed to San Cristóbal. Santana, emboldened by
assistance which Baez was rendering him in the Con-
ss, now also, on May 19th, broke openly with Jiménez,
l marched upon the capital where Jiménez had sur-
nded himself with the very small number of persons
o still remained loyal to him. On May 29th, after a
itulation had been agreed to by Jiménez, through the
ervention of the British and French Consuls and the
erican Agent, Jiménez resigned his office, and fled from
capital on a British vessel for Curaçao.

On the following day, Santana, with his victorious army,
ered the capital as Dictator, signalizing his return to
ver by throwing immediately into prison all the citizens
o had forced his own resignation and who had sup-
ted Jiménez during the last days of the latter's admin-
ation. On July 4th, the Dictator summoned the electo-
colleges to assemble on the 25th of the same month. The

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Buchanan, May 2, 1849.

colleges filled the vacancies which existed in the previou Congress, and the new Congress, under the Presidency o Buenaventura Baez, inaugurated its sessions on July 5th

The following day, General Santana appeared befor the Congress to resign the extraordinary powers grante him by the Congressional decree of April 3rd, when Bae seized the opportunity, as President of that body, to offe him, in the name of the Congress, "the assurances of it highest gratitude for the important services which he ha rendered the Republic, freeing it at the same time fro civil war," and terming Santana "in the name of a grate ful nation, a precious instrument chosen by Heaven itself" to defend the people in their march towards civilization Immediately thereafter, the Congress elected Santiag Espaillat as President of the Republic, Santana receivin 31 votes and Baez 12, to the 45 cast in favor of Espaillat

Santiago Espaillat, head of one of the most prominen families of the Cibao, was too far-sighted to be lured, how ever. With the army under the complete domination o Santana, and the Congress responsive to Baez, the Presi dent installed under such conditions would soon be crushe between the millstones of their consuming ambitions When word was brought to him of his election to th Presidency, Espaillat refused to accept the precariou honours—and persisted in his refusal, notwithstanding th urging of the northern provinces which were desirous o seeing a resident of the Cibao in the Presidency.

Santana, who had by now, although his egotism and th lustre of his recent victories combined to blind him, som faint apprehension of the danger which the increasin prominence of Baez might constitute to his own ambi tions, and some perception of the corroding greed whic dominated Baez, had hoped to find some figurehead t

ce in the Presidency whom he could retain there so long he saw fit. Espaillat, a man of honour and position, who uld have obtained the loyal support of the entire Cibao, uld have suited Santana eminently. Espaillat's obstinate ermination to refuse the Presidency caused the Dictator face a far less agreeable solution. Baez, representing that own activities in the Congress had been responsible great measure for Jiménez's downfall, claimed the sidency for himself since Santana had already an- nced his own unwillingness to return to office—and to s contention the Dictator could raise no valid objec- n.

Perhaps also various other considerations had weight. ntana undoubtedly believed that his own control of the ny implied his control of the President. Baez's heritage African blood, which permitted the coloured elements feel that they were not excluded from participation in Government, might prove an added safeguard to the ites in the event of a new invasion from Soulouque's minions. Finally and most weighty of all, Santana was hly dubious of the outcome of the French protectorate ject; were he to permit Baez to assume entire respon- ility and incur among the protectionists the odium of appointing the expectations which the project had cited, might Baez not be definitely eliminated as a pos- le contender for his own position as supreme arbiter of country's destinies?

Baez was consequently elected in the place of Espaillat, d the Congress adjourned thereafter—not, however, fore it had granted Santana the title of "Liberator of the therland," and the more practical—and incidentally re remunerative—title of General-in-Chief of the mies of the Republic.

4.

On September 24, 1849, Colonel Baez was inaugurate President of the Republic before the Congress. Bette qualified, through no small natural ability and by virtue o his education in Europe, than most of his compatriots, an afforded, by his recent diplomatic missions, the oppor tunity to gauge more accurately than his predecessors i the Presidency the temper of the European Powers towar his country, all his advantages were nullified by his un rivalled cupidity, against which the interests of his countr never had weighed, and never would weigh, in the balance

Slight of stature, with long shrewd nose and sma shrewd eyes, flowing mustache, and the "Burnsides" af fected by the Victorian dandies, he showed in his perso but faint evidences of the African strain he inherited fro his mother, save in the texture of his hair and the grayis tinge of his skin. That he lacked personal magnetism evident. Senator Sumner said that one of his friends ha been impressed by Baez as "the worst man living of whor he has any personal knowledge." [1] And while that impre sion may have been caused by prior prejudice, Baez nev succeeded in capturing that unreasoning support from th masses which more despicable characters even than he hav often been granted. He was no military hero—in fact h record is bare of military exploits. Yet for nearly thirty five years of the nation's history, through the unworth ambitions he was able to engender in others, and by th intrigues of which he was a past master, he maintaine himself ever present as the most powerful—and the mo pernicious—influence in the Dominican Republic.

With considerable acumen, immediately after h

[1] Speech of Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, delivered in the U. Senate, March 27, 1871.

tallation in the Presidency, Baez made use of the noeuvre which he was to utilize so often in the future: appeal to the patriotic sentimentality of the Dominican ple. He announced, in grandiloquent terms, a program government which, had it been declared with sincerity d carried out with determination, would undoubtedly e cured many of the ills from which the Republic was eady suffering. He stated his fixed purpose to reform the ny and, in particular, to inaugurate that system of dis-line which it had previously lacked; to revise the mone-y system of the Republic by creating a metallic standard ich would prevent the disastrous fluctuations in ex-nge; to simplify and better the administration of tice, and to obtain the modification along determined es of the Constitution of the Republic; to establish a nicipal and a rural police; to reform the system of blic instruction; to stimulate the development of the icultural resources of the land, to open roads, and to courage foreign commerce; to call to public office the e men of all political parties with regard solely to their egrity, energy and ability; and finally, to assure the ce of the Republic by obtaining the protection of some ong European power.

From the patriotic viewpoint, all provisions but the last this program of administration sounded well. Unfor-nately, the last was the only provision in which Baez was ficiently interested to turn to it his attention. His binet, announced two days after he assumed office, was nposed of Manuel Joaquín Del Monte as Secretary of tice, Public Instruction and Foreign Affairs; José Maria drano as Secretary of Interior and Police; the Presi-t's former colleague on his European mission, General n Esteban Aybar, as Secretary of War and Marine; and

the famed Trinitario, General Ramón Mella, as Secretar
of Finance and Commerce, who, with rare ingenuousnes
accepted office in the belief that his presence would facil
tate entrance into the public administration of the me
who had upheld the doctrines of the liberal party. Genera
Santana announced his loyal support of the new Govern
ment, making it incidentally entirely plain that his voic
had been instrumental in determining the selection of Bae
by the Congress as President of the Republic.

While the administration of President Baez was still i
ignorance of the French Government's determination t
reject his proposals for the French protectorate, Mr. Ben
jamin E. Green, who had been appointed Commissione
in the Dominican Republic by President Taylor shortl
after his inauguration, had arrived in Santo Domingo. I
is very clear from Mr. Green's first letters to Secretar
Clayton that the United States Government was desirou
of avoiding the complications which might ensue from th
installation of a European protectorate over the Dominica
Republic, and it is further clear that Mr. Green himsel
inoculated with the imperialistic fever recently spreadin
in the United States as the result of the acquisition of Tex
and the still more recent war with Mexico, was not aver
to obtaining for his own Government a protectorate ove
the new Republic, or to negotiate the annexation of th
country should it prove feasible.

While on his way to Santo Domingo, a journey whic
in those years occupied the better portion of two month
he sent Secretary Clayton a private letter from Havan
Notwithstanding the fact that his observation of con
ditions in Cuba had been limited to a stay of ten days, spen
entirely in the quarantine station at Havana, Mr. Gree
wrote that nine-tenths of the Cubans desired annexatio

the United States. He continued, "Many are anxiously king to the United States for the initiative of annexa-n. Any such step on the part of our Government or ple will be hailed with delight by the whole creole ulation of the Island." [1] His hope of increasing the inions of the United States was enhanced by the con-ons which he found upon his arrival late in August, 9, in Santo Domingo:

On the flight of Jiménez, the late President, of which will have heard before this reaches you, the admin-ation of affairs was placed temporarily in the hands of neral Santana. An election was then had, and Santana lining to be a candidate, Buenaventura Baez, late sident of the Congress, was chosen President and will be alled in a few days. The ceremony is only delayed for arrival of General Santana who is at present in the rior. . . . Baez . . . is supposed to be in the interest under the control of the French Consul. . . . The nch party . . . is composed of a very few individuals is not likely to become a popular party as many sus-t. . . . France would be pleased to see Haitians in session of the whole Island . . . as in such case the tians might be able to make some satisfactory arrange-nt of their indebtedness to France. . . . England and nce desire above all things to get possession of Samaná. . This Government will not hesitate to grant it for a n of years or in perpetuity to whichever will negotiate guarantee a treaty of peace with Haiti so as to enable n to go to work and recover from the poverty to which long war has reduced them. I have no doubt that they uld prefer to make such an arrangement with the ted States. . . . I have to request that you inform me the earliest opportunity how far our Government will

[1] Mr. Benjamin E. Green to Secretary Clayton, July 21, 1849.

be willing to interfere between this Government and Hai to bring about that result by negotiation or otherwise, an whether, if offered to me, I may accept Samaná as a con sideration for our giving notice to the Haitians that the must cease to molest this people." [1]

Shortly after this despatch was written, Mr. Green hopes were raised still higher by the fact that the Ciba provinces, opposing the "rapprochement" with France de sired by Baez, and believing, as did General Santana at th time, that the hope of assistance from Spain was illusory addressed, on September 25th, a petition to General San tana beseeching him to recommend to the Government th initiation of negotiations with the United States for th purpose of obtaining American protection, or even Ameri can annexation. In his reply to the petition, Gener Santana expressed his determination to support this ple and Mr. Green's satisfaction must have been still furthe increased by the fact that the Secretary for Foreig Affairs, the following month, officially requested th French Consul to hasten the reply of his Government t the Dominican request for a protectorate, in order tha should the French reply be in the negative, the Dominica Government might not be prevented from addressing itsel for a similar purpose to the Government of the Unite States. In fact, on October 3, 1849, Señor Del Monte, o behalf of President Baez, had already inquired officiall of Mr. Green "whether the Government of the Unite States would take the Dominican Republic under its pro tection, or, what they would prefer, annex them." M Green, who was as yet without positive instructions fro Secretary Clayton, was constrained to limit his answer t the statement that the Government of the United Stat

[1] Mr. Benjamin E. Green to Secretary Clayton, August 27, 1849.

uld prefer to see the Dominican people maintain their
ependence, and that the best protectorate the Do-
nicans could obtain would be through recognition of
r independence by treaty with the United States.
e American Commissioner's conventional reply caused
sident Baez himself, two days later, to withdraw from
advanced position taken by his Minister, since he
ised the American Commissioner that he himself had
ays been in the vanguard of those who wished to place
Dominican provinces in the possession of France;
ging a belief that France, having been more concerned
many years past with the affairs of the Island, would
more ready to give effective aid in case of necessity.
At the same time, Mr. Green reported he was informed
Sir Robert Schomburgk that he had just received
ructions from Lord Palmerston that British interests
commerce were not sufficiently involved to justify the
ense of a British protectorate over the Dominican Re-
olic, and that the British Government had so stated in
ly to the Dominican Government's application for pro-
tion against Haiti. Sir Robert Schomburgk added that
British Government had no desire to obtain possession
Samaná, "except with a view to preventing the French
n obtaining it"; and the British Consul added, angered,
Green reports, by the opposition of the President to
ratification of the commercial treaty negotiated by
British agent during the Jiménez régime, "Baez's op-
ition to the provision in the proposed treaty with
at Britain stipulating free trade in favour of English
jects, (an article designed to prevent governmental
nopolies), is explained by his desire to establish a
acco monopoly as the basis of a loan to be obtained
France, in which plan he is personally interested."

On October 20th, Mr. Green was informed by the Mi ister for Foreign Relations that the French Governme had refused to agree to assume a protectorate over t Dominican Republic owing to the opposition of t British Government. The danger of the French prote torate having therefore been removed, Mr. Green lost time in recognizing officially the existence of the Domin can Government by presenting his credentials as Americ Commissioner. His act was welcomed by the Dominica authorities, who, Mr. Green reported, realized that t public presentation of his credentials would encourage t people "who were disheartened by the refusal of France accept the protectorate, and by the consequent danger a renewed invasion from Haiti." Baez, jockeying as eve made the recognition of his Government by the Unit States a leverage in his continued negotiations with t French agent. In a further despatch to the Secretary State, Mr. Green states—

"Del Monte and Baez were the first projectors of a Fren protectorate, on which project they have staked the political reputation, and consider its failure as fatal their own influence and importance. They had the id of making this country a colony of France as anteceden to the first movement for throwing off the Haitian yok They have clung to it for six years, in a great measure ow to it their present position, and will abandon it with gre reluctance." [1]

The support given by General Santana to the petitio from the Cibao urging his approval of the project of American protectorate began necessarily to be galling the Francophile President, whose irritation caused him

[1] Mr. Benjamin E. Green to Secretary Clayton, October 24, 1849.

rn the American Commissioner that the activities fos-
ed by General Santana were most displeasing to him.
twithstanding his knowledge of the special reasons for
urgent interest which Baez had in obtaining the
nch protectorate, Mr. Green could not restrain him-
from arguing that the motives of France when she
favoured the protectorate were hardly such as could
relished by a Dominican patriot. He advised the Presi-
t of his conviction, from certain negotiations of which
was informed, that the sympathies and interests of
nce were with the Haitians; that France would prob-
y be obliged to maintain her refusal to accept the
minican protectorate owing to the determined oppo-
on of England to the scheme; but that should France
ervene even only as mediator between Haiti and the
minican Republic, it would be solely with a view to
cting some arrangement by which the Dominicans
uld be forced to assume a portion of the Haitian debt,
then once more submit to Haitian domination under
guise of a federal reunion.

Mr. Green was well aware that President Baez had
en pains to conceal from public knowledge in Santo
mingo that this very scheme was then being urged
n the French Government by Haitian agents in Paris,
o in turn were supported by the powerful influence of
"Institut d'Afrique." In his despatch to the Secretary
State, Mr. Green reports, commenting upon his con-
sation with Baez, that

e cruelties of the Haitians toward all who spoke the
nish language have given such force and universality to
feeling in favor of the whites in the Dominican Re-
lic that it is not uncommon to hear a very black negro,

when taunted with his color, reply: 'Soy negro, pero negr blanco' [1]." [2]

In the late autumn of 1849, while continuing to pres for a reconsideration by the French Government of th proposals for the French protectorate, upon which hi hopes were staked and in which his personal financia interests, through the hoped-for tobacco monopoly, wer so involved, Baez deemed it necessary to encourage th populace by making some outward demonstration o energy, and to forestall, if possible, for a breathing space the invasion of Soulouque, by taking up the offensiv against Haiti. Such vessels as the Dominican Governmen could command were armed and sent to Haitian water to prey upon Haitian shipping, and to dissipate, if pos sible, the concentration of Haitian forces on the coas near the frontier. Owing in large part to the fact tha the Dominican vessels were commanded by a Frenc officer, Colonel Fagalde, whose constant intemperanc rendered him incapable of giving intelligible orders a crucial moments, the Dominican expedition resulted i greater disaster to the Dominicans themselves than t their Haitian adversaries.

The expedition had, however, the desired effect o postponing for the time being the invasion of Dominica territory by Soulouque, who had by now created him self the Emperor Faustin I, and whose ambitions, wit the assumption of imperial dignity, were ever increasing The Emperor Faustin had in view not only the subjuga tion of the Dominican provinces but also the extensio of Haitian sovereignty to the adjacent islands, to whic his spies and agents had already been sent. Early in Jan

[1] "I am a negro, but a white negro."
[2] Mr. Benjamin E. Green to Secretary Clayton, October 24, 1849.

ry, it became known that a Haitian named "Jacinthe" l been arrested by the authorities of St. Thomas for empting to foment disturbances among the negroes. ien his papers were investigated by the police, it was rned that he had sent to the Haitian Emperor a plan of island of St. Thomas, with full information regarding garrison, and had advised Faustin that it would be y for the Haitians to capture the City and obtain pos- ion of the Island. At the same time, it was learned that Emperor had also been advised that the house of hschild and Company was furnishing arms and ammu- ion to the Dominicans from St. Thomas.

The ambitions of the Haitian Government, as evidenced the divulgence of the St. Thomas conspiracy and by re positive proof of an impending invasion of the minican provinces, caused Mr. Green to advise his Gov- ment that should the United States desire to conclude reaty with the Dominican Government, the Emperor ustin should at once be notified that unless he desisted m further molestation of the Dominican people, the ited States would intervene by force of arms, on the und that continued war between the Dominicans and itians was devastating the Dominican Republic and langering the independence of the country, and was ectly damaging to commercial relations between the minican Republic and the United States.

On January 20, 1850, M. Chedeville, the chancellor of French Consulate in Santo Domingo, who had been for ht months in Paris attempting to induce his Govern- nt to accept the protectorate, returned to Santo Do- ngo unable to obtain any satisfactory reply to the minican proposals. Baez, constrained to accept the vitable, now determined to seek another form of

protection against the Haitian plans of conquest. Hee
ing the ever increasing pressure from the Cibao, an
more powerful yet, the voice of Santana, he was induce
to invite the mediation of the United States. Accordin
to Mr. Green, the fact that a Spanish squadron, hoverin
off the harbour of Santo Domingo for several days, ha
been supposed by President Baez and his Cabinet to be
Haitian fleet, proved an even stronger motive in deter
mining the request for American intervention. At al
events, on January 24, 1850, the following note was sen
by the Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Green:

"HONORABLE SIR:

"I am charged by my Government to communicate t
you that, desirous of putting an end to the cruel war whic
we have maintained against the Haitians since the momen
of our glorious separation, we would see with pleasure th
intervention of the powerful Anglo-American natio
which you represent to obtain peace, which is so necessar
to the moral and physical progress of our country; i
being well understood that we will preserve always ou
nationality and independence as a condition sine qua no
of any agreement with our enemies.

"With sentiments of the highest consideration, I am
etc.,

M. T. DELMONTE
Minister of Justice, Public Instruction an
Foreign Relations."

The appeal to the United States was strongly supporte
by all the members of the Cabinet, who had by now defi
nitely abandoned the hope of obtaining a French protec
torate, although Baez, encouraged by the appointment t
the French Ministry in 1850 of Ferdinand Barrot,
brother of the Adolphe Barrot who, as French Commi

ıer to Haiti in 1843, had originally devised the pro-
torate project with Baez, deluded himself that the
eme might now receive greater support in Paris.
The request for American mediation was at once
posed by the French and British representatives; in
opinion of Mr. Green, because of the desire of their
pective Governments to see the Haitians victorious
in possession of the eastern end of the Island. The
itude of Sir Robert Schomburgk left no doubt in the
ıerican Agent's mind that his instructions were dic-
:d by a very strong bias in favour of the Haitians; and
dilatory policy of the French was due, he claimed, to
insistence of the Haitian Government that it could
continue to pay the charges on its French debt unless
obtained possession of the revenues from the ports of
eastern end of the island. Pressing for the conclusion
the pending treaty with England, Sir Robert Schom-
gk intimated to President Baez, early in February, that
re the treaty proposed by him, inclusive of the article
hibiting monopolies, to be signed by the Dominican
nipotentiary, the intervention of Great Britain would
offered to the Dominican Government with a view to
venting further Haitian invasions.
Baez thereupon informed Mr. Green that he had posi-
e information that the Haitians were prepared to in-
e the Republic at an early date, and that he, naturally
ugh, desired to know what the United States Govern-
nt proposed to do in response to the Dominicans' plea
assistance. To this Mr. Green replied that he had
ady urged his Government to intervene but was un-
e as yet to give any positive assurances as to what
onsibilities it would in fact undertake. Baez, under
stant pressure from the French and British agents to

call upon France and England for their mediation, rathe
than upon the United States, and alleging that action b
the latter Government might be too long delayed to pre
vent the anticipated invasion, determined that the bes
solution of his difficulty was to invite the mediation o
the three powers conjointly. Consequently, identic note
similar to the note already addressed to the America
Commissioner, were despatched on February 22, 1850, t
Mr. Green and to the French and British Consuls.

In May, 1850, Mr. Green was instructed to proceed t
Port-au-Prince. No decision had been reached by Secre
tary Clayton whether the United States should join wit
France and England in the projected intervention, and n
reply was made to the Dominican request. But the Ameri
can Commissioner's sympathies appear by now to hav
been strongly enlisted on the side of the Dominican peo
ple, since he admired the courage with which they wer
prepared, single-handed, to repel the threatened attac
upon their independence, and the splendid tenacity wit
which, despite the unworthiness of their rulers, they wer
attempting to solve their domestic problems. Ascertainin
upon his arrival in Port-au-Prince that two America
firms, Messrs. B. C. Clark and Company, of Boston, an
Messrs. Ropier and Company, of New York, had engage
to send vessels with provisions and army supplies to assis
the Haitians in attacking the Dominicans, he urged th
Secretary of State to take prompt action to prevent th
planned infraction of the neutrality laws of the Unite
States.

What was far more dangerous, Mr. Green learned, wa
the fact that the Emperor Faustin had forestalled th
official intervention which France and England had b
then agreed to undertake, by obtaining from the Frenc

British Consuls in Port-au-Prince the transmission to Dominican Government of the terms of peace which Haitian Emperor was willing to propose. The terms e such as Mr. Green had feared the European Powers uld favour. As soon as he learned of these proposals, Mr. en returned hastily to Santo Domingo. There he was ised by the President of the full extent of the ignominy ch the acceptance of such terms would entail:

1. The Dominicans were to acknowledge the authority he Emperor and to raise the Haitian flag;
2. In return therefor, Faustin would promise to ap- nt none but Dominicans to office within the limits of minican territory, and would confer titles of nobility n Generals Santana and Baez, the former of whom uld remain as military, and the latter as civil, governor he 'Eastern Department';
3. He would likewise confer titles of nobility upon h other Dominicans as the Dominican Government ght indicate, and would appoint several Dominican zens members of the Senate in Port-au-Prince;
4. He would station no troops within the limits of minican territory, and would permit the Dominican horities to maintain their army and navy in the same e of efficiency as existed at that time."

Before the American Commissioner's return to Santo mingo, the Dominican Government, although fearing offend the mediating Powers, had made its position n:

As the Dominican Government has requested the diation of the three great Powers, England, France and United States of America, no negotiations on this sub- can be begun before the certainty of the acceptance ejection of the said request shall have been obtained.

"In the meantime, let it not seem strange to you to see us making the greatest preparations to repel our enemies as we have heretofore done, even when less able than now if they still persist in invading our territory." [1]

The sudden death in the summer of 1850 of President Taylor, which brought with it the appointment of Daniel Webster as Secretary of State by President Fillmore, resulted in the recall of Mr. Green. In his last despatch to the Department of State, he expressed his well founded fears for the safety of the Dominican people should the United States refuse to intervene in their behalf, and advised the new Secretary of State that the Emperor Faustin had sworn "by the soul of his mother, that he will not leave a chicken alive on Dominican soil." In reporting upon the course of his mission, Mr. Green stated that he had obtained the confidence of General Santana and of the latter's loyal follower, General Abad Alfau, but that while he had sought to establish the most cordial relations with President Baez he had the best of reasons for believing that he was the enemy of the United States. Mr. Green may not have been wrong in his conjecture that Sir Robert Schomburgk, availing himself of the fact that General Baez was of mixed blood, might well have increased his prejudice against the United States by enlarging upon the manner in which the coloured race was treated in so great a portion of the territory of the United States at that time.

Upon the refusal of the Dominican Government to entertain the proposals proffered by Faustin, the latter obdurately refused for some time to assent to the mediation of the French and British representatives. Upon

[1] Señor José Maria Medrano, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Sir Robert Schomburgk, British Consul, April 30, 1850.

eipt of this information, general alarm manifested lf throughout the Dominican territory. The general prehension is pictured in despatches of the American mmercial Agent:

The feelings of the people here, their hopes and dedence, rest entirely upon being noticed by the United tes. These hopes have been raised by Special Agents t out here. I have learned, through Sir Robert Schomgk, that the United States has agreed, in conjunction h England and France, to mediate between this Rolic and the so-called Empire of Haiti through their pective consuls. This, added to Mr. Green's having been e eight months and it being well understood that he ne here with powers to recognize this Republic and ke a treaty and living here without entering into any otiation, has destroyed the confidence which this Govment have heretofore had in me. After both the vernments on this Island had complied and assented to mediation of the three Powers, the Emperor Soulouque rched his men and committed depredations upon these ple. The French and English Consuls here jointly made rotest against this movement. Rather than permit the nsuls of France and England to stand forward in the se of humanity and republicanism more than myself as representative of the United States, I alone made a ilar protest and shared with them the expense of sending same to Haiti, which cost me $84, which I hope will be unded me by my Government.

* * * *

All that this people ask for is peace with the Haitians. ey have nobly sustained themselves for seven years as a ublic without involving themselves in debt. They have ght well and bravely; have left their families to supt themselves, while they, without pay, without medical

attendance, without food and almost naked, have willingl marched and fought for the cause of liberty. While the hold the implement of agriculture in one hand to rais crops which it is doubtful they can reap, they are oblige to keep the sword in the other. To this I have been witness.

* * * *

"In regard to the mediation between this part of th Island and that of Haiti, I learn from authentic source that England and France have determined to blockade th ports of Haiti in consequence of Soulouque's refusing t come to an armistice of ten days. The policy of the Frenc is this. The Haitians owe to them a large sum of money which they never can pay so long as they continue at wa with these people. The policy of the English to sustain th negroes in the Antilles is well known, and the interferenc on their part is more for the protection of Haiti again certain supposed expeditions and to oblige them to wor and improve their part of the Island." [1]

5

With the advent of Daniel Webster as Secretary o State, the policy of the United States took definite shap Secretary Webster's sympathies were strongly enlisted o the side of the Dominicans. He refused to countenanc the policy of indifference to the sufferings of the strug gling Republic which Secretary Clayton had pursued not withstanding the repeated protests of his Commissioner Determining, soon after he took office, that the only effec tive method for maintaining the stability of the Domini can Government lay in joining France and England in joint mediation, he announced the acceptance of th responsibilities entailed, and later caused the appointmen as Special Agent by President Fillmore, in the first day

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Webster, July 13, September 29 and Novem ber 30, 1850.

the new year, 1851, of Mr. Robert M. Walsh, who was
tructed to proceed immediately to Port-au-Prince to
n the representatives of France and England in their
orts to secure, if not a definite peace, at least a suspen-
n of hostilities for a long period between Haiti and the
minican Republic.

To govern the conduct of his negotiations, Mr. Walsh
s handed by Secretary Webster, before his departure
m Washington, the following instructions:

"Department of State
Washington, 18th January, 1851

ONFIDENTIAL
R. M. WALSH, Esquire,

Although in the letter of the Department of this date
are directed to be governed in your proceedings in St.
mingo by the views expressed in the instructions of Sir
nry L. Bulwer to Mr. Usher, yet as the latter may con-
ve those instructions to warrant him in demanding from
Dominican Republic in behalf of the Emperor
louque, concessions which, if yielded, would, it is be-
ed, trench upon the just rights of that Republic, and
uld therefore render insecure any peace which may be
blished between the parties, it is deemed advisable to
ert to those points, in order that you may endeavor to
st them so far as you can compatibly with the main
ect of your mission.

It is probable that Soulouque may require an extension
is dominions so as to include a part of the territory
merly belonging to the Spanish quarter of the Island,
now embraced within the territory of the Dominican
ublic. This pretension will, it is presumed, be set up on
ground that the population of the French part of the
nd is much more numerous than that of the Spanish

part, and yet that the number of square miles embraced by the former is considerably less than that embraced by the latter. There might be some weight in this pretension if the difference between the areas of the territories of the parties respectively were greater than that which actually exists; if the boundaries between them were not naturally good; or if the population of Soulouque's dominions were inconveniently crowded or were likely to become so within any appreciable time. As the reverse of all this, however is believed to be the truth, you will object to any extension of Soulouque's territory. If, however, a treaty of peace should be concluded between the parties, the boundary should therein be defined so as in future to leave no cause of dispute between them respecting it.

"If, also, the Emperor Soulouque, should require from his adversary any concession of a humiliating character such as the hoisting of his flag at the City of Santo Domingo, even temporarily, you will oppose it as being incompatible with the actual state of the contending parties, and as being certain to leave a rancorous feeling in the bosoms of the Dominicans, dangerous to the perpetuity of peace. They have shown much gallantry in expelling the Haitians in 1844 and in repulsing the subsequent attempts to resubjugate them. From the information in possession of the Department, it is believed that they desire peace, not so much through any consciousness of inability to maintain their independence, as from a wish to cultivate the arts of peace and thereby develop the vast and almost virgin resources of their part of the Island. The mode of warfare adopted by the Haitians, impelled as they have on former occasions been, not by the lust of dominion only but by their savage antipathy to a different race, is shocking to humanity, denounced by international law, and cannot claim any sympathy from civilized communities.

"The Department understands that one of Soulouque's

etexts for bearing arms against the Dominicans is, that less he can reestablish Haitian authority in their territory, he cannot, without the revenue which would then collected in their ports, resume the payment of the aitian debt to France. There is some cause to apprehend at this pretext has not been without influence in the ench Councils adverse to the Dominicans. It is difficult, wever, to understand why it should have made any impression, especially when it is considered that the Ordinance Charles X in 1825, by which the independence of Haiti ecognized upon the condition of their paying 150,000,-0 francs to France, expressly confines that recognition the French part of the Island.

"I am, Sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

DANIEL WEBSTER."

Mr. Walsh arrived at Port-au-Prince on board the S.S. *Saranac* on February 2, 1851. Immediately after arrival, he obtained an audience with the Emperor:

"The courtyard was filled with troops in rather motley ire, who saluted as we passed, and the hall of reception s crowded with ministers and generals and other dig-aries who made quite a glittering show. Soon after our trance, the Emperor made his appearance in a costume ich, though rich, was not in bad taste, preceded by uts of 'Vive l'Empereur' from his courtiers, and we re then presented in due form. He seemed at first de-edly embarrassed, as if he did not know what to say or . . . . On being informed that the *Saranac* would ve in a day or two, he manifested not the least chagrin. e truth is, the big ship in the harbor is not a pleasant ctacle to his eyes. It is a pity the commander cannot tract his stay here, as the presence of the steamer would terially assist our negotiations. Faustin I is stout and

short and very black, with an unpleasant expression and a carriage that does not grace a throne. He is ignorant in the extreme but has begun to learn to read and write and is said to exhibit commendable diligence in his studies. Energy and decision are his most important traits and no soft feelings are likely to interfere with their full display when occasion calls them forth. . . . It is stated that one of the chief causes of the Emperor's intended expedition against the Dominican Republic is his desire to be crowned in the City of Santo Domingo." [1]

On February 7, 1851, Mr. Walsh addressed a note to the Duke of Tiburón, the Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which he made the following declarations:

"The Government of the United States, having determined to coöperate with the Governments of England and France in bringing about the pacification of this Island, has sent me as its agent for that purpose. It believes that the only proper way to accomplish it is for the Government of Haiti to acknowledge the independence of the Republic of Santo Domingo, that independence having been now so long maintained as to prove the impossibility of its being overthrown by the power of this Empire, and in consequence to establish its claim to general recognition. Any further prosecution of the war, therefore, is abhorrent to the dictates of humanity and reason and injurious to the interests of neutrals. . . . The principle is now fully established that the actual possession of independence for a reasonable time entitles a nation to be acknowledged as sovereign. This is a principle which the American world established as consecrated and must ever be upheld . . . The best interests of the Haitian Empire demand the recognition of Dominican independence . . . In every point of view, therefore, the Government of the United States en-

[1] Mr. Robert M. Walsh to Secretary Webster, February 5, 1851.

rtains the conviction that it is incumbent upon the mperor to recognize the independence of Santo Do-ingo."

Upon receipt of this note, the Haitian Minister called on Mr. Walsh in order to declaim a set speech which he d prepared in advance, in which the Minister main-ined that the island was one and indivisible in accord-ce with the "designs of nature," and also that as the aitian Constitution declared that the Dominican Prov-ces formed a part of Haiti, the Dominican people had right to withdraw from that connection. Mr. Walsh, hough it must have been difficult for him to reply avely to such logic, succeeded in limiting himself to ting that the designs of nature were not necessarily od titles in law, and that the proclamation as a fact what did not exist, by no means called it into being; r the Constitution of 1806 referred to by the Duke of burón was promulgated by Haiti long before the junc-re of the two parts of the Island had been effected.

Previous to Mr. Walsh's arrival, the French and British gents, in conjunction with the Commercial Agent of e United States in Port-au-Prince, had succeeded in taining from the Emperor Faustin a truce of two nths, with one month's notice of the renewal of hos-ities. They had continued to urge upon the Emperor a finitive peace, but, finding that impossible, had pro-sed a truce of ten years on December 19, 1850. When r. Walsh arrived in Port-au-Prince, no answer to the nt proposal had yet been given by the Haitian Govern-ent. Finally, on March 3, 1851, the Haitian Minister formed Mr. Walsh and his French and British colleagues at no official answer could be given by the Haitian Gov-

ernment to their insistence upon the recognition by Haiti of the independence of the Dominican Republic, inasmuch as it involved a breach of the Constitution. The three agents protested at this palpable attempt to promote further delay, remarking that even if Constitutional difficulties existed, they had nothing to do with the declaration of a formal truce. The only reply which this protest elicited was the statement by the Minister that "His Majesty will do nothing without consulting the Senate, his first duty being to God and to observe the Constitution." Mr. Walsh, in his report to Secretary Webster, stated that it was only with considerable difficulty that he and his colleagues could "keep their faces straight" upon receiving this answer.

The Haitian Government, to postpone matters further and to involve the foreign representatives in long drawn-out discussions, appointed four commissioners to confer with them. On March 6th, the three agents had their first and only interview with this commission. They were then notified that the Emperor had summoned the Chambers of Congress to assemble on March 21st, to consider the weighty questions involved.

During the course of the protracted negotiations, Mr. Walsh does not appear to have been without diversion:

"The birthday of the Emperor was celebrated a few days since . . . At the reception, various toasts felicitating His Majesty were pronounced by the representatives of different deputations. To all of them, he made replies which might have been comprehensible if they had only been audible. But he is so embarrassed upon such occasions, besides having a natural defect of speech, that his remarks rarely succeeded in crossing the threshold of his lips. His knowledge, moreover, of French is slight; the only lan-

:age, if it may be dignified by that epithet, with which he familiar being the creole patois of the country. To the w words of compliment which I addressed him, he oked a brief response, but that was all as far as my ears uld ascertain. . . . His diffidence is reported to be the sult of an intense consciousness of his own deficiencies mbined with a dread which is always haunting him of licule. . . . He is approaching threescore and ten al-ough he does not in the least represent that age. The gor of his frame and color of his hair do not betray the ssage of even fifty winters. His peculiar sensitiveness was e cause of the enmity which for some time rankled in his east against the mulattoes, who, on his election as Presi-nt, despising his apparent imbecility, made him the butt all sorts of jests—an enmity which on the 16th of April, 48, was somewhat appeased by the slaughter of many the most prominent of his yellow compatriots. The npress and his daughter, the Princess Olive, were seated ar him during the levee, but not on the platform which pported his chair of state. The former is a very ordinary ack woman in appearance, and the latter, a child of about n years old, does not bid fair to surpass her mother in rsonal charms. . . . There was a great display of plumes d gold lace. . . . Two of the maids of honor of the npress, who had absented themselves for some reason hich was not considered good, were arrested by her ders and sent to different places in the country to expiate eir crime in solitary punishment." [1]

On the day preceding the assembling of the Haitian ongress, Mr. Walsh, wearied by the interminable con-rsations which resulted in no definite commitment, livered an ultimatum to the Haitian Minister for For-gn Affairs. He insisted upon an immediate reply to the

[1] Mr. R. M. Walsh to Secretary Webster, March 3, 1851.

demand of the three Powers for pacification of the Island, and stated that, "he would warn the Haitian Government for the last time, in the most earnest and emphatic manner, against any attack upon the Dominican Republic. It may be sure that any attempt of the kind will only result in disaster to itself." [1]

On the following day, the Emperor attended the opening of the session of Congress:

"The ceremony of the Chambers was performed with all possible parade . . . His Majesty and suite were robed for the occasion in costumes just arrived from France, making such a display as I have never seen rivalled except at Franconi's in Paris, and certainly none but theatrical magnificoes would venture to exhibit such varicolored and glittering splendor in any other metropolis however imperialistic. The toilette of Soulouque himself was quite wonderful, especially the chapeau with its half dozen feathers of different hues." [2]

The deliberations of the Haitian Congress, completely under the domination of Faustin, had no positive result, as Mr. Walsh had anticipated, and on April 23rd he was forced to report to Secretary Webster that the Haitian Government positively rejected a truce for ten years or a definitive peace with the Dominican Republic, and had proposed as an alternative that prior to a settlement the Dominicans must recognize the sovereignty of Haiti. The sole benefit of practical result obtained by the joint mediation was the promise on the part of Faustin to abstain from hostilities until England, France and the United States had been officially informed. But the intervention

[1] Mr. R. M. Walsh to the Duke de Tiburón, Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 20, 1851.

[2] Mr. R. M. Walsh to Secretary Webster, April 8, 1851.

f the three Governments was also productive in con-incing the Emperor of the impossibility, for the moment, f obtaining possession of the eastern part of the Island, though, to assert himself, Faustin compelled Congress to eclare that it was not competent to take any step which ould result in the modification of the Constitution of 306.

In the first days of May, Mr. Walsh traveled to Santo omingo on the French warship *Cocodrile,* accompa-ed by the French Consul-General in Port-au-Prince. rior to his departure from the Haitian capital, he com-unicated to Secretary Webster his opinion of the condi-ons existing in the Haitian Empire, which, while it may e prejudiced, presents a vivid picture:

"The Haitian Government, in spite of its Constitutional orm, is a despotism of the most ignorant, corrupt and icious description, with a military establishment so enor-ous that while it absorbs the largest portion of its revenue or its support, it dries up the very sources of national rosperity, by depriving the fields of their necessary borers to fill the towns with pestilent hordes of depraved nd irreclaimable idlers. The treasury is bankrupt. . . . he population is immersed in Cimmerian darkness that an never be pierced by the few and feeble rays which anate from the higher portions of the social system. he influences of civilized life—the influences of religion, erature, science, or art—they do not exert the least prac-cal sway, even if they can be said to exist at all. . . . he press is shackled to such a degree as to prevent the least eedom of printing and people are afraid to give utter-ce, even in confidential conversation, to aught that may e tortured into the slightest criticism of the action of the overnment. . . . The ultimate regeneration of the

Haitians seems to me to be the wildest Utopian dream." [1]

Upon Mr. Walsh's arrival in Santo Domingo, he delivered to Señor Medrano the following personal letter from Secretary Webster:

"To His Excellency
The Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Dominican Republic.

"Sir:

"Allow me to introduce to Your Excellency Mr. Robert M. Walsh, who visits the Dominican Republic as a Special Agent of the United States for objects which he will in due time make known to Your Excellency. He is aware of the interest which we take in the prosperity of that Republic, of our strong desire to cultivate its friendship, and to deserve it by all the good offices which may be in our power. He is also aware of my zeal to promote these by whatever may depend upon my ministry. I have no doubt that Mr. Walsh will so conduct himself as to merit your confidence, and I avail myself with pleasure of this occasion to offer to Your Excellency the assurance of my most distinguished consideration.

DANIEL WEBSTER

"Department of State,
Washington, 18th January, 1851."

The terms of Mr. Webster's letter created the most favourable impression upon the Cabinet. Mr. Walsh reports the President as saying that while his Government was gratified to hear that the Emperor of Haiti promised not to make war, it was naturally disappointed to learn that he would not consent to make peace; and that Baez expressed the utmost confidence in the ability of the

[1] Mr. R. M. Walsh to Secretary Webster, April 8, 1851.

Dominican people, unassisted, to repel an invasion, and ssured the American Agent of his gratitude for the ood offices interposed in his Government's behalf by the Jnited States.

In summing up his impressions for Secretary Webster's enefit, Mr. Walsh declared that although the mediation elieved the Dominicans

for the time being of apprehension of attack, it did not llow them to lay aside their arms and devote themselves o the pursuits of peace; and they expressed the strong ope that the three Powers would continue their inter- osition until the independence of the Republic had been ecured. That result can only be accomplished by coercing he Haitian Government. All persuasion and argument are hrown away on it; all sense of duty and justice and right s merged by it in sanguinary ambition and avaricious self- shness. The Dominicans will listen to no terms which do ot establish their national sovereignty which they have so ng and so successfully defended. They would prefer total xtermination, as they declare and as their conduct demon- trates, to falling again under the atrocious despotism vhich they have shaken off, and every consideration in the nterest of justice and of humanity demands that their ndependence should be placed on a secure and permanent asis." [1]

Mr. Walsh's mission being limited in his instructions to our months' time, he was obliged to leave Santo Domingo mmediately after the presentation of his credentials to he Dominican Government.

6.

The practical failure of the efforts of the mediating owers in attempting to force upon the Haitian Emperor

[1] Mr. R. M. Walsh to Secretary Webster, June 10, 1851.

a truce of at least ten years with the Dominican Republic caused Baez to realize that the country must, for the time being, at least, depend upon its own resources in warding off the imminent attack from Haiti. In the spring of 1851, he called to arms a large number of troops from the eastern Provinces, at whose head General Santana marched to the capital. For the time being the mobilization resulted in nothing more concrete than a great military parade outside the walls of Santo Domingo, but the steps taken by Baez were seen, the following autumn, not to have lacked justification. By the middle of September, the Emperor Faustin had again assembled a very large armed force, with headquarters at Ounaminthe across the Massacre River from Dajabón.

General Santana, unwilling to acquiesce calmly in any military decisions reached by Baez, moved, on his own initiative, a correspondingly large body of Dominican troops to the Province of Monte Cristi; Baez thereupon despatched large forces from the capital to the frontier, and with his staff sailed around the island to the scene of the anticipated hostilities. But the speedy mobilization of the Dominican troops rendered possible by the activity displayed by the Dominican authorities proved to be sufficient to dissuade the Haitian Emperor from the intended invasion. Faustin withdrew his troops from the frontier in brief order and returned to Port-au-Prince, where he received, in December, two months after the activity displayed by the Dominicans rendered any foreign intervention unnecessary, stern warning from France and England that those two nations were determined to enforce respect for the independence of the Dominican Republic.

By the year 1852, the constant interference of Santana

the affairs of the Government began to prove almost tolerable to Baez. It became impossible for the President take any determined action regarding the organization the army, under his nominal control, without the prior sent of the ex-President, and Santana even insisted upon e submission to him of all questions involving the for-gn policy of the Republic. After the ratification of the eaty with France signed May 8, 1852, Baez despatched eneral Abad Alfau to Port-au-Prince to attempt to ne-otiate directly with the Haitian Emperor the peace which e latter had been unwilling to conclude at the behest of rance, England and the United States. The negotiations roved fruitless; and since the step taken by Baez proved stasteful to Santana, the President was obliged to make, he did also upon several other occasions, an expiatory lgrimage to El Prado to explain matters to Santana and ceive assurances that the latter's displeasure would not pressed to such a point as to prevent Baez from serving ut his Presidential term. Baez was not yet able to assert mself.

Owing to the pressure of public opinion, which was nvinced at the time that Santana was effectively the erator of the Republic and the proven defender of the tion's independence, Baez was compelled, notwith-anding his evident reluctance, to approve, before the piration of his term of office, a decree of the Congress anting Santana not only a golden sword suitably in-ribed, but likewise a grant of $16,000 pending such time the finances of the nation permitted the Republic to ace at his disposal a yearly pension for the remainder of s life. It was, in fact, painfully evident to Baez that ntana had obtained such an effective control over the my and was so strongly supported by the mass of the

people that his own continuance in the Presidential chair depended solely upon the whim of the "Liberator" of the Republic.

Two months prior to the termination of Baez's term of office, on December 18, 1852, the Spanish man-of-war, *Isabel Segunda,* arrived at Santo Domingo, bearing on board the Spanish historian, Don Mariano Torrente, who had been sent to the Republic by General Cañedo, then Captain-General of Cuba, as his Special Agent. To avoid diplomatic or local comment, Torrente appeared first in the guise of the vessel's purser, later as an itinerant explorer. But the masquerade was soon discontinued, since shortly after his arrival he was publicly welcomed into the Cathedral by the entire chapter of the clergy with the Archbishop at their head. To make Torrente's mission sufficiently significant the Prelate is reported to have remarked, upon pointing out to the visitor the Spanish arms, still fixed above the High Altar:

"Look there, Sir, dominating everything, is the noble shield of the glorious Spanish arms, preserved by the unanimous respect and affectionate veneration which the Dominican people ever bear for your country. There we keep it as a reminder of better days and as a symbol of our hope for a happier and more tranquil future!" [1]

After such a tribute the Spanish Agent was not astonished to have the President, who, forced to abandon the French protectorate project, was only too desirous of cutting out the ground from under Santana's feet by obtaining the sympathies of Spain on his own behalf, approach him on the subject of annexation. On this subject, however, Torrente was not authorized to speak, and in reply merely pointed out that Spanish recognition would doubt-

[1] General de la Gándara "Anexión y Guerra de Santo Domingo."

ss be hastened should the Dominican Government assume
a portion of its national debt the amount of the claims
eld by those Spanish subjects whose properties had suf-
ered confiscation during the Haitian Occupation, and
ould the Republic volunteer to negotiate a commercial
eaty with Spain, in which Spain were accorded most-
avored-nation privileges.

Torrente's insinuations bore fruit rapidly, although he
imself remained in the Republic but a brief period. As a
nal bid for Spanish favour, in his farewell address to the
ongress, which had assembled January 26, 1853, and had
once elected the "Liberator" President of the Republic,
aez urged the national legislative body to adopt in every
articular the proposals advanced by Torrente.

7.

On February 15, 1853, General Pedro Santana again
ook office as President of the Republic, and on February
7th, the tenth anniversary of the Republic's independ-
nce, a general celebration was held. *El Progreso* of March
, 1853, contains a glowing account of the festivities:

"Great was the enthusiasm which the public showed in
elebrating the memorable day of their glorious inde-
endence; the day upon which they broke the chains of
avery and showed themselves to the world triumphantly
emonstrating their liberty and presenting an example to
l nations of how strong the political determination of a
eople may be.

"The decorations, the music, the illumination, and above
l the joyful acclamations had been announcing since the
revious evening that the populace filled with joy was cele-
rating their remembrance of a memorable day.

"There dawned the day of the 27th of February. Great
owds filled the streets and squares of the City and the
eat of the drums, the sound of the military music, and

the salutes of the cannon made perfect harmony with the general animation. At eight o'clock in the morning appeared in the Plaza de Armas the Liberator, the President of the Republic, followed by a great number of attendants reflecting in his visage the modesty which is innate in him and accepting the honors which he so well deserves with the same expression with which he confronted adverse fate on more than one occasion. A moment before entering the holy Cathedral, where a solemn Te Deum was to be celebrated, he addressed the following allocution to the people and to the Island:

" 'Dominicans! I was in retirement in my home given up to the care of my family and enjoying, moreover, the tranquillity which has been existing for some time in our beloved country, when the voice of the people, which is for me the first of all laws, called me by suffrage to preside for the fourth time over the destinies of the Nation. . . .

" 'The advantage of preserving complete harmony in our diplomatic relations is incalculable and I shall make every effort to see that it shall never be interrupted. I realize, moreover, that we should likewise enter into contact with other foreign powers and in accordance with this conviction, I sent to some of them, in my earlier four-year period of administration, diplomatic agents with instructions designed to that end. I believe it possible to obtain it, and to unite our interests with others through treaties of friendship and commerce, and to that purpose I will dedicate a portion of my administrative efforts. . . . I value justly the helpful influence which the intervention of powerful friendly nations can exert over the destinies of the Republic in their decision to protect our sacred cause by intimating to the Haitian Government that it must cease in its impudent and impracticable pretensions to dominate this territory.—I shall now conclude, but listen

o me well. If, notwithstanding the mediation of the riendly nations; if, notwithstanding their noble and just lesires, the Haitian chief were to persist in arming his egions and with them march against us, you need never e alarmed. Remember that already a thousand times have ve defeated his impudent attempts and punished with eath his temerity; and finally, count upon the strength f my arm, as I count upon the strength of yours, and elieve unfalteringly that I shall always be disposed to acrifice my life in defending our dear country.

" 'Long live religion, national union, independence and he Dominican Republic!' " [1]

The return to power of Santana was received with pproval by the great mass of the people, which was onvinced that the "Liberator" was its mainstay against Haitian assaults; even the remaining members of the old iberal party welcomed his inauguration; and General rancisco Sánchez, notwithstanding his enforced retirement from active political life, addressed a congratulatory message to the President through the public press.

The day after his inauguration, Santana appointed General Pedro Eugenio Pelletier Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ustice and Public Instruction; Don Miguel Lavastida ecretary of Interior and Police; Don Francisco Cruz Moreno Secretary of Finance and Commerce; and upon he refusal of General Felipe Alfau to accept the portolio of War and Marine, his brother, General Abad Alfau, as appointed to that position.

Further light is thrown upon the general situation in the ountry after the inauguration of Santana, and in particlar upon the international relations of the Government, y despatches from the American Commercial Agent:

[1] *El Progreso*, Santo Domingo, March 6, 1853.

"The object of Mariano Torrente, who recently came here in the Spanish steamer *Isabel Segunda,* was to form an alliance with this Government. They offer to land here a Spanish force of 5,000 men in case difficulties should arise with the United States and the proposition has been favorably received. He also went to Haiti to make the same propositions.

"The French are also intriguing for favor here. They are building a steamer for this Government and are completely to man, equip, and furnish everything except the hull, for which this Government have paid them $45,000. The French Consul General, M. Raybaud, is shortly expected here and I believe one of his principal objects is to make a secret treaty of alliance with this Government, as it is well known here that they have requested a military force from France, the greater part of which is to be placed at Samaná.

"According to Article 210 of the Dominican Constitution, the President has absolute power to do as he chooses without consulting Congress. Consequently he need not make public his acts.

"Today, Mr. Juan Abril embarked for Havana, via St. Thomas, to negotiate with the Governor-General of Cuba in regard to the propositions made to this Government.

"It is very probable he will come to Washington to make propositions. His departure and mission has been kept very secret. Should this gentleman arrive in Washington to propose a treaty and should the Government be disposed to enter into negotiations, it would be well to make me acquainted with the same, as I have some suggestions to make which will be of great importance to the Government.

"I earnestly request that the President will not send any more Special Agents here. It has done no good, but to the contrary, a great deal of injury to our interests. . . . Spain is making some alliance with this Government to

rotect them against the Haitians and more particularly
) prevent any large emigration to this part of the Island
rom the United States. . . . General Santana told me in
conversation that he intended to send a mission to Wash-
gton to obtain a recognition of this Republic and make
treaty. . . . The country at present is in such a wretched
ate and no disposition in the people to work under any
rcumstances that unless a large emigration come here, it
impossible for this Republic to sustain itself." [1]

As soon as Santana had firmly established himself in the
residency and had obtained convincing proofs of the
eneral popularity which, for the time being, he enjoyed
roughout the Republic, he determined to eliminate from
ne political scene the two elements which had caused him
isquiet during the preceding four years. The first was the
lergy, whose intervention in political matters had in-
reased during the Presidency of Baez; the second was
aez himself.

Brusquely ordering the aged Archbishop, Don Tomás
e Portes e Infante, to appear before the Senate, Santana
ccused the prelate of fostering dissatisfaction among the
eople with the civil authorities, and ordered him, with-
ut mincing words, to take the oath of allegiance to the
onstitution. The Archbishop at first refused, but upon
eing confronted with an order exiling him from the
epublic should he continue in his refusal, he at length
ave in and took the oath required of him. The agitation
aused the Archbishop, who had reached an advanced age,
) lose his mind, and the speedy exile of those more influ-
ntial members of the upper hierarchy who had refused
) follow the example of their superior by obeying the
ommands of the President, left the direction of the

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, March 7, 1853, and May 3, 1853.

Church in the hands of such submissive clerics that the President was caused no further uneasiness. As soon as this step had been accomplished, Santana turned his attention to Baez, who had retired to his estates in Azua.

As the first step in his campaign against the man whom he now had valid reason to fear as a potential rival, and whose attempt to supplant him in his championship of the Spanish policy was a further motive for his elimination, Santana commanded his spokesmen in the Congress to draw up a scathing reply to Baez's farewell address. The reply was well drafted, and its effect was only diminished by the fact that the Congress had previously passed a resolution expressing its high appreciation of Baez's accomplishments. In the reply dictated by Santana, the representatives declared that the sole benefits occasioned the nation during the Presidency of Baez were those for which Santana alone was responsible; that it was by his insistence alone that they had been rendered possible, and that had it not been for Santana's utmost exertions, the administration of Baez would have resulted in general disorder. The Congress claimed that, far from leaving the national treasury in a satisfactory condition, as he had alleged, Baez had left it empty, and that his recommendations to the Legislative Body to assume as a part of the national debt the claims of Spanish subjects, would, if carried out, prove ruinous to the nation.

After sufficient time had elapsed to enable Santana to ascertain that the charges formulated against Baez by the Congress were generally welcomed, he called together, on July 3, 1853, all the civil and military authorities of the capital to a general meeting in the Palacio del Congreso, outside of which the troops had been marshalled as if for a military parade. Thereupon, the President read a mani-

festo addressed to the Dominican people. Commencing his address with the declaration that his acceptance of the Chief Magistracy was solely due to his belief that by that method only could he save the nation from utter disaster, the irascible "Liberator" speedily plunged into a long drawn out and detailed arraignment of Baez: Baez had been opposed from the outset to the patriotic revolution of 1844; as soon as the revolution had broken out, Baez had despatched an Agent from Azua to the President of Haiti warning him of the rebellion, and giving him full information of the movements of the revolutionary troops; Baez, as recently as 1849, had undertaken clandestine negotiations with leading Haitians, from whom he had received financial support which he had later, as President of the Republic, repaid from national funds; Baez had at various times offered the support of the Dominican Government to Haitian revolutionaries, and had even attempted to facilitate the entrance into the Republic of Haitian troops; Baez had proposed to Santana, when the former had decreed mobilization of the national forces in 1851, that they combine in overthrowing the Constitutional Government of the Republic and form a joint dictatorship—and although Santana, as he said, had scornfully rejected the proposal, Baez would, on subsequent occasions, have carried it into effect had he not feared that Santana's opposition would render its success impossible.

The pent-up accumulation of jealousy, the remembrance of all the intentional and imagined slights of the past four years, burst forth and ended in a vulgar tirade. Baez the conspirator—the arch-traitor—the assassin— the scorn of every true patriot; the old "Liberator" stood before the members of his cabinet, who cringed

before an outburst of fury of which they had not for years seen the like, before his Generals in their gold lace and all the assembled dignitaries, spent with rage. At the end of his harangue Santana's mood changed—he admitted his responsibility for the elevation of Baez to the Presidency, and told his listeners he hoped the frank confession of his earlier error would obtain him the forgiveness of his fellow-citizens. But he lost little time in simulated, or at least vain, regrets. Declaring that the safety of the Republic demanded it, he announced that he had determined to avail himself of the prerogatives vested in him by Article 210 of the Constitution to decree the perpetual exile from the territory of the Republic of Buenaventura Baez.

As they left the Palace and walked past the assembled troops in the Plaza de la Catedral, Santana's auditors must privately have formulated to themselves the query they dared not make openly—why had Santana elevated to the Presidency a man whom he had long known guilty of the grossest treachery to his own country? That unanswerable question, which must ever remain as the most positive impeachment of Santana's own sincerity, was soon publicly propounded to the Dominican people in a manifesto published by Baez in St. Thomas, to which refuge he had succeeded in escaping from his home in Azua, before the "Liberator's" emissaries could seize him. Unfortunately for his own reputation, Baez appears to have been utterly unable to disprove the detailed charges made against him by Santana, and although, with habitual cynicism, he claimed that the sudden outbreak of Santana was due to the vigour with which he himself as President had opposed Santana's constant requests for the advance of public moneys for his own private uses, it is doubtful that his

reply to Santana gained for him any measure of sympathy from the fellow-citizens whom he was now publicly accused of having attempted to betray.

As soon as the Congress had served Santana's purpose by affording him the pretext for his arraignment of Baez, and had satisfied the President's desires by largely increasing his salary and the salaries of the members of his administration, as well as by granting him the unlimited powers which he demanded, Santana commanded the Legislative Body to adjourn, with which behest it meekly complied. He thereupon directed his attention once more to the foreign relations of the Republic.

8.

In the spring of 1853, assurances had been received from England and France that the policy of the two powers in guarding the independence of the Republic would be maintained. More interested, though, in procuring the attention of Spain, Santana selected no less prominent an emissary than the former "Trinitario," General Ramón Mella, as his representative in Madrid. Mella's instructions as Confidential Agent, though limited to the direction to interpret to the Spanish Court the affectionate regard of the Dominican people for Spain, and to take such steps as might be necessary to ensure the "tranquillity and the future of the Dominicans," afforded him necessarily considerable latitude in his negotiations with the Spanish Ministers. Upon General Mella's arrival in Madrid, his conversations with the members of the Spanish Cabinet turned to the oft mooted question of "protecting the independence of Santo Domingo," but the Spanish Government, fearful, as it stated, of "awakening the jealousy of the United States and of

alienating the sympathies of the Cuban slaveholders," appeared no more anxious to assume the responsibilities which an actual protectorate would demand than it had when approached in former years by Baez and his colleagues. Mella impressed upon the Spaniards, with considerable skill and still greater logic, that mere recognition of the Dominican Republic could not have the effect feared, and concluded by declaring that should Spain persist in her refusal to recognize the Republic, the Dominican Government would be forced to negotiate with some other nation an agreement which would guarantee the protection of its independence, and in fact, he assured the Spanish Minister of State, the greatest embarrassment of his Government at that very moment consisted in refraining from the negotiation of such an agreement with the United States. But his repeated efforts proved fruitless, and General Mella was forced to leave Madrid and return to Santo Domingo, having secured none of the assurances desired by his Government. The attention of Santana was now, as a last resort, turned to the possibility of securing protection from the Government of the United States, which had recently despatched to the Dóminican capital another Special Agent in the person of General William L. Cazneau.

General Cazneau had been appointed Special Agent of the United States by President Pierce on June 17, 1854. The new Agent of the American Government had already had a varied career. Born in Boston and educated in Massachusetts, he had removed to Texas while still a young man. He had there participated in the events which resulted in the annexation of the Texan Republic by the United States, and had there gained his title of "General." But his subsequent career in the new state was

ch that he was obliged to leave his home at Eagle Pass short notice in 1853, and cast about for new means of nployment. Learning by chance of the general situation the Dominican Republic, he succeeded in interesting overnor William L. Marcy of New York, who was soon take office as Secretary of State under President Pierce. cretary Marcy, who was thoroughly imbued with the ctrines of Stephen Douglas, so often proclaimed in his eeches, which declared that the "manifest destiny" of e United States provided for territorial expansion to the uth, and particularly in the direction of the West Indies, ndered the advantages offered by annexation of Santo omingo. One may picture the Secretary, leaning back, rayed in the faded dressing-gown which he wore in his me, redolent of the snuff in which he indulged in too pious quantities, emphasizing his points with his favour- red bandana while the Texan General expounded the sirability of the Dominican Republic.

Whether President Pierce at first shared the view to hich Marcy soon was led, that eventual annexation of e Dominican Republic should be undertaken, is uncer- in, but he too was speedily convinced.

The great figures so long responsible for the direction the foreign relations of the United States—Daniel ebster, John C. Calhoun, John Quincy Adams, Henry ay, who had ever fostered the growth of the new epublics to the South—had now vanished. For a while ch policy as there was with regard to the Latin Ameri- n States was a policy far from noteworthy for its herence to the tenets of international morality. "In 52, Greytown, the principal port of one of the Repub- s of Central America, was bombarded and burned by naval force of the United States, on the flimsy charge

that its inhabitants had infringed the rights of the Transit Company. No reparation on our part has ever been made for this wanton and brutal exercise of power . . . the career of the filibuster Walker: first in Sonora, Lower California, then in Nicaragua, where at last he was driven into Rivas, and taking shelter on board the U. S. sloop-of-war *St. Mary's,* was brought to New Orleans, but only to receive sympathy, and not punishment, for his piratical achievements. Mr. Buchanan was loud in deprecating such crimes, but could find no authority for punishing the criminals." Walker's "acts nevertheless ineffaceably stained the character of our country. . . . With Paraguay we had some difficulty . . . which caused us to send a formidable naval expedition there with threatening demands. Will she ever forget or forgive us? . . . Our attitude towards Cuba . . . sometimes our private citizens propose to take it by force at their own risk and expense. . . . We withdrew our Minister from Peru in consequence of the seizure of two American vessels illegally loaded with guano; . . . Peru has paid no damages and loves us little; . . . The Brazilian Government was not permitted to mediate in the war against Paraguay." And it was in the light of a policy, or lack of policy, which had made such conditions possible, that Secretary Marcy caused the appointment by President Pierce of the Texan adventurer as the Special Agent of the United States in Santo Domingo, with instructions to obtain by treaty a foothold in the Republic.

If the purposes of the United States were open to criticism, the contemptuous disregard by the European Powers of Dominican sovereignty at the time General Cazneau

[1] From a speech by Senator Justin S. Morrill, delivered in the U. S. Senate April 7, 1871.

as despatched to Santo Domingo, may be learned from ontemporaneous despatches of the American Commer-al Agent in the Dominican capital:

"Two French subjects arrived here from Haiti, and this overnment suspecting them to be spies or suspicious per-ns obliged them to leave the country. For this the Gov-nment have been forced by the French Consul and a rench steamer of war to pay $2,800. Not content with is, the French Consul required of the President to expel om office the Secretary of the Treasury, the Governor this City, and the Comptroller of the Customs House, ving as reasons that one Colonel Mendez, who has been ceiving the sum of $2,000 per annum to drill the troops, ad been grossly offended. This the Government has re-used to do. The Secretary of State has been despatched France, as well as the Secretary of the French Consul, to ttle the difficulty there. I have good reason to believe that e intention of the French is to overthrow the present resident of the Republic, General Santana, a man of beral principles, and place ex-President Baez again in ower, a mulatto who most cordially hates Americans and l that is American, and is purely a Frenchman in his art. It would be well to send immediately a vessel of war this port, by which time I shall have authentic informa-on of what I have stated. . . . Mariano Torrente, of uba, is now in Europe assisting this movement of the rench to govern this Island. I had an interview with resident Santana this morning, who seemed very down-arted and expressed his regret that the United States ould not recognize this Republic the same as other nations ad. He requested me to ask you if you would receive a ecial plenipotentiary to negotiate a treaty." . . .

"The French are using all their endeavors to overthrow destroy this little Republic. The headquarters of their berations is at St. Thomas." . . .

"I have learned that the French Consul General of Haiti is to arrive here on or about the 25th of December. His coming bodes no good for this Republic. Yet another messenger was despatched by this Government to Puerto Rico to ask Spanish protection. In my former despatch, I mentioned that one had been sent to Madrid. I think it proper now to mention that if these applications to Spain fail which I have every reason to believe they will, this Government and people will solicit the protection of the United States." [1]

France was hoping to effect some arrangement satisfactory to the Haitians which would assure the payment of her claims against Haiti. To accomplish this under Santana seemed impossible, and her efforts were therefore directed towards securing Baez's return to power. Great Britain, desirous of preventing the French from obtaining any foothold in Dominican territory, and not desirous itself of increasing its burdens in the West Indies by assuming a protectorate, had determined to offset French influence by proclaiming its intention to assist the Dominicans in preserving their independence, only so long however, as the policy of opposing Haitian pretensions did not prove disquieting to its negro subjects in the West Indian colonies. Spain, long resentful of the support afforded by the United States to her revolted colonies in Latin America, and fearful lest the American Government might foster revolution in her remaining colonies in the West Indies, was not minded to incur added responsibilities by undertaking the Dominican protectorate unless it were necessary to do so in order to forestall such an attempt on the part of the United States. That Spain

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, November 27, 1853, November 30, 1853, and December 13, 1853, respectively.

d France during these years had a secret understanding
to the policy to be pursued by them towards the
ominicans is undoubted, and that policy was largely
sed upon the growing animosity of France to the spread
British influence throughout the world. The policy laid
wn by Daniel Webster in his instructions to Mr. Walsh
s a policy which would have resulted in maintaining the
lependence of the Dominican Republic, and would have
eserved the integrity of Dominican territory against
y intrigues fostered by the European Powers through
aiti. Unfortunately, the death of Webster in 1852, and
e subsequent change of policy of the American Govern-
ent caused by the exigencies of domestic politics, reversed
mpletely the attitude of disinterested assistance orig-
ally adopted towards the Dominican Government.

CHAPTER II

SANTANA AND BAEZ

1.

TO the stranger arriving in Santo Domingo in 1854 few evidences of material progress since the days of the Haitian Occupation could have been discernible. The capital was still a city of barely 15,000 inhabitants crowded within the old Spanish walls. The palaces, monasteries and churches built in the years of Spain's glory still were standing, but many of them were fast falling to ruin and for years had not been used. The streets were still unpaved, and in the months of the rains presented an almost impenetrable morass to the pedestrian. In the neighbourhood of the Cathedral, and in the streets back from the river-front, the wealthier citizens had their residences, while the shacks of the poor clustered on the cliff facing the sea, or sprawled along the hillsides towards the suburb of San Carlos, which as yet was a waste expanse outside the city walls, occupied only by a few of the more daring. "Horses, donkeys, sheep, pigs and goats wandered freely about the Puerta del Conde and other portions of the City," [1] but the municipal authorities, notwithstanding the occasional pleas of the local press, took small pains to keep the streets and squares cleared for the city's human inhabitants.

On the days when a schooner arrived, certain activity could be noted along the wharves and in the tiny village of Pajarito across the Ozama River. But for long days on end the capital maintained unbroken the tranquillity of its every-day existence, varied by the occasional interruption of a band of horsemen clattering into the city from

[1] *La Acusación*, Santo Domingo, December 4, 1856.

e Cibao, a rare performance in the theatre, the rumour
invasion from the Haitian frontier, enough to bring
e women panicstricken to the streets, or the return of
e "Liberator" with his escort from El Prado.

Beyond the walls of Santo Domingo, towards San
ristóbal, Baní and Azua, towards the blue mountains of
onao and Cotuy, or across the Ozama towards San Pedro
Macorís and the distant Seybo, where now lie miles of
ne fields and pasture land, there then stretched an end-
ss vista of waste or brush. The plantations of colonial
ys had long since been swallowed up by the ever-
ncroaching vegetation of the tropics. The roads to the
orth, once well-travelled, were now mere trails, through
hich, in the rainy season, horses and mules must flounder
their withers. The journey from Santiago to the capi-
l, made speedily, took three days; but intercourse be-
veen the Cibao and the south, except upon official busi-
ess, was rare, and travel not always safe. "There is little
curity for property and persons; every person who
avels carries his sword and pistols." [1]

Commerce was stagnating, although from the southern
rovinces mahogany, lignum vitæ, and dye-woods were
ill exported, and Puerto Plata still shipped such tobacco
the Cibao provinces could produce, to Hamburg. But
e constant mobilizations of the past years, which had
ken, time and again, the peasant from his land, leaving
s crops to rot in the ground, and the ever-present danger
renewed invasion from Haiti, had killed initiative, and
d arrested the progress of the agriculturist at the mo-
ent in the nation's history when the fostering and
mulation of agriculture were most urgently demanded.

But to the eyes of General Cazneau, who had been

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, March 11, 1854.

despatched to Santo Domingo by Secretary Marcy earl in the winter of 1854, it seems that the picture whic the Republic presented could hardly have been mor satisfying.

Cazneau's first despatches after his arrival in th Republic miss no opportunity.

"The situation of the Dominican Republic is peculiar i that none of the American Republics have by treaty recog nized its independence, and since it is forced to depen upon the good will of France and England for the tem porary relief afforded by the existing truce with Haiti, th negotiation of a treaty with the United States will naturall be welcome." [1]

The negotiations of General Mella in Madrid were of n importance.

". . . while it may be the local belief that General Mella mission is for the purpose of negotiating the return of th Dominican Republic to its old allegiance to Spain, San tana's ruling policy is indubitably the creation of th Dominican Republic as an independent American powe preferably under the protection of the United States . . ."

So much for the broader aspects of international policy now for the more detailed report of material advantage The soil is unimaginably fertile—mines of gold, silver, cop per, coal, are omnipresent. Timber concessions, salt con cessions, railroad concessions, public utility concession every variety of concession is displayed before the sup posedly dazzled eyes of President Pierce, available fo American citizens, if only an American protectorate negotiated and General Cazneau sent to negotiate it. N military force would be required from the United State

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, January 23, 1854.

Eight thousand Dominicans are always in arms for imme-
ate service . . . once a week the whole available popula-
on is mustered for drill, a certain proportion being
afted in rotation for military duty . . . the Republic
as artillery and 30,000 stand of arms, all purchased in the
nited States since 1844. . ." [1]

nally, and this argument was conclusive,

. . the re-election of General Santana, and his return
power for an indeterminate period, makes it a most
opitious time for establishing *close relations* between the
nited States and the Dominican Republic." [1]

During the weeks of General Cazneau's first visit, Gen-
al Santana was fully occupied in forcing through the
egislative Bodies the revised form of the Constitution
hich he had long had under consideration, but not too
ccupied to discuss with Secretary Marcy's Agent the pur-
oses of the latter's journey. The conversations between
he two were so satisfactory that Cazneau was able upon
is return to Washington in the spring to take with him
draft form a treaty, approved by the Dominican Presi-
ent, for submission to the American Government.

The new Constitution, finally approved after acrimo-
ious discussion in the Congress on February 25, 1854,
ade various fundamental changes in the early Constitu-
on of the Republic. The Consejo Conservador, now
rmed the "Senate," was increased to a membership of
n, two senators representing each province; and the
ribunado, now termed the "Chamber of Representa-
ves," was composed of twenty members, each province
eing accorded a representation of four members. Changes
the judicial system were introduced, and the Vice

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, February 12, 1854.

Presidency was created, the Vice President to be elected for a term of four years, two years after the President's election. Among the transitory provisions was one providing that Santana should hold office for two terms, that is, until 1861. Over the protests of the President, the famous Article 210 of the original Constitution was suppressed, and the discussions to which the suppression gave rise created such friction between the Executive and the Legislative authorities that the President, ten months after the new Constitution had been sanctioned, was led to demand its drastic revision, as the result of which both Legislative Bodies were consolidated into a single chamber termed the "Permanent Senate," composed of two representatives from the provinces of Santo Domingo and Santiago, and one from each of the remaining provinces, each Senator to hold office for six years. Civil liberties were harshly restricted, and the Chief Executive not only finally obtained the dictatorial powers which he desired, but likewise obtained the increase in his own tenure of office of two terms of six years each, dating from April 1, 1855. Prior to this final revision of the Constitution, Santana, who had attempted to induce General Felipe Alfau to accept the Vice Presidency, was forced, upon Alfau's refusal, to offer it to General Manuel de Regla Mota, who took office at the end of August, 1854.

Upon his return to Washington, General Cazneau found he had sown seeds in fertile ground. President Pierce by now shared the views of his Secretary of State that the "manifest destiny" of the United States encompassed the Dominican Republic.

The draft agreed upon in principle by the Dominican President and Cazneau was thereupon revised by Secretary Marcy to conform in general with other commercial

eaties negotiated by the United States, with the signifi-
nt modification that the motive for the negotiation of
e treaty was expressly stated in the 27th article of the
oposed instrument, namely, the acquisition of a strategic
act as a coaling depot in Samaná Bay. General Cazneau
s ordered to return to Santo Domingo to obtain the
mal agreement of the Dominican Government to the
aty as re-drafted in the Department of State, with
ese final instructions: while a mile square of territory
r the coaling depot in Samaná Bay was sufficient, care
s to be exerted in obtaining for the Government of the
nited States for an indefinite period all rights of au-
ority and control over it, at an annual rental of not
ore than two or three hundred dollars; the possession of
is tract by the United States, it should be pointed out
the American Agent, would give stability to the Do-
inican Republic; should the depot not be granted, and
e other provisions desired not be obtained, the United
ates Senate would be unlikely to ratify the treaty, and
e President of the United States might not even under
ch circumstances be willing to submit it to that body
r its approval; lastly, the negotiation should be accom-
ished speedily, and the ratification of the Dominican
overnment should be procured prior to General Caz-
au's return with the signed treaty to the United
ates.

General Cazneau reached Santo Domingo for the sec-
d time on July 18, 1854. At the time of his arrival, since
eneral Santana was absent from the capital on one of
periodical visits to El Prado, the Executive Power was
the hands of the Vice President. Presenting his creden-
ls to the Minister for Foreign Relations, Don Juan
epomuceno Tejera, who was at once summed up by

General Cazneau as "a man of American ideas," the American representative sent a message to El Prado requesting the presence of the President in the capital. Santana amiably complied with the request, and returned in post haste to Santo Domingo, naming, upon his arrival, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and General Juan Luís Franco Bidó, Senator from Santiago, as Commissioners to commence official negotiations with the Agent of President Pierce.

General Cazneau was charmed with the cordiality of his reception. He at once wrote Secretary Marcy that the only possible obstacle to his success in concluding the proposed treaty entrusted to him was the vague dread on the part of the populace of the real intentions of the United States, which Cazneau was sure was solely due to the propaganda of the European Consuls, who had alleged that the United States intended to seize Dominican territory, set aside the native whites, and enslave the blacks; and that while Santana and the members of his Cabinet, of course, held different opinions, it might be difficult for the administration to resist the active prejudice of the general populace.[1]

This "active prejudice" was naturally enough increased by the precipitancy of Captain George B. McClellan, who had accompanied General Cazneau to the Republic on the U.S.S. *Constitution*, in proceeding with a survey of Samaná Bay prior even to the commencement of negotiations with the Dominican Government. The news of McClellan's surveying operations and his announced opinion that the United States should establish its coaling depot in the harbor of Carenero Chico, and should obtain for that purpose the control as well of Levantados Bay,

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, July 24 and August 8, 1854.

ere at once reported in Santo Domingo, to the alarm of e European Consuls and to the delight of the opponents General Santana, who raised the cry that the United ates intended to annex the country, and that General ntana was conspiring to betray the coloured population to slavery.

Immediately the French and British Consuls joined rces in opposing Cazneau's negotiations. On August th, Sir Robert Schomburgk advised Santana, in the me of his Government, that Great Britain was decidly opposed to the negotiation of any agreement between e United States and the Dominican Republic which ight provide the United States with a coaling depot on ominican soil, representing the intention of the United ates as an attempt to create a permanent naval establhment within Dominican territory. The British Consul as materially aided in his campaign by Theodore Stanley eneken, a British concession seeker residing in Schomrgk's house, who had become a naturalized citizen of e Republic and had recently been elected a member of e Dominican Congress. The official protests of Schomrgk and the intrigues of Heneken in the Congress mpened considerably the early enthusiasm for the merican treaty manifested by Santana, since, in view the critical condition of the negotiations with aiti, the definite withdrawal of England from her ntinued mediation would, the President feared, have rious consequences. In fact, Santana believed that the tion of the British Consul afforded proof of the de- e of Great Britain, once peace with Haiti had been ncluded, to force a reunion of the Republic with aiti.

But negotiations continued unchecked, and on Sep-

tember 7th, General Cazneau was able to report that all the articles of the proposed draft had been agreed upon. September 8th was set by Santana as the date for the signing of the treaty. Early that morning the British war vessel, *Devastation*, arrived in port. At seven o'clock in the morning and again at noon, the British and French Consuls obtained audiences with the President and his Cabinet. The European representatives, supported by this display of force, declared that were the Dominican Government to conclude the proposed treaty with the United States, France and England would at once withdraw their protection from the Republic, the implication being that the Emperor of Haiti would in that contingency refuse to conclude peace, and would at once commence hostilities against the Dominicans. On September 9th, Santana informed Cazneau that the opposition of the European Powers was so strong, and the threat made so powerful, that it was impossible for his Government to sign the treaty originally agreed upon were the provisions providing for the rental of Samaná retained in the document. The President suggested that the treaty be modified in such a manner as to avoid giving France and England any pretext for subjecting the Dominican Republic to Haiti, and should then in that revised form be signed "before England and France should have time to ripen their plans for endangering the existence of the Republic." [1] Finding Cazneau acquiescent, General Santana shifted the burden of responsibility from his own shoulders by retiring again to the tranquillity of El Prado, and on October 5th the modified form of the treaty [2] was signed by direction of the Vice President. Immediately thereafter, the Congress

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, November 23, 1854.
[2] Appendix A.

as summoned in extraordinary session to meet November
t, to consider its ratification.

Fearful lest they had been outwitted, the British and
ench representatives sent for reënforcements. In re-
onse to the summons, on October 27th, Maxime Ray-
ud, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Port-au-Prince,
rived in Santo Domingo, having been preceded by the
itish war steamer, *Buzzard,* which in turn was joined
a French war vessel. Believing themselves now in a
sition to dictate rather than to threaten, Sir Robert
homburgk, on October 28th, addressed a formal note
the Dominican Government. He apprised the President
the disapproval of her Majesty's Government:

"October 28, 1854.

Señor Ministro:

"I am instructed by the Earl of Clarendon, Her
ajesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform
e Dominican Government that Her Majesty's Govern-
ent learned with surprise that notwithstanding the ad-
ce offered by the representatives of the mediating
wers, which could have no other object than to promote
e safety and welfare of the Dominican Republic, the
esident has thought proper to negotiate a treaty with the
nited States by which both the safety and welfare of the
epublic will be greatly and immediately endangered.

"England and France have on more than one occasion
terfered to uphold the independence of the Dominican
epublic when that independence was threatened by a
ighbouring power, and they had a right to expect that
e arrangements contemplated by this treaty should not
ve been made without their knowledge and sanction,
rticularly with a power which has hitherto refused to
knowledge the independence of the Dominican Republic
d the suddenness and peremptory character of whose

present proceedings must cause well founded suspicions of its ulterior object.

"The undersigned avails himself, etc.

ROBT. H. SCHOMBURGK."

As the result of these menaces and the show of force practically demonstrated in the harbour of Santo Domingo before the eyes of the citizens of the capital, no quorum appeared in the Congress, and the Vice President hesitated to transmit the treaty for ratification. The British and French representatives were still not satisfied, however. M. Raybaud took it upon himself to advise members of the Senate that he had come to Santo Domingo for the purpose of blocking the conclusion of the treaty and that his Government would prevent it by force if necessary; Sir Robert Schomburgk traveled to the interior of the Island, and holding a series of meetings with the inhabitants of the northern provinces, particularly the residents of Samaná, he advised the Dominican people that ratification of the treaty implied their enslavement by the United States.

Cazneau himself seems by now to have been desirous of postponing the attempt to secure ratification until more favourable circumstances might arise, since on November 24th he notified Señor Tejera that he withdrew for the moment the treaty from the consideration of the Dominican Government.[1] But the American representative was too late, since Santana, aware of the gravity of the situation, doubtful whether effective protection from the United States would in fact be forthcoming, and intimidated, with the almost superstitious dread of European Powers which ever beset him, by the demands of the British and French Consuls, had returned to the capital

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, December 6, 1854.

and had secretly advised Sir Robert Schomburgk and Raybaud that he would satisfy their demands by submitting the treaty to the Congress with such modifications and amendments as the European agents might indicate, confident that the American Government would reject the treaty in such form. Consequently, on November 27th, the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to General Cazneau's notification of withdrawal by stating that unless General Cazneau desired to abandon negotiations altogether, the Dominican Government possessed the legal right to submit the treaty to the Congress for its consideration. On December 3rd, the treaty was submitted to Congress with "offensive mutilations and additions inserted upon the margin of printed copies of the treaty in the handwriting of the British Consul," [1] and on December 5th, the treaty was ratified with these amendments.

The humiliation of Santana had been accomplished, and the "manifest destiny" of the United States had suffered a setback, but the French and British Consuls were not yet content. Not satisfied with the fact, as Mateo Perdomo, who was an influential member of the Congress, declared, that "no Congress existed since the day when the French squadron arrived, since its members had been threatened with force and could not act freely under such circumstances," Sir Robert Schomburgk and the French Vice-Consul, Darasse, addressed, on December 14, 1854, a joint note to Santana. They stated that before France and England could determine whether they would press for the conclusion of a long truce between the Dominican Republic and Haiti, they desired to ascertain whether the Dominican Government would formally obligate itself

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, December 6, 1854.

never to sell, lease, grant or alienate in any way any portion of Dominican territory, particularly that surrounding Samaná Bay, to any foreign Government; never to accept any foreign subsidy or hypothecate any portion of the national revenues; never to diminish the sovereign jurisdiction of the Republic nor to permit any foreign Government to establish any naval depot on Dominican territory; never to conclude any treaty with any foreign power for special privileges other than those already granted, "nor to negotiate a treaty with any nation which could not afford the same rights and privileges to all Dominicans regardless of their color." In response to the demand of the two Consuls for an immediate reply, Santana was obliged to afford the assurances demanded, although the assurances so conveyed were not contained in the guise of the secret convention anticipated by the French and British Governments.

2.

Cazneau's mission had terminated disastrously, and although he attempted to palliate his failure by advising the Secretary of State that the treaty with the objectionable modifications had been ratified by the Congress while it was in session as a Constitutional Convention and that consequently its ratification was null and void,[1] even Secretary Marcy realized that his Agent's usefulness was for the time being at an end. Cazneau consequently returned to the United States for a significant series of interviews with some "American capitalists," and then went back again to Santo Domingo where he had purchased in the capital's suburb, San Carlos, the "Estancia Esmeralda," a luxurious plantation. Perhaps his efforts to feather his

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, December 23, 1854.

own nest might prove more successful than his attempts to increase the dominions of the United States.

The revelation of the ambitions of the United States proved a stronger argument in persuading the Spanish Government to accord official recognition to the Republic than all of General Mella's eloquence, and at the end of the year, 1854, a Spanish Consul arrived in Santo Domingo, who busied himself, as soon as his exequatur had been granted, in registering innumerable Dominicans as Spanish subjects. Santana, whose faith in his own powers appears for the moment to have been shaken by the failure of his negotiations with the United States, raised no objections to these proceedings, perhaps in the belief that the policy pursued by the representative of Spain might be indicative of a change of heart on the part of the Spanish Government.

In any event, in the first days of the new year, 1855, he retired once more to El Prado, where he awaited the popular verdict upon the *coup d'état* which the final revision of the Constitution had in fact created. Santana had not long to wait. On March 25th, an abortive attempt at revolution in the interest of Baez, headed by Generals Pelletier and Duvergé, took place in the capital. The President, who had been advised of the conspiracy before the authorities in the capital obtained wind of it, reacted as if to a tonic, and immediately captured and executed the leaders of the plot in the eastern provinces. The chief conspirators in the capital, captured by the Vice President, were later sentenced to exile or to long imprisonment, although the Trinitario, General Francisco Sánchez, who had at the last moment participated in the conspiracy, succeeded in obtaining asylum in the British Consulate. General Cazneau, back again in the capital as a private citizen,

continued to favour Secretary Marcy with the benefit of his advice:

"The revolution attempted by Baez was inspired by the British and French Consuls and when it was put down the leaders of it were at once granted refuge by the European consuls. England and France are coöperating with the negro party headed by Baez to convert the whole island into an African dependency. None of the negro leaders were executed (with the exception of five taken by President Santana in the interior), since the death sentences pronounced by the courts were modified as the result of the intervention of the European Consuls, sustained by a naval demonstration." [1]

Throughout the period of the Cazneau negotiations, the French and British representatives in Port-au-Prince had lost no opportunity in impressing the Emperor Faustin with the danger which would threaten his own domain should a slave-holding power such as the United States obtain foothold on the Island. The alarm which they occasioned His Imperial Majesty was destined to have graver consequences than the European agents had probably anticipated, and the value of the much vaunted "protection" of France and England must have been questioned by Santana, when, in the last days of November, 1855, the Haitian Emperor commenced his greatest, and what was fortunately destined to be his last, attempt to reconquer the Dominican provinces.

As soon as the danger was actively apparent, Santana moved with admirable despatch. Realizing from past experiences that it was useless to attempt to protect the smaller towns along the Haitian frontier, the President established a large force in Azua, and marched an approximately

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Marcy, June 9, 1855.

equal number of troops to Guayubín to oppose the advance of the Haitian armies, which numbered some 30,000 men. The Emperor Faustin pursued the usual plan of attack. His forces were divided into three separate armies; one to proceed through the Cibao, one through the southern portion of Barahona, and the central army, commanded by Faustin himself, to overcome the anticipated Dominican resistance at Azua. The Dominican outposts were, as had been expected, obliged to retreat, in comparatively good order, however, before the black flood that was rolling up over the country from the west. The Dominican armies, which had responded to the call to arms as one man, under the command of Santana, supported by the ablest officers of the Republic, inflicted a decisive defeat upon the southern armies of the Emperor at Santomé on December 22, 1855. On the same day, the northern armies of the Haitians were defeated even more decisively at Cambronal. These two preliminary victories were followed up by others, and by the end of January the Haitian defeat had become complete. Loss of life on both sides was great, but the Haitians' losses were far in excess of those which they had inflicted upon the Dominicans.

The last Haitian refugees straggled across the frontier to Ounaminthe on January 27th, where they were granted the recompense of an inspiring address from the Emperor Faustin, who, declaring that the invasion had been undertaken with the assurance that it would be supported by the great majority of the Dominicans, inveighed against Dominican ingratitude in bitter terms. Faustin concluded his proclamation with the following words, which it may be hoped was sufficient reward for the Haitian soldiers, who had been called to arms at the moment when their crops were being harvested and who were consequently return-

ing to a year of famine: "Fly back to your homes with your heads raised high, since you have accomplished your duty."

As soon as Santana had assured himself of the reëstablishment of order throughout the frontier provinces, he returned on March 6th to the capital at the head of his victorious army, receiving a welcome from the citizens of the capital, which from its sincerity must have proved more grateful than the artificial acclamations which the Liberator had so often concerted for himself in the past.

3.

The exigencies of the local political situation and his military duties as commander of the Dominican army in the war with Haiti had not caused Santana to overlook the international problems which confronted his administration, nor had his momentary acquiescence in the demands of the European Consuls in the autumn of 1854 caused the President to abandon final hope of an arrangement with the United States. In May of the following spring, the American Commercial Agent was able to report that Santana had expressed a desire to renew negotiations:

"In a recent interview with President Santana, he expressed the hope that the negotiations for a treaty with the United States would still be pending. The United States can have all they desire here. The Spanish treaty has been concluded. I have not yet got a copy. The principal item is 'that they are not to permit strangers to hold any part of this territory'." [1]

The encouraging reports from Mr. Elliott and the confidential suggestions with which General Cazneau contin-

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, May 5, 1855.

A RIVER OF THE CIBAO

ued to deluge Secretary Marcy, brought a new ray of hope o the Washington Administration's otherwise darkening norizon. But the Secretary of State was well aware that he Senate, which was then wholly under the domination f the Southern States, would never acquiesce in the modi- ications inserted in the Treaty of 1854 by the Dominican Congress at the behest of the British Consul. Did not the mendment to Article 3 specifically provide that all Do- minican citizens in the United States, regardless of their olour, were to be accorded treatment similar to that en- oyed by American citizens? Mr. Elliott was therefore njoined to insist upon the omission of any such modi- ication as this of the original draft, since "the safety and peace of the Southern States require this exclusion." [1] Should the Dominican Government concede these altera- ions, the American Government would be eager to conclude negotiations.

No sooner had negotiations once more been taken up, nd the agreement of the Dominican Government been btained to Secretary Marcy's stipulations, than the oppo- ition of the European Powers again made itself felt:

"As this Government agreed that they would recede rom their proposed amendments to the treaty, I made vertures to them on the 3rd of December to negotiate the ame. At this time a sudden invasion of the Haitians topped all the business of the Government. I have this day eceived word from President Santana, who has been all he time with the army, that he will be here in a few days, vhen the treaty shall be immediately attended to and con- luded as soon as possible. . . . The treaty will pass sub- tantially the same as that proposed by William L. Caz- eau. They desire to make a separate convention regarding

[1] William L. Marcy, Secretary of State, to Jonathan Elliott, American Commercial Agent in Santo Domingo, October 9, 1855.

Samaná when the country is more tranquil. The Haitians publicly accuse Santana of wishing to give this Island to the Americans. Also Mr. Segovia, Chargé d'Affaires and Consul General of Spain, has arrived to join English and French Consuls in opposition to our having a naval station here." [1]

But Santana's position was for the moment far more securely entrenched than it had been two years before. The resplendent victories of the Dominicans over their Haitian adversaries, accomplished by their own unaided efforts, had dispelled for the time being all further fear of attack from Faustin. The indifference of France and England during the struggle which the Dominicans had fought for existence, had proved the vanity of the promises of protection of the two European Powers, and had convinced Santana that either France was conniving at his own overthrow by Haitian arms in order to place Baez in the Presidency, or else that the two Powers had secretly agreed to the extension of Haitian sovereignty once again over the Dominican Provinces. Finally, Santana's personal prestige in the Republic was greater than ever. The Liberator had once more earned his right to his title.

Consequently, the protests of the British and French Consuls, supported as they now were by their Spanish colleague, fell upon deaf ears, and on March 11, 1856, Don Tomás Bobadilla and Don Jacinto de Castro were instructed by the President to sign the new version of the Treaty of Peace, Commerce, Navigation and Extradition between the United States and the Dominican Republic proffered them by the American Commercial Agent. The Treaty was at once ratified, on March 27th, by the Senado Consultor.

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, January 16, 1856.

While appreciating to its full extent the temporary rength of his position, General Santana was still timorous f entering into any arrangement regarding Samaná, and dvised the American Agent that a separate agreement roviding for the rental of a coaling depot in the Bay ould be entered into by his Government in the near ıture. Mr. Elliott reported that the increasing hostility f the British, French and Spanish Consuls had prevented ıe President from ceding the United States the desired epot in the Treaty of Peace and Commerce:

"The Consuls of Spain, England and France have made rong opposition to our having any treaty whatever with ıis Republic. The treaty as it now reads is substantially ıe same as that signed the 5th of October, 1854. It does ot express all that was desired but is the best that I could ıake under the circumstances at the present time." [1]

All memories of past discord between the European owers, as soon as the treaty with the United States had een ratified by the Dominican Congress, were merged in ı outburst of hostility against the American Govern- ıent, increased no doubt by resentment at the success ith which the Dominicans had been enabled to repel naided the attack from Haiti, and the realization that romises of British or French protection would not in the ıture be rated very highly. The American treaty, simple its provisions appeared to be, was believed to have secret auses incorporated in it, and caused bitter attacks to be ıade upon the policy of the United States in the public ress of England, France and Spain, particularly in that of ıeir West Indian possessions. The success of the Domini- ıns in maintaining their independence was termed "an

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, March 22, 1856.

attempt at revolution," and the Americans were charged with having rendered the Dominican Government the assistance necessary in carrying this "revolution" to a successful termination. An editorial published in the *Daily Advertiser* of Kingston, Jamaica, is sufficiently indicative:

"The Dominicans, aided by our revolutionizing neighbors, the Americans, have given battle to the Emperor Soulouque; His Imperial Majesty had to save himself by flight and there was the greatest disorder throughout the Island. Despatches were immediately sent off to the commodore on this station, which was the occasion of the recent visit of the French man-of-war, *L'Acheron*, and her immediate departure was for the protection of English and French interests in that place . . . It is well known that the Americans some time ago proffered their aid to the Dominicans and not long since it was freely expressed in the American papers that a naval force was to leave for Samaná, which arrived there . . . The effect of this revolution, if the Americans are really engaged in it, will no doubt terminate seriously. England and France will not tamely allow such a violent proceeding, as they are both as greatly interested in the balance of territorial possession in the New World as they are in the balance of power in the Old. The Monroe Doctrine, which the Americans have been the first to start, will be carried out on this—for if they are allowed to occupy Haiti they will most surely concentrate an immense body of troops there and eventually descend upon Cuba, and if America holds Cuba and Santo Domingo, in the event of a war with England, of what use would be Jamaica to the Parent Country. The question is fraught with importance and is another link in the chain that is to draw England, France and America into a bloody war." [1]

[1] DAILY ADVERTISER of Kingston, Jamaica, Tuesday, April 10, 1856.

The terrifying rumour that the United States was eady gazing with covetous eyes upon Cuba and Puerto co, in addition to the reported American attempt to ure the annexation of the Dominican Republic, had en sufficient to cause the Spanish Government to modify original attitude of aloofness towards its former colony, d resulted in the negotiation in 1855 of a commercial aty between the two countries. A new policy was deter- ned upon, and to carry it out, that astonishing indi- dual, Don Antonio Maria Segovia, was sent to Santo omingo as the Consul General of Spain.

Segovia, whose prior career in the Spanish Consular rvice and modicum of note as a "littérateur" had puffed n with an altogether overweening sense of the impor- nce of his new rôle, had been led to believe by the Spanish nister of State that the article in the new treaty with ain, whereby the Spanish Sovereign renounced all her rmer rights in the former colony and specifically recog- zed the independence of the Republic, would prove so tifying to the Dominicans that Santana would no nger be tempted to heed the siren voices of the American gents.

The Spanish Consul was the more chagrined conse- ently when, upon his arrival, Santana, who was still gaged in the pacification of the frontier provinces, gave indication of his appreciation of the fact that so im- rtant an emissary as Segovia had arrived in Santo omingo. The President ignored the Spanish Consul's stence, and Segovia was forced to present his credentials the Vice President. But the sense of slight was rapidly nged to one of injury when Santana, whom Segovia d been charged to invest with the Grand Cross of Isabel Católica, not only failed to hasten to the capital to

receive the decoration, but actually ordered General Regla Mota, the Vice President, to receive it in his stead.

The self-conceit of the Spaniard had received already a severe blow. But when he was apprised, after the President's eventual return to Santo Domingo, that a treaty with the United States had actually been concluded, his indignation had no bounds. The signal ingratitude of the President, after receiving such proofs of the Spanish Government's benevolence—Segovia had carefully overlooked the earlier twelve years of Spain's contemptuous neglect—had by now fully convinced the Spanish Consul that Santana was no fit person to exercise the Presidency.

Casting about for a remedy, Segovia had no need to wait long for suggestions. The partisans of Baez, who one by one had returned to the capital, had lost no opportunity of making evident their profound affection for Spain. They had dined the Spanish Agent, had presented him with scrolls bearing long lists of the names of the Spanish sympathizers, had caused crowds to gather before the Spanish Consulate to cheer the appearance of Spain's worthy representative, and had emphasized the importance of each act of indifference on the part of Santana. Baez, they pointed out, had in his last public address made overwhelmingly plain how different his feeling was towards Spain—how desirous of being guided by the Spanish Government. What a change in the situation there would be, should the Spanish Government favour the return of Baez to the Presidency!

Segovia lost no time in taking the hint. The provisions of Article VII of the treaty between the Republic and Spain afforded an excellent opportunity for accomplishing his purposes. This article provided that Spaniards residing in the Dominican Republic who had adopted Domini-

n nationality, could recover their former nationality, could their adult children, during the year subsequent the ratification of the treaty; those who had been siding without the Republic could recover their Spanish tionality during the two years following. Segovia proeded to open the registers of "matriculation" in his Conlate, registering not only such individuals as were inuded within the elastic provisions of the seventh article the Spanish Treaty, but likewise any other individual le to pay the fee of two dollars demanded for the privige of obtaining Spanish citizenship.

The opponents of the Government at once availed emselves of the opportunity of obtaining protection om the Spanish Consul so that they might the more eely oppose Santana. The President, determined as he d always proved himself to be in matters of internal licy, once more made evident his inborn dread of open pture with any European Power, and limited his protests ainst Segovia's activities to notes addressed to Segovia his Minister for Foreign Affairs, or to representations the Spanish Government through his diplomatic agent Madrid. Mr. Elliott's indignation at the proceedings was elling throughout the summer:

"A difficulty arose as to the meaning of Article VII of e Spanish treaty, and it was agreed to await the decision om Spain, but all at once the Spanish war steamer *asco de Garay* and bark of war *Gravina,* anchored off is port and the Spanish Consul begins issuing certificates citizenship to all who chose to ask them and in this way ll make a large number of Dominicans, mostly blacks, aniards, as they are glad to get out of military service. ne Haitians can then easily enter . . . The Spanish Con- did all he could to stop our making a treaty and it is

very evident that this calamity has fallen on this Republic by reason of that treaty. His object is to crush the Republic and have it handed to the Haitians who do not permit foreigners to hold property or do business in their own name."

* * *

"Señor Antonio Maria Segovia, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, from the very day of his arrival, began speaking to all the members of the Dominican Government concerning the injury that the ratification of the American treaty would cause to Spain and urged the Executive to reject it. He then requested delay in the negotiation of the treaty to permit him to go to Port-au-Prince to notify the Emperor Soulouque to vacate that portion of the Dominican territory occupied by Haitians, offering to the Dominican Government a Spanish loan and to create the means of forming a purely Spanish immigration, but President Santana would not listen to it. After the signing of the treaty, he urged the Dominican Government to withdraw it or to refuse to ratify it and as a means of accomplishing that he proposed a Spanish protectorate, a quantity of troops and a good navy and the assumption of responsibility by Spain for the attitude of the Dominican Government towards the United States. He then declared to Santana that the Spanish Government would far prefer securing Dominican territory for the Haitians than for it to be under American influence. The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires is now endeavoring to undermine the Republic by granting Spanish citizenship to individuals in the Dominican Republic, not only those born after Spain abandoned the territory but also to Dutch, American, and French who have become naturalized Dominicans. He has sent agents throughout the country assuring people that their attaining Spanish nationality will secure them from danger and freedom from military service, that gold and silver from Spain will abound in place of Dominican paper money by

change of sovereignty and that by such change they can
free of the despotism of Santana and the members of his
overnment of white persons. The result of these reports is
at the adherents of the Government are constantly de-
easing and that the Government itself is now hardly
rong enough to defeat the plans of revolution of Baez,
ho has openly declared his intention of having a colored
vernment. The Spanish Government has fostered a
rmal plan to destroy the Dominican Republic. The
anish Chargé d'Affaires obliged the Dominican Govern-
ent to hoist the Spanish flag on July 17th, and salute the
anish vessels of war in the port, and then forced them to
peat the salute and obliged the Secretary for Foreign
lations personally to apologize to him and to his officers
or not treating Spain with more respect.' He is also about
establish a newspaper here to be called *Isabel Segunda,*
r the purpose of advocating the re-assumption of Spanish
vereignty. Certain destruction awaits this Republic if the
nited States do not immediately and energetically inter-
re, as this Government are paying very high prices and
ending all their means to keep their troops under arms.
. The United States can make any convention that they
sire with this Government. We can have naval stations
here we choose on our own terms and in case of necessity
pend on assistance from these people—if we only take
me interest in them." [1]

The lack in the recently negotiated treaty of the provi-
n—the all-important provision in Secretary Marcy's eyes
for the lease of the Samaná territory, had caused the
merican Government to grow decidedly lukewarm
wards the Dominicans. Not even the urgent appeals of
s Commercial Agent could persuade the Secretary of
ate "to take some interest in them," and he regarded the

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, July 5 and 19, 1856, respectively.

subsequent rejection of the Dominican treaty by the American Senate with complete indifference. The ratification of a mere commercial treaty was not likely to further the realization of the "manifest destiny" of the United States.

Santana, who had continued to countenance meekly the open opposition of the Spanish Consul and the activities of the Baecistas which the latter fostered, unconvinced by the shrewder of his counsellors who, like Bobadilla, were certain that the jealousies between the foreign Powers would render impossible any determined assault by a European nation upon the sovereignty of the Republic, at the first intimation of the withdrawal of American support determined to abandon the struggle, trusting that his countrymen would soon insist upon his recall to power. By the spring of 1856, he had decided to resort to the same manœuvre which had been successful once before. Retiring to El Prado, he announced his decision to resign the Presidency, and forced the Senado Consultor, on May 26th, to accept his resignation, leaving the Vice President, General Regla Mota, to assume the Presidency in accordance with the Constitution then in force.

4.

General Regla Mota, suddenly called upon to assume the Presidency in moments far more critical than those in which he had hitherto, during the temporary absences of Santana, been obliged to direct the administration, at first attempted to maintain a firm control of affairs. The weakness of his character and his lack of popular support rendered his task hopeless.

In the program of administration which he announced to the Senate, General Regla Mota attempted to temper

the hostility of the Spanish representative by an obsequious reference to the desire of his administration to maintain the most friendly relations with the Spanish Government. But Segovia was not to be satisfied with any such empty professions of friendship. Surrounded by the opponents of the Government, who were able with impunity to continue their attacks upon the administration in the sheet, *El Eco Del Pueblo*, directed by Don Manuel Maria Gautier, Segovia laid his plans for the immediate return to power of Buenaventura Baez, whom he had visited in St. Thomas and from whom he had obtained satisfactory assurances that were Baez to become President, the policy of the Dominican Government might readily be dictated from Madrid.

Segovia now threw aside all pretense of conforming to the customary rules of diplomacy. Announcing publicly that Buenaventura Baez was "the sole man capable of restoring tranquillity and of governing the Republic in peace and prosperity," he obtained the coöperation of the British and French Consuls, who were nothing loath, in forcing General Regla Mota to propose to Santana that he effect a reconciliation with Baez and agree to the latter's return to the country:

"Yesterday, Santana's reply was received stating that if the Government thought the return of Baez was really indispensable to the country and that his supposed influence would not only reconcile the local disturbances but also cause the Spanish Consul to cease his hostile intentions towards his unhappy and unprotected country, he would agree to the return of Mr. Baez; that whilst yielding to the determination of the Spanish Consul, to whom he attributes the exigent proposal, he tendered his resignation as commander-in-chief of the Dominican army. His resig-

nation was read in the Senate and it created a most extraordinary sensation as it is interpreted to show how much he disapproves of the step. Santana said, after reading the official despatch received from this Government, 'This is what I am reduced to after having signed the American Treaty, and what have I gained with the friendship of the United States? Not even a vessel of war to investigate matters, and Baez once here, adieu to all American projects or conventions.' The Vice President and his brother, General Felipe Alfau, who is a member of the Senate, told me . . . 'We are resolved not to have any further engagements with the United States unless they are accompanied by means of defense . . . The Dominicans know their duty as a nation, but are not sufficiently strong to repel Spain whose Consul is the cause of our having written for the treaty. . . . If the United States Government intends securing its interests in this country, there is no time to be lost as it is a common report that the Spanish Government will land an armed force here to meet the Americans." [1]

Declaring that a war between the United States and Spain was inevitable in the near future, and that it would better suit Spain to meet the Americans in the Dominican Republic as the field of battle rather than in Cuba,[2] Segovia obliged Regla Mota to summon the Electoral Colleges to meet September 22nd, to fill the vacancy existing in the Vice Presidency and to send at the same time an invitation to Baez, who was still in St. Thomas, requesting him to return immediately to the Republic. Baez was to return to the Presidency through the Vice Presidency:

"A letter was written to Mr. Baez, who is now in St. Thomas and has been there since 1852 awaiting a favor-

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira, Acting Commercial Agent, to Secretary Marcy, August 7, 1856.

[2] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, August 7, 1856.

able opportunity to return here, acquainting him with the fact that Santana was disposed to reconcile matters with him provided he would agree to return to the country as a private citizen, respect its laws, and promise not to put himself at the head of any party . . . As the Spanish Consul has all along evinced a deep interest in imposing Mr. Baez on the country, there is no doubt in my opinion that Mr. Baez will readily submit to the most humiliating conditions, particularly as he is aware that the Spanish Consul has already paved the way for him to reach the Presidency —this naturally will be effected by means of a revolution to overthrow the present administration, as the Spanish Consul is determined to have Baez at the head of affairs, (he is a mortal hater of Americans), that will mar the progress of American projects until he can destroy effectually the Dominican nationality." [1]

The sole hope of General Regla Mota and the supporters of Santana lay in some effective demonstration of sympathy by the Government of the United States. On July 18th, Segovia, accompanied by the British and French Consuls, obtained a secret interview with the President and his Cabinet, in the course of which they demanded the withdrawal of the treaty with the United States, stating that their countries "would never permit the people of the United States to have a foothold in the Dominican Republic," and on the following day, Perdomo, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, was obliged to sign a letter drafted by Segovia himself, addressed to the American Secretary of State, requesting the withdrawal of the treaty with the United States from further consideration.

As a last resort the President requested the American Commercial Agent, Mr. Elliott, to go in person to Wash-

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, August 14, 1856.

ington to urge upon the American Government the necessity of affording the Dominican Government some support should they desire to maintain their treaty in force. Mr. Elliott was authorized to offer to the American Government not only any location in the Bay of Samaná which the United States might desire for a naval depot, but any other commercial advantages they might require, "on the condition that the United States will guard the Dominican Government against any of the consequences thereof." [1] On August 2d, Mr. Elliott left for Washington, but he proved unable again to interest President Pierce or Secretary Marcy, nor was he able to induce them to consent to any effective action in compliance with the pleas of the Dominican Government.

Deprived of all hope of the American support upon which they had once confidently counted, Regla Mota and Santana were helplessly obliged to give in to the force of the circumstances which Segovia had created. The return of Buenaventura Baez to the Republic was preceded by the return of the swarm of his office-seeking brothers, cousins, and other relatives, to whom amnesty had reluctantly been granted by the Government at Segovia's behest. Immediately after his return, in accordance with the plans elaborated by the Spanish Consul, Baez was elected Vice President of the Republic. On October 6th, Baez, attended by the President, General Regla Mota, and the sole remaining member of Regla Mota's Cabinet, took the oath of office before the Senate, asserting that now that he was "named to that high office by the omnipotent will of the people" he found himself too overcome by his feelings of gratitude to be able to express them in words.

The time was now ripe for the last step. Consequently,

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Marcy, September 10, 1856.

General Regla Mota, who had long since abandoned hope of withstanding the plans of the Spanish Consul, resigned the Presidency on October 8th, leaving Baez once more in the Presidential chair.

Segovia had been signally successful in obtaining as President of the Republic a man of whose docility he could be certain. But his modesty was commendable. Greeted after the inauguration of Baez as President by a cheering throng of the President's partisans, Segovia protested that the merit for this accomplishment was not his alone, but should in fact be shared by all; and that "his small merit in having availed himself of favorable circumstances did not deserve such high praise" since he had only "carried out the desires and instructions of his Queen in working for the liberty of the Dominican people."

He soon found a new field for his talents by increasing the already general unpopularity of the American Government in the Republic. Segovia, who had already distinguished himself upon various occasions by encouraging street crowds to gather before the American Consulate and threaten that they would tear down the American flag and destroy the American coat of arms, now incited public attacks on all Dominicans who had favoured the negotiation of the American treaty. Don Domingo de la Rocha, the father-in-law of Mr. Elliott, and one of the first Senators to vote for the American treaty, was among those singled out for assault, and had it not been for the opportune assistance offered by the Captain of the British war vessel *Tartar,* Mr. Pereira, the Acting Commercial Agent of the United States, and his family, would probably likewise have fallen victims to the rabble incited by Segovia.[1] Having dictated the President's inaugural ad-

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, November 22, 1856.

dress, which declared that Baez would ever be vigilant to prevent the ambitions of any foreign nation from impairing the sovereignty and independence of the Dominican Republic, Segovia soon spread the rumour that the American Government was sending vessels of war to Santo Domingo to force upon the Dominican Government the exchange of ratifications of the American treaty. Whether Baez believed the report, or whether he more probably desired to further Segovia's policy of increasing hostility against the United States, he in fact gave orders early in November for the fortification of the capital and even mobilized troops in Samaná to ward off the imaginary attack.

The antipathy of the Baez administration to everything American was made evident in many ways. Mr. Pereira reported to Secretary Marcy that he had been invited by the President to an official dinner, served at five o'clock in the afternoon, at which all the members of the diplomatic corps were present.[1] At the close of the interminable function, through which the guests had sweltered, Baez proposed the healths of the Emperor of France, Queen Victoria, and Queen Isabel II, but the health of the President of the United States was ostentatiously omitted; and Mr. Pereira's indignation was increased by the reported remark of General Baez that no power could induce him to drink the health of the "President of the Filibusterers." The autumn of 1856 must have been a disagreeable time for American citizens, and in particular for the American Consul.

"On October 30th, St. Andrew's Day, whilst the people were carrying on the old Spanish custom of pitching eggs about the town, a gang of the matriculated or Spanish

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, November 22, 1856.

party determined to avail themselves of that occasion to pitch eggs filled with some fetid substance against the sign and eagle attached to this agency." [1]

Apparently the incident of the "pitching of the eggs filled with some fetid substance" caused even the President to realize that it was time to call a halt, since on November th, he addressed a proclamation to his fellow-citizens requesting them to cease "once for all, all individual manifestations, and above all, offensive cries, which defame a cultured people and in which our adversaries take delight." The President likewise took occasion to assure the people that his Government had taken efficacious measures to protect the country against any attacks, domestic or foreign, and that were it necessary, they might be well assured that they could count upon the support of "friendly allies."

Segovia had placed Baez in the Presidency, and had created such general hostility to the United States that he feared no longer the possibility of a resumption of negotiations with the American Government. It was now time to proceed with the final elimination of Santana. At the suggestion of the Spanish Consul, the President lost no time in filling all the public offices with members of his own innumerable family, and failing them, with his supporters, and in forcing the resignation from the Senado Consultor of such Senators as had been identified in the past with the Liberator. As soon as a properly submissive Senate had been organized, heeding the advice proffered by Segovia and reiterated by *El Eco Del Pueblo,* Baez came to the conclusion that the institution of the Vice Presidency provided an unnecessary complication, and deliberately ignoring the provisions of the Constitution,

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, November 22, 1856.

refused to proclaim General Juan Esteban Aybar, elected to fill the vacancy caused by Baez's own succession to the Presidency, Vice President of the Republic. There was now little doubt that Segovia, through Baez, could govern the Republic as he saw fit. A new newspaper, appropriately entitled *La Acusación,* had been founded in the capital for the sole purpose of attacking Santana. The first number, published November 20, 1856, made plain the policy of the sheet:

"It is now time to hasten the disappearance from the earth, as he has already disappeared from the political scene, of the Monster who has openly declared himself the enemy of humanity and with whom the Nation never can again reconcile itself. Let the Government know, from today on, that it has no great political program to settle; that it has no important passions which it must satisfy, but rather that it is under the obligation of punishing many crimes, of avenging the blood of many martyrs slain by the bestial caprice of a despot who by his own acts has placed himself without the law." [1]

A week later, the scope of Segovia's program was somewhat enlarged by the call, published in *La Acusación,* to all citizens of the capital to assemble to discuss the following two questions:

"Is it in the interest of the Dominican Republic to invoke the protection of Spain, France and England in the event that it is threatened by some aggression?

"Is the continuance of General Santana in the country dangerous to the security of the State?" [2]

[1] *La Acusación* of November 20, 1856, published in Santo Domingo: Editor: Juan E. Jiménez.

[2] *La Acusación* of November 27, 1856.

Needless to state, when the suggested mass meeting had assembled, the two theoretical questions propounded by Segovia met with a unanimous affirmative.

The Senate did not delay long in seeing from which quarter the wind blew. Accepting first of all the resignation of Santana as commander-in-chief of the Dominican armies, which it had earlier refused to accept, it proceeded on December 1, 1856, to cancel the lease for fifty years of the Island of Saona granted General Santana on May 26, 1856, in recognition of his public services. Few doubted the impending fate of Santana. Mr. Pereira, himself of Dominican origin, feared the worst:

"There is little doubt . . . of the horrid end that good man will have in this unhappy country if he allows himself to be impeached. Santana is yet on his farm, where he awaits quietly the result of his forced reconciliation with President Baez . . . Let me implore you, Sir, not to abandon our people. All ask for protection from the United States and I cannot doubt but that you will send here a couple of vessels of war merely to look on and see that no injustice is committed against our citizens or their property." [1]

The Senate finally, notwithstanding the insistence of Don Pedro Tomás Garrido and Don Carlos Baez, Senators from Santo Domingo and La Vega, that Santana be impeached, limited itself to passing a resolution granting Baez full powers to deal with Santana as he saw fit. The outbreak of slight disturbances in Neiba, speedily put down, which it was claimed, without the shadow of proof, Santana had directly incited, gave the President the opportunity he sought. He ordered General José Maria Cabral to proceed with a body of troops to El Prado, and Santana

[1] Mr. Jacob Pereira to Secretary Marcy, November 29, 1856.

was arrested and brought to the capital on January 8th. At midnight on the 11th of January, 1857, the Liberator was placed upon the Dominican schooner *Ozama*, and after being later transferred, through the influence of the French Consul, to the French Frigate *Iphigénie*, finally succeeded in reaching St. Thomas, the refuge of so many Dominican exiles.

5.

Amazingly enough, the vengeance which Segovia had succeeded in inflicting upon Santana was directly responsible for his own downfall. The Dominican Agent in Madrid, carrying out the instructions sent him prior to Baez's inauguration, had been pressing for some months upon the Spanish Government the necessity of reaching an agreement restricting the interpretation to be given to the notorious Article VII of the Spanish Treaty, through which Segovia had been able to build up "a bastard state within Dominican territory." The Spanish Cabinet, desirous of meeting, as it thought, the wishes of the Dominican Government, and apprised as well by intimations from France and England that the Spanish Consul in Santo Domingo had been interpreting the treaty in such a manner as to give offense to the French and British Consuls, determined to disavow the actions of Segovia, and suddenly recalled him. Baez was thrown into utter consternation. Were his strongest supporter, the man who had brought him to the Presidency, to be shorn of influence, how could he maintain his own position? Dismissing immediately the Dominican Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid, he reached the extraordinary decision of appointing the recalled Spanish Envoy as his own agent at the Spanish Court, to request the Spanish Government to agree that the treaty be given the exact interpretation

gainst which the Dominican Government had been pro-
esting, and at the same time he notified the Government at
Madrid that far from disapproving the actions of Segovia,
he Dominican Government viewed his removal from the
Consulate with the deepest regret. Baez's efforts proved to
e vain, however, since the Spanish Minister of State, the
Marqués de Pidal, refused either to reappoint Segovia as
Spanish Consul or to receive him as Agent of the Domini-
an Government, and Baez was constrained to limit him-
elf to employing Segovia as his secret agent in fruitless
egotiations with the Government of Haiti.

The loss of Segovia forced Baez to the realization that
o remain in power he must from now on depend solely
pon his own resources. To obtain large quantities of ready
noney became at once a prime necessity.

At the time of Baez's return to the Presidency the
inancial situation of the Government was by no means
lisastrous. There was comparatively little paper in circula-
ion. The chief cause for complaint in commercial circles
ay in the fact that the greater demand for paper at the
ime of the annual harvesting of the tobacco crop in the
Cibao caused a considerable fluctuation in its exchange
alue, resulting in the increasing introduction into the
orthern provinces of large quantities of foreign gold and
ilver, with which foreign business houses preferred to pay
heir obligations. This condition, which might readily have
een remedied had the Government sincerely desired to
nd a solution of the problem, provided Baez with an
xcellent pretext for obtaining the quantity of ready
noney which he required, and likewise with the oppor-
unity to strike at the commercial leaders of the Cibao
who were hostile to his administration. In a message to
he Senate on April 13th, the President called attention to

the constant fluctuation in the value of the national paper prior to the harvesting of the northern tobacco crops, and expressed the opinion that this evil should be remedied by authorizing the national Government to issue larger quantities of paper money, which it was alleged could be retired from circulation as soon as the tobacco crop had been harvested, his recommendation being based upon the conclusion that this operation would maintain the national paper at a stable rate of exchange.

In accordance with these recommendations, the President was authorized by the Senate, on April 20th, to issue immediately $6,000,000 of paper money, and by a resolution of May 2nd the powers of the President were so increased that Baez was enabled to issue altogether $18,000,000.

As soon as the printing-presses had manufactured sufficient quantities of paper money, the leading members of the Baecista "ring," as well as the British, French and Spanish Consuls, were permitted to obtain large amounts at a figure far below the nominal rate of exchange, and like the President himself, sent agents throughout the country to buy up the tobacco or other crops in exchange for the new paper; the produce so purchased was then resold to Europe and paid for in foreign gold. The "ring" made money, but panic set in before more than a small percentage of the quantities of paper money amassed had been unloaded. The "papeleta" or paper dollar shot down in value. While the national currency circulated at sixty or seventy "papeletas" to one silver dollar when Baez returned to power, the new paper depreciated so rapidly that the exchange rate soon became 2,000 to one, and ultimately reached 3,000 to one.

The planters of the Cibao, and in fact all the leading

business men of the Republic, with the exception of those to whom the favours of the President had been granted, were immediately faced with ruin. The President attempted to quiet the situation by calling to a conference some of the leading residents of the Cibao, but the subterfuge proved singularly unsuccessful. Indignation meetings were held, and on July 7th, the political and military leaders in the Cibao provinces proclaimed themselves in open rebellion against the Government. On that night, in the historic fort of San Luis in Santiago, a series of resolutions were drawn up disavowing the authority of the Government in Santo Domingo, and declaring that Baez had usurped the Presidency, since the Constitution of 1854 had stipulated that a period of six years must elapse before a citizen could be re-elected as President of the Republic, and that as Baez's first term had only expired on February 27, 1853, he could not have been constitutionally re-elected before 1859.

The leaders of the revolt, Don Benigno Filomeno de Rojas and Generals José Desiderio Valverde and Domingo Mallol, at once formed a Provisional Government. General Valverde was selected as its President, with de Rojas as Vice President, and these were assisted in the administration by the most prominent leaders of the north, including Don Ulises F. Espaillat, Don Pedro Francisco Bonó, and Don Antonio Hernandez. The revolt spread like wildfire throughout the Republic, notwithstanding the announcement by Baez, calculated to impede revolutionary contagion, on July 10th, that the revolution was the work of only a few turbulent spirits and was opposed by the country at large. Government troops sent from the capital by Baez to quell the revolution soon ascertained the contrary, since they were defeated after a few pre-

liminary skirmishes, and by the end of July the Provisional Government had gained the support of the entire Republic with the exception of Santo Domingo and Samaná.

To a decree of the Provisional Government issued July 26th, declaring the impeachment of Baez on the ground that he had usurped the Executive Power in open violation of the Constitution, the Senate in the capital replied on July 30th by a grant to the President of $50,000 "in payment for damages occasioned his property during the Governments of Santana." Already, by the first of August, the capital was surrounded by revolutionary troops whose command the Provisional Government had entrusted to General Juan Luís Franco Bidó. The capitulation demanded by the revolutionary general was contemptuously rejected by Baez, who ordered repeated attempts made to dislodge the besieging forces from around the walls of the city. It is possible that the revolutionists, discouraged by Baez's success in maintaining himself in the capital, and the Baez partisans who had reason to appreciate the general unpopularity of the administration, might have reached during the month of August some agreement providing for the resignation of the President and the retention by the members of the Government of their loot, had the situation not suddenly radically changed.

General Santana, who had been awaiting the course of developments in St. Thomas, and who had at first been somewhat dismayed by the charges levelled in the revolutionary manifesto of the Santiago Government against his own conduct in his various administrations, finally determined to return to the Republic together with General Regla Mota and the others of his closest followers who had been sharing his exile. Reaching Santiago towards the end of August, he at once petitioned the Provisional Gov-

ernment to appoint him commander-in-chief of the forces which were attempting to overthrow the Government of his detested adversary. The Provisional Government, while it had no illusions concerning the danger which might result from placing Santana in such a strategic position, was, however, so disheartened by the ill success of its armies in reducing the capital, and appreciated so fully the great popularity which Santana enjoyed among the military element in the Republic, that it at length gave in, and permitted Santana on the 18th of September to take over from General Franco Bidó the command of the besieging forces.

The advent of Santana spurred the members of Baez's Government on to still more determined resistance. The certainty that surrender would imply their own imprisonment or death at the hands of the Liberator added an incentive to their defense of the capital. Moreover, the British, French and Spanish Consuls, who envisaged the prospect, should Baez fall, of losing all hope of enriching themselves through the redemption of the paper money of which they still had masses in their possession, now became more active in their support of Baez, and actually procured from the French and Spanish Governments officers to assist in the defense of the city, and to direct the operations of the Government's artillery.[1]

For months the siege continued. By the end of the year, 1857, famine had broken out in Santo Domingo, where the greatest suffering existed for lack of food, since, although Baez could from time to time obtain provisions by sea, all roads leading into the city were shut off. Desertion from the besieged forces was constant. By the beginning of December, the American Commercial Agent reported that

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Cass, April 21, 1858.

the number of men supporting Baez in the capital had dwindled to 400, while the number of the forces sustaining the siege totalled at least 6,000.[1]

Throughout the winter of 1858, the situation remained approximately the same, with little change beyond the gradual reduction of the number of the defenders of the capital, and the success of the Provisional Government in crushing the last vestiges of Baez's support in Samaná. By devious financial operations, in the course of which Baez mortgaged properties of the Government, including even the Government Palace, the President was enabled to obtain vessels from neighbouring islands with which he attempted unsuccessfully to blockade Puerto Plata and other strongholds of the revolutionaries.

In the meantime, the Provisional Government, while concentrating its efforts upon the attempt to obtain the surrender of the capital, had not been idle along other lines. A Constitutional Convention, assembled in Moca on December 7th, had agreed upon a new Constitution, satisfactory to the Cibao in that it declared the future capital of the Republic to be the City of Santiago, which established both universal suffrage and direct elections. The Moca Constitution, which was signed February 19, 1858, was drafted along exceedingly liberal lines and was doubtless in no small part inspired by the political theories of one of the leading men in the history of the Republic, Ulises F. Espaillat, who had long been preaching progressive doctrines of government. A transitory provision of the Constitution entrusted the selection of the first President and Vice President under the new Constitution to the Constitutional Convention itself, and General Valverde and Don Benigno Francisco de Rojas were confirmed in

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Cass, November 23, 1857.

the offices which they already held, taking the oath of office on the 1st of March, 1858.

The beginning of the summer months disclosed a desperate state of affairs in the capital. Pestilence had broken out, and the nights were hideous with the lament of the mourners and the creaking of the wheels of the death-carts. Famine had for months been taking its toll from the weak, and from the numbers of the poor who could not obtain their portion of the wretched donkeys that were slaughtered for food, nor share in the rare provisions reaching the city by sea. Even the European Consuls were ready to urge Baez to surrender. But the majority of the President's supporters, in mortal dread of the vengeance Santana would impose, refused to permit Baez to give in.

When news of the appalling situation in Santo Domingo reached General Cass, who had the year before been appointed President Buchanan's Secretary of State, he determined to despatch an American warship to the Dominican Capital to take such measures as might be necessary to protect the American Agency, and to bear supplies to the starving Americans resident there. On May 26th the *Colorado* arrived in the port. The commanding officer, Commodore John M. McIntosh, realizing as soon as he arrived that the continuation of the siege was solely due to the well-grounded fear of the Baecistas of the general persecution in which Santana would undoubtedly indulge, offered his services as mediator upon the understanding that the lives of the capital's defenders must be guaranteed by Santana. Consequently, although the Santiago Government protested bitterly at the leniency of its terms, a form of capitulation was at length signed on June 12, 1858. The capitulations provided that the Presi-

dent should resign his office and leave the country, while Santana obligated himself to refrain from persecuting any of the supporters of the Baez administration. As soon as the capitulations were signed, Baez, with the members of his Cabinet, fled from the capital on a Government vessel to Curaçao, and Santana, once more at the head of victorious troops, entered Santo Domingo on June 13th. The year-long siege was ended.

6.

The revolution left the country prostrate. Commerce had dwindled to such an extent that during the entire year only two American vessels had reached the port of Santo Domingo, and only two foreign schooners had left the capital for the United States. No agricultural produce had been grown, except in the Cibao, where the tobacco crop was barely one-tenth of that previously harvested. The public treasury was empty, government property had been mortgaged by Baez, and the Republic was flooded, notwithstanding the precautionary decrees of the Provisional Government, with quantities of paper money not worth the paper upon which it was printed. The surrender of the capital, moreover, accomplished little in pacifying the Republic. No sooner had Santana entered the city than he commenced to chafe at the restrictions imposed upon him by the Provisional Government. Little time elapsed before recriminations commenced between the southern and eastern provinces and the provinces of the Cibao, which had, for the first time since the independence of the country, constituted a government responsive to their own interests and desires. The inhabitants of the south and east, claiming that their efforts alone had been responsible for the final overthrow of Baez, refused to

agree to the preponderance of the representatives of the Cibao in the Santiago Government, and far less to the removal of the capital from the south to Santiago.

On July 27th, a commission of prominent citizens of Santo Domingo, among the names of whom one may find without surprise those of Don Tomás Bobadilla, Don Juan Nepomuceno Tejera, and General Abad Alfau, waited upon General Santana to advise him that the provinces of the south conferred upon the Liberator full powers to reëstablish immediately the Constitution of 1854, in place of the Constitution of Moca which "catered solely to the interests of the Cibao," and besought him to maintain public order, and to reach an agreement with General Valverde which might guarantee the interests of the entire nation.

Santana assured the members of the commission that while he was entirely disposed to leave the Republic and return to exile, should the interests of the nation demand such sacrifice on his part, he believed that the Dominican people commanded his presence in the Government, and he could not refuse to heed their call. Appointing, on July 30th, a Cabinet of secretaries composed of well tried supporters, he awaited the reaction of the Cibao Government to the trend which events had taken.

Although General Valverde soon ascertained that the public enthusiasm which had acclaimed his Government outside the Province of Santiago during the revolution against Baez, had been created rather by the general detestation of Baez than by the popularity of the Santiago administration, he was not at first inclined to give in to Santana, particularly in view of the loyal support which the inhabitants of Santiago continued to lend him. Santana soon became impatient, and sending troops from the

capital towards the north under the command of General Abad Alfau, forced the towns through which his troops marched to declare themselves favourable to him. La Vega, Moca, and San Francisco de Macorís withdrew their allegiance from the Santiago Government, and finally, as the result of increasing desertions from his own forces, General Valverde accepted the inevitable and tendered his resignation as President of the Republic on August 28th. Santana's troops entered Santiago on September 1st, and with this, the Liberator's authority was generally recognized throughout the Republic. The members of the Santiago Government, profiting by previous experience, left the country as soon as they could find means to do so.

On September 23rd, Santana, who had proceeded to the Cibao to assure himself that effective means were being taken by his subordinates to crush all potential opposition, returned to Santo Domingo, where the populace accompanied him to a Te Deum in the Cathedral to give thanks for the return to power of the Liberator, whom so short a time before they had sped upon his way to exile. The Constitution of Moca was revoked, and that of 1854 was proclaimed in force, and decrees were issued at the same time providing for the election of a new Senate as well as for the election of the President and Vice President of the Republic. On January 31, 1859, General Santana, who had naturally enough been elected President by a great majority, was inaugurated as President of the Republic for the third time, and his close supporter, General Abad Alfau, was elected to the Vice Presidency.

7.

In the month of October, preceding the inauguration of the President, General Santana received the visit of M.

Maxime Raybaud, for many years French Consul General in Port-au-Prince, and prime leader among the European Consuls who had forced Santana to abandon the original treaty of 1854 with the United States. M. Raybaud, who had already been deprived of his office as Consul General by the French Government, made himself popular upon his arrival in Santo Domingo by announcing that the purpose of his visit was "to view with my own eyes the depths of the misery to which the Dominican Republic has been brought." While this was announced as the ostensible reason for his visit to the Dominican Capital, Santana was not long in ascertaining that Raybaud came as the secret agent of the Emperor Faustin, who had been encouraged to believe, well aware as he was of the economic devastation of the Republic, that the moment might be opportune to recover through diplomacy that domination of the Dominican territory which he had proved signally unsuccessful in recovering by the force of arms.

On October 2d, Raybaud addressed a very lengthy communication to Santana, conceived in the most patronizing tone, calling attention to the progress and prosperity enjoyed during the previous ten years by the Haitians, which he alleged was the envy of all thinking Dominicans. He pointed out the fear of the great majority of the Dominican people of being placed at the mercy of the United States, "a people possessing not only a different religion, but who are also actually humiliated in having even a chance contact with any individual suspected of having African blood." He dwelt upon the manifest inferiority of the Dominican Republic, and claiming that the Dominicans were utterly incapable of maintaining their own independence, Raybaud asserted that the present moment offered the last favourable opportunity which the Domini-

can Government would have to obtain its welcome back into the Haitian fold. In conclusion, he advised Santana that the situation was clear; that should the President oppose a friendly union with Haiti, the Dominican Republic would either be absorbed by the United States or be forced at once into a disastrous war with Haiti, as the result of which the Dominican Republic would be treated as conquered territory.

Upon receipt of this letter, Santana caused its immediate publication, and one may imagine his delight at this opportunity for revenge upon the man who as Consul General of France had been able to inflict the most bitter humiliation of his political career. Sending Raybaud his passports, he had him marched immediately to a waiting vessel, upon which the Emperor Faustin's agent was obliged to return to the territory of his employer.

It was an extraordinary chapter in diplomatic history, that last mission of M. Maxime Raybaud to Santo Domingo, only explicable in that Raybaud believed his successful bullying of Santana when Consul General of France, successful only because of Santana's dread of complications with the European Powers, had procured him such personal influence over the President that he could continue to dictate to him in his new rôle of secret agent of the Haitian Emperor.

The incident had, however, a result of the gravest import. The allaying of popular apprehension resulting from the resolute attitude adopted by Santana, and from the overthrow of Faustin's Government by General Geffrard, which had created a Republic in Haiti with Geffrard as its President, afforded Santana a breathing-space in which to negotiate once more the foreign protectorate, without

which he had become convinced the nation could not maintain itself, and without which he felt he himself could not remain in power during the latter years of his life. For there was no doubt that the Liberator was feeling the weight of his increasing years. He was by now approaching the age of seventy, and the many campaigns in which he had seen service, and the vicissitudes of his long career, made increasingly welcome to him the moments of tranquillity at El Prado. His own increasing infirmities made him more than ever anxious to obtain through a foreign protectorate that comforting assurance of his retention of control which he realized that he himself could not much longer ensure by his own efforts.

The oft repeated, and unsuccessful attempts during the past fourteen years to incline France towards assuming new responsibilities, and the lurking suspicion that France's policy was committed to the interests of Haiti, did not tempt Santana to waste any time in negotiations with France. There remained two alternatives—the United States and Spain. The popular prejudice which Segovia had succeeded in creating against everything American, and his own bitter experiences in 1854 and 1856, had well nigh convinced Santana that there was little help to be expected from the North Americans. He was not willing to abandon hope altogether, however. Moreover, the fear of American intervention might well prove the strongest argument in negotiating for a protectorate with Spain. To sound the ground, Santana informed the American Commercial Agent, immediately after Raybaud's dismissal, that while Constitutional difficulties might render it impossible for the Dominican Government to cede exclusive jurisdiction over the Bay of Samaná to the United States, the Govern-

ment would readily facilitate its purchase, or its rental on a long lease, to private owners.[1]

At the same time, Santana, in accordance with the powers granted him by Article 35 of the Constitution of 1854, granted a concession to a company formed by British and French capital, ceding the company the right to work all the mines in the Republic, the company to pay 1,000,000 francs within three months and to commence operations within three years, the Dominican Government to receive 10 per cent of the gross returns. A few months later, Santana likewise granted a French company a concession ceding all the guano and wood upon the public lands of the Government, the Government to receive 1,000,000 francs for the privilege, and to obtain likewise from the company the construction of stipulated public works. These two companies, believing that the value of their concessions would be enhanced, and their shares more readily sold in the United States, were the Dominican Government to obtain recognition by treaty from the United States, suggested to Santana that an envoy be sent by him to Washington to negotiate the treaty which the British and French Governments had been so active in opposing four years before. Santana consequently despatched to Washington as his envoy Don Antonio Delfín Madrigal, with confidential instructions to secure a commercial treaty from the United States.

8.

The stage was now set for Santana's real objective, the negotiation of a protectorate from Spain. So early as October 21, 1858, the start was secretly made. In a long communication addressed to the Spanish Govern-

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Cass, October 14, 1858.

ment at Santana's instance by his Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Spanish Government was informed that the motive of this note was the President's desire to give the Spanish Cabinet a truthful account of the recent history of the Republic, and of the actual conditions there existing. Protesting his desire to retire to private life, from which only the treachery and disastrous administration of Baez had called him, Santana dwelt upon the relations of the Republic with Haiti and narrated in detail the constant intrigues of the Haitian Government, of which he claimed Raybaud's mission was a flagrant example. The constant dread of Haitian aggression was, Santana advised the Spanish Ministers, the cause of such unrest that it made economic prosperity impossible in the Republic. He denied as an absurd rumour the possibility that the United States would again consider the annexation of the Republic, since the Dominican people had no ties of race or religion with the North Americans, admiring merely "their ability in industry, their activity in commerce, and the kindly disposition which they manifested" in their relations with the Dominicans, qualities which the Dominicans had reason to admire as well in many other peoples. The intrigues of Haiti, Santana concluded, constituted the chief problem which the Dominican Government was called upon to face, and he desired to know whether the Spanish Government, by virtue of the second article of its treaty with the Republic, would effectively impede any Haitian attempt to impair the territorial integrity of the Dominican Republic, since in that article the Spanish Government had declared its desire that the Dominican provinces should always remain under the control of the people inhabiting them.

The reply of the Spanish Government, despatched on

February 23, 1859, must have proved far from satisfactory, since it limited itself to the expression of the belief that with the recent overthrow of the Emperor Faustin and the inauguration of Geffrard as President of a new Haitian Republic, the fear of any invasion of Dominican soil from Haiti was materially diminished, and in formal terms expressed the hope of Spain that the Dominican Republic would continue happy and prosperous, and the assurance that Spain would never remain indifferent to any attempt to diminish the independence of the Dominican Republic.

Santana was naturally not content with this reply. On May 20th he appointed General Felipe Alfau as his Special Representative at the Spanish Court, with instructions to obtain from the Spanish Government solemn assurances that it would maintain the independence of the Dominican Republic and the integrity of its territory; protection in the event that the independence of the Republic or the integrity of its territory were ever threatened; and money and artillery with which to provide for the fortification of the Bays of Samaná and Manzanillo; together with the promise to facilitate the employment by the Dominican Government of Spanish officers to train its army, and the agreement to foment the immigration into the Republic of Spanish settlers. General Alfau was authorized, should he obtain these assurances, to obligate the Republic to offer the Spanish Government such concessions as it might desire, and to undertake that the Republic would enter into no treaty or alliance with any other nation, and would neither lease nor alienate to any other power, public lands or waters pertaining to the nation.

The instructions to Alfau were rendered more peremptory by the unexpected problems with which Santana's

Government was suddenly faced. In addition to the demand of the Danish Government that the Republic indemnify the owners of vessels seized and sold by Baez during his last months in the Presidency, which resulted, when Santana expressed reluctance to assume responsibility for the piratical acts of his predecessor, in a threatened blockade of Dominican ports, the Government was involved in a far graver complication.

With an empty treasury and with a country exhausted by the long drawn out revolution, Santana's Government had found itself unable to redeem at its face value the great quantities of paper money issued by Baez, and had consequently, for the purpose of instilling confidence, issued a decree, on May 5th, 1859, providing for the redemption of the so-called "papeletas" at a rate somewhat higher than the previous market rate. At once the European Consuls, who saw their hopes of amassing riches thus suddenly dispelled, publicly announced that the Government's decree, which had fixed the value of the Dominican paper at 2,000 to one Spanish dollar, was null and void so far as the subjects of the countries which they represented were concerned. Addressing a note, astonishing in its insolence, even from those agents who had so long been able to force their will upon Dominican Governments, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Consuls demanded that the Dominican paper be redeemed at a figure far higher than that fixed by the terms of the decree. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, with unexpected temerity, returned the communication, stating that he could not consider transmitting a note couched in such terms to the President. Once more the Consuls sent the objectionable letter to the Minister, and once more the Minister returned it. At this juncture, the Consuls requested the coöperation of the American Com-

mercial Agent, Mr. Elliott, believing that their position would be strengthened should their attitude be endorsed by all the members of the Consular body. The American Commercial Agent, who had no such personal interest in the speculation as had his European colleagues, by instruction of his Government refused his support.

The Consuls of France, Great Britain and Spain thereupon announced their decision to suspend all intercourse with the Dominican Government, and demanding their passports, left the country. Santana, who had been absent from the capital, was now faced with a situation peculiarly disquieting to him, and returning at once to the capital, issued, on May 27th, a decree stating that the subjects of the three powers whose Consuls had left the country remained under the special protection of the Dominican Government.

The country was now in such a state of misery as it had never previously experienced:

"The treasury was utterly bankrupt. There was no coined money of any kind to be seen in circulation. The entire Republic was filled with paper currency, which in its intrinsic worthlessness and rapid depreciation could only be compared to the 'Continental money' of American Revolutionary days." [1]

All trade in the Cibao, which had fallen into the hands of a few European merchants, was stagnant, and the farmers and tobacco growers throughout the country, discouraged by their experiences during Baez's administration, had refrained from planting crops. During the month of May only one brig in ballast and one small schooner half laden entered the port of the capital. The lack of any com-

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Cass, May 21, 1859.

mercial treaty between the United States and the Republic obliged American vessels entering Dominican ports to pay extra tonnage dues. As a result, little American shipping came to the Republic, and American citizens were obliged to do their freighting under European flags. Business with the United States had been constantly decreasing, and by the summer of 1859 there was only one American commercial house doing business in the entire Republic.

Receiving word of the economic distress in the Republic, a condition always likely to create dissatisfaction with the Government, and learning of Santana's difficulties with the European Powers, Buenaventura Baez, who, after his flight from the capital had been residing in the United States, hurriedly journeyed to Curaçao, which he selected as a favourable vantage ground from which to concert a revolution against Santana. Many of his supporters had quietly returned to the Republic, but Baez himself preferred to direct operations at a safe distance. Signs of his activity were soon apparent. An insurrection against the Government, of slight importance and speedily crushed, took place in the spring of 1859. A more serious conspiracy to obtain control of the capital was disclosed the night of Santa Rosa, August 30th, which likewise proved unsuccessful, owing to the energetic measures adopted by the Vice President, who had been left by Santana at the head of the Government. Among the ringleaders of the plot was General Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, by now transformed into one of the most pernicious partisans of Baez. Sánchez and his fellow-conspirators were seized and exiled, and General Alfau at the head of his troops marched to Azua, where the revolution which had simultaneously broken out in the border provinces was soon put down. As soon as a number of executions and decrees

of exile had diminished the ardour of the Baecistas, Santana again temporarily assumed control of affairs, but owing to a return of the illness from which he suffered during the remaining years of his life, speedily returned to El Prado, leaving General Alfau once more in control of the Executive Power.

By returning so speedily to his retreat in the Seybo, the Liberator had relinquished the helm in time to avoid the arrival on November 30th, of the British, Spanish and French warships which were bringing back to the capital the indignant Consuls, who had obtained instructions from their Governments to act conjointly in forcing a settlement of their grievances against Santana's administration. The first three days were passed in the exchange of correspondence between the Consuls and the authorities whom Santana had left in control to bear the brunt of the dispute. Don Miguel Lavastida, the Secretary of Foreign Relations, at first protested his satisfaction at the more courteous terms in which the new demand to modify the decree of May 5th was worded, but insisted upon the inability of his Government to comply with its stipulations, and utterly refused to consider the humiliating salutes of the foreign flags exacted. Thereupon, the benefit of Alfau's negotiations in Madrid was made apparent by the significant withdrawal of the Spanish Consul, who refused to press further for the exaction of the salutes demanded, although he continued to join his French and British colleagues in the demand that the Government's decree be amended so that the paper money should be redeemable at 500 to the Spanish dollar, rather than the 2,000 to the Spanish dollar previously fixed. The French and British authorities refused to follow the example of the Spaniard, and threatened to use force to obtain compliance with all of their

demands. Lavastida thereupon resigned, and Dávila Fernandez de Castro, who replaced him, by instruction of Alfau gave in. After the multitude of salutes demanded by the war vessels had been fired, the Consuls disembarked, and on December 13th, the decree providing for the new rate of redemption was issued by the Government.

9.

The negotiations of Señor Madrigal in Washington had not proved productive of any concrete results beyond perhaps inducing unwary American investors to buy shares in the French companies which had urged his despatch. The mission, however, proved intriguing to Secretary Cass. The Secretary of State decided to avail himself of the services promptly tendered him by General Cazneau, who had reached the conclusion during the years he had spent in his "Estancia Esmeralda" since the termination of his earlier mission, that it would be difficult for him to negotiate in the United States the sale of the concessions which he was acquiring from the Dominican Government, should no treaty be concluded between the Republic and the American Government. Gullible as the American investor might be, General Cazneau was doubtful whether his fellow-citizens would invest much capital in a country with which their own Government had no treaty relations. Early in April, 1859, to his satisfaction, he received again the coveted appointment as Special Agent of the United States:

"You have been appointed Special Agent of this Government to the Dominican Republic," he was instructed by General Cass, "and you will receive herewith a letter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of that Government accrediting you in your official character . . . You are

especially desired to report the situation and probable stability of the Government, upon the prospects of trade in the production of the country, upon the security and protection of foreigners, and particularly of American citizens, and whether there is any special subject which demands the interposition of this Government . . . Circumstances may favor the negotiation of a commercial treaty with that Government. You will direct your inquiries to this subject and report such information as you may obtain, together with your own views, when the matter will be submitted to the President for his direction." [1]

While General Cazneau was directed particularly to obtain a satisfactory settlement of the claims of certain American citizens whose property had been confiscated without compensation by Baez, he was instructed that

"It is far from this Government's wish to seem to take advantage of the exigencies of the Dominican Republic to press these reclamations to a settlement."

On June 14th, Cazneau returned to Santo Domingo from Washington, and presenting his credentials to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had immediately thereafter a confidential interview with General Santana. Cazneau, as ever, was persuasive:

"The Baez party which aims at placing the supreme control in the hands of the negroes, was defeated and driven from the City in July, 1858, after sustaining a siege of eleven months. Its leaders relied on the sympathy of England and France . . . At present, the Cabinet, Congress and Courts are filled by white men . . . The restoration of Baez or the annexation to Haiti, strongly but se-

[1] Secretary Cass to General William L. Cazneau, April 7, 1859.

cretly urged by France and England, would sweep them out en masse to be replaced by blacks selected from the class most bitterly opposed to American interests." [1]

Convincing arguments, these, to be addressed to a Democratic administration the year before the outbreak of the Civil War!

"The Baez party, which is seeking annexation to Haiti as a means of excluding the white race from the Island, had concerted a general revolt to take place in all the districts simultaneously. The attempt was postponed in consequence of the appearance of the American Commissioner" . . .

"The leading members of the Cabinet and Senate are very anxious to obtain treaty recognition from the United States. President Santana would now propose it but for his morbid dread of a failure, which he firmly believes would precipitate the downfall of the Republic." [2]

It is singular that such arguments did not convince President Buchanan of the desirability of concluding immediately and on any terms a treaty with the Dominican Republic, particularly after the President had received the following plea in which Mrs. Cazneau supported her husband's representations:

"I entreat you, in justice to your own family and in behalf of this isolated young State, not to leave the Dominican Republic much longer out of the pale of United States recognition. Up to this time there has not been a day that I have not been on a sick-bed or waiting and watching by the side of fever stricken members of my family . . . but in all times and under whatever circum-

[1] William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, July 2, 1859.
[2] William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, October 17 and December 13, 1859.

stances the ruling thought is to accomplish well the duties before us, whatever they may be." [1]

The negotiations of General Alfau in Madrid, which continued throughout the summer and autumn of 1859, at length resulted, notwithstanding the fact that the danger of Haitian intervention had been greatly diminished by the five year truce between the Dominican Republic and Haiti agreed upon in February, 1859, in extracting from the Spanish Government, one by one and ever reluctantly, the assurances which Santana had instructed his envoy to demand. By the beginning of March, Cazneau reported that Santana had received word from General Alfau that the Spanish Ministry was disposed to accede to the plan of a protectorate over the Dominican Republic.[2] In fact, only a few weeks later, Santana determined that the time had come when he might do away with subterfuge, and with long-protracted negotiations with the Spanish Court, and addressed a letter directly to the Queen:

"In the Palace of Santo Domingo,
April 27, 1860.

"My Great and Good Friend:

After Divine Providence favored me with your powerful assistance in bringing peace to this people, brought low by civil war; when the same protection had made it possible to regain the friendship of other nations alienated by the evil government which installed itself by surprise; when at length a truce of five years was concluded with the enemy who disturbs our tranquillity, I have felt myself under the obligation of securing that which still remained to make this same people happy—confidence in the future.

[1] Mrs. William L. Cazneau to President Buchanan, October 17, 1859.
[2] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, March 4, 1860.

Seventeen years of continuous disquiet have taught us that our political situation would condemn us to pass through the long series of tribulations which our brothers on the South American Continent are experiencing, if indeed we were not first swallowed up by some powerful state which coveted us.

"Such a situation destroys the confidence which a strong and just government might otherwise obtain; it destroys all hope of utilizing the natural riches of our soil which would give promise of so much under more favorable circumstances, and obliges him who today is responsible for the happiness of the people to seek a brighter future under a condition of affairs which would be more lasting and stable. Our origin, our language, our religion, our customs, our sympathies finally, incline us to seek to find that stability in a more perfect union with her who was our mother than the union which now exists, and assuredly never will a more favorable opportunity present itself than the opportunity which actual conditions offer us today. The sentiments of love towards the Spanish Nation . . . have sprung to new life, thanks to the noble and generous conduct which the Spanish Nation has adopted towards us and the loyalty with which the Republic has known how to awaken it. Moreover, the influence with which Heaven has blest me over a people which I have led to victory during seventeen years has increased through the peace which I have been able to bring to them in the civil struggles which I had not, either directly or indirectly, been responsible for. Would, therefore, Madam, this not be the opportune moment to draw more closely the bonds which unite both peoples? If, when this opportunity has passed, there were to come another one of those political upheavals to which new republics find themselves so easily exposed—what then would be the result of that combination of circumstances when perhaps my more than

sixty years, my sufferings, and perhaps even death itself might have deprived me of the ability to offer my services to the Republic?

"If Spain then has, as I am convinced, an interest in avoiding such a contingency, I and the great majority of the Nation are disposed to adopt whatever measure may be fitting to assure the happiness of the Dominican people and the interests of Spain in her American possessions. The Consul whom Your Majesty has deigned to send to this Republic has obtained by his worthy conduct our affection and esteem, and without doubt has informed the Government of Your Majesty of the sentiments with which all we Dominicans are inspired towards your Royal Person. I, Madam, the representative of the Dominican people, and the personification of those sentiments, have sent to Your Majesty's Court a plenipotentiary to manifest these sentiments with even greater force. These sincere demonstrations of our respectful affection, those proofs of our undoubted inclinations, will induce, I have no doubt, Madam, your Royal Heart to favor those who were your sons. In that hope, I offer my sincere wishes for your prosperity and for the prosperity of the kingdom whose government is entrusted to your hands.

"I repeat the expression of these feelings of regard, and I remain—my Great and Good Friend—

"Your great and good friend,

"PEDRO SANTANA." [1]

10.

While there remains no record of the Queen's reply, Santana's direct appeal bore speedy fruit. By June, the assurances obtained by Alfau were already in process of realization. On June 30, 1860, Cazneau was obliged to report that although there was, in his opinion, a visible

[1] General Pedro Santana to the Queen of Spain, April 27, 1860.

growth of good will and confidence towards the United States in every direction, "the project of a Spanish protectorate appeared to be in active process of realization":

"The Spanish and Dominican Governments have entered into an understanding to garrison this Republic with 10,000 Spanish subjects and to place the standing army under the instruction of Spanish officers. About 1,500 persons have already arrived and three more vessels are under Government contract loaded exclusively with Spanish subjects to be permanently settled here. The immigrants are to remain under the protection of the Spanish flag. The whole movement is conducted in a quiet systematic manner which proved a careful prearrangement." [1]

On July 31st, the situation was even more clearly defined:

"On July 28th, a Spanish war vessel arrived directly from Cadiz with 100 citizens of the better class on board—engineers, teachers, and professional men. Arms and ammunition were likewise landed and a large number of Spanish officers. Another Spanish war steamer is to follow immediately with 350 more. Dominican territory will thus form a link of security for Spain between Cuba and Puerto Rico." [2]

Events were now marching rapidly to their inevitable conclusion. Santana commenced to call to him one by one his leading military supporters throughout the Republic, informing them of the end he had in view, and concerting with them the measures to be taken, once the announcement of the Spanish protectorate could be made public. He had already received assurances of the hearty co-

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, June 30, 1860.
[2] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, July 31, 1860.

operation of the Spanish authorities in Cuba and Puerto Rico, and on October 12th had held an interview at San José de los Llanos with General Pelaez de Campomanes, assistant to the Captain-General of Cuba, in the course of which arrangements were determined upon for the procedure to be adopted so soon as the Spanish Government could be forced to undertake the protectorate, or, as Santana believed more desirable, decree the annexation of the Republic. For the Spanish Ministry in Madrid was more than ever reluctant at this late stage in the comedy to commit itself.

Although Don Pedro Ricart y Torres, Santana's new Minister of Finance, was sent with Don Mariano Alvarez, the Spanish Consul, to Havana at the end of October to inform General Serrano, the Captain-General of Cuba, that both Santana and Vice President Alfau, with the support of the whole Cabinet, "certain of the unanimous desire of the people," had definitely determined to incorporate the Republic in the Spanish Monarchy, with the hope that "during the glorious reign of Isabel II, by the free and spontaneous will of the Dominican people, the favorite island of Isabel I might again become a part of the Spanish Dominions," the Spanish Government still held off. In fact, as soon as he was advised by an agent from Havana of this latest and insistent message from Santana, General O'Donnell, leader of the Liberal Union, and Spanish Premier at the time, replied to General Serrano, on December 8th, that the Government of Her Catholic Majesty had not yet been fully convinced that, should the step be taken, internal difficulties might not arise which would place Spain in an excessively embarrassing position, particularly with regard "to the other nations of the New World." Consequently, Serrano was instructed that the

Spanish Government desired to postpone consideration of the annexation of the Dominican Republic, while continuing "to support the Government of General Santana, and any other Government guided by the same policy, with all the means at its disposal." Serrano, however, was authorized—and this was all the latitude which Santana and his Spanish supporters needed—in the event that he became convinced that the postponement of its decision by Spain might permit the United States to further its own reported ambitions, to accept the annexation of the Republic without delay. It was merely stipulated as an indispensable prerequisite in such an event, "that the act be, and appear to be, completely spontaneous in order to safeguard absolutely the moral responsibility of Spain," and it was further specified that no Spanish troops should be landed on the Island "until the authorities and the people had proclaimed the annexation in a solemn and unanimous manner."

Madrigal's mission to Washington, and the fortunate coincidence of Cazneau's second mission to Santo Domingo, had long since been used by Santana as the means of convincing the Spanish authorities in the West Indies that the United States was only too desirous of securing the advantages which Spain was so dilatory in accepting. So far as the will of the people was concerned, that was a matter which Santana assured Serrano would not cause any trouble. Steps had long since been taken to assure the control of the Republic by his agents, and should any citizens be so ungrateful as to protest against the benefactions which the Liberator was providing for them, Santana could assure the Spanish authorities that he had effective means at his disposal to quiet them. A few did effectively protest against the rumours which by now were current,

notwithstanding the secrecy with which Santana had enshrouded his negotiations. General Ramón Mella raised the cry of alarm. Public apathy was so great, however, that his protests were futile, and his immediate imprisonment by Santana caused little, if any, public agitation. His fellow Trinitario, General Francisco Sánchez, who was then in exile in St. Thomas, in printed warnings secretly circulated, likewise called upon his fellow-countrymen to rise to defend their liberties. But the long identification of Sánchez with the interests of Buenaventura Baez, and, more in particular, the fact that Sánchez, by one of those strange inconsistencies with which Dominican history is replete, was seeking, at first with some assurance of success, assistance from the Haitian Government of Geffrard in overthrowing the Dominican Government, made it unlikely that his cry would stir the popular imagination. Almost alone, with only a few others here and there throughout the country, Don Fernando Arturo de Meriño, the Vicar-General of the Church, braved the wrath of the Liberator, and even dared to proclaim in an address which he delivered in the presence of Santana and the Spanish authorities who had congregated at the Te Deum in the Cathedral on February 27, 1861, the seventeenth anniversary of the independence of the Republic, "True patriotism is the first of a citizen's duties, and the foundation of the stability of the Nation." But these few voices raised were of no avail in awakening the people to the impending change in their condition, nor in convincing them that their independence was at stake.

Throughout the winter of 1861, plans were completed for the proclamation of annexation, and the Spanish Government, at length convinced by Serrano of the necessity of heeding Santana's pleas, agreed upon March 18th as

the day upon which the incorporation of the Republic in the Spanish Monarchy would become effective.

During these months, the American Special Agent, while well aware of the impending plans, appears to have made no further effort to offset them. The retirement of Secretary Cass in December, 1860, may have proved disconcerting, but it is more probable that the Texan General was far more dismayed by the impending struggle in the United States, and believed that it would be more profitable for him to remain on close terms with Santana. He made little comment regarding the approaching annexation to Spain beyond remarking:

"Four-fifths of the Dominicans, without distinction of class or color, are intensely dismayed at the prospect of a return to the Spanish yoke." [1]

General Cazneau, presumably, had likewise other affairs to attend to. Perhaps the business which Mr. Joseph W. Fabens—that gentleman who was to be so closely allied with him in the future—was now advertising in the Dominican press as having its headquarters "in the old custom-house in front of the Atarazana Gate," was already occupying much of his time.

The Special Agent found time, however, to object to the very evident opposition of the American Commercial Agent to the approaching annexation. Mr. Elliott, who had already alienated the sympathy of Santana's Cabinet by objecting in strenuous terms, not unnaturally, to an editorial published on August 5, 1860, in the *Correo de Santo Domingo,* written by Don José Maria Gafas, a Captain in the Spanish Army, which referred to the United States as "the refuge for all the criminals of the

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Black, January 11, 1861.

world," and who had observed that "a repetition of the scenes of 1856, when this Consulate and the American flag were grossly insulted, would not again be overlooked," continued in his tactless criticism of Santana's policy.

As soon as he was advised that Santana had requested his recall, he wisely inferred that "General William L. Cazneau appears to be my enemy and is mixed in this business." [1] General Cazneau had already deplored, in communications to the State Department, the interest manifested by Mr. Elliott in furthering the activities of emigration associations from the United States.[2] He now complained:

"Mr. Jonathan Elliott has permitted himself to contract such habits of intemperance that he has become altogether unfit for his post. President Santana has directed the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Pedro Ricart y Torres, to address a note stating that the conduct of Mr. Elliott, and his fatal vice of intemperance make it impossible for him to maintain the good relations desired by both Governments. Mr. Elliott has made seditious and criminal harangues from his balcony, in the loudest voice his lungs could compass, inciting the colored class against the Government and offering to lead the negroes to massacre the Canary Islanders whom this Government have brought from Venezuela. Mr. Elliott is endeavoring to convince the negroes that these people have come to enslave them . . ." [3]

An individual who could express any sympathies for the coloured race was naturally, in the opinion of the Texan General, unfit to hold the position of American Commercial Agent, and Secretary Cass so evidently shared Caz-

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott to Secretary Cass, August 20, 1860.
[2] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, March 4, 1860.
[3] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Cass, September 10, 1860.

neau's opinion that he appointed, a few days prior to his own resignation, a protégé of Mr. Slidell, Mr. William Richmond, to replace Mr. Elliott. Unfortunately for Cazneau, however, Mr. Richmond's Confederate connections caused the cancellation of his appointment by President Lincoln before he had started for his post.

By the beginning of the year 1861, as soon as the date for the proclamation of annexation had been agreed upon by the Spanish Government, and as soon as a grant of $500,000 had been obtained, and a sufficient number of Spanish officers had arrived in the capital to take command of the Dominican troops, General Santana, who, by decree of the Senado Consultor, had been invested with temporary dictatorship, announced to his agents in all parts of the Republic that the formal proclamation of annexation to Spain was to be announced in Santo Domingo on March 18th, and simultaneously in all the other important towns and communes of the Republic. On March 17th, the citizens of the capital awoke to find the walls of the houses and the doors of the public buildings covered with copies of a proclamation commanding them to assemble on the following day in the Plaza de la Catedral.

The events of that historic day are graphically described in the first number of the *Gaceta de Santo Domingo*, the official organ of the new Colonial Government, published on March 21, 1861:

"Editorial

"Long live the Queen!

"The glorious Spanish flag, that symbol of civilization which for more than three centuries waved over our towers and fortresses, has been raised again in this Antillian Island favored by Isabel I, loved by Columbus, and from now on

under the protection of Isabel II, the Magnanimous, today once more our august sovereign.

"As the result of this event the Dominican people have seen the realization of their most fervent hopes and of their most real and noble aspirations and in truth, the act in which there took place the solemn proclamation of our political transfer could not have been more spontaneous nor could have satisfied more fully the sincere desires of this people.

"From dawn of Monday, the 18th, the day set for this change to take place, great crowds kept circulating through all the streets of the Capital, which made evident that some great event was soon to take place: at seven in the morning the Plaza de Armas was invaded, one can truthfully say, by every class of individual, and a little later the troops of the garrison of this City began to arrive, *all without arms,* and accompanied by their respective generals and officers. The valiant General Pérez, Comandante de Armas of the Capital, arrived later followed by his estado mayor to view the interesting picture which the scene presented; but as yet there was noted the absence of the illustrious leader of the Dominicans and of his loyal and sapient counsellors whom all awaited with eagerness, as if in the impatience which all were feeling in that moment there existed the general desire to hasten the realization of their cherished hopes. Finally His Excellency appeared, with the brilliant following composed of his Ministers, Senators, Generals, resplendent officers, all the municipal bodies, and all the other personages of distinction who were to be present at the proclamation, and a little later His Excellency presented himself on the principal balcony of the Palace of Justice, from which, as the result of the frank and spontaneous expression of the will of the people and of the infinite number of petitions which the people had sent him, declaring himself definitely in favor of the

incorporation of this part of the Island in the Spanish Monarchy, he addressed, in a loud and clear voice to his fellow-citizens, a fervent allocution . . .

"When His Excellency concluded, loud cheers re-echoed: the music of the military band accompanied the voices of the multitude and a salute of 101 shots gave notice that there was now waving from our fortress and public edifices side by side with the Dominican flag the glorious banner of Castile, symbol of salvation, under whose protection and beneath whose shadow all invoke heaven that we may see rewarded with a government of peace, equality and justice the immense sacrifices which this heroic people has for so long been dedicating in its efforts to regain its liberty.

"Immediately afterwards, all went to the Holy Cathedral where there was held a solemn Te Deum as a sign of gratitude to the Almighty who has granted us so many benefits in the midst of our tribulations, but before the Te Deum was solemnized, we saw with pleasure that the Most Illustrious Monseñor Gabriel B. Moreno del Cristo at the foot of the altar steps standing in front of the Most Excellent Don Pedro Santana, addressed to him the expressive discourse which is published in these columns.

"Thus has been briefly indicated the manner in which our political transfer has been effected, a unique example in the history of other countries, but not so in our country which has already given to all unique examples of perfect fidelity and love at all periods, and which, far from being led astray by false illusions, sees and feels the reality of things. May Divine Providence sanctify this splendid union in which both peoples should rejoice, and may we all be today, as we always have been, true Spaniards as sons of that noble nation which gave to us our origin and whose glories, achievements and virtues are likewise deserved by us.

". . . The great importance of the allocution of Don Pedro Santana, the noble sentiments which are reflected in it and the tremendous enthusiasm with which the crowds gathered in the Plaza de Armas heard it and welcomed it, proved beyond the shadow of a doubt how spontaneous the movement has been, as well as the well deserved confidence which the illustrious defender of our country's liberty inspires in all of us."

The allocution of Sanatana, which merited such appropriate praise from the Spanish editor, forms a sardonic climax to the history of these first seventeen years of Dominican independence—years during which the aspirations of the Dominican people, who had sacrificed their lives, their blood, their treasure, their all, to preserve their liberty, were ever betrayed by the two despots who had imposed themselves upon the nation.

"Dominicans! It is not many years since that my loyal and consistent voice reminded you, in presenting to you the reform of our political constitution, in these words, 'Our national glories, the heritage of the great and noble people to whom we owe our origin.'

"In making them so truly manifest my sentiments, I thought as well that I was the faithful interpreter of your own, and indeed I was not mistaken. My own policy was then forever indicated, but your own has gone even further than my fondest hopes believed.

"Many and spontaneous petitions of the people have come to my hands, and if, yesterday, you had granted me extraordinary powers, today you yourselves are hoping that that which your loyalty has ever desired may indeed become fact. Religion, language, beliefs and customs, all we maintain unaltered. Not, however, that there have not been those who have attempted to take from us such

precious gifts; and the nation which has given us so much is the same nation which today is bending its arms like a loving mother who recovers her child lost in the shipwreck in which its brothers have perished.

"Dominicans! Only the ambition and the resentment of one man have alienated us from our mother country; in later days the Haitian dominated our lands, but our national valor drove him out, and the years which have passed since then to all have spoken for themselves.

"Shall we permit ourselves to lose the elements upon which we can count today which are so dear to us although they may not be strong enough to assure our own future and the future of our children? Before that may take place, before we see ourselves in the state in which those other pitiful republics find themselves, forever involved in civil war in which are sacrificed valiant generals, statesmen, numerous families, considerable fortunes and innumerable unhappy citizens, without the way being found to make themselves stable and strong, rather than that such a day should dawn here, I, who ever sought your safety; I, who aided by your courage have defended foot by foot the lands on which we stand; I, who realize how urgent are your needs, wish you to hear the Spanish Nation and look well at what she offers us.

"She grants us the civil liberty which her own people enjoy and guarantees to us our personal liberty and therefore removes the danger of our losing it; she assures to us our prosperity, recognizing as valid all the acts of the Republic; she offers to bear in mind and to reward all cases of merit and will not forget services which have been devoted to the country; finally, she brings peace to this soil where so many combats have taken place, and with peace she brings the benefits of peace. Yes, Dominicans, from today on you can rest from the weariness of war and you can occupy yourselves with tireless energy in assuring

the future of your sons. Spain protects us, her flag waves over us, her arms will repel our enemies; she is not unmindful of our labors and jointly we will defend them, forming one people and one family, as we always have been. Together we will pray before the altars which that same nation erected, before those altars which today she will find as she left them, intact, spotless, and still crowned with the shield of her national arms, her own castles and lions, the first standard which Columbus at the side of the cross raised in these unknown lands in the name of Isabel I, the Great and Noble Catholic, the august name, which the actual sovereign of Castile inherited as she likewise fell heir to the love of the inhabitants of this Spanish Isle. Let us raise the flag of her monarchy and proclaim ourselves loyal subjects of our Queen and Sovereign! Long live Doña Isabel II! Long live liberty! Long live religion! Long live the Dominican people! Long live the Spanish Nation!"

CHAPTER III

THE SPANISH OCCUPATION

1.

ON February 11, 1861, Abraham Lincoln commenced the long journey from Springfield to Washington to undertake the heaviest task with which any President has been confronted. The South was defiant, menacing, aggressive; in the North public opinion was hopelessly divided, the extremists advocating immediate rupture, the great mass favouring compromise at any cost so long as war might be averted. In his inaugural address the President made the course he had marked for his administration plain beyond doubt: "I . . . consider that in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is unbroken; and to the extent of my ability, I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States . . ." He besought those who threatened the Union: "In your hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail you. You can have no conflict without yourselves being the aggressors. You can have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the most solemn one to preserve, protect and defend it . . ." The preservation of the Union was the goal upon which all of Lincoln's hopes were set, to the attainment of which all his energies were to be expended. No other matter could be taken into consideration. In his own words, "Let us do one thing at a time, and the big things first."

The initial non-resistance of the administration, although it was criticized with scorn by the Northern

extremists, created alarm among the members of the Confederate Government at Montgomery, who realized the general reaction which had set in throughout the revolted states, and feared that the conciliatory patience demonstrated by the President would win over great numbers in the seceded states, and cause the prestige and authority of the Confederate Government to vanish. For a few weeks there was outward peace.

To the brilliant Senator from New York, William H. Seward, whom Lincoln had appointed, as his chief rival for the Presidency, his Secretary of State, the opportunity was ripe for a desperate experiment. Were the public mind in the North and in the South to be diverted from the acute danger of imminent civil war to the threat of war with a foreign enemy, any enemy, Europe at large if need be, would not the common patriotism of the country rally at the cry of foreign aggression, and the disease of domestic discord be purged in the struggle for self-preservation against the common foe?

The constant encroachment of the great Powers of Europe upon the American hemisphere during the preceding years, against which Buchanan had but feebly protested, and which had evidenced a most flagrant and contemptuous disregard for that basic principle of the foreign policy of the United States formulated by John Quincy Adams and proclaimed thirty-five years before by James Monroe, afforded the pretext sought by the Secretary of State. There were the continued attempts of France and England to increase their supremacy in Central America; the joint expedition of France, Spain and England to obtain by an armed demonstration from President Juarez a settlement of the claims of their nationals against Mexico, which paved the way for Louis Napo-

leon's disastrous adventure in Empire building in the Americas; ultimately, the Spanish occupation of the Dominican Republic, of which a special messenger sent in haste from Santo Domingo by the American Commercial Agent had just informed Seward.

The project of the Secretary of State, crystallized into the memorandum entitled "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," was transmitted to Lincoln early in April. The President was urged immediately to send "agents into Canada, Mexico and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence in this continent against European intervention"; to insist upon an explanation "categorical and at once" from France and Spain of their now only too evident designs upon Mexico and the Dominican Republic; to demand similar explanations from Russia and England of their proceedings on the American continent; and finally, should, as was inevitable, only unsatisfactory explanations be obtained from France and Spain as to what already was in each case a "faît accompli," the President was called upon to "convene Congress and declare war against them."

But the serene determination of Lincoln to concentrate all the powers of the Government upon the preservation of the Union was not to be diverted by a policy which in other circumstances might not have lacked justification. His logical intellect could see no wisdom, when any chance spark might kindle the blaze within the house, of deliberately lighting the conflagration of its exterior. And in fact only a few days elapsed before the Government at Montgomery, fearful that unless "blood were sprinkled in the face of the Southern people they would be back in the old Union in less than ten days," [1] ordered the attack

[1] James G. Blaine, "Twenty Years of Congress."

on April 12th upon Fort Sumter which lit the flame of the Civil War.

The bellicose despatches proposed by Seward were consequently modified by Lincoln's intercession into protests addressed to the European Governments against the activities they had displayed in the American continent. But the counsel of Seward, soon made public, was in great part responsible for the wave of antipathy to the Union which rolled over Europe at the outbreak of the Civil War, and greatly enhanced the sympathy for the Confederate cause, for which various powerful motives already had existed in England and in France. In Spain it quickened into fever heat the resentment against the Government of the United States to which the long-continued sympathy demonstrated to the Latin American Republics, the suspected hunger for the remaining Spanish colonies, and finally the "Ostend Manifesto" had given birth.

Moreover, conditions which obtained at the time in Madrid were such that small heed would have been paid in any event to the American protest against the open violation of the Monroe Doctrine, formally reported some months later to the Cortes by the Minister of State, Calderón Collantes. For there was a fast increasing belief in Spain in the year 1861, that the renaissance of the Spanish Empire was at hand. It was a belief which the Liberal Union, "that group of all the disillusioned," [1] had carefully nurtured, and it was upon a policy of imperial aggrandizement that the party leader, General O'Donnell, Premier at the time, had staked his political fortunes. The war with Morocco, which O'Donnell had waged to the successful conclusion of the capture of Tetuán, from which he had taken his title as Duque de Tetuán, had

[1] La Gándara "Anexión y Guerra de Santo Domingo."

created the wildest enthusiasm, not only in Spain itself but in the Spanish colonies as well. The Spanish people, beguiled by the fantasy that a return to the glorious days of the Empire was dependent solely upon the acquisition of some scattered territories, were well sheltered by their political mentors from the practical realization that conditions abroad and at home would render the emulation by Spain under Isabel II of the exploits of the great Emperor or of his son altogether impracticable. For in Spain itself social and political conditions were at the low ebb of their rankest decadence, over which the recent military exploits in Morocco could barely throw a gloss. The country seethed in the midst of the social revolution which all the years of the nineteenth century could not resolve.

At the head of the State there still reigned for a few more turbulent years Isabel II: "immensely stout, and with the most good-natured face in the world, she was certainly nothing to boast of in elegance of manner or dignity of deportment. . . . always acting on the impulse of the moment, obeying her own will in all things, instead of being guided by any fixed principle of action." [1] Engrossed primarily by the demands made upon her by her long series of favourites, among whom O'Donnell had a conspicuous place, and by the care of the increasing number of her royal progeny, she abandoned affairs of state to the Premier of the moment, who not infrequently mingled his official privileges with those of a more intimate character. The Queen "had no idea of what is meant by ruling over a nation, and made no attempt to do so, well or ill. She carried out the formal functions to which her position condemned her with a sort of resigned ennui.

[1] From a letter of Lady Louisa Tenison, 1852.

But she never really grasped the meaning of the conflicts that went on around her, she never realized the play of forces, the struggles of ideas, the supreme interests which it was in her power to decide. . . . Indifferent to the great questions of state, incapable of even knowing whether she was taking the side of Liberalism or Absolutism, she was very sensitive to personal influences. A man who acquired power over her could attract her either way." [1]

Surrounding the Sovereign was the horde of office-seekers, each, save for rare exceptions, seeking the Queen's favour as a means of furthering his own ambitions. Espartero, Narvaez, O'Donnell, Escosura, Prim, González Bravo —a long line, alternating in power. Beyond the Ministers, the army, ever-dissatisfied, undisciplined, heeding the voice of the highest bidder for its support. And so far removed from the Crown that its voice was inaudible, the great body of the common people, drifting towards any leader from whom it thought to obtain a betterment of its abject misery.

It was for such a Sovereign and for such a Government that Santana sacrificed the dearly-bought independence of his country. And through the force of circumstances, except for the formal protest ultimately made by the Government at Washington, and for a few words of caution tendered by the British Cabinet, there was but one Government to raise an outcry against the perpetration of the annexation to Spain. On April 6th, Fabre Geffrard, the President of Haiti, registered the protest of his Government "solemnly, and in the face of Europe and America, against any occupation by Spain of Dominican territory" and declared that the Haitian Republic would

[1] The *New Review*, London, 1869.

never recognize the annexation, and would reserve to itself the right to employ any means within its power to assure its own best interests.

2.

It is open to question whether the bulk of the Dominican people themselves would have shown any determined resistance to the project of annexation, had they been afforded the opportunity of so doing, before they were confronted with the accomplished fact, in March, 1861. The exhausting struggle of the seventeen years of independence, the ever constant menace of invasion from Haiti, the continued exile of the liberal leaders, which had removed from the political scene the voices which had first roused the nation to respond to its pristine ideals, had all contributed to the gradual decay of the earlier devotion to the concept of liberty; and the passion for independence had become merged in an overwhelming desire on the part of the agricultural and commercial classes for peace, and the material benefits which it was imagined peace must bring. The recurrent dictatorships of Santana and Baez, with their prompt annihilation of anything which even remotely resembled independent thought, had stifled at its outset the growth of any public opinion in the Republic. In fact the tremendous percentage of illiteracy, and the lack of any press, save the sycophant sheets created solely for the purpose of fawning upon the Government, or more rarely for the purpose of upholding the claim of some rival for the Presidency, would, even under far more favourable conditions, have rendered the growth of public opinion, as distinguished from partisan fervour, impossible.

As it was, under the almost feudal system which pre-

vailed, the ignorant masses followed unhesitatingly the opinions evinced by their local "caciques" or chieftains, and even in the larger towns the poorer classes followed like sheep the dictates of the petty leaders to whom, for one reason or another, they were addicted. Santana once said to a Spaniard, after the annexation had been completed, "I have made you an immensely valuable gift, for I have given you a people without journalists and devoid of lawyers." And Santana understated the truth. For the immense majority of the Dominican people were not yet vocal; they responded as yet unswervingly to the commands of their leaders. Betrayed, they were still obedient to the "caciques" whom Santana had suborned to serve his own purposes. And it was only when the utter ignominy of their plight at length became plain to them, that the ideals of liberty and freedom, instilled into the souls of his fellow-countrymen by Duarte and those of his companions who were worthy of the task, instinctively maintained at all costs in the wars with Haiti, caused the masses, ignorant as they were, to rise in their might and cast from them the yoke which their unworthy rulers had placed upon their necks.

The Spanish Premier, even in those months when he foresaw, as he thought, the disintegration of the American Union into factions whose jealousies between themselves would ever prevent their making common cause against the European attempts at territorial expansion in the New World, was still cautious. Notwithstanding the imperial policy to which he was committed, he was reluctant to assume responsibilities which might entail vast expenditures without commensurate returns. It was his chief lieutenant, General Francisco Serrano y Dominguez, whose eminence in the Liberal Union had gained for him the

chief office in the gift of the Spanish Crown outside the Premiership itself, the post as Captain-General of Cuba, who prevailed upon his chief to take the risks entailed in the annexation of the Dominican Republic. General Serrano, whose acclaim as the "handsomest man in Spain" had doubtless been of avail to him in becoming the first of his Queen's favourites many years before, and in thus rivaling the distinction accorded his superior, was likewise a man of considerable brilliancy and of inordinate ambition. He was not to be deterred from increasing the dominions of Spain in the West Indies and safeguarding the colonies of Cuba and Puerto Rico, by the sober considerations of his chief, nor by the potential opposition of America, particularly as he was advised by his agents that the Confederacy would interpose no objection to the addition of another colony to Spain's slave-holding dominions in the West Indies.

But the explicit instructions of O'Donnell that the annexation of the Dominican Republic would not be undertaken before the Spanish Government had received the expression of the unanimous consent of the Dominican people, which must be obtained before Spanish troops were landed, could not be overlooked either by Serrano or Santana.

Santana's intention had originally been that the annexation to Spain should be proclaimed in all the communes of the Republic on March 18th, the day upon which it was announced to the citizens of the capital. His plans, however, had miscarried. By March 15th there was no evidence that the Dictator's agents in the more remote provinces had completed the arrangements required. Santana's impatience to be able to advise Serrano that the farcical pretense of obtaining the "unanimous con-

sent of the Dominican people" had been carried out, caused him, early on March 15th, to send special messengers to his agents throughout the Republic with the most urgent instructions, which covered every detail in the proposed ceremonial.

"The Proclamation is to be made immediately; the Spanish flag is to be raised; a solemn notarial act of the ceremony is to be written, which must be signed by all the people present who know how to write, and the names of the persons who do not know how to write are to be included in it . . . As soon as the flag has been saluted with twenty-one guns, the 'comandantes de armas' are to be notified . . . The proclamation should be made as early as possible in the morning, so that the Dominican flag need not be raised . . . A Te Deum is to be sung and the civil governor of the Province is to address an allocution to the public, to explain the guarantees and the advantages which the annexation implies . . ."

A few hours after these reiterated instructions had been despatched, the Dictator received the announcement that in Hato Mayor, where Colonel Manuel Santana, his son, was Provisional Governor of the Province, the proclamation of annexation had been made on March 12th, before a gathering of ninety-five persons congregated in the church. Although the announcement had anticipated the date fixed by six days, Colonel Santana's letter to his father must have been peculiarly gratifying:

"Hato Mayor, March 12, 1861.

"My dear Papa:—

". . . I have received your instructions with the greatest enthusiasm and joy since in this manner we will be freed from this condition of poverty and calamity, and I

can assure you that at no time could [the annexation] have been better received than now, for already the people desired any arrangement at all which would improve our situation, and so it is that here in Hato Mayor, as in the Seybo, everybody has manifested the greatest enthusiasm and contentment and since they have had explained to them so very clearly the advantages which will be brought to the whole Republic and to each individual, all have sworn with the greatest good faith to accept joyfully the splendid arrangement that the Republic is now to become a Spanish province. . .

"I can assure you that here and in the Seybo and in Higuëy, from what General Michel has told me, there isn't the slightest sign of discontent, but on the contrary, all have declared that they would have desired the flag to be raised before now.

"At any rate, I have made to them the most persuasive arguments which were within my power.

"All your family were well. I hope that you preserve your health.

Your most affectionate son,
M. G. SANTANA."

But notwithstanding the urgency of Santana's orders, the announcement of the annexation was not made in such important towns as Monte Cristi, Guayubín and Puerto Plata until as late as March 26th.

The President's fear that some unforeseen event might yet arise to prevent the consummation of his project induced him to wait no longer than March 18th, the day upon which the annexation had been proclaimed in Santo Domingo, to issue a decree providing that the laws and general regulations which had been in existence in the Dominican Republic were to continue in effect, except for such as provided for the exercise of sovereignty, until

they were revoked or modified by the Spanish Queen. On the following day, a further decree was issued providing that until the Spanish Government had reorganized the local administration, the four Secretaries of State in Santana's Cabinet would continue to attend to the public business of the new colony.

The first days in the capital, while Santana was still awaiting word of the "unanimous support of the proclamation of annexation" from the remote towns, were replete with celebrations. The senior officer among the Dominicans in the garrison of the capital, Colonel Juan Ciriaco, invited such Spanish officers as had already arrived in Santo Domingo, as well as his Dominican fellow-officers, to a banquet in his residence. After a series of toasts to the "brotherly love with which the Spaniards and Dominicans today regard one another," the whole gathering, no doubt somewhat exhilarated by the banquet, accompanied by the military band, marched through the streets of the town, pausing before the residences of Santana and General Alfau and other notables of the city to address congratulatory speeches to them. According to the *Official Gazette*, "joy was universal." Two days later, the Spanish officers invited their Dominican colleagues to a similar banquet in the Casino de Colón, and after this entertainment had been concluded, the guests once more, again accompanied by the military band, proceeded to parade through the streets of the city, "which they kept on doing until a late hour of the night."

Upon the receipt by Santana of the notarial acts prepared by his subordinates in the communes, which he believed would be proof conclusive to Serrano of the unanimous desire of the Dominican people for the Spanish annexation, the official accounts of the reception of

the proclamation throughout the Republic were despatched to Havana. Thereupon orders were immediately issued by the Captain-General of Cuba, whom it had not been difficult to convince that O'Donnell's instructions had been complied with, for a considerable body of troops from Puerto Rico and from eastern Cuba to embark at once for the neighbouring island.

By the middle of April, a large number of troops had already arrived. Some one thousand men were transported to Samaná, which the Spanish authorities had determined immediately to fortify. A considerable number of troops were likewise sent through the Province of Azua to garrison the outposts along the frontier, but by far the greater number of the acclimatized troops from Cuba and Puerto Rico remained temporarily in the capital. By the early summer, General Serrano had sent altogether some six thousand Spanish soldiers to Santo Domingo, and Santana was enabled to announce that a garrison of 10,000 men was to be maintained, and that twelve vessels of war were temporarily to be anchored in Dominican harbours.

Once Serrano had taken the steps necessary to insure the retention of the former Republic, the Spanish Premier was informed that the Dominican people had unanimously accepted the annexation with every sign of rejoicing. General O'Donnell was now faced with an accomplished fact. Overcoming his initial reluctance, he advised the nations of the world, through the Spanish representatives abroad, that the Spanish Government had been forced to undertake the annexation of the Dominican Republic, without any purpose of derogating its sovereignty or independence, solely in order that the Dominican provinces should no longer be exposed to the possibility of

invasion by an enemy people. Three weeks later, on May 19, 1861, the Spanish Queen signed the decree, later submitted to the Cortes, officially proclaiming the annexation. Santana's palpable anxiety was relieved on June 16th when an emissary from General Serrano announced to him officially that Isabel II,

"obeying the magnanimous impulses of her heart, had deigned to heed the wishes expressed by the faithful inhabitants of the Spanish portion of Santo Domingo, and had consented to permit the former colony to return to the bosom of the fatherland, forming from now on an integral portion of the Spanish Monarchy."

Returning post-haste to the capital from Azua, where he had gone in company of several officials on a visit of inspection, Santana announced to the Dominican people in a proclamation published June 22nd, that the Queen of Spain had deigned to consent to the annexation of the Spanish portion of the Island of Santo Domingo, which acquired thereby the status of an integral province of the Spanish Monarchy.

So the last step in the program was successfully taken. And the Dominican people, without being afforded the opportunity of passing upon the annexation project through a plebiscite, or by the submission of the project to the Senate or to the courts, having given their supposed "unanimous consent" at the ceremonies so carefully staged in advance by Santana, became officially Spanish subjects, and residents of a remote colony of the Spanish Crown.

3.

But although Santana, now appointed upon Serrano's recommendation Captain-General of the new province,

had announced to the Spanish Government that peace and tranquillity existed throughout the colony, the reverse was the case. Barely six weeks after the proclamation of annexation, the first organized revolt against the transfer of sovereignty had taken place. On the night of May 2nd, a group of discontented Dominicans led by Colonel José Contreras had succeeded in obtaining possession of the military stronghold in Moca. The insurrection was doomed to be short-lived, since the Captain-General, at the head of a body of his devoted Seyban troops, immediately marched upon Moca, and capturing the ringleaders of the rebellion, summarily executed them. The ruthless severity displayed by Santana, entirely in keeping with the arbitrary policy which he had followed during the years when he was responsible to no other than himself, was condemned by the majority of the Spanish officials, and notably by the new Lieutenant-Governor of the Province, General Pelaez de Campomanes, as being contrary to the conciliatory course which the Spanish Government should pursue, particularly in that by such measures the impression would necessarily be created abroad that the annexation by Spain of her former colony had been accomplished through conquest rather than as a result of the alleged desire of the Dominican people themselves.

While the executions ordered by Santana effectively curbed for the time being the semblance of revolt within the colony, it quickened rather than diminished the activities of the Dominican exiles in Haiti, who had not abandoned the campaign undertaken prior to the annexation. A guerilla warfare had been effectively maintained for some months along the frontier by General José Maria Cabral and General Francisco del Rosario Sánchez, who

still hoped to restore Baez to power, and who had received in their operations effective assistance from President Geffrard. Of a sudden, the President of Haiti, intimidated by the increasing levies which were constantly arriving in Dominican territory from the neighbouring Spanish colonies, determined to withdraw his support from the revolutionaries. As soon as the change in the situation became known, Cabral suspended activities, leaving General Sánchez to continue the campaign by himself. Lured into ambush, Sánchez and his chief supporters were captured at El Cercado by the troops sent in pursuit by General Santana, and were brought as prisoners to San Juan, where they were there executed on July 3rd, without even the bare formalities of military law, by the direct order of the Captain-General. If the executions at Moca had proved distasteful to the new Spanish authorities, the military assassinations at San Juan were far more disquieting. The indignation of General Pelaez at the action of his superior reached such a pitch that he addressed vigorous protests directly to the Spanish Government, and raised a doubt in the minds of the authorities in Madrid whether the unlimited confidence which they had been led by Serrano to have in Santana, as a man indispensable in the Government of the colony, had not in fact been misplaced.

The flicker of revolt, the Spanish Government determined, was primarily caused by the arrogant proclamation of the Haitian President, without whose assistance, they believed with reason, the Dominican rebels could not have successfully waged their revolutionary campaign in the border provinces. With such insolence Serrano proposed to deal speedily. To the dismay of Geffrard, who had seen many threats made in past years by the great

Powers, but who had never before seen such threats materialize into effective action, the Haitian Government awoke on July 10th to find a Spanish fleet anchored in the harbour of Port-au-Prince. On board was General Rubalcava, who proceeded to demand of the Haitian President immediate recognition of the annexation by Spain of the Dominican Provinces, an indemnity of $200,000 for the damages caused Dominican property by Haitian armies, and a positive guarantee that the Haitian Government would in the future maintain a patrol along its boundary so that no further revolutionary attempts upon Spanish authority in the Dominican portion of the island could again be effectively undertaken by Dominican exiles on Haitian soil. Geffrard was successfully intimidated into complete acquiescence in the Spanish demands, and although it is recorded that only $25,000 was actually paid in lieu of the total indemnity required, the energy displayed by Serrano upon this occasion was sufficient to check the Government of Haiti for some years to come.

4.

Enheartened by the easy success of his emissary in curbing the hostility of Haiti, Serrano decided the time had come for him to make a personal inspection of the colony which he above all other Spaniards had been chiefly instrumental in adding to the dominions of Spain. Apparently confident that upon his arrival he would be overwhelmed with demonstrations of popular esteem, and rejoicing in the prospect, he was at the same time vaguely disquieted by the reports reaching him of the increasing friction developing between Santana and the Spanish officers subordinate to him, and solicitous by his personal intercession to remove the causes thereof. "With two

magnificent warships, laden with the innumerable effects required upon a ceremonial voyage, surrounded by a resplendent escort adequate to the dual dignity of his person and of his rank, the Captain-General of Cuba appeared" on August 6th "in the harbor of Santo Domingo, where there awaited him disillusions of the kind which even the most optimistic spirit can neither deny nor even mitigate, since they are accompanied by strong and lasting personal impressions. The personal inspection of all that which was contained abstractly and with a certain mythological mystery in the word 'annexation,' the sight of the reality in all its nakedness, must have quenched his enthusiasm and caused his hopes to vanish. . . . In proof of it, his visit which was to have been of considerable duration, was cut short to the number of days necessary for the Te Deum, a couple of banquets, and a ball." [1]

The first and greatest shock occasioned the punctilious Captain-General of Cuba was the absence of his colleague of Santo Domingo from among the group of officials awaiting his arrival upon the dock. Serrano's impression that all was not proceeding harmoniously in the administration of the colony was thus speedily confirmed. In fact while the visiting dignitary was proceeding in state to the Cathedral, where the multitude assembled by the military officials was to give thanks in a solemn Te Deum for the honour conferred upon them by his visit, the Captain-General of Santo Domingo, alleging a sudden indisposition, was swinging back and forth in a hammock upon the balcony of his residence only a block away, sulkily meditating upon the better days, for the change in which he himself had been primarily responsible, when there were no superior authorities to question his actions, and

[1] La Gándara "Anexión y Guerra de Santo Domingo."

no upstart Spanish subordinates who dared to protest against the measures which he saw fit to take. For the disagreements between Santana and his Dominican satellites and the ever-increasing number of Spanish officials, which had commenced with the protests of General Pelaez against the military executions ordered by his superior, had undergone a rapid growth. The resentment among the Dominicans had already struck deep roots.

For a brief period Serrano's diplomacy improved the situation. Bearing in mind the old fable of the mountain and Mohammed, he called upon Santana as soon as the ceremonies of his public welcome had been completed. Concealing his astonishment at being received by the Captain-General of Santo Domingo "bare-foot, and clad only in a country-man's shirt and linen pantaloons," he assuaged Santana's irritation temporarily, upon ascertaining that the appointment of Spanish officials to posts coveted by many of the Dominican's followers had been a chief contributing cause of the difficulty, by assuring him that the Spanish Government would thereafter give the lion's share of lucrative appointments to the Dominicans indicated by Santana. The latter was so far mollified that upon the following day, his sudden illness entirely cured, he presented himself, still arrayed in peon's dress, which formed a striking contrast to the ceremonial uniforms of the brilliant escort accompanying Serrano, in the Government Palace, to be installed officially as Captain-General of Santo Domingo, and to take the oath as Knight Grand Cross of the American Order of Isabel la Católica.

5.

If Serrano's brief visit temporarily appeased the irascible Captain-General of Santo Domingo and his insatiate

band of sycophants, it had no such beneficial effect upon the rank and file of the Spanish Queen's new subjects. Already among the men of note in the northern provinces of the Cibao, who had at first inclined to the belief that any change in their condition must be for the better, discontent was rife. Gradually the epidemic spread, gained headway with each new cause for dissatisfaction, captured the leaders in the southern provinces who at first were more readily dominated by the Government at the capital, and when it had finally permeated the lower classes, incited at length by their own peculiar grievances, the smouldering opposition to Spanish rule broke into the blaze of concerted revolt which eventually destroyed utterly the last vestige of alien control.

The causes for popular discontent were fundamental, manifold and cumulative.

In the words of General Gándara, the last Spanish Captain-General of the colony, who for personal reasons was not over-partial to the policy pursued by his Government:

"There existed complaints . . . to which Spain was not in a position to attend, since similar vices in the Spanish Government itself lacked attention; . . . There were others which the proximity of the other Antilles made it difficult, if not impossible, to remedy; there were others finally, and by far the greater number, which our statesmen utterly failed to comprehend, and of which they did not grasp the importance, and for that reason they were disregarded. . . . The original oligarchy of Generals and merchants ruling Santo Domingo was replaced by another of Spanish officials; all the evils in administration were rendered worse rather than better, and the sole panacea offered by Spain to her new colony, that system of centralization and monopoly which was

governing us ourselves, instead of tending to placate and captivate, was far more likely, as proved to be the case everywhere, to foster discontent, and to provoke those terrible crises of modern society which terminate upon the field of battle." [1]

In the instructions which Santana had given his agent at the Spanish Court when it was at length believed that annexation would be undertaken, the Dominican President, appreciating better than any other the bases which would be likely to win popular approval for Spanish Government, had stipulated that the Cabinet of Madrid must agree to enter into certain obligations respecting the Dominican people. These stipulations, readily accepted by the Spanish Ministers, were:

1. That individual liberty be guaranteed, and that slavery be never again established on Dominican soil.
2. That the Dominican Republic be considered as a Spanish Province, and enjoy as such the same rights.
3. That the greatest possible number of those men who had rendered important services to the country since 1844 be given public employment, especially in the army, and that these might continue to be employed by Her Majesty.
4. That as one of its first measures, the Government of Her Majesty decree the amortization of the paper money actually in circulation in the Republic.
5. That the validity of the acts of the successive governments of the Dominican Republic since its birth in 1844 be recognized.

Of these specific obligations, which Santana believed constituted the sum of the material requirements of the

[1] La Gándara, "Anexión y Guerra de Santo Domingo."

people once peace was assured, only the first and the fifth were actually carried out.

At the outset the Spanish officials were loud in their promises of the benefits which annexation would confer upon the colony. The ports were to be fortified and enlarged. The peninsula of Samaná was to be fortified in such manner that complete control would be obtained over the Mona Passage, and the town of Santa Barbara de Samaná itself was to be immediately increased to the size of an important commercial center, with the most liberal municipal charter ever granted by Spain. Steam communication was to be established between Santo Domingo and the other Antilles, post offices were to be installed in every commune, roads were to be constructed between all the principal towns, and telegraph lines were to be laid. The courts were to be reconstituted, and the tariff was to be reformed so as to stimulate Dominican commerce. Sanitation was to be undertaken by experts.

As the months sped by and not only the general assurances of reform failed to materialize but even the specific obligations entered into by Spain were not carried out, the very munificence of the promises so glibly made reacted against the Spanish authorities.

The first signs of dissatisfaction were noted among the military elements, when Spanish officers were one by one appointed to positions of importance in the colonial troops, and the Dominicans, forced to make way for them, were retired upon a small percentage of their former pay. The experience of the Dominican military authorities was soon after shared by the civil officials. From Spain, Cuba and Puerto Rico there poured a stream of hungry office-seekers, to whom O'Donnell and his colleagues were gladly offering the lucrative positions they could not find for

them elsewhere. To satisfy them the native office-holders were gradually removed, and Santana himself had difficulty in obtaining, when a Royal Audiencia was established by a decree of November 21, 1861, the appointment of such trusty supporters as Don Tomás Bobadilla and Don Jacinto de Castro as Magistrates of the Crown. Within a brief period the Dominican people saw the national pay-roll augmented from the small figure of the latter days of the Republic to the immense total of $3,500,000, when the yearly revenues barely produced half a million dollars, and saw eighty per cent of the salaries granted reverting to the Spanish "carpet-baggers."

The resentment of the office-holders was soon equalled by that of the commercial and agricultural classes. Believing at first that the assurance of peace would cause the immediate increase of prosperity, they found the reverse to be the case. With the outbreak of the American Civil War commerce with the United States was necessarily cut off, and the increasing discrimination evidenced against foreign business for the purpose of favouring commerce with Spain, had the immediate effect of closing to Dominican products the best markets they had previously possessed in Europe. The Dominican merchant soon found to his cost that the reform of the tariff benefited solely the Spanish exporter and would ultimately strangle Dominican trade. The gravest cause for discontent, however, in that it implied the inevitable ruin of many who had legitimately obtained quantities of Dominican paper, was the constant postponement of the agreement of the Spanish Government to redeem the paper money in gold or silver at a fixed rate. Not until two years after the date of the annexation was the work of redemption commenced, and the redemption, if it can be so termed, was

undertaken by replacing the Dominican "papeletas," which had been issued in denominations of $2, $5, $10, $20, and $50, with paper notes of worse quality than those they replaced, in issues of fifty cents, $2, $5, $15, and $25, or with copper coin. The entire Dominican issue of $50 notes the Spanish authorities, without justification, declared counterfeit, and announced its repudiation. There was no action of the Spanish Government which created more bitter antagonism, or more thoroughly demonstrated the corruption of the standards of the Cabinet at Madrid.

There were other causes, equally potent, however, for the increasing ferment of unrest. The enforcement of the Spanish penal code, with all its heritage of the dark ages, was intolerable to a people which had enjoyed the benefits, which shone by contrast, of the more enlightened Napoleonic Code. The Spanish penal code, among its other retrograde provisions, instituted severe punishments for the observance of religious rites other than those of the Catholic Church. To the Dominican people, to whom religious liberty had been a cherished principle, notwithstanding the fact that they were in their immense majority devout Catholics, the restrictions now imposed were repellant, and were rendered doubly so by the attitude displayed by the new Spanish Archbishop, Don Bienvenido Monzón y Martín.

Archbishop Monzón soon proved himself to be, in his utter failure to grasp the necessity of conciliating public opinion, a worthy colleague of most of the Spanish officials sent by O'Donnell to the colony. The Dominican clergy, who had at first eagerly welcomed, with few exceptions, the transfer of sovereignty, were soon thrown into consternation, not only by the fact that Spanish priests

ere fast replacing Dominicans in the more important osts in the gift of the Church, but also by the action of ie prelate in undertaking to control their private lives, hich were in some cases notoriously lax. The success of ie Archbishop in eradicating the "heretical" Methodist hurches which had been founded many years previously y American immigrants, and his subsequent altercation ith Santana, who refused to turn over the papers and cret archives of the Masonic Order to the Archbishop r his inspection, and advised the prelate to attend to his wn concerns, since masonry "was not a fit business for n Archbishop to meddle with," fanned popular discon- nt as well as that of the clergy. It remained for the rchbishop to force the native priests to abandon the ractice of accepting fees for their parochial services, and ntent themselves with a beggarly monthly stipend, and ie immense power which the Dominican clergy was able exert was at once directed not only against their reli- ous superior, but against every semblance of Spanish ntrol as well.

Finally the resort of the Spanish authorities to the levy greatly increased taxes upon the impoverished inhabi- nts of the colony to meet the ever-increasing expenses the occupation provided the last straw upon the back the already sorely over-burdened populace. After little ore than two years the disastrous result of the Spanish periment was clearly shown in reports of the American mmercial Agents:

"It is now nearly two years that this part of the Island s been under Spanish rule and as yet it remains in the me miserable state as formerly. I neither hear of nor see y improvements . . . The small amount of money in rculation is that which the troops (only 3,000 men are

now alive) spend from their pay. Living and all articles of necessity are excessively high. Spain has already expended $2,000,000, and is now wasting $100,000 a month . . . All foreign produce imported now pays a duty of 30%; Spanish products in Spanish vessels pay only 9% . . . [1] The arbitrary levies and taxes which have been forced upon the people of this Island to support a gang of idle Spanish officials have so disheartened the people that the majority have abandoned their farms and woodcuts, and have allowed their plantations to overgrow with weeds . . . commerce is dead . . . there is an almost total suspension of exports, and ruin has come to the merchants of the Island." [2]

If the Spanish authorities so soon succeeded in causing the ruin of the colony and in awakening the burning hostility of all classes, they obtained by their policy even more speedily the violent antipathy of the foreign residents, many of whom had been among the first to welcome the advent of Spanish rule. To none was the hostility of officialdom more heartily displayed than towards the resident Americans. According to the American Agent, "the Spaniards here are no friends of the United States, and almost without exception lean towards Jefferson Davis and his bogus Southern Confederacy. Nothing has pleased them more than to hear of the defeat of our army and as they hoped, the ruin of the United States." [3]

But hatred for the American Union was demonstrated in more practical fashion than in the mere expression of

[1] Mr. Jonathan Elliott, Acting Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, January 13, 1863.

[2] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger, American Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, October 2, 1863.

[3] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger, Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, September 28, 1863.

ıe hope of its defeat, or in the confiscation of the ıurches of the American Methodist negroes. On July 3, 1862, the *Alabama*, built in a British shipyard and ıanned with British seamen, had slipped quietly down ıe Mersey to commence the long series of its depreda-ons upon the shipping of the United States. Within two ıonths its ravages in the Caribbean had driven the major ɔrtion of the Union vessels from those waters. In the ɔrts of the colony the raider found a ready refuge. On ıuary 28, 1863, anchoring in the roadstead of Santo omingo, the commander of the Confederate steamer, ɔmmander Ralph Semmes, put ashore the crews of two nion sailing vessels which he had sunk between Santo omingo and Haiti. Welcomed by the Spanish authori-es, the *Alabama* plied sometimes for weeks within ıe territorial waters of the colony, taking occasional fuge from the American men-of-war concentrated at . Thomas, in some sheltered port of the Dominican col-ıy. The protests of the American Agent were fruitless, ıd his indignation appears to have been divided between ıe Spanish authorities for their breach of neutrality, and ıe commanders of the Union men-of-war, to whom he ıd sent repeated word of the raider's whereabouts. "So ng," the Agent reported to Secretary Seward, "as they ɔuld lay in St. Thomas, and the officers indulge in iced leps and cocktails, they cared nothing about the *labama*." [1]

6.

By the end of the year 1861 Santana clearly foresaw ıat unless a radical change took place in the policy of e Spanish Government, disaster was inevitable. Discon-

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger, Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, October 1863.

tent against the occupation was increasing dangerously, not only among the better educated elements of the populace, but among the lower classes as well. His own indignation at the treatment accorded him was unbounded. For a few brief months after the visit of General Serrano his wishes had been generally met, but as time went on the Captain-General found his recommendations entirely ignored, and his own supporters not only passed over in favour of Spanish office-seekers, but also upon the rare occasions when Dominicans were offered preferment, his most bitter opponents, the partisans of Baez, received appointment by recommendation of General Pelaez, the Lieutenant-Governor, whose relations with his chief had now become those of open hostility. The climax came when Santana's two remaining Dominican Secretaries of State, Dávila Fernández de Castro and Miguel Lavastida, were removed from office early in January, 1863, without the prior knowledge of the Captain-General.

With the impetuous temper characteristic of him, Santana despatched immediately his resignation to the Queen, believing undoubtedly that the announcement of his resignation would be received with such consternation in Madrid that not only would the Spanish Government insist upon his retention of authority, but that it would likewise provide him with the ample powers which he had formerly held as Dictator of the Republic, and accede to his pleas for the removal of the Spanish officials, whose constant meddling in the administration of the colony had now become altogether insupportable. Basing his resignation upon the conventional ground of ill-health, he did not lose the opportunity to magnify his own accomplishments:

"A strong and well organized administration extends hroughout the country, and promises to improve its con-ition. Forces on land and sea, and even more the glories vhich the nation is acquiring in all quarters, act as a uaranty against foreign menace; everything has changed; ll has improved; all, finally, has obtained that character f progress which assures a successful future."

During the preceding months, however, the Spanish linisters had commenced to feel that Santana was by no ieans so indispensable to their purposes as they had at rst been led to believe. Serrano himself had been disillu-oned. Consequently, Santana's resignation was promptly ccepted, on March 28th, 1862. Although the pill was ilded by the grant of the title of Marqués de las Carreras, ie rank of Senator of the Kingdom, and a life-pension of 12,000, Santana's mortification was intense and his dis-nay unassumed, when he at length realized that his hope f retaining indefinite control of the country was now retrievably shattered.

But he was unwilling to permit his fellow-subjects to erceive his chagrin. In a farewell address he assured them nat "already their fortunate fate was securely written in ie book of destiny; their families have a safe home; their roperties a strong arm to defend them"; and impressed pon them that "union, respect of the law, affectionate ubmission to the authorities, love of order and devotion o their daily tasks" were the means of permitting them o enjoy the fruits of his tireless efforts of the past eighteen ears to promote their well-being. On July 20, 1862, antana installed his successor, General Felipe Rivero y emoyne, as Captain-General, and retired to meditate pon the perversities of fate at his beloved estancia, l Prado.

7.

The Spanish Government was incredibly inept. Among all the masqueraders of the Liberal Union, desirous as they were of playing the rôle of empire builders of the nineteenth century, the sole leader who demonstrated a spark of capacity, Serrano, was soon to leave the Antilles to pursue his fortunes as Duque de la Torre in the wider sphere of opportunity of Spain itself. The incapacity of the Spanish Cabinet, already evidenced by the utter failure of its Premier to grasp what were in reality the simple requirements of the situation in Santo Domingo, was strikingly emphasized by the character of its appointees to the new colony.

Of all the prominent officials sent by Spain to Santo Domingo, General Rivero is perhaps the outstanding figure for the crass stupidity which he consistently displayed during the fourteen months of his rule as Captain-General. Born in Caracas, his outlook on life was bounded by the narrow limits of the colonial environment in which he had grown up. Through petty intrigue he had now reached, as Captain-General of the Spanish province, the apex of his ambitions. Quite ignorant of the fundamental necessities of the situation with which he was now called upon to deal, he attempted at first to palliate by means of conventional phrases the very practical discontent which was smouldering in the hearts of the Dominicans and as soon as he discovered that words would not solve the problem, he resorted to the other alternative of a weak character, and attempted to stamp out by sheer brutality the dissatisfaction which was rife.

No sooner had he entered office than he proceeded at once to heap upon the Dominican people a mass of petty restrictions and limitations of the personal freedom which

hey had formerly enjoyed, which brought home to each ndividual, far more intolerably perhaps than the broader nd already existing causes of unrest, how obnoxious the panish administration actually was. Severe penalties had lready been imposed upon those partaking in the seemngly innocent pastime of playing cards in the taverns and afés, the only amusement besides cockfighting generally xisting in the monotonous lives of the Dominican poorer lasses. Additional decrees were promulgated on Septemer 20th and October 15th by General Rivero, which reatly increased the resentment of the laboring classes. he first obliged the country people to transport from one istrict to another the equipment of any troops or officers vho might pass their way, thus obliging the farmer to leave is home for days at a time at the option of any passing panish officer. The second was a series of regulations govrning sanitation, religion, morality, and the upkeep of ouses, streets, and country roads, all unadapted and indaptable to the requirements and needs of the Dominican eople. A third decree of January 12, 1863, obliging each ouseholder to remodel his house in accordance with the heories of the Captain-General, was an attempt to force he already impoverished inhabitants of the country to pend uselessly sums they had no means of obtaining.

If the policy pursued by the new Captain-General was lready creating for the Spanish troops a potential enemy n each Dominican, an equally formidable antagonist had lready appeared among them, for yellow fever had roken out. Before Rivero's arrival, the dread enemy had lready thinned the ranks; after his arrival it increased s ravages:

"On July 1st, 1,000 troops arrived from Havana. Of the ,000 troops previously landed, only about 300 remain, all

the rest having died of yellow fever, and of those left between twenty and thirty are dying daily. On account of the rainy season and the filthy condition of the City, there is no hope for an abatement of the fever." [1]

During the next five months another thousand died, and the soldiers who had come from the garrisons in Puerto Rico and in Cuba, and who were believed to be acclimatized, were buried by the hundreds in Dominican soil. The holocaust was so appalling, the signs of general discontent among the Dominican populace so formidable, and the mutterings of mutiny among the Spanish troops so disconcerting, that Rivero took alarm:

"On the night of the 30th of September, a meeting of the highest Spanish authorities was held at the house of Governor-General Rivero, when it was agreed to advise General O'Donnell and the Spanish Government to abandon the Island." [2]

But General O'Donnell, holding his position in Madrid against increasing odds, could not stultify himself by admitting to the Spanish people that the hopes of a new empire with which he had beguiled them had so speedily vanished, and issuing orders that more conscripts be drafted from their vineyards or their olive groves to be poured into Santo Domingo, where they would die even more rapidly than their brothers, who had already undergone exposure to the tropics in Cuba and Puerto Rico, he rendered inevitable the struggle of the next two years, which was to result in the gravest tragedy for Spain and in the utter desolation of the colony which had been so briefly restored to her.

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, July 3, 1862.
[2] Mr. Jonathan Elliott, Acting Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, October 3, 1862.

By now the storm was breaking. An attempt at rebellion, which was put down, in the first days of February, 1863, at Neiba, was followed by a more threatening revolt which broke out on February 24th, when General Lucas de Peña, leading a small body of Dominican patriots, captured a Spanish detachment at Guayubín. Martial law was immediately proclaimed by Rivero, who sent an urgent message to the Marqués de las Carreras in his retreat at El Prado to join the Lieutenant-Governor, General Carlos de Vargas, in stemming the tide which was flooding the Cibao. Before Santana reached the decision to comply with the request, the revolution had been proclaimed in both Moca and Santiago, where the Dominican flag was once more hoisted. But the early attempts at revolution proved temporarily unsuccessful. The better drilled and better armed Spanish troops succeeded in dispersing the revolutionaries, who were mostly armed solely with machetes. Such of the rebels as could escape, fled into the impenetrable brush of the frontier provinces, and those of their leaders who had been captured were shot without a hearing on April 17th, notwithstanding the appeals and the petitions which came both from the foreign Consuls and from leading Dominican citizens. Had it not been for the general amnesty proclaimed by the Queen at the request of the Spanish Cabinet, on May 27th, more executions would have followed, and the remaining captives from the revolutionary forces would have been condemned to work as galley slaves in chains in Cuba, "some for twenty years and others for ten years, and a few of those of lesser importance in the streets of Santo Domingo in the chain-gang." [1]

The lull afforded by the amnesty was of short dura-

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, April 6, 1863.

tion, and resulted principally in granting the opportunity to the leaders who had escaped, among them notably General José Cabrera, General Pedro A. Pimentel and General Benito Monción, to perfect arrangements with the Haitian General, Sylvain Salnave, who had commenced a revolt in the north of Haiti against Geffrard, for support in their efforts to dislodge the Spanish authorities.

On August 16th, the revolution broke out once more at Capotillo, where a small body of Dominicans under the leadership of Cabrera and Monción surprised a Spanish detachment and utterly routed it. And this time the revolution was not to be quenched by the energy of Santana, nor by the brutality of the Spanish officers; it was destined to continue until the last Spanish soldier had been driven from Dominican soil.

The reports from the American Commercial Agent were now constant:

"A state of martial law has been declared by General Rivero. The revolutionists attacked General Hungría, the Governor of Santiago; his bodyguard were mostly slain but he himself escaped. They next attacked Guayubín, where all the Spanish soldiers were killed and the town destroyed. The whole Cibao has risen in arms and they are killing and driving the Spaniards before them. . . Over one-half of the officers and men of the Spanish garrisons in the northern part of the Island have been killed or wounded, and two-thirds of the garrison in Santo Domingo have died from yellow fever during the present month. The total number of Spanish soldiers is under 3,000 men and at least one-third of them are in the hospitals. The Government is engaged in building fortifications around the Capital since the Spanish force in the Capital is less than 1,000 able-bodied men. General Rivero has appointed

a military tribunal in Santiago with full powers to pass sentence upon any revolutionists brought before it." [1]

"The revolution has been gaining strength daily and every district nearly has declared against the Spaniards. In several parts of the Island where there were but few Spanish troops, the commanders called together the Dominicans and supplied them with arms and ammunition with the intention of marching to La Vega and Santiago to crush the revolution, but as soon as the Dominicans had the arms in their possession, they slaughtered the Spaniards. The few Spanish soldiers and residents who escaped fled to the Capital. Moca has been burned to the ground."

"Five hundred Spanish troops have arrived in Santo Domingo from Puerto Rico to protect the palace and the City.

". . . . . ." [2]

"Spain's Governors in Macorís and Cotuy, Dominicans by birth, succeeded in reaching the Capital bearing each a passport issued them by the revolutionists. The passport states 'The Dominican Republic still lives. Liberty or death, and a war of extermination to all Spaniards and their blood.'

"General Santana is now in the Capital where he awaits the arrival of additional Spanish troops to lead them against the revolutionists." [3]

"Owing to the fact that no Spanish troops arrived, General Santana obtained 500 Dominicans from the neighborhood of San Cristóbal, and with 1,000 Spanish troops, on September 15th, crossed on the rope ferry the Ozama

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, August 31, 1863.
[2] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, Sept. 6, 1863.
[3] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, Sept. 14, 1863.

River marching towards Santiago by the Monte Plata road, the shorter road being impassable owing to the floods.

"Santiago has been totally destroyed. Some 2,000 troops reaching Puerto Plata from Havana, with the local garrison, totaling in all 3,000, marched towards Santiago taking six days to arrive there. General Buceta, the Spanish Commander of the Cibao, who had taken refuge in the fort with about 1,000 men and taking the revolutionists in the rear, enabled the Spanish forces from Puerto Plata to cut their way into Santiago. The Spaniards thus regained possession of the City, but immediately afterwards the Dominicans attacked them from all sides and the Spaniards were forced to take refuge in the fort of San Luis. The Spaniards refusing to surrender the fortress, the Dominicans burned the City to the ground, when the Spaniards agreed to capitulate. The terms of the capitulation were that the Spanish troops were to leave everything in the fort together with their own arms, but contrary to their agreement, they blew up the powder magazine and retained their arms. At this the Dominicans were so incensed that notwithstanding their agreement to give the Spanish troops free passage, they fell upon them and only one-half succeeded in returning to Puerto Plata. About 6,000 rifles have thus been obtained by the revolutionaries.

"General Santana with his army has been checked at Monte Plata and is there awaiting reënforcements." [1]

"When the news reached here that the districts of Bánica, San Juan, Neiba, and Azua in the west had declared against the Spaniards . . . the Government became so frightened that at midnight, with a strong guard, they took from their beds thirty-six of the most respectable and influential men in the City, handcuffed them, and marched them on board of a small schooner, sending them as

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, September 21, 1863.

prisoners to Puerto Rico, without one cent in their pockets or even a change of clothing . . . Among them were several foreigners, some who have been merchants in this City for ten and fifteen years. Among the number arrested is Joaquín Delmonte, a merchant of this City, who had resided some years in the United States and received his first naturalization papers. The Government has also arrested three of the principal priests . . . and sent them as prisoners to Havana. As the Spaniards have been routed and driven from every town, hamlet, and district in the interior and have now been obliged to take refuge in this City and Puerto Plata, there is no limit to their arbitrary rule . . . At Samaná, they had over 300 Spanish convicts in the chain-gang, murderers and felons of the worst kind, who had been sent there from Spain, and as this motley government needed troops, the chains were taken from these convicts and arms put in their hands. As these men were condemned to the chain-gang for life, they will no doubt, with these arms in their hands, and free from their chains, make good their escape to teach the poor Dominican the villainy of a Spanish convict." [1]

"The Dominican revolutionists have obtained possession of Puerto Plata and hoisted the Dominican flag. They gave the Spaniards and their families time to embark. While this was going on, a Spanish man-of-war arrived and when the Spaniards were embarked, the Spanish war vessel began firing upon the City and the whole City was destroyed by fire." [2]

"On Sunday, October 4th, the Spanish troops and the Chinese laborers employed by the Spanish authorities, pillaged all the stores and private residences in Puerto Plata. This was sanctioned and encouraged by the Spanish officers

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, September 28, 1863.
[2] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, October 10, 1863.

present. On October 5th and 6th the same individuals set fire to the stores and dwellings of the City." [1]

"The refugees from Puerto Plata were brought to the Capital. Many poor families have been put on shore at this City without shelter, food, clothing or friends, and it is heartrending to see these poor women and little children wandering through the streets exposed to the broiling tropical sun or the rain, not knowing where to go or to lay their heads. The public buildings and churches are used as barracks and hospitals for the troops.

"A large number of wounded soldiers have been sent to Puerto Rico. Two steamers left today filled with sick and wounded. All the families who had the means left Puerto Plata for the neighboring islands after Santiago was destroyed. There is now not a town or district which has not pronounced for the revolution. San Cristóbal has declared, and the ferry at the Haina River has been taken possession of by the Dominicans, preventing the Spanish troops from the Capital from marching to San Cristóbal. Samaná has been burned. Two steamers were despatched this morning for Azua and Baní to bring here the troops and their families. In the east at Monte Plata the revolutionists are attacking Santana, who has been fighting for the last ten days. Living is enormously high. The few old goats around this City and its outskirts are being brought up and killed, and those who can afford it get some as a favor at from thirty to fifty cents a pound. . . . The people of San Carlos, numbering about 1,500 inhabitants, have been ordered by the Government to move into the City. The chain-gang of Dominican prisoners has been employed for two weeks in cutting down the trees within one mile of the City walls and for the last three days they have had over 1,000 men employed at the same work. The whole

[1] From an affidavit forwarded by Mr. Arthur Lithgow, American Vice Consul in Puerto Plata, to the Department of State.

illage of San Carlos is to be destroyed so as to erase all rotection to the enemy." [1]

"Five steamers have arrived bringing troops and families rom Azua. The Spanish authorities spread the rumor hroughout that province that 30,000 Spanish troops were oon to arrive to lay waste the whole Republic and that he citizens of Azua who remained in their homes would e treated as rebels. The Azuans were consequently fright-ned into abandoning their homes in that province and o take passage as refugees on these Spanish steamers, from hich they have been landed in Santo Domingo City with-ut shelter, food or clothing. Every house in the City of zua has been abandoned and most of the country people ave fled. The Captain-General has sent his own family to uerto Rico for safety. Santana is still held at Monte Plata here his retreat has been cut off. Attempting to give attle to the revolutionists at Yamasá all his baggage, nules, horses, guns, ammunition, provisions, together with wo Spanish generals and about 100 Spanish troops were aptured. He has sent for reënforcements from the apital day after day but his messengers are generally aken before they reach the City. Two hundred troops, ith one cannon, were sent to his relief, but they only got ve miles from the Capital when they were captured or lled. The Spaniards are fortifying the walls of the City nd they are afraid to venture one mile out on the Guibia ad." [2]

In the midst of the struggle, as soon as it became ident that the first scattered attempts at revolt were st merging into the supreme effort to end Spanish occu-tion, amid the still smoking ruins of Santiago, a Pro-sional Government of the Dominican Republic was once

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, October 10, 1863.
[2] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, October 19, 1863.

more constituted. On the 14th of September, 1863, in one of the few houses which still stood after the conflagration, a small group of citizens proclaimed, "Before God, the world, and the throne of Spain," that the Dominican Republic had been restored. By popular acclamation, General José Antonio Salcedo, who had figured prominently in the initial battles of the rebellion, was chosen President of the Provisional Government, and Don Benigno Filomeno de Rojas, who had already figured as Vice President in the Santiago Government of 1858, was once more selected to hold his previous post. Don Ulises F. Espaillat was called upon to direct the foreign relations of the new Government, and Duarte's companion, General Ramón Mella, joined the administrative Junta together with other prominent citizens of the Cibao, among them Don Pedro Francisco Bonó and Don Sebastián Valverde, all of them long identified, so far as conditions had made it possible, with the spread of liberal doctrines in the Republic.

The Provisional Government, on September 23rd, addressed a proclamation to the Spanish Queen, detailing the motives for the rebellion against her Government's authority and begging the appointment of plenipotentiaries by Spain to agree with the Provisional Government upon the bases of a treaty of peace which might put an end to the conflict. The petition obtained no reply, as might have been anticipated, but had presumably some effect in inducing the Spanish Cabinet to listen more attentively to the counsel of General Carlos de Vargas, the Lieutenant-Governor of the colony, who had gone to Madrid and had remained there for some months urging modification of the policy which the Spanish Government had been pursuing, and the conciliation of the Dominican people. Vargas was finally successful in ob-

ining the approval of his recommendations, and received
mself the appointment as Captain-General in the place
Rivero. His return to Santo Domingo was generally
elcomed by those who had not taken an active part in
e Revolution, and in line with the new policy upon
hich he had insisted, his early proclamations endeavoured
dispel the general hatred and bitterness toward the
anish authorities, and announced the pardon of the
ajority of the unfortunate Dominican non-combatants
ho had been exiled from the country by Rivero.

Rivero himself was ordered to leave the capital the day
on which the new Captain-General arrived, and left for
adrid to be tried by court-martial. The reign of terror
hich the later months of Rivero's administration had
oduced was reported by the American Commercial
gent:

"Rivero's imbecility, mismanagement, and retaining
such men in office as General Buceta, late Governor of
ntiago and the Cibao, have been the cause of this late
volution and the almost total ruin and desolation of this
untry. General Buceta is a fair specimen of the Spanish
rant. Being brought up as a jailer and the keeper of
ons on the barren island of Ceuta, his training has not
en such as would fit him to be the governor of a harm-
, free and independent people. His first appointment
der this Government was that of Commander at
maná, where he compelled, at the point of the bayonet,
the people within his jurisdiction to work on the public
hway one week out of every three without receiving
cent for their labor. At Samaná there are about 300
nerican colored people who have resided in this country
some years; also a few English subjects. These poor
laved people appealed to the English Consul and myself
we protested against such arbitrary and brutal pro-

ceedings. We finally succeeded and General Buceta was removed, but instead of sending him to the Island of Ceuta, from where he ought never to have been taken, the Captain-General appointed him Governor of Santiago and of the Cibao, where he made himself still more obnoxious. In Santiago, he would walk the streets early in the morning and wherever he found a house closed he would send his buglers and drummers to turn the people out of their beds. . . . His own guilty conscience would not allow him to sleep and he was determined to deprive every one else of their rest . . . On several occasions, where he passed houses about seven in the morning and found them closed, he would at once order his drummers before the doors, and many a poor woman in her confinement breathed her last under his inhuman and tyrannical mood. Several respectable men of Santiago, whose income was sufficient to maintain them without labor, he took from their houses at the point of the bayonet, marched them to the plaza, and there made them shoulder heavy timbers and carry them around the square until the blood would run from their shoulders. A reign of terror and arbitrary cruelty commenced . . . and a certain Colonel Campello, who was unfortunately appointed to the command of the frontier, committed there the most abominable outrages, robbing property, ravishing women, and shooting in cold blood a number of inoffensive and respectable inhabitants without even the form of a trial." [1]

General de Vargas, who had made friends among the Dominicans while serving as Rivero's lieutenant, and whose efforts to better the condition of the people had gained for him the esteem of many, might earlier have succeeded in postponing, at least, the outbreak of the rebellion, but he had now come too late.

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, October 26, 1863.

8.

During the first weeks after the installation of the new Captain-General there was a temporary lull in the hostilities. It was the expectancy of the Provisional Government, and the belief of the disgruntled elements generally, that the adoption by the Spanish Government of the new policy made evident by the appointment of Vargas, portended its willingness to negotiate an agreement of evacuation. The instructions given the Captain-General, however, contemplated no such eventuality, and Vargas's leading generals, Santana in particular, who interpreted the conciliatory proclamation of their superior as a deplorable evidence of weakness, not only combated the course adopted as stubbornly as they dared, but likewise in their dealings with the populace made emphatically plain the divergence between their own views and those of General de Vargas. As a natural result intense hostility was not long in showing itself again generally against the Spanish authorities, and the Santiago Government, disappointed in its expectations, and ignored by the Cabinet at Madrid, formally declared on December 25th that a state of war existed on land and sea between the Dominican Republic and the Spanish Monarchy. By the same proclamation the accumulated bitterness of the Cibao people was vented on Santana; the "Liberator" was declared guilty of the crime of high treason against his country; he was proclaimed an outlaw, and all officers of the Provisional Government were urged to shoot him at sight.

To General de Vargas, largely ignorant of the manner in which his desires for a milder policy were being deliberately thwarted by his subordinates, the recrudescence of animosity against Spanish rule on the part of the Domini-

cans, notwithstanding his attempts at conciliation, was only explicable on the ground of gross ingratitude. This belief, gradually engendered in him, and his disappointment at his ill success in obtaining the pacification of the country, which he had assured his Government the adoption of the policy which he proposed would speedily procure, eventually converted his desire for conciliation into a bitter determination to force submission to his authority by strength of arms.

The renewal of the campaign was not marked by any outstanding achievement on either side, however, due to the lack of loyalty to their commander displayed by the Spanish Generals, and the jealousies and increasing rivalries among the revolutionary leaders. For months the exhausting conflict continued:

"The Dominicans are keeping up a continual guerilla warfare and with the rainy season at hand the few Spanish troops left are fast dying. Santo Domingo is a perfect hospital. Three thousand troops sent from the Capital the middle of October to attempt to quell the revolution in San Cristóbal took ten days to fight their way there. Over 500 men were killed or wounded on the way. When they arrived, they found the town deserted. Being obliged to procure their water from the River Nigua, half a mile from the town, they are losing about fifteen men daily in obtaining it. Only 1,000 are left who are capable of doing duty." [1]

"The Spanish troops have been forced to abandon San Cristóbal and have fallen back upon the Haina River. The position which they occupy there is one of the most unhealthy on this Island. A force of 800 men on a Spanish steamer from Cuba arrived at Monte Cristi intending to

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, November 10, 1863.

march to Santiago overland; when a few had landed, the Dominicans started firing and captured 100 prisoners and four boats. The steamer with the troops which were left retired and landed the forces in the fort at Puerto Plata. A few weeks later, two men of war with 1,500 Spanish troops arrived at Manzanillo Bay, intending to land at the mouth of the Dajabón River for the purpose of marching to relieve the Spanish garrison at Dajabón and from there to take the road to Santiago. They were thereupon ordered away by the Haitian garrison and when word of their arrival reached President Geffrard, he issued orders to them that not one Spanish soldier would be permitted by his troops to land. The Spanish men of war consequently proceeded to Puerto Plata and came thence by sea to Santo Domingo." [1]

"The Spanish troops which abandoned San Cristóbal and encamped on the Haina River, with a reënforcement of 1,000 men from the Capital, have marched along the coast to Baní under the protection of the guns of two men of war. The Dominicans abandoned the town after setting fire to it and have fled to the mountains." [2]

"2,300 Spanish troops have reached Azua and the Dominican inhabitants of Azua who had taken refuge in Santo Domingo at the instance of the Spanish officials have been permitted to return to their homes.

". . . General Santana has now been three months at Monte Plata. The Dominicans whip him about twice a week and it keeps the small steamer busy bringing down his sick and wounded and taking up rations and fresh troops. The small steamer ascends the Ozama as far as Yabacao, about fifteen miles, where the Spaniards have established a depot for supplies with a guard of 300 men. From there everything is taken by mules to Santana's army

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, November 25, 1863.
[2] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, December 4, 1863.

some ten miles further. On December 11th, the Dominican revolutionists captured Santana's depot of supplies, obtaining 70 mules, 500 arms, 2 cannon, 60,000 rounds of ammunition, 40,000 rations and 300 prisoners. Santana's men were consequently kept six days with almost nothing to eat." [1]

The position of Santana must by now have appeared desperate even to himself. General Luperón, the negro leader from Puerto Plata, whose brilliant participation in the rebellion had already brought him to a position of high prominence, with a force of eager patriots, now well armed with the arms and ammunition they had succeeded in capturing from their adversaries, was opposing Santana at every step. Time and again, the dwindling force commanded by Santana was defeated by the troops commanded by Luperón. The morale of the Spanish soldiers was fast disintegrating. The orders issued by Santana were often set aside by the Captain-General, whom Santana's opponents among his Spanish colleagues had succeeded in alienating from him.

At the beginning of March, Santana was ordered to abandon his attempt to force his way to the Cibao, to withdraw from the outposts at Monte Plata and Guanuma which he had so long been defending, and to concentrate his troops in Guerra and San Carlos. When he received these instructions the despair of the Marqués de las Carreras had no bounds. With the passing of the months, as the failure of the Spanish troops to maintain their supremacy became more manifest, and the popularity of the Government in Santiago increased, the desertions to the cause of the revolution from among the ranks of Santana's personal supporters had become more numerous.

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, December 28, 1863.

One by one the sycophants of the days of Santana's greatness, the recipients of his favours, were going over to the Provisional Government. The name of even Tomás Bobadilla was soon to be counted among the revolutionists, and the old General felt himself very much alone. When he received word of the order to retreat, which made evident the lack of confidence of the Spanish Government in his capacity, such faith as he had in those of his followers who were still with him, weakened. Accusing them of cowardice and indecision, he complained bitterly to Don Miguel Lavastida, one of the very few who still remained loyal to their old leader.

"I have maintained," he wrote on March 16th to Lavastida, "the two outposts at Monte Plata and Guanuma with perseverance and under the most unfavorable circumstances . . . It was because I realized the necessity of maintaining those two points; because I had an interest in saving the situation, and notwithstanding the obstacles and the difficulties that may have presented themselves I had sufficient energy to overcome all hindrances as they came, ignoring the intimations of my timorous colleagues, dismissing from my side the cowards who could have engendered lack of confidence among the troops . . . General Alfau . . . has once more demonstrated his desire to withdraw from the discouragements and the fatigues which we are all encountering, and has retired to enjoy the tranquillity which he should not dare to attain before peace has been well established in the land of his birth."

But the complaints of Santana were now as fruitless as the protests he despatched to the capital, where the defeats which his troops encountered during the retreat had destroyed the last vestige of Santana's military prestige. The evacuation of Monte Plata permitted the revolu-

tionists to obtain control of passes of the utmost strategic importance, inasmuch as they afforded them free access to the Cibao from the outskirts of Santo Domingo and resulted in the isolation of the Seybo, whither Santana with some two thousand men had retired. The disasters of the preceding months, for which the leaders of the Liberal Union in Madrid threw the blame upon the change of policy sponsored by Vargas, brought about the speedy recall of the latter, who was now stricken with brain fever, to which the disappointments and humiliations he had suffered had no doubt largely contributed. In the stead of Vargas as Captain-General came General José de la Gándara y Navarro, whose severe ability, demonstrated during several years of efficient service in eastern Cuba, encouraged the Spanish Cabinet to hope that the repressive measures, to which it had become thoroughly committed, and which Gándara had instructions to carry out, would bring about the pacification of the colony in short order.

9.

General Gándara assumed office on March 31, 1864. The first words which he addressed to the troops under his command gave notice to all that an implacable foe had arisen to head the struggle against the revolutionists.

"The impenetrable forests, the roughness and the impassability of the roads, the torments of the climate and all the natural and man-made obstacles which we may encounter in our campaign shall not be invincible to us; . . . Soldiers of the Army and of the Reserves, our Queen and our country expect energy in our operations and constancy in our duties until this land shall have been pacified. When this has been accomplished, we shall all have com-

plied with our duty, but in any event, it shall always be said of you that the glory is yours since you can always claim the victory and the honor."

General Gándara lost no time in making preparations to undertake an offensive campaign upon a scale far larger than that which had been previously contemplated, and in this purpose he had the hearty support of the new Captain General of Cuba, General Dulce, who had received orders to support Gándara with all the means within his power. The first step, in la Gándara's opinion, was to establish discipline among all the officers under his command, and with this object in mind, well aware of the resistance his predecessors had encountered from Santana, he lost no time in taking steps to procure either the humble subordination of the Marqués de las Carreras or his downfall, should he resist. He therefore appointed immediately a Spanish General of recognized ability, General Baldomero de la Calleja, second in command to Santana, in order that the latter might be replaced by Calleja in case of necessity. The climax which Gándara had anticipated was not long delayed. Santana, violently incensed by the preference shown to a Spanish officer over the Dominican officers still loyal to him, protested at the appointment. He wrote at once to Gándara, with whom he had already had an interview in which heated recriminations had passed:

"This order of yours appointing a Spanish officer as my lieutenant, when there are many officers of the old Dominican army of equal rank, makes it evident that you lack confidence in them, and this lack of confidence is entirely unfounded since there is no ground for it when it concerns men who are daily giving proof of their loyalty and patriotism . . . When I entrusted this land to Her

Majesty, Queen Isabel II, as its chief, making possible its annexation to the Monarchy, I made an agreement with the Spanish Government in which it was stipulated that equal consideration should be given to the generals and officers of the Dominican army as to those of equal rank in the Peninsular Army, and by virtue of these circumstances it is my duty to raise my protest to the highest authority of the Island when I see that the rights of those functionaries are prejudiced or when their dignity, which is my own, suffers offense, for I will not accept the confidence and the distinctions conferred upon me if these are granted in derogation of the rights of the officers who stand in the same situation as my own."

La Gándara, nothing loath, seized the opportunity to threaten Santana with a court-martial should he persist in the attitude which he had taken. The Captain-General claimed that the old man's criticism of the instructions he had issued were mutinous:

"Your Excellency has forgotten even the most fundamental notion of your position and of your duty, and if through an excess of undeserved consideration I do not in the present case make complete use of the powers with which I am invested, it is to give Your Excellency one more proof, and perhaps the last, of the consideration with which I propose to treat you and to respect the position and the antecedents of Your Excellency. I shall presently give a full account to my Government of the manner in which the Marqués de las Carreras treats, considers and obeys the person whom Her Majesty has honored with royal generosity and upon whom she has conferred her authority to represent her in this distant portion of her dominions. At the same time, I shall advise Her Majesty's Government, as I now inform Your Excellency, that appreciating as I do all the obligations imposed upon me

by my command in the honorable mission which has been entrusted to me, and desiring to repay, as I should, such honorable distinctions, I am firmly resolved to maintain the dignity of the position which I hold and the respect which should be shown to my person as the representative of the sovereign authority, and as the commanding general of the army to which Spain has entrusted the honor of her arms before the world and before history. To accomplish it, my first duty, my instant obligation, is to maintain the most severe discipline in the army, and the most complete subordination to my orders and decrees in all that which I deem necessary for better service to Her Majesty. To this discipline and to this subordination, all members of the army should incline, without distinction of classes or of persons, and the Marqués de las Carreras should be the first to submit to them, to give the example to which he is obligated by his position and by his rank. Solely under these conditions am I able to consent and to tolerate that the command entrusted to me, be exercised by me, and only in the event that Your Excellency as the first of my subordinates recognizes these facts can you continue to hold the command with which you are actually entrusted. Therefore, if Your Excellency is not disposed to recognize my authority and to obey my orders, Your Excellency may depute your command to the general appointed as your lieutenant, to which his rank entitles him. I am making this finally very plain to Your Excellency, that should you continue to hold your command, the repetition of another instance similar to the one which gives rise to this communication will cause me, however regrettable it may be, to dictate your removal."

It was Santana himself, his hand shaking with the infirmity of age, his body racked with the disease which,

due to the rigours of the last two years, had made rapid inroads on his iron constitution, who penned the last chapter in his own long career. The ingratitude, as he considered it, of the Spanish Captain-General steeled his spirit to a final gesture of self-assertion.

"My communication," he wrote, "contained solely proper criticism made with all good faith and loyalty . . . in the interest of the service of Her Majesty . . . in order that more favorable results might be obtained in combatting the rebellion and in hastening the triumph of her cause . . . General Santana does not commit acts of insubordination, and respects every law, both social and military. If, after having made a voluntary abdication of the supreme authority of an independent state, through love and loyalty to the mother country, I had sheltered the thought of submitting to no authority superior to my own, I would not have insisted upon resigning, as Captain-General of the Island, the post which Her Majesty conferred upon me when the former Dominican Republic was declared to be a Spanish province, nor would I have persisted in presenting my resignation and have submitted with pleasure to the authority of the new Captain-General whom the Government desired to appoint. But while I obey the authority and respect the orders of the Captains-General, I can do no less than offer to them just and indispensable criticisms when I see that they are committing errors and are following a policy which may produce prejudicial results, and that is what I have done with Your Excellency . . . Your Excellency accuses me in sweeping terms of harboring subversive intentions and that opinion, most Excellent Sir, I can do no less than reject with all the dignity of my honor and of my offended loyalty. The Marqués de las Carreras cannot, nor does he know how to, harbor subversive ideas. That opinion might be held

of other generals who do not have my qualities nor my antecedents. I have been governing this country for twenty years, after having been the prime factor in its independence. During those twenty years, I had no other ambition than its well-being and its glory, and it was for that sacred purpose that I undertook its annexation to the mother country, from which I think it should never have been separated. From that moment I committed myself heart and soul to sustain with equal enthusiasm and energy the honor of the Spanish flag and the throne of Doña Isabel II, to whom I had sworn loyalty, holding first the rank of Captain-General with all the rectitude, the conscience, and the responsibility for the laws which the holder of that high position should demonstrate . . . I desire to state to Your Excellency, first of all, that I do not fear your menaces. Your Excellency, with the authority which you hold, can, of course, take any step which you deem prudent, but I, tranquil in my conscience and in the conviction of my own loyalty, can await serenely the verdict of those who may judge me, assured as I am that some day justice and truth will reveal themselves. If I have committed any fault, let me be judged. But I will not suffer menaces . . . General Santana is not threatened, he is judged. In any event, since Your Excellency qualifies my criticisms as mutinous, and since you consider them acts of insubordination, and since I must continue making them to Your Excellency whenever I consider that you take measures which are improper, similar to those which have given rise to these communications, I am entrusting the command of this army to General Baldomero de la Calleja, appointed by Your Excellency my lieutenant, and I am leaving for Santo Domingo, where Your Excellency may dispose of me as you see fit, in order that, if you do so desire, the faults which you attribute to me may be judged."

When Santana had despatched this missive, he handed over the command of his troops to General Calleja, making his arrangements to go to the capital for a final test of strength. Proceeding to El Prado, he sought two days of repose to gird himself for the struggle. On June 8th, the Lieutenant-Governor, General Villar, who saw him at his home, found him sitting in the doorway of his residence, looking out over the fields at his cattle grazing in the shade of the towering mangoes and caobas with which the plains were dotted. Villar was shocked by the old man's appearance. It almost seemed as if his faith in his own destiny had been shattered. Word may have reached him that secret orders had been given by La Gándara that as soon as he arrived in the capital he was to be made a prisoner, and be sent to Cuba to await the decision of the authorities at Madrid.

But Santana was not to leave his country again. On June 14th, the day after he reached the capital, he died suddenly, whether of a stroke or by his own hand has never been definitely established.

Who knows what passed through his mind during those last few hours of his life? The long years when the Haitians ruled over the land, and the secret conspiracies in which he had so often taken part; the first call to arms, when he had collected about him his loyal farmers from the Seybo to march to Azua; the intrigues of Baez; the steady growth of the ambition which tormented him more and more as the years passed by—the vision of a foreign Power which would guard his country and permit him, so long as life would last, to remain the supreme authority; the glories of Azua and Las Carreras, and the cheering crowds as he rode back to the capital so many times at the head of his victorious army; where were those now who had applauded

him then? Instead of being the supreme power, the hero of his country, the Liberator of the Fatherland, he was execrated, detested by them all, an outlaw for whose assassination any patriot would receive the thanks of the Dominican people, a defeated subordinate broken by the Spanish Captain-General. The glory of the day when the annexation had been proclaimed and he believed that all his ambitions had been realized; the growth of the cancer of rebellion; the jealousy of his new Spanish colleagues; the nightmare struggle to retain his own supremacy; the humiliation of his last defeats; the contemptuous insolence of La Gándara. Perhaps at the last, his thoughts turned to the sunny childhood days out in the pastures with his brother, Ramón, long before the turmoil and the heat of the later years. Of all the disappointments and torments and frustrated hopes, perhaps those last few hours before death wiped it all from his memory must have been the most bitter to endure.

Villar wrote humbly to General Gándara:

"Taking into account the important part General Pedro Santana has played in this country, the distinguished mark of regard which Her Majesty has deigned to confer upon him, his rank and his position as ex-President of the former Republic of Santo Domingo, believing that I was interpreting faithfully the desires of the Government of Her Majesty, I have given orders that the honors of a Captain General of this province be paid him when he is buried, although I appreciate, of course, that he is not entitled to them; and I have ordered that his remains be buried within the fortress of La Fuerza in accordance with the petition of his family, who fear that the hatred of the factions into which this country is now divided might cause a sacrilegious profanation of his tomb."

10.

By a strange and dramatic coincidence, the last months of Santana's life saw the brief return to the Republic, a wraith from better years, of Juan Pablo Duarte. For twenty years, the hero of the Separation had wandered unknown from one country to another. From Germany, where he had been sent as an exile by Santana, he had journeyed to Venezuela. Penniless and unknown, he had traveled far into the interior of South America, suffering hardships of every description. His family and friends had long since believed him dead. At length, word reached him by chance, in the small village where he had taken refuge on the Rio Negro on the boundary of northern Brazil, that the country to which he had devoted all he held dear in life had been sacrificed by Santana's ambitions to the Spanish Monarchy. Making his way to Caracas, he found there a handful of friends who told him of the revolution and that in Santiago a Provisional Government had been installed. Reaching Guayubín at last, Duarte wrote Don Ulises Espaillat:

"Exiled from my native land by that band of parricides who beginning by exiling the founders of the Republic, have concluded by selling to the stranger the country whose independence they swore to defend against all enemies, I have led during twenty years the nomad life of an exile, without previously obtaining from Providence the realization of the hope I have always fostered in my heart to be able to return one day to my fellow-citizens, to consecrate to the defense of their liberties what still remained of my strength and life. But there came the hour when Judas Iscariot believed that his work had been consummated through his treason, and there came then for me the hour of my return to my country. God has made

smooth my path notwithstanding the many difficulties and risks attendant upon my return. Here I am with four companions in this heroic town of Guayubín, ready to share with you in any way which you see fit all the vicissitudes and struggles which God may yet have in store, in the great task of restoring the independence of the Republic which you have already initiated with such honor and glory."

Espaillat was the sole member of the Provisional Government ready to welcome the hero of the independence of the Republic back to participate in its restoration. The chorus of thanksgiving which arose among the masses when they learned that the idol of twenty years ago had returned to give them new courage in their struggle against the Spanish usurper, aroused universal jealousy among the leaders of the rebellion, whose rivalries between themselves had already assumed formidable proportions. They were by no means disposed to step aside in favour of the man to whom more than to any other was due the founding of the Republic itself. Refusing to agree to the appointment of Duarte to any position of authority within the Government, and equally unwilling to bestow upon him any military command, it was due solely to Espaillat's insistence that the members of the Government could be persuaded to refrain from ignoring Duarte's presence completely. Finally, he was offered a diplomatic mission abroad. At first his indignation at such ingratitude caused Duarte to refuse the mission offered him. At length, however, he accepted it, realizing, readily enough, that his continued presence in the Republic would give rise to such dissension that the task of the restoration would become more than ever difficult. His last words upon leaving, for the last time, the shores of the Republic were these:

"If I returned to my country after so many years of absence, it was solely for the purpose of serving her with my soul, my life, and my heart, preaching as I always have, love among all the Dominicans. It was never my purpose to be a cause for discord nor a motive for dissension."

Forgotten once more by the band of politicians, when he could no longer jeopardize the realization of their own ambitions, as he had been forgotten before, he died some twelve years later, July 15, 1876, alone and utterly destitute, in Venezuela.

11.

Before the death of Santana had removed the sole figure likely to question his military decisions, La Gándara had already embarked upon the campaign which he had conceived before his installation. It was his belief that the capture and occupation of the northern sea-ports of the colony would render it possible to cut off all communication between the Provisional Government in Santiago and the outside world, which would result in the speedy fall of the revolutionary stronghold itself. Once Santiago was taken, the Spanish troops could readily crush opposition in the central provinces and clear the road to the capital in the south. If La Gándara's strategy was theoretically sound, he failed to take into account two overwhelming handicaps under which his men would labour. The first was the lack of adequate preparations to provision the Spanish forces, once they were landed in a devastated region where no supplies could be obtained, and the faulty equipment of the soldiers. The cannon and rifles furnished the forces under La Gándara's command were antiquated and often useless. Even the vessels upon which additional

troops were being sent to Santo Domingo by General Dulce, the Cuban Captain-General, were unseaworthy. According to a report of the American Commercial Agent, "The Spanish war vessels are rotten. An American engineer in Spanish employ has told me that there are ten Spanish men-of-war lying in Cuba with their boilers burnt out, not fit to go to sea. One of the principal Spanish frigates, the *Blanca*, 51 guns, fired a salute at Port-au-Prince which so completely disabled her that she had to proceed at once to Spain for repairs." [1]

The second, and the more formidable, handicap was the inability of the Spanish troops to withstand the climate. During the last months of the preceding year, 18,000 troops had been sent to Santo Domingo from Puerto Rico and from Cuba, making, together with the troops already on duty upon their arrival, a total of some 21,000 men in occupation of the colony. Of that number, prior to May, 1864, over 9,000 had died of fever, or had been sent back from Santo Domingo incapacitated by wounds or disease. Some 1,000 had been killed in the constant fighting. With the approach of the rainy season, black water fever and yellow fever had recommenced their inroads, and an epidemic of smallpox likewise ravaged the garrisons.

By the middle of May La Gándara was energetically carrying out his plans. Mustering as many of the troops left at his disposal as he could remove from the southern garrisons, together with a force of Dominicans between the ages of fifteen and sixty conscripted in flagrant violation of the commitment of the Spanish Government at the time of the annexation, he joined at Manzanillo Bay

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger, Commercial Agent to Secretary Seward, January 10, 1864.

a force of more than 6,000 men transported upon a squadron of fourteen warships from Santiago de Cuba.

The first attack in the new campaign was directed against the town of Monte Cristi, gallantly defended by General Benito Monción, who had under him not more than five hundred Dominicans, sparsely armed, with only a few ancient cannon at their disposal. Assistance was hurriedly rendered him by General Pedro Antonio Pimentel and General Juan Antonio Polanco, and this small number of patriots, while eventually forced to abandon the town, were enabled to inflict serious losses upon the immensely superior number of the Spanish troops. In the course of the engagement, the commander of the Cuban expeditionary forces, Field Marshal Primo de Rivera, was severely wounded.

When La Gándara attempted to follow up his initial successes and sought to crush the guerrillas in the waste regions between Monte Cristi and Santiago, he courted inevitable disaster:

"The Dominicans pursued the policy of evacuating every town or village before the Spanish troops arrived, burning or destroying all property so that the Spanish troops are not able to maintain themselves. In addition, the Spanish soldiers are exposed to continual sniping. Mule trains with provisions sent to the Spaniards are almost invariably captured by the revolutionists." [1]

Through the impenetrable cactus brush of the regions now incorporated in Monte Cristi Province, the Spaniards were utterly unable to pursue the revolutionists. Continually losing their way, misled by guides sent for the purpose by the Dominicans, cut off from their provisions,

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, May 18, 1864.

suffering agonies of thirst under the blazing tropical sun, they no sooner encountered a band of the Dominicans than the latter retired, leaving the invaders to continue a pursuit during which their numbers were daily reduced by fever and sunstroke, or by the occasional bullet of the sniper. The guerrilla warfare waged by the inhabitants of the country, they could not withstand. La Gándara, in his despatches to his Government, reported that his campaign, as a result of the victory of Monte Cristi, had gained much moral strength and that

"if the operation of Monte Cristi had been commenced in the year 1863, it would have put an end to the war and would have resulted in the pacification of the Island. Undertaken in 1864, it was the first step towards a similar end, but it required a campaign in the autumn as a necessary complement." [1]

As it was, the Spaniards succeeded only in occupying Monte Cristi and in retaining control of Puerto Plata, and nothing more:

"In Puerto Plata, the Spaniards have been confined to the fort for more than nine months. They have succeeded in taking Monte Cristi at a great sacrifice of men, but from there they cannot advance inland. In addition to the yellow fever, an epidemic of smallpox is raging." [2]

The Spanish commanders in the north were soon compelled to realize that they could undertake no more than to maintain the seaports. In the south their position was equally desperate, notwithstanding the large reënforce-

[1] La Gándara, "Anexión y Guerra."
[2] Mr. William A. Reed, Acting Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, July 21, 1864.

ments which the Lieutenant-Governor, left in command of the capital, had obtained:

"Sorties of the Spanish troops from Santo Domingo have been repulsed in every encounter and a convoy of provisions for the troops has to be accompanied by 800 to 1,000 men. Skirmishes occur daily and the stillness of the night is ever broken by the rattle of musketry from the advance guard station half a mile distant from the City." [1]

12.

The fighting continued with considerable activity throughout the summer of 1864. La Gándara, whose confidence in his ultimate success proved at first unshaken by disaster, persisted in his futile effort to break the stubborn resistance of the Cibao provinces by attempting to force a wedge of Spanish troops into the heart of the Cibao. Realizing at last that this was hopeless, he diverted his attention to the increasing activities of the revolutionists in the eastern and southern Provinces; but here likewise his troops met with but slight success, and the successes which they were able to wrest, with considerable losses, were invariably rendered sterile by the continued inroads which disease made upon the armies. By the end of the summer not only had the virtual control of the revolutionaries of the territory adjacent to the northern seaports been successfully maintained, but many of the scattered Spanish garrisons to the east and to the west of the capital had been forced to abandon their positions and concentrate in the larger towns. Troops despatched to relieve outlying garrisons were ambushed along the route of march by the revolutionaries, and throughout October and November the losses suffered were so severe that by

[1] Mr. William A. Reed to Secretary Seward, August 27, 1864.

the latter month the Spaniards had been forced to abandon all points which they had formerly held in the east except the town of Seybo, and in the west they had been obliged to evacuate before the revolutionists and content themselves with holding the capital. By the end of December, La Gándara had been forced reluctantly to the conclusion that pacification of the colony by military force, under the circumstances which existed, was impracticable, and to commence the concentration of his forces in the capital, Samaná and Puerto Plata.

Before this date, however, the Captain-General, forced to appreciate the utter failure of his plans of conquest, and receiving, to his chagrin, repeated reports of the increasing unpopularity in Spain of the effort to pacify the colony, had determined to make the attempt to obtain by diplomatic means that acquiescence in the occupation which his policy of conquest had been unable to secure.

For several months the Provisional Government had vainly sought to obtain recognition or at least the admission of their status as belligerents from the foreign Governments with which the Dominican Republic had had diplomatic relations. The circular note drafted by Don Ulises Francisco Espaillat as Minister of Foreign Relations to arouse sympathy with the Dominicans in their struggle to regain their independence, encountered, as was to be anticipated, but scant response from Europe, and as little from the Government at Washington, which was then in the midst of the dark days of the campaign of 1864. Believing that the most favourable hope for moral support lay nevertheless in the United States, the Provisional Government despatched General Pablo Pujol as its Confidential Agent to Washington. To Seward, eager as he had been to lose no opportunity of hastening the elimination of

European dominion from the American continent, and particularly anxious as he was to see the termination of Spain's occupation of the Dominican Republic, the petitions of Pujol for the moral support of the Government of the United States proved peculiarly embarrassing. When the Governments of Europe had recognized the belligerency of the Confederate States less than three weeks after the proclamation of the blockade of the southern ports by President Lincoln, no voice raised in protest in the United States had been louder than that of the Secretary of State at the "affront" and "act of hostility" to the Union. When, a year later, Gladstone made his famous declaration at Newcastle that Jefferson Davis "had made a nation," and the recognition of the Confederacy by the British Cabinet as the result of pressure brought to bear by Napoleon III seemed imminent, no man in public life in the United States had denounced more vehemently the anticipated announcement of recognition than Seward. Recognition therefore of the Provisional Government at Santiago, or even the admission of its belligerent status, so long as the contest with Spain was not permanently decided and the independence of the insurgents was still inchoate, would necessarily have been regarded, in Seward's own words, as a "hostile act towards the Sovereign State." The Secretary of State was consequently constrained to receive the agent of the Dominican Provisional Government unofficially, and to limit himself in his private conferences with Pujol to personal expressions of sympathy with the revolutionary cause. While the American Government gave, therefore, no formal assistance to the Dominican insurgents, frequently thereafter privileges were conceded them which hardly concorded with the most rigid observance of the national laws of neutrality, as

when, the Provisional Government having issued letters of marque, no steps were taken to prevent the outfitting and sailing of several vessels from New York under the Dominican flag.

The return of General Pujol in August from Washington, where, in the opinion of the offended leaders of the revolution, he had accomplished no more than to obtain "promises from President Lincoln," presented the opportunity sought by La Gándara to establish direct contact with the Revolutionary Government. Having already attempted, without result, to spread dissension among the insurgent forces by inducing a group of Dominican generals commanding Spanish troops to address a manifesto to the rebels beseeching them "to put down their arms, and to follow no longer the path of illusion and of error," he sent a secret agent to Pujol immediately after the latter's return from the United States. This emissary was instructed [1]

"to advise him that he would not reject any proposition made by the Dominican Government which would have for its purpose the negotiation of an arrangement which would permit both countries to terminate the war and possibly to negotiate the terms of peace."

The Provisional Government directed Pujol to reply

"that the Spanish Government, guided by the great and elevated principles of humanity and of political necessity, should give a proof of the magnanimity so characteristic of the Spanish people by granting the Dominican people peace and relief, tranquillity and repose."

The exchange of these communications led the Provisional Government momentarily to believe that a cessa-

[1] General Luperón, "Apuntes Históricos."

tion of hostilities might be obtained by negotiation, but the result of conversations had with La Gándara by a commission sent to his headquarters near Monte Cristi by the Provisional Government soon made evident that the Captain-General's sole purpose was to obtain the unconditional surrender of the revolutionaries. La Gándara, in his report upon the negotiations to the Spanish Minister for War, stated that the revolutionary commissioners, while willing to negotiate a treaty of surrender admitting the recognition of the triumph of the Monarchy, insisted upon the recognition of the Republic's independence and the complete evacuation of the Island, although they were disposed to agree to furnish a future contractual obligation to cede no portion of their territory to any other nation, nor to grant to any other country privileges which might prejudice the interests of Spain in the Antilles. Their pretensions, La Gándara reported, he scornfully rejected.

13.

The internal dissensions with which the Provisional Government was filled in the autumn of 1864 undoubtedly gave La Gándara ground for hope that his insistence upon conditions of peace far more humiliating to the Dominicans might eventually be crowned with success. The charge of inertia had long been levelled by many of the revolutionary generals against the head of the Provisional Government, General José Antonio Salcedo. The intrigues against the President were in part caused by Salcedo's lack of military capacity, and were stimulated by the failure of the negotiations with La Gándara, but they were due far more to the desire of the more prominent of the revolutionary chieftains to obtain for themselves the powers which had been vested in the Provisional

President. Jealousy of his superior had for some months dominated General Gaspar Polanco in particular. Availing himself of the continued absence of the Provisional President from Santiago, Polanco finally gathered about him a clique of the dissatisfied. As soon as they deemed the time ripe for action, a meeting of the disgruntled Generals assembled on October 10th in the fort of San Luís in Santiago. A series of resolutions were drafted proclaiming their refusal to recognize any longer the authority of General Salcedo as President of the Provisional Government, charging Salcedo with secret sympathy with the Spanish Government, and with the creation of a dictatorship in his own person in open violation of the terms under which the Provisional Government had been installed the preceding year. The acquiescence of Salcedo in the desire of the Spanish Captain-General to enter into negotiations was the most popular charge which could be levelled against him, and General Polanco concluded his impeachment of the Provisional President with the declaration, intended to gain the approval of the populace in general, that his own presence in the new Provisional Government then proclaimed was the best assurance that the "common enemy" would be summarily expelled from the national territory.

The Provisional Administration was completely reorganized by those responsible for the coup d'état. For the time being, the effort to overthrow Spanish tyranny was forgotten in the struggle which followed the domestic revolution. General Salcedo, whose headquarters had previously been established in Guayubín, still retained a considerable number of loyal followers. Announcing his determination to quell immediately the rebellion against his own authority, Salcedo marched towards Santiago. As soon as the newly organized Provisional Government was

informed of the threatened attack, General Luperón was sent to prevent the onward march of the troops commanded by Salcedo, with confidential instructions to obtain from him, if possible, assurances that he would recognize the new state of affairs and consent to a voluntary exile in Haiti until such time as the new Provisional Government had been enabled formally to establish itself. The encounter of Luperón and Salcedo took place in Barrancón. Salcedo was accompanied on his march by his wife, and his lady, according to Garcia, "of little foresight and with a most energetic temper," advised her husband by no means to accept his dismissal from office, but rather to put down by force the rebellion against his authority. Salcedo, evidently lacking the determination of his wife, consented to adopt the counsel of Luperón and agreed to accompany him to the Haitian frontier. General Luperón relates in his account of the occurrence the repeated efforts which he himself made to save the deposed President on his journey to Haiti from assassination.[1] Both in Dajabón and in Mangá, General Monción and General Pedro Antonio Pimentel attempted to seize Salcedo in order to execute him. The situation was finally rendered more serious by the refusal of the Haitian authorities to permit Salcedo to set foot on Haitian soil. At length, Luperón was forced to return with his prisoner to Santiago. The deposed President was later removed from Santiago to Puerto Plata, where he was assassinated by secret orders issued by General Polanco. The murder of Salcedo, whose chief fault appears to have been his incurrence of the jealousy of his rivals, permitted the new Government at least to pose as the sturdy defender of the nation against all attempts on the part of the Spanish

[1] General Luperón, "Apuntes Históricos."

authorities to procure by diplomatic means the victories which they had not been able to secure in the field. For the time being, La Gándara was obliged to desist from his resort to diplomacy.

14.

The ignominious failure of the Liberal Union in Spain to satisfy the hopes of imperial aggrandizement which they themselves had inspired had caused the fall, in the late autumn of 1864, of the O'Donnell Cabinet. General Narvaez, Duque de Valencia, who had succeeded O'Donnell as Premier, instructed La Gándara, as soon as he took office, that the Spanish Government was unwilling to permit a continuation of hostilities in the interior of the colony, and ordered the Captain-General to take no steps other than those necessary to maintain the authority of Spain in the seaports still held by the Spanish troops. The new Cabinet was considering "attentively the general situation in the territory of Santo Domingo, the state of the war, the expenses and charges which its continuation imposed upon the nation, the sanitary conditions existing in the army, and the advantages which the country might hope to procure as a result of the campaign," and had already, upon assuming office, determined "to submit the entire question to the decision of the Cortes upon the approval of which it had to count, inasmuch as the fundamental interests of the State were involved."

The news of the decision which the increasing unpopularity of the war had forced upon the Spanish Cabinet reached the Provisional Government as soon as the Captain-General had been apprised of it. Immediately thereafter, on January 3, 1865, the Provisional Government addressed a plea for peace to the Spanish Queen, through the Haitian Government, which had already been

acting as an intermediary between La Gándara and the insurgents:

"Through circumstances which Your Majesty no doubt ignores and which would be exceedingly painful to relate, our liberty and independence were wrested from us and our land annexed to the vast possessions of your glorious monarchy. For barely three years, this people bore impatiently the loss of its dearest and most sacred rights; but the day came when the unanimous will of the Dominican people appealed to God and to their own strength to reconquer their Fatherland, their liberty and their independence. For more than sixteen months, Madam, this small portion of the world has been presenting to the universe the sad spectacle of a struggle which must be afflicting to humanity. Deign to hear, Madam, the voice of a whole people which is addressed to Your Majesty and to the generous sentiments of your great heart, beseeching you to put an end to the struggle and to return to it that which it yesterday had lost. The voice of the people is the voice of God; it is the voice of truth. The Dominican people, with the deepest sorrow, say to Your Majesty: 'Think, Madam, that there where yesterday were flourishing cities today can be seen only mountains of ruins and ashes; that the fields, which recently were filled with crops, today are barren and desert; that their riches have disappeared; that on all sides nothing but devastation and misery can be seen; that desolation and death have taken the place of what was a short time ago animation and life . . . May peace and tranquillity, by your royal command, be restored to the Dominican people, and this concession will ever be one of the most glorious deeds of your reign, for it will be an act of humanity and of transcendent justice."

The appeal of the Provisional Government, if it ever in fact was read by the Sovereign Lady, proved unnecessary,

since the Cabinet of Narvaez had already presented to the Cortes, before its receipt, the project of the law authorizing the evacuation of the Dominican colony. The preamble of the project, alleging motives of the noblest humanity for the annexation, undoubtedly afforded cynical amusement to O'Donnell and Serrano, and the other leaders of the Liberal Union:

"This desperate struggle, which occasioned, without compensation, the necessity of spending futilely the public treasure, and of wasting the wealth of the Spanish colonies, had not been brought about by the attempt of former Cabinets to undertake a selfish war of conquest, so foreign to the reasoned, just, pacific and disinterested policy which Spain had for so many years been observing; neither had it originated through the need to repel foreign aggression, opposing force to force at any cost in sustaining the defense of the threatened honor of the nation. Far from it: this struggle commenced immediately after the former Government of Her Majesty had concluded that all the inhabitants of the Dominican Republic were begging, imploring and soliciting with impatience their reincorporation in the Spanish Nation, their former mother, and to become one of her provinces, aspiring to the happiness which Cuba and Puerto Rico enjoyed. . . . The Government, . . . believed in the desire which appeared to inspire the Dominicans and accepted the petition; and advised Her Majesty to agree to the annexation. . . . In that manner two motives, at the same time most noble, most just, and most powerful, were those as the result of which the annexation was undertaken. The first, the right based upon the unanimous will of a people, a right which is indisputable and which already had been consecrated by the common consent of the nations of Europe and of America. . . . The second, the obligation of humanity,

the pity towards the unfortunates who beg favor and assistance when they see themselves submerged in a sea of disasters and misfortunes. No other right was asserted by the Spanish Government in taking possession again, as it had in the past, of the Spanish portion of the Island of Santo Domingo: it did not assert the right of recovering what it once had possessed, nor the right of conquest, since both are contrary to the policy of the Government, to the interests of nations, and to the good relations which at all times it has maintained with the independent nations of America . . . Soon, however, fatal signs made themselves manifest that there were lacking the spontaneity and unanimity which should have been the foundation of the annexation. Nevertheless, it was the duty of the Government to assure itself of the general sincerity of those violent protests which several times were repressed. The conflagration spread; it overwhelmed towns and provinces, and extended to the whole territory, and today the Spanish portion of the Island of Santo Domingo presents to the eyes of the civilized world the spectacle of an entire people in arms ungratefully treating as tyrants the same individuals who believed that they had been called to come to them as their saviors . . . The belief that the Dominican people as a whole or even that an immense majority desired and above all insisted upon their annexation by Spain was an illusion: since the struggle there has become general, it no longer has the character of a measure taken to subject a few discontented rebels, but has acquired rather the character of a war of conquest, completely foreign to the spirit of Spanish policy; and even by increasing our sacrifices in order to obtain a triumph we will place ourselves in the sad situation of acquiescing in a complete military occupation filled with difficulties and not free from the necessity of *dangerous explanations;* and even under the most optimistic belief that one part of the

population might be favorably inclined to us after our victory, the authorities which might then be established in those dominions would necessarily have to be either little suited to the habits and customs of the natives or very distinct from those which are installed today in our other foreign colonies."

Whether the defeat of the Confederacy, which made imminent those "dangerous explanations" with the United States Government referred to by Narvaez, or the popular disgust with the Dominican campaign, proved the stronger argument, is a matter for conjecture. In any event, the Spanish Cortes supported the Government's policy of evacuation by a large majority, notwithstanding the plea of Serrano, now Duque de la Torre, "to save the nation's honor and the future of Spain's West Indian Colonies."

Before instructions had time to reach La Gándara to undertake that immediate evacuation of the colony which the Cortes had now authorized, the Provisional Government installed by Polanco had in its turn been overthrown. In January of 1865, the towns of the frontier provinces proclaimed a state of rebellion against the Government at Santiago. By the end of the same month, the leaders of the new revolution, Generals Pimentel, Monción and Federico García, had entered the town of Santiago without opposition, and after imprisoning the members of the late Government had appointed a "Junta Gubernativa" under the temporary presidency of Don Benigno Filomeno de Rojas. The chief figures among the new authorities were General Luperón and that expatriated Englishman, Theodore Stanley Henneken, who had ten years before proved of such invaluable assistance to the British Consul, Sir Robert Schomburgk, in opposing the treaty with the

United States. Announcing a determination as strong a that of its predecessor to come to no agreement with Spai other than one based upon the unconditional evacuatio of the Island, the new Government proceeded to declar in force the Moca Constitution of 1858, and, after th holding of such elections as the times permitted, installe on March 25th a Constitutional Government of th Republic, at whose head were General Pedro Antoni Pimentel as President and de Rojas as Vice-President.

Proclaiming a general amnesty to all Dominicans in th ranks of the enemy save those who had participated in th act of annexation, those who had accepted positions a Spanish officers, and those who openly opposed the restora tion of the Republic, the new President made his polic plain in his inaugural address. "If Spain," he declared, " disposed to continue the war, we must wage it with all o its terrible consequences; but if she wishes peace in goo faith, if openly and sincerely she extends towards us th hand of friendship, we will accept it frankly, we will bur our resentments and inaugurate a new and happy era o peace and concord . . . If I combat, it is for my country for her welfare, happiness, liberty and independence. M ambition is limited to that, and once those cherished objec are attained, I aspire to nothing further than to withdra to private life, and to enjoy in the quiet of the domest hearth the satisfaction of having fulfilled my duties." An nouncing at the same time that he had been entrusted wit the chief magistracy only until a Constitutional Assembl might convene in the capital within ninety days after th termination of the Spanish occupation, General Piment awaited the renewal of negotiations by La Gándara.

15.

For some time, the speedy abandonment of the province had been anticipated. Public expectation was rife. At the end of March, the American Commercial Agent reported:

"It is momentarily expected that the Spanish officials will receive instructions to abandon the colony. Arrangements have already been made with the Dominican Provisional Government for an exchange of prisoners. While no suspension of hostilities has been officially proclaimed, no warlike demonstration on either part has taken place for a month past." [1]

La Gándara's negotiations were initiated in personal correspondence with the Vice President, whom La Gándara described as "having afforded services of the greatest magnitude to the Spanish cause, notwithstanding the fact that he had later become our bitter antagonist." [2] On April 2nd, the Captain-General sent a confidential letter to de Rojas advising him that the Spanish Government had under consideration a project of law as the result of which Spain would doubtless abandon the colony. Declaring that his Government had no desire for vengeance, and that he as the representative of the Queen desired to do everything within his power to carry out his instructions with dignity and chivalry, he requested to be informed whether the Government at Santiago would be disposed to negotiate an agreement, should the moment arrive in which the various questions attendant upon the evacuation of the Island might be settled. A week later the President himself replied that he had no doubt an understanding could be reached. A few weeks later, General Pimentel, who had

[1] Mr. William A. Reed to Secretary Seward, March 28, 1865.
[2] La Gándara, "Anexión y Guerra."

encountered considerable difficulty in conciliating th divergent opinions of his Cabinet, requested the Captain General to be patient, since his Government was nearl ready to commence negotiations.

While awaiting the decision from Santiago, La Gándar appears to have been exercised by the attitude of the Ciba press, which purported to publish the views of the Gov ernment. An article which appeared in the *Boletín* o Santiago on April 30th, raised the indignation of th Captain-General to such a pitch that he could only calm himself by addressing a heated protest to the President:

"I regret having to inform you that my reading of th *Boletín* of Santiago of April 30th has caused me a ba impression. The complaints of Cabral are intemperate; th information of Manzueta is false, and the official commen is not appropriate in view of the present circumstances. am glad that you did not sign the document and I mu express my regret that Señor de Rojas did sign it . . Never shall I grow weary in lamenting that the Domin cans respond with an offensive lack of confidence and a unjust and disloyal spirit of suspicion to the magnanimou conduct which Spain observed when she came to Sant Domingo, and to the generous policy which she pursu today when she renounces her perfect right to remain i Santo Domingo—her conduct finds no example in histor and most assuredly no other nation would have emulate her."

General Pimentel, dominated by Henneken, who w at the time alleged to be unduly partial to the Spanis cause, replied on May 11th in an astonishingly mild ton declaring that he was sincerely desirous of leading the di cussions to conciliatory ground, and assured La Gándar that he would employ all his authority and prestige

dispel exaggerated ideas among the Dominicans, as well as to moderate the tone of the press to which the Captain-General had so bitterly objected.

"There is no doubt," he concluded by saying, "that if we were able to approach one another, we would embrace each other under the shadow of our respective flags . . . Already the hour is striking when Dominicans and Spaniards should put aside their arms to give each other an embrace in which will disappear forever the remembrance of this struggle in the magic cry, 'Long live the Queen and long live the Dominican Republic.' "

On May 9th, the commissioners of the Dominican Government were appointed, and General Pimentel lost no time in notifying the Captain-General of their departure. General José del Carmen Reinoso was, he assured La Gándara, an honourable man of good sense, not exaggerated in his ideas; General Melitón Valverde was a "joven simpático," intelligent and well disposed; Presbítero Miguel Quesada, one of the finest models of the Dominican clergy. The commissioners were empowered to negotiate

'regarding the evacuation of the territory, towns, capital, and all places and cities actually occupied in Dominican territory by the Spanish troops; the exchange of prisoners, and concerning every other matter which may refer to the termination of the war with Spain; negotiating and signing a convention providing for peace in the manner and in the form regarding which they were privately instructed . . . the Government obligating itself to carry out all that its envoys and special commissioners . . . may do by virtue of their letters of credence."

For several weeks negotiations were continued, and the convention which resulted was signed in Guibia on June

2nd by the Captain-General and the three Dominica commissioners. Its terms had been agreed upon, howeve before the receipt in the Republic of the information tha the Queen of Spain had sanctioned, on the first of Ma the law approved by the Cortes revoking the decree o March 19, 1861, which authorized the annexation of th Republic to Spain.

The convention of June 2nd would doubtless not hav been negotiated had the Dominican commissioners bee apprised in time of the terms of the Spanish decree decla ing the abandonment of the Republic, but under an circumstances, the convention to which they had affixe their signatures contained extraordinary concessions to l granted by the Dominican patriots who had so successful resisted the long continued attempt of the Spanish armi to subjugate them. The convention explicitly recognize the fact that the Spanish Government had obeyed "motiv of the highest generosity and nobility" when she ha acquiesced in the annexation of the Dominican Republi that Spain had been entirely within her rights in opposin by the force of arms the restoration of the Republic; th Dominican Government was obligated to declare witho effect any decrees which it might have promulgated again any individuals on account of occurrences which ha taken place during the revolution, and to offer full pro tection to any Dominicans who had assisted the Spani authorities in their efforts to pacify the country. Artic IV of the convention provided that the Dominican Go ernment should pay the Spanish Government an in demnity, the amount of which was to be fixed in subsequent treaty, to cover the expenses of the war, the government, and of the administration of the colon as well as to cover all expenditures occasioned by the co

version of the Dominican paper money, and the cost of any local improvements which might have resulted from the Spanish administration or from the investment of Spanish capital; Spanish vessels were to receive most favoured nation treatment, and in Article VII it was provided that

"The Dominican Government obligates itself never to alienate either the whole or any portion of its territory to any nation or people, and to enter into no convention which might prejudice Spanish interests in the Antilles, without the prior agreement and consent of the Spanish Government."

Finally, special commissioners of the Spanish Government were to reside in the Republic to see that the provisions of the convention were carried out, and to protect Spanish subjects until such time as a treaty of peace and amity between the two nations had been concluded.

As soon as word reached Santiago of the contents of the convention there was an outburst of popular indignation. General Pimentel, forced by the general clamour to disavow the acts of his commissioners, issued on June 12th a decree which declared that as the commissioners had exceeded their power, and had gravely compromised the future of the Republic by violating the dictates of the Provisional Government, the Convention of Guibia was null and void. At the same time, the President was forced by his Cabinet to publish a project of a convention which would be acceptable to his Government, markedly distinct in all of its provisions from the convention already signed. The convention as now proposed provided simply that from the date of the signing of the agreement a state of peace would exist between the Dominican Republic and

Spain, as the result of which Spain would proceed with the immediate evacuation of Dominican territory. The remaining articles stipulated the manner in which the exchange of prisoners was to be undertaken, provided the assurances that the sick and wounded of the Spanish troops would be properly cared for, and stipulated that compensation would be made for private property confiscated by one or the other of the opposing forces; the commercial treaty of 1855 between Spain and the Dominican Republic was to be renewed until such time as modification of it might be negotiated, and provision was made that Spanish vessels in Dominican ports and Dominican vessels in Spanish or colonial ports were to receive most favoured nation treatment.

Upon the publication of the draft convention, the Government appointed General José Maria Cabral and General Henneken to persuade the Spanish Captain-General to accept the convention in the form now proposed. But La Gándara indignantly refused to receive the newly appointed commissioners, declaring that the conduct of the Government in repudiating the action of its former commissioners, to whom it had granted full powers, constituted a gross breach of faith. On June 26th he addressed a communication to Cabral and Henneken declaring the convention of June 2nd entirely valid, and announced his intention of seeing that it was carried out without alteration or modification; the Captain-General further stated that in view of the conduct of the Dominican Government he intended to carry out the evacuation of Dominican territory in the way and at the time he deemed fit, and that pending such time, he would continue the war in any form which appeared to him to be advantageous to the honour and interests of his Government.

The Captain-General, already bitterly opposed to the announced determination of his own Government, and infuriated by what he claimed was the intentional perfidy of the Dominican Government, attempted to make good his threats by the issuance, on July 5th, of the following declaration:

"1. In abandoning the portion of this Island which constituted the former Dominican Republic, spontaneously annexed to the Monarchy in March, 1861, Spain reserves all the rights accruing to her by virtue of such annexation; which rights she will avail herself of in any way she deems appropriate and by any method within her power.

"2. Until the Government of Her Majesty may dispose otherwise, the present war between Spain and Santo Domingo will continue.

"3. Apart from the measures which I may think necessary to accomplish that which is contained in the preceding article all the ports and coasts of the Dominican territory will continue in a state of blockade in conformity with the provisions contained in the proclamations of October 5 and November 7, 1863, which are extended from this date to cover all the ports and coasts of the said territory of Santo Domingo which were not included in the second of the proclamations referred to."

But these menaces could not cause serious alarm to the Dominican Government in view of the fact that the evacuation was already in process of realization. The spite of La Gándara was, however, made evident in more practical ways. All arms and ammunition which the Spanish authorities could not remove upon the fleet of Spanish vessels which had arrived in the first days of July to bear away the Spanish troops, were either destroyed or hurled into the sea; public edifices were wrecked; and finally, the

Spanish officials spread terror among the non-combatants of the capital by embarking upon the vessels a number of civilians, among them women and children, with the announcement that they were to be held as hostages until such time as the Spanish Government was satisfied that the exchange of prisoners had been satisfactorily carried out. On July 11th, the last Spanish forces embarked from the capital, and on July 20th, the Spanish troops which had been delayed in Puerto Plata by the formalities attendant upon the exchange of the last remaining prisoners likewise sailed away. A month later the American Commercial Agent was able to report:

"All is quiet under a Provisional Government." [1]

[1] Mr. Paul T. Jones to Secretary Seward, August 14, 1865.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFTERMATH OF THE INSURRECTION

1.

THE tranquillity which the American Commercial Agent alleged as existing subsequent to the Spanish evacuation was but short-lived. Within a week after the despatch of that reassuring report, Mr. Jones, the Agent, was himself urgently demanding that an American warship be sent "for God's sake" to the Dominican capital to save his life and the lives of the foreign residents. Although the commander of the U.S.S. *Mercedita,* who responded to the call, felt constrained to report that the perils which had so shaken the American Agent were solely those conjured by the alcoholic hallucinations of a man who was "intoxicated, morning, noon, and night," the brief calm with which the exhausted land had at first been blessed, rapidly merged into a condition of anarchy which was to continue, with but slight alleviation, for more than twelve months.

The state of the country was in fact such that any spark might have caused the outbreak of rebellion. The moment required the presence at the head of the Provisional Government of a man strong enough to capture popular confidence, and able to quiet the unrest arising from the state of abject misery into which the people had been plunged by the devastating war for a time sufficiently long to enable constitutional government to be reëstablished. For with the departure of the Spanish authorities, there were neither national Executive, Legislative nor Judicial authorities. The authority of the National Convention of Santiago was local in its character, and to it neither the inhabitants of the eastern or southern prov-

inces, nor those of the capital, were responsive. Unfortunately, the Provisional President, General Pimentel, lacked entirely the qualities and the character necessary to maintain order during such troublous times.

His authority, in so far as it was exerted at all, was repressive and capricious. Such small amount of public monies as his agents could obtain from the Cibao Customs Houses was spent for the gratification of the clique about him, and the soldiers of the restoration, who had sacrificed all they possessed, were obliged to return to their homes and to their abandoned plantations and farms without even the recompense of the small percentage of their pay which they might have obtained under an honest administration. The opposition to the Provisional Government became so violent that in the beginning of August armed outbreaks occurred in the capital and in the west, where the military leaders refused further to recognize the Santiago Government, and proclaimed General José Maria Cabral "Protector" of the Republic. Pimentel, cowed and unable to withstand this early rejection of his authority, resigned his office on August 13th, leaving the field clear to General Cabral.

Cabral, while similar to Pimentel in lacking strength of character and decision, differed radically from him in having at heart, so far as his limited intelligence permitted him to grasp them, the interests of his country. He obtained the immediate support of two widely divergent elements. The first was the liberal group composed of the younger generation which, appreciating Cabral's good intentions, hoped that by installing him in office it might prevent the return to power of the ring of politicians to whom it attributed the downfall of the Republic four years before. The second was the group composed of the

former followers of Santana. While most of these had in the later days of the revolution deserted their chief to seek favour from the leaders of the restoration, they feared, with reason, that they could expect no favours from the members of the Santiago Government whose antipathy to the memory of Santana and to all which savoured of him continued vehement. But the Santanistas feared far more the return of Buenaventura Baez, at whose hands they had already ascertained from experience they could expect no political favours, and might far more probably encounter imprisonment or exile.

Perhaps the most astonishing phenomenon in all Dominican history is the fact that Baez could still hope to rally around him popular support. For his course during the war of the restoration had been pusillanimous to the last degree. Protesting against the annexation to Spain so long as he hoped that the early outbreaks against Spanish rule might cause the evacuation of the colony, he later went over, body and soul, to the Spanish cause. Through the connivance of a few of his partisans who had succeeded in gaining the ear of the Captain-General who followed Santana in office, he persuaded the Cabinet at Madrid that his own influence in the colony was so considerable that it was worth their while to conciliate him, and the method of conciliation, it was made evident, must be material. Receiving as the result of his representations a liberal subsidy from the Spanish Crown and the honorary rank of Field Marshal in the Spanish army, he passed the years during which his fellow-citizens were struggling for liberty in leading a life of luxurious ease in Europe. As soon as he became confident that the rebellion would eventually triumph, and that the abandonment of the colony would be decreed by the Spanish Government, he resigned with

a patriotic flourish his rank as Field Marshal, and, leaving Europe, took up his abode in Curaçao to manipulate at closer quarters, though still at a safe distance, his own return to power.

Largely due to the manner in which Baez played through his agents, upon the jealousies and rivalries of the chiefs of the late revolution, the Provisional Government of Cabral fell before many months. One by one the civilians who had rallied about the "Protector" were forced through the pressure of the military chieftains to vacate the posts to which Cabral had appointed them, and the struggle degenerated into the old effort of the followers of Baez to throw out of office the supporters of Santana. At the end of October, General Pimentel, recovered from the panic into which the unpopularity of his own Government had thrown him, and permitted to return to the capital, seized his opportunity and demanded the removal of all those partisans of Cabral who were opposed to Baez' return. Cabral weakly acceded to these demands, and dismissing from office all of his supporters who were known to be antagonistic to the former President, appointed in their stead Baecistas nominated for him by his own opponents. On the same day upon which the National Assembly after much deliberation had finally agreed upon one of the most liberal constitutions which the Dominican Republic has known, the Assembly found itself forced, by the threats of a rabble of armed ruffians brought to the capital from the Seybo by General Pedro Guillermo, an illiterate negro partisan of Baez's, to elect the latter President of the Republic. Acting under similar coercion the Assembly was later forced to agree to the election of a new Congress, composed of Baez's followers, and at the same time Cabral agreed further to stultify himself by proceed

ing to Curaçao at the head of a commission to beseech Baez to return once more as President of the Republic.

2.

On December 8, 1865, Buenaventura Baez, heralded by his own newspaper as "the angel of peace called to fulfill the patriotic mission of uniting the Dominicans and of making them truly happy under the protection of a government which will guarantee all their rights," was inaugurated for the third time as Constitutional President of the Republic.

That Baez was under no illusions regarding his own security was evidenced by the fact that far from permitting his fellow-citizens to indulge in pleasing prospects, as he had been led to do in the past, he painted for them in his inaugural message the desperate situation of the Republic. The Government, he advised them, was without organization in any Executive department; with a floating debt the amount of which was unknown; shaken by anarchy, the country was permeated with extravagant ideas, impracticable and impossible of fulfillment; agriculture was abandoned; commerce was ruined; entire cities and towns had been wiped out; there was no national credit and consequently the nation was deprived of the indispensable means of defense in the case of emergency. But Baez must have become still less optimistic upon hearing the words of Padre Meriño, who, upon his return to Santo Domingo at the end of the revolution, had been elected President of the National Assembly, and in that capacity had been called upon to announce officially to the President of the Republic his election. Throughout his long career, Padre Meriño was one of the few men in the Republic whose convictions stood foursquare, whose own

ambition for power constituted an unfaltering desire t
utilize such power for the benefit of his country, and wh
was never shaken in his beliefs by fear of popular opinion
By a man with the vision of Meriño, no doubts could b
harboured as to the benefits which the return to power o
Baez might entail:

"Extraordinary things happen in this country," h
warned the President; "your star has once more risen upo
the horizon of this Republic and you are called upon t
occupy again the Chief Magistracy. So unexpected a
occurrence has prostrated with astonishment many wh
are now looking at you . . . Speaking to you in the fran
language of truth . . . I shall not avoid saying to you tha
you should labor under no illusions, since among a peopl
like our own, to make use of the expression of an illus
trious American orator, 'It is as easy to pass from exile t
supreme power as it is from supreme power to impeach
ment before the Bar of the Senate' . . . Sincere patriot
men of principle, all decent citizens, who desire, and ar
the only ones able, to give stability to the Governmen
are always disposed to support governments which ar
progressive and liberal, governments which are truly na
tional. They only refuse their support and leave suc
governments at the mercy of their opponents, when the
see them prostitute public interests to private interest
when they understand that despotism has banished justic
from the seat of power, when, finally, they see in th
stead of the Executive elected to labor for the happine
of the people a sanguinary tyrant in the Presidential Chai
a perverse ruler or an audacious speculator who collects
colossal fortune, robbing the people of the riches whic
they have confided to him in order that he may procu
peace, liberty and progress for his country . . . If, durin
the Presidential period fixed for you by the Constitutio

ou obtain, as I hope you will, the good of the country, ne satisfaction will be that of all, but the glory yours in articular."

Very much of a man was Padre Meriño. His intent was lear to all. There could be no doubt as to whom he eferred by the "audacious speculator" and the "bloody yrant." That the sentiment of many in the country was nat of the President of the National Assembly was soon nade manifest by the fact that on the same day as that pon which General Baez was inaugurated in the capital, revolution against his Government broke out in Puerto lata under the able leadership of General Gregorio uperón.

In the appointment of his Cabinet, Baez made a shrewd ffort to conciliate all the groups with which he felt there vas even the slightest possibility of establishing relations.)f the Ministers appointed, Don Manuel Maria Gautier, amed Minister of Justice, Public Instruction and Foreign ffairs, was the only one upon whom Baez could per- onally depend. The Minister of Interior and Police, ieneral Pimentel, thus rewarded for his participation in ne overthrow of Cabral, had been previously unknown to aez, who mistakenly believed that Pimentel's appoint- nent would bring with it the support of an influential lass in the Cibao. The Minister of Hacienda, Don Pedro omás Garrido, had broken away, like many others, from aez in 1857, and his appointment demonstrated the ntention of the President to draw back by the lure of ublic office all individuals of prominence who had ormerly been connected with his party. The remaining ember of the Cabinet, the Minister of War, in the person f General José Maria Cabral himself, made plain the

desire of Baez to obtain through his appointment the su
port of the western provinces. In that hope, however,
was likewise to be disappointed.

The revolution so soon proclaimed by General Lupe
was speedily suppressed, owing to the inability of
revolutionary leaders in the north to postpone the sa
faction of their own ambitions long enough to mak
concerted front against Baez's troops. Urging as a ju
fication this outbreak of rebellion against his author
Baez thereupon commenced a series of personal perse
tions which did nothing to enhance his own popular
One by one, not only those who had been identified in
past with Santana's party but likewise the principal lea
of the liberal party, who vainly struggled to further
growth of democratic government in the Republic, w
imprisoned or exiled. The new elections to the Natio
Congress naturally enough, therefore, united in the L
islative body solely such citizens as were submissive to
wishes of the President, and in that sense the election
the President's half-brother, General Valentín Rami
Baez, as President of the Senate was significant.

Embarking upon a policy of absolute repression, Gen
Baez brought his power to bear with merciless seve
upon all those whom he suspected of revolutionary sy
pathies. Before six weeks had passed 190 political priso
from Puerto Plata, Santiago, and Azua, against whom
specific charges had been lodged, filled the prisons of
capital.[1] Baez was, however, speedily forced to the c
clusion that he could not gain the support of any of
various groups which he had tried to conciliate, by
inability to retain their leaders in his Cabinet. The riv

[1] Mr. Paul T. Jones, American Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward,
7, 1866.

etween the President and Cabral, terminating in the flight f the latter, brought matters to a crisis. Azua, although o long dominated by the President, rallied to the cry of ebellion at once launched by the fugitive Minister.

"When a portion of the revolutionary army was twelve niles from the Capital, the gates of the City were closed, nd a cannon placed in front of the President's palace. The reluctant citizens were called on by proclamation ead at the corners of the streets to array themselves in he common defense . . . In two engagements between he revolutionists and the Government, the latter was each ime defeated . . ." [1]

Martial law was at once proclaimed, and the submissive Assembly harried into granting authorization to the Presi- ent to issue $100,000 in paper currency with which to ay off his shoeless, coatless and shirtless soldiery. But tronger measures still were deemed necessary, as the result f the growing symptoms of unrest. Under the lash of ompulsion the Congress at length set aside the Con- itution of 1865 and replaced it with the Constitution f 1854 by which the President was granted almost dic- atorial powers. With the change of Constitutions the tage was set for the advent of mob tyranny.

"On April 22nd, a proclamation was read at the corners f the streets announcing the change in Constitutions. There was no demonstration. The following day, the new Constitution was inaugurated by a parade, the ringing f bells, and the firing of salutes. At midday, all public unctionaries were invited to assemble at the palace to roceed from there to the Cathedral to attend a Te Deum

[1] Mr. Paul T. Jones, American Commercial Agent, to Secretary Seward, March , 1866.

of Thanksgiving. Two days later . . . General Pe
Guillermo, a favorite of General Baez, rode through
streets, sword in hand, proclaiming 'Death to all m
chants opposed to Baez's administration,' and ended up
front of the store of Joaquín Delmonte accompanied
twenty-five ragamuffin soldiers demanding the person
Mr. Delmonte, dead or alive. Immediately all the st
were closed, the streets cleared save by the soldiery. Twe
prominent citizens were at once arrested and imprison
among them a priest recently arrived from St. Thomas

In these days of chaos, the gallant President took
chances as to his own security. Mr. Jones reported him

"taking every precautionary measure for his perso
safety. He now is garbed in military clothes, and ev
evening at dusk two cannon are placed in front of
palace door, which are removed the next morning." [2]

But all Baez's struggling to retain the Presidency
fruitless. On April 23rd, the principal leaders of the Cib
charging the President with disregard of his most sac
obligations in setting aside the Constitution of 1865
with indulging in persecution to satisfy his personal sp
alleging that Baez was conspiring to sell the Republic
France, and accusing him of robbing the national treas
for his individual profit, declared themselves in o
rebellion, and a week later announced their support
new Triumvirate, composed of Generals Luperón, Fe
rico de Jesús García and Pimentel. It was only then
Baez found that his flamboyant Minister of the Inter
with a capacity in treachery and in double-dealing wor
of his chief, had long been intriguing for Baez's overthr

[1] Mr. Paul T. Jones to Secretary Seward, April 25, 1866.
[2] Mr. Paul T. Jones to Secretary Seward, April 17, 1866.

The troops of the Cibao supported, although half-heartedly, by the revolutionaries under the command of Cabral in the south, rapidly overcame the Government's resistance and within a few days occupied Moca, La Vega and Cotuy. At this point, General Pimentel, hoping to outmaneuver his colleagues in the Triumvirate, as he had already successfully deceived Baez, deserted Luperón and García and by forced marches appeared alone before the Capital at the end of May. On May 28th, the entrances to the city were forced, and Baez, who had already stationed a Government vessel in the port upon which he hoped to escape in the case of necessity, was obliged to take refuge at midnight, owing to the suddenness of the attack, in the French Consulate, whence he was secretly placed on board a passing steamer and was eventually enabled to reach Curaçao once more.

3.

For the time being, therefore, the partisans of Baez, or the members of the "Red" party, as they were now known, were completely defeated, and the "Blues," the term applied to all the elements opposed to the return of Baez, were in complete control. Unfortunately, however, for the Republic, once the object which all the groups loosely termed the "Blues" had in view had been successfully achieved, there was no common policy to bind them together. In the south, the furtherance of the ambitions of General Cabral was the cause of the rebellion; in the east, the former partisans of Santana had joined the revolution, terrified at the prospect of a continuation of Baez's administration; in the Cibao, popular opinion was pulverized, each group supporting its local leader in the hope that fortune might favour the advancement of that leader

to the Presidency. For a time, the state of open anar which threatened was postponed by the agreement many of the revolutionary chiefs upon a pact, signed July 12th in Jacagua, providing that Buenaventura E was deposed from the Presidency and should at no tim the future be permitted to return to office; that until Dominican people in general elections should selec President all candidacies for the Presidency should ignored, and that until such time as a President migh constitutionally inaugurated, the Government of Triumvirate should be generally accepted through the country.

On August 10th General Luperón and General Ga joined the third member of the Triumvirate, Gen Pimentel, in the capital and immediately decrees w issued providing for the election of a Congress an President of the Republic. The air was filled with rum of plots and counterplots. A working agreement was s entered into by Pimentel and García for the captur assassination of General Luperón, whose increasing po larity they had good reason to fear. But the latter, realiz that his own hopes of obtaining the Presidency must the time being be laid aside, succeeded in checkmating colleagues by publicly suggesting that the Triumvirat replaced by General Cabral, to hold office as Provisi President until such time as a Constitutional Governm might be elected. Pimentel and García, outplayed their turn, were forced by the pressure of pu opinion to agree, and on August 22nd, a decree issued appointing General Cabral Provisional Presid whereupon the members of the Triumvirate joi agreed to withdraw with their personal followers f the capital.

Now that General Cabral had been returned to power s the result of the rivalry between the three members of he Triumvirate, his election as Constitutional President f the Republic was assured. On September 23rd, Cabral vas proclaimed elected by a majority of 4,000 votes over hose cast for the other candidates, and as soon as the Constitution of 1865 had, with slight modifications, been nce more proclaimed in force, the Provisional President, n September 29, 1866, was inaugurated as Constitutional resident of the Republic.

4.

During the years of the Spanish occupation, General Cazneau, that "tenacious adventurer," as he is described y José Gabriel García, had not been idle. A few months rior to the annexation of the Republic to Spain he had ntered into partnership with Colonel Joseph W. Fabens, vhose activities in Santo Domingo had already been adver- ised in the local press. Colonel Fabens, like his partner a ative of the State of Massachusetts, and, also like Gen- ral Cazneau, a participant in the activities which had led o the annexation of Texas to the United States, had first merged from obscurity in 1854, when he had been em- loyed by Secretary Marcy in a diplomatic capacity to nvestigate the validity of claims against the United States or property destroyed in Nicaragua during the bombard- ment of Greytown by Captain Hollins. According to Davis Hatch, an American who had obtained, for certain New York interests, a concession in 1864 from the Spanish uthorities for the working of the salt mines at Neyba, and vhose grievances against Cazneau and Fabens were to be ater responsible for the final wrecking of the latter's chemes,

"If Cazneau was the more vicious of the two, Fabens
the more dangerous from his greater cunning and ex
sive duplicity." [1]

The partners, as is made plain by a confidential le
written March 17, 1861, by Santana's last Minister
Finance, Ricart y Torres, to the Captain-General of C
had made every effort to entrench themselves secu
before the annexation officially took place:

"A gentleman . . . who passed through Havana
embarked for this City on board the steamer *Cuba.*
object of his arrival, which we supposed might be s
claim regarding the guano affair of Alta Vela, is far n
important in its nature. This gentleman, together
General C[azneau] and Colonel F[abens] (other stra
ers, both Americans) spoke with me first and later
posed, in a conference which they had with the Presi
of the Republic, the following points:

"1. To grant a loan to the Government for the sun
$500,000 bearing a small rate of interest and for a
term, the amount of which would naturally be place
the disposal of the Republic;

"2. To establish a current of immigration, paid fo
themselves, to people the Peninsula of Samaná;

"3. In return for these advantages, from the Gov
ment they request exclusive privileges to open up
navigation of the Yuna and Yaque Rivers (the two p
cipal rivers of the island); a concession to establish a
yard, to be undertaken by the immigrants . . . the
ploitation of the coal mines and all other mines of
Republic, and a concession covering some leagues of
cultural land on the banks of the Yuna and Yaque R
where agricultural colonies may be established . . ."

[1] Howard's "Hatch-San Domingo Report."
[2] La Gándara, "Anexión y Guerra."

While the desired concession was not secured, it was the hope of Cazneau that the relations of intimacy which he had formed with Santana would permit him notwithstanding to obtain other concessions which might be advantageously disposed of in the United States. In this hope he was disappointed so long as Santana remained in power. The early revocation of his appointment by Secretary Seward as Special Agent of the United States no doubt increased the notorious sympathy which Cazneau demonstrated for the Confederacy during the earlier years of the Civil War, and caused him to remain during the first two years of the war in Santo Domingo, trusting that his protestations as a Confederate sympathizer would render the Spanish authorities more favourably disposed towards him.

The partners first availed themselves of the fact that President Lincoln and his Secretary of the Interior, Caleb Smith, were known to favour the colonization of emancipated negroes in the West Indies or in Liberia. As early as December 16, 1862, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts had introduced a bill to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, which carried with it an amendment appropriating $100,000 to assist in the colonization of former slaves who desired to emigrate from the United States. The bill, finally passed with the express approval of President Lincoln, received the benediction of Charles Sumner as making possible the payment of "a small installment of that great debt to an enslaved race which we all owe." Quick to detect the practical advantages which could be reaped from this hobby of the Abolitionists, Cazneau and Fabens at once formed a company in New York known as the "American West India Company." In the prospectus it was declared that the Company had purchased extensive

tracts of land for colonization purposes, particularly wi
a view to cultivating cotton on an extensive scale by fi
labour. The colonists, with the assistance of the Span
authorities, were to be settled on land situated four leagu
north of Santo Domingo upon a navigable branch of t
Ozama River

"which has the reputation of being one of the most bea
tiful and healthful spots on the south side of the Isla
. . . The example and instruction it will afford to oth
settlers will be of incalculable value to those while co
stituting the best mode of employing the best classes
free labor in a manner which will insure permanent hon
and satisfactory means of livelihood . . . Very favoral
arrangements can be made . . . for the introduction
a large number of agricultural homeless laborers from t
United States for whom the United States Governme
feels a responsible interest and who would find there a m
desirable home."

Many of the unwary were caught by the elega
verbiage of this alluring prospect, and numbers depart
for Santo Domingo. Their experiences were later divulge

"Upon an investment of short of $4,000 in wild lan
in Santo Domingo, Cazneau and Fabens represented th
they had property to the value of $2,000,000, the capi
of the Company. They sacrificed hundreds of lives by th
fake representations; and those who escaped with th
lives lost everything. Not one remained. Cazneau a
Fabens made small fortunes out of the operation." [1]

The following report of the American Commerc
Agent at the time, which recounts a typical instan
would have been enlightening to the Abolitionist societi

[1] Howard's "Hatch-San Domingo Report."

"About twelve or fifteen immigrants arrived some weeks ago to settle here. They came out under the auspices and persuasions of J. W. Fabens and William L. Cazneau. They all intend to return to the United States by the first conveyance, cursing in their hearts the West India Company of Fabens and Cazneau." [1]

But the experience suffered by Cazneau in the autumn of 1863, when his house and plantations at San Carlos, where he and his wife were living at the time, were completely destroyed by order of the Spanish authorities, evidently led him to realize that temporarily at least his expectations of increasing his fortune in Santo Domingo must be abandoned, and returning to the United States, he undertook, with his partner, the flotation of various other companies, among them the San Domingo Cotton Company and the San Domingo Company, all of them as unlikely as the first wild-cat scheme to prove profitable to the American investor. With the termination of the revolution against Spain, General Cazneau and his partner returned to Santo Domingo in June, 1865, to await the opportunity which they were sure would arise to enable them to profit at the expense of the Dominican people.

5.

The opportunity was not long delayed. During the months he was seeking to recover from the wounds inflicted by the assassins who had murdered Lincoln—a shrunken parody of his former self, sunk in his wheel-chair at the State Department, his broken jaw bound to his head—Secretary Seward was labouring to devise the means to repair the havoc wrought to the Monroe Doctrine

[1] Mr. William G. W. Yaeger to Secretary Seward, April 6, 1863.

by the unchecked activities of the European Powers in years of the Civil War. Upon this aim his singularly une abilities were from now on concentrated.

As the first step in the rehabilitation of the Mon Doctrine in the eyes of the world, Seward believed it i perative that the United States acquire a West Ind naval base, which, he felt, would remove the danger repeated aggression from Europe in that portion of American hemisphere. For a while he hesitated betw the purchase of the Danish West Indies and the acqu tion of the Bay of Samaná. He was at length inclined favour the latter, alarmed by the report in the autu of 1865 that the return of Baez to the Presidency of Dominican Republic was being actively fostered Napoleon III to smooth the way for the long-postpo annexation to France, but more particularly exerci perhaps by the proposal of the British Government, in J of that year, that the United States concur in a jo declaration of the neutrality of the Samaná Peninsu This proposal, Seward replied, the American Governm although earnestly desiring that no foreign state atte to disturb the inhabitants of the Dominican island, co not entertain owing to its traditional objection to enta ling alliances. The declaration so proposed, implying a did European intervention in an exclusively Ameri question, had been broached to both the British and Fre Cabinets by agents of the Haitian Government, fea lest the unsuccessful experiment of Spain in Santo D mingo might leave the way clear for the ambitions of s more powerful nation. Consequently Seward determi to lose no further time and to trust to no agents in as taining how far the commitments of President Baez France had actually gone, and to anticipate any Europ

declaration of neutrality by the lease, or preferably by the purchase, of the Peninsula of Samaná by the United States itself. He therefore set sail for Santo Domingo where he arrived January 15, 1866, accompanied by his son, Frederick W. Seward, the Assistant Secretary of State.

Seward's visit appeared a heaven-sent opportunity to General Cazneau and to Colonel Fabens. Welcoming Secretary Seward upon his arrival in the harbour, they availed themselves of the chance presented by the fact that the Commercial Agent, Mr. Jones, incapacitated by his habitual intemperance, was unable to accompany the Secretary of State in his formal call upon the President of the Republic, and offered their services as interpreters during Seward's interview with Baez. While the official paper, *El Monitor,* limited itself to the statement that the interview was restricted to a frank exchange of opinions, "in which our independence, our Constitutional organization, our pending questions with Spain and Haiti, and the recognition of our nationality" were discussed, it added the significant comment that "the details of this interview provided the most satisfactory preliminaries for negotiations tending towards a frank understanding between the United States and the Dominican Republic."

The personal contact which Cazneau had thus been enabled to effect with the American Secretary of State, and the coincidence of his own hope of enhancing the value of his concessions in the desire of Seward to guard against continued encroachment by the European Powers, made Cazneau lose no opportunity to encourage Secretary Seward to believe that the Dominican Government eagerly awaited the negotiation of closer ties with the United States. Within two weeks of Secretary Seward's visit to Santo Domingo, we find Cazneau writing to him:

"I have had several interviews with President Baez c
American affairs. He is a statesman and is very anxious
satisfy the Government and people of the United Stat
that he will encourage American enterprise and energ
He is very anxious to carry out your suggestions in relatic
to more intimate relations with the United States." [1]

On April 11th, General Cazneau wrote again to advi
Seward that President Baez had "honored" him

"with several private interviews for the purpose
having an accurate and confidential exposition of
policy conveyed through the Secretary of State
President Johnson. President Baez desires the President
consider it as the unofficial appeal from the youngest
the American Republics to the oldest and the stronge
believing the United States to be the closest friend a
protector of those children of the common family w
from their geographical proximity are the natural all
of the United States. Haiti, to which the friendly count
nance of the American Cabinet is imparting dignity a
strength, is of all the States of the world the most co
pletely alien in policy and sentiment, inasmuch as
Constitution excludes the white race from citizensh
while the Dominican Republic has invariably pursued
different course. 'The equality of all races before the la
is one of the foundation stones of the Dominican Republ
The Dominicans have, since 1844, been obliged to defe
their independence at incredible sacrifices from the co
stant menace and repeated attacks of Haiti. Preside
Baez believes that the Dominican people having saved
Republic for the American system by their own unaid
efforts may justly claim the confidence and sympathy
the United States. President Baez outlines a plan of admi
istration so just, peaceful, and comprehensive that it ne

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Seward, January 29, 1866.

but to be fairly understood to commend the cordial approbation of every enlightened government and most of all that of the United States. The President's message to Congress advising the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic was received with joy. That has decided the Dominican Republic to determine a policy of acting as the sentinel state for the United States in the Caribbean. While President Baez is making overtures to the President of Haiti for a treaty of peace, Haitian officials are fomenting rebellion against the Dominican Government, spreading the propaganda that President Baez wishes to sell the Dominican negroes to the Americans as Santana sold them to Spain. It is highly necessary to secure the Dominican territory, *as well as American capital invested in it,* from the devastating invasions of Haiti." [1]

For the time being, the ambitions of Cazneau and his partner and the completion of the policy set for himself by the Secretary of State, were both checked by the overthrow of Baez from the Presidency. Nevertheless Cazneau wrote again, relating the circumstances which caused the exile of Baez from the country, and advised the Secretary that immediately prior to the President's flight from the capital he had sent for General Cazneau and had urged him to inform the Secretary of his intention, so soon as he returned to power, to obtain a treaty of amity and recognition from the United States, and had in particular besought him not to abandon the country "until American vested interests should be established in vigorous activity, since he regarded them as the principal means for the eventual redemption of his country from revolutionary chaos." [2]

The brief intercourse which Seward had had with

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Seward, April 11, 1866.
[2] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Seward, May 30, 1866.

Cazneau evidently led him to believe that the latter migh become an effective instrument in carrying out his ow purposes, apparently ignorant of the fact that in th carrying out of those purposes Cazneau furthered the sat isfaction of his own pecuniary ambitions. Inducing Pres dent Johnson to appoint Cazneau as Minister Resident i the Dominican Republic, a special appropriation wa thereupon requested from Congress to provide for th expenses of the mission. At this juncture, Davis Hatch, c the Neyba salt mine, whose original antipathy to Caznea and Fabens had been fanned by the partners' refusal t permit him to approach Seward during his brief visit t Santo Domingo, wrote to Washington setting out in n charitable aspect the previous careers of both Cazneau an his associate, and dwelling particularly upon the fact tha Cazneau during the Civil War had openly announced h support of the Confederacy and had at the same tim been excessively bitter in his denunciation of Seward him self, as well as of other leading men of the North. Whe this information reached Washington, Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committe not unnaturally insisted that the nomination be re jected. Seward, however, remarking merely that Caz neau had "deceived" him, had the nomination with drawn by the President from further consideration by th Senate.

Notwithstanding the withdrawal of his nominatio General Cazneau continued to communicate with th Secretary of State. In a further letter, he opened up new vista of alarm to the apprehensions of Mr. Sewa by impressing him with the possibility that the Dominica people might become involved in a revolutionary strugg instigated throughout the Spanish Antilles by Haiti f

the purpose of obtaining negro supremacy.[1] Claiming that had his nomination as Minister Resident been confirmed he would have been able to retain President Baez in power, he insinuated that he could be appointed Special Agent, as he had been in the past, without the concurrence of the United States Senate and that in that event he could save the Republic from negro anarchy. He urged Seward to grant official recognition to the Dominican Government, and claimed that should he only be able to obtain "periodical visits from American war vessels" he would feel entirely able to regulate the action of the Dominicans.

At the same time, the situation of the Republic had given rise to considerable alarm on the part of the Government of President Cabral soon after his inauguration as President, owing to the outbreak of war between Spain and Chile. The historian, José Gabriel García, a leader of the liberals, who had been temporarily appointed by Cabral Minister for Foreign Affairs, realized that were the hostilities between Spain and Chile to spread to some of the other of Spain's former colonies, the neutrality of the Dominican Government might readily be jeopardized. On October 18, 1866, García addressed a confidential note to the American Secretary of State requesting that he be advised as to the course that the Dominican Government should pursue in the event that the theatre of the war between Spain and Chile were to extend to the Caribbean Sea. García, announcing his belief that the Monroe Doctrine implied that the republican system in the American continent should not be capriciously attacked and that its destruction should not be the object of any war undertaken by a European Power, requested some declaration from the Secretary of State as to the policy which the

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Seward, October 9, 1866.

United States would pursue in the event that the Repul
lics of Latin-America were attacked by a European Powe
or by a combination of European Powers, in order th
the Dominican Republic, without going beyond the stri
limits of neutrality, might conform its attitude to th
adopted by the United States. The reality of the appr
hensions of the Dominican Minister was made patent b
his admission that he realized that the neutrality of t
Dominican Republic might not satisfy Spain's aspiratio
in the American hemisphere, and that Spain might co
sequently pretend to derive from the maintenance of su
neutrality a pretext for resuming her interrupted w
with the Dominican Republic. García asked whether
that event the United States Government would suppo
the Dominican Republic.

Further information which reached Secretary Sewa
during the autumn of 1866, to the effect that the D
minican Government was desirous of concluding, wit
out further delay, a treaty of amity and commerce wi
the United States, and finally the definite request,
November 8, 1866, for the negotiation of an agreeme
whereby the United States Government should furni
practical assistance to the Dominican Republic, led Se
retary Seward to the belief that the time was ripe to pr
to a conclusion the negotiations which he himself h
initiated the preceding winter.

6.

On November 8th, the Minister for Foreign Affa
had addressed an official note to Secretary Seward aski
whether, in view of the unequal contest which the D
minican Republic had maintained for two years with t
Spanish Monarchy, the Government of the United Sta

"would be disposed to advance to it a million dollars in the character of a loan on just, equitable and reasonable conditions." He likewise inquired whether the United States Government

"would also be disposed to give to the Republic, on credit, a number of pieces of heavy artillery sufficient to meet the requirements she has of them, since the artillery which had been in Dominican strongholds before the Spanish War had all been broken up."

On the same day, an official request of the same character, but in more detailed form and with ramifications which the Minister for Foreign Affairs had not cared to put on paper, was conveyed to the new American Commercial Agent, Mr. Somers Smith. Mr. Smith reported [1] that President Cabral had requested him to ascertain whether the United States Government would be willing to grant a loan of one or two millions of dollars to the Dominican Republic, and had added that the Republic preferred to apply for assistance to the United States rather than to any European Power. The Government's need of financial assistance was immediate in that it was necessary to redeem the outstanding paper currency, amounting in all to some $500,000, inasmuch as the Government of Baez had refused to accept it in the payment of customs duties, (notwithstanding the obligation printed on the face of the bills), and it was believed indispensable to retire money in which there was no confidence from circulation, the Government intending to redeem it at 50% of its face value. Mr. Smith was authorized by Cabral to state that the Dominican Government had no other indebtedness with the exception of approximately $100,000

[1] Mr. J. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, November 8, 1866.

of bonds issued for supplies which were receivable in pay
ment of customs duties. The remainder of the loan, onc
the paper currency was redeemed, was desired for th
purchase of 10,000 stand of approved arms, 100 cannon
a few heavy guns for fortifications, and a small steamer
In concluding his relation of the desires of the Dominica
Government, Mr. Smith declared that he had been author
ized to offer to the United States as collateral the use o
the coal mines at Samaná and the possession of the Levan
tado and Carenero Keys at the entrance to Samaná Bay
"for such time and for such purpose as might be agree
upon." The request of the Dominican Government, mad
with the utmost secrecy, met with immediate respons
from the American Secretary of State.

Selecting his son, the Assistant Secretary of Stat
Frederick W. Seward, as the representative of the Unite
States in the proposed negotiations, Secretary Seward pro
vided him with detailed instructions as to the course to b
pursued during his mission in Santo Domingo. The Assis
ant Secretary was officially apprised that President Johnso
authorized him to conclude a convention with the Domin
can Republic for the cession or lease of the strategic por
tions of Samaná to the United States.[1] He was provide
with a draft convention which the Secretary of State ha
prepared, of which the salient article, Article IV, w
as follows:

"The United States shall have the right to fortify an
garrison and protect the leased territory aforesaid durin
the term aforesaid with such fortifications and land an
naval forces as the President of the United States ma
deem expedient and to remove all ordnance, arms an

[1] Secretary Seward to Asst. Secretary of State Frederick W. Seward, Decemb
17, 1866.

military stores that may be placed there during the said lease by the United States; but the Dominican Government may, at its option, purchase the same or any part thereof at a fair valuation to be paid to the United States."

In the event that the absolute cession of the territories desired would be consented to by the Dominican Government, he was to offer as a consideration therefor not more than $2,000,000, payable one-half in cash and the other half in arms and munitions of war, no cession to be acceptable, however, unless made in full sovereignty to the United States. In the event that only a lease of the territory were to be agreed to, the territory was to be leased for not less than thirty years, and in that event the sum of $10,000 might be paid upon the ratification of the convention by the Dominican Government, and after the exchange of ratifications the United States would remit annually as rental the sum of $12,000, either in gold or in munitions of war at the option of the Dominican Government.

In his instructions, Frederick Seward was reminded that during the administration of President Pierce an effort had been made to obtain a lease of the Bay of Samaná, as a coaling station for passenger and naval steamers, but that the activities of Captain McClellan, who had proceeded to Samaná to make a survey prematurely, before definite arrangements had been concluded with the Dominican Government, had given notice of the negotiations to certain European Governments, which had been enabled to thwart the plans of the United States. The Secretary of State added that the intervention of Spain in the Dominican Republic had been caused by the desire of the Spanish Government to prevent the United States

from obtaining any foothold in Samaná. Seward's instruc tions concluded with the warning:

"The proposition now under consideration will not succeed unless caution, secrecy and despatch shall be preserved in carrying it into effect . . . It is deemed indispensable tha the convention should be ratified by the Dominican Gov ernment before any consideration shall be paid by thi Government . . . You will direct your attention to th competency of the Executive for the time being to ente into and ratify the convention or whether the consent o the Dominican Congress to the instrument will be indis pensable to its validity. Vice Admiral Porter of the Navy will accompany you . . . His great experience in foreig countries and especially his familiarity with the region yo are about to visit will be found useful towards the purpos of your mission."

At the same time, full powers were transmitted to th American Commercial Agent, Mr. Somers Smith, to nego tiate the commercial treaty requested by the Dominica Government.

On January 19, 1867, the Assistant Secretary of Stat accompanied by Admiral Porter, arrived in Santo Do mingo on the U.S.S. *Gettysburg*. General Cabral, who ha been absent in the northern provinces, returned imme diately to Santo Domingo and negotiations were at onc initiated. Upon the day following the President's arriva the American representatives commenced their confer ences with the President and the members of the Cabine to whom they had been presented by Don José Gabri García, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Referrin to the request of the Dominican Government that th United States advance a loan to the Dominican Republi the younger Seward declared that in the opinion of h

Government a lease or purchase of the Samaná Peninsula appeared more advisable and more advantageous than the suggested loan. He reminded the members of the Dominican Cabinet of the purchase by the United States of Louisiana from France, of Florida from Spain, and of various territories from Mexico as having been productive of friendship and mutual advantage, and insisted that events in Mexico and in Haiti and elsewhere indicated

"but too plainly how difficult it is to preserve independent sovereignty and peaceful relations between two nations one of which occupies the position of creditor and the other that of debtor."

He added:

"The United States has no disposition . . . to enter upon any line of policy which would not assure to the republics of America stability, prosperity and progress." [1]

It was soon evident that the policy which the agents of the American Government desired Cabral to adopt had caused a serious disagreement in the Dominican Cabinet. The Ministers of the Interior and of Finance, Don Apolinar de Castro and General Pablo Pujol, favoured the acceptance of either of the alternatives proposed by the United States, while the Ministers of War and of Foreign Affairs, General José del Carmen Reinoso and Don José Gabriel García, objected to the trend the negotiations had taken. For the moment, Cabral needed time in which to arrive at a conciliatory solution, and General Pujol was consequently appointed Commissioner to prolong the negotiations. In his account of the continued conferences had with the Dominican Commissioner, Frederick Seward

[1] Mr. Frederick W. Seward to Secretary Seward, January 20, 1867.

reported that the Dominican Government manifested
willingness and even a desire to enter into some arrange
ment with the United States with regard to Saman
which would provide the American Government with
suitable naval harbour and coaling station, but that
was placed in an embarrassing position since it coul
not, without flagrantly violating the second article o
the new Constitution, consent to an absolute cession o
any of its territory, and that it had consequently propose
a lease of the Levantado Key which commanded th
entrance of the Bay of Samaná, together with the us
of the adjacent waters, as well as certain specific privi
leges on the mainland of the Peninsula.[1] The America
representative declined to entertain this proposition o
the ground that the Levantado Key and the waters adja
cent were commanded by the heights of the Peninsul
and insisted that the United States desired no territor
unless they acquired absolute control of it, and unless suc
territory could be held and fortified against all enemie

As the result of past experience, it was not unnatur
that the Dominican Government had entered upon the
negotiations with some degree of distrust, although Sewar
had emphasized that the negotiations then in progress ha
not been sought by the United States but had been entere
upon at the request of the Dominican Government. Whi
the members of the Dominican Government realized th
advantages of the American proposal as a means of pro
tection against foreign aggression, they were reluctant t
assume the responsibility of taking a step which the
feared would render the Government unpopular. For th
bitter memories of the Spanish occupation had bee
directly responsible for the introduction of the secon

[1] Mr. Frederick W. Seward to Secretary Seward, January 22, 1867.

article into the new Constitution, and this article was generally interpreted as making unlawful even a temporary occupation of Dominican territory by a foreign government. Appreciating at length the strength of the opposition to his proposals, Seward recommended that nothing further be done for the time being, suggesting that the matter be held in reserve for future discussion until such time as a way might be found to evade the evident constitutional obstacles.

During the course of the discussions, General Pujol provided Seward with a memorandum outlining what Cabral's Government was then willing to concede. It contained four points:

1. The rental to the United States of the waters of Samaná Bay so that the United States and the Dominican Republic might hold joint sovereignty over them;
2. The sale of lands on the Peninsula to be used by the United States as shipyards;
3. An agreement on the part of the United States to provide the Dominican Republic with the means necessary for undertaking the defense of Samaná Bay;
4. The lease of the Levantado and Carenero Keys.

In his formal reply to this memorandum, Seward stated that an agreement to Point 1 would be contrary to the established policy of the United States to avoid entangling alliances. In regard to Points 2 and 3, he replied that shipyards would be worse than useless to the United States if they could not be protected and defended by American fortifications, and that were the United States to obtain actual sovereignty over the Peninsula of Samaná it could be far more effectually defended than were the United States to be merely permitted to render assistance, in case

of necessity, to the Dominican Government. In regard t
Point 4, Mr. Seward stated that the lease of the Levantad
and Carenero Keys alone would not be sufficient inasmuc
as the fortification of these keys could not, owing to the
natural position, render them sufficiently strong, nor coul
fortifications there have sufficient extent.

General Cabral, greatly disturbed by the divergence i
the opinions of the members of his Cabinet, was as usu
unable by himself to come to a decision. He therefor
sought the advice of his ring of supporters, who, apprise
of the intention of the National Assembly to pass a reso
lution proposed by Don Mariano Cestero and supporte
by the President of the Chamber, Don Juan Bautis
Zafra, providing that any public authority instrument
in effecting the cession of any portion of the Republic
any other nation should be declared guilty of high treaso
strongly recommended that the President terminate th
negotiations. Cabral, therefore, finally stated that owin
to the second article of the Constitution, which provide
that "no part of the territory of the Republic could ev
be alienated," the Dominican Government was unable
enter into either of the alternative agreements propose
by the United States.

For the time being, Secretary Seward was constraine
to postpone the consummation of the project; but belie
ing that the reluctance of the Dominican Government
accede to the American proposals was largely due to th
fear that the Baez faction might make the acquiescen
of General Cabral a plausible ground for another revol
tion, and realizing that the increasing impoverishment
Cabral's Government might tend to make it later mo
willing to find a means of granting the suggested lea
or cession of the Samaná territory, he instructed the Cor

mercial Agent, Mr. Somers Smith, to continue negotiations. These instructions were in general similar to those issued before to Seward's son, but contained the proviso that the lease of the territory should, if possible, be for a period of ninety-nine years, for which privilege the Commercial Agent was authorized to offer the sum of $1,000,000, payable in annual installments. He was informed that

"as any convention that may be made will require ratification by the Senate of the United States and a law of Congress to carry its stipulations into effect, you will take care that the period allowed for ratification and payment shall embrace sufficient time to prevent any lapse in case Congress should not be in session when it is signed . . . If the convention could be made during the ensuing session of the Fortieth Congress" it would be particularly desirable "in order that it might be immediately submitted to that body for final action before its adjournment."

Mr. Smith was authorized, however, to remit immediately after ratification the sum of $75,000 in case the agreement provided for the sale of the territory, and $25,000 in the case of a lease. In the latter event, the lease was to cover

"the territory known as the Peninsula of Samaná, the Bay of Samaná and the keys known as Levantado and Carenero with all the rights and appurtenances thereto belonging as they have heretofore belonged to the Government of the Republic, the territory . . . to extend from west to east thirty-two miles and to be eleven miles across at its greatest breadth, together with the waters of the Bay of Samaná and all the bays and harbors in said Peninsula and the full and exclusive jurisdiction over the territories and waters aforesaid."

As the months passed by, although President Cab
became more favourably disposed towards the Americ
proposals and transmitted an agreement based up
Seward's later proposals in the first days of June to
secret session of the Congress, the opposition in the Co
gress became more vocal although a majority was appa
ently in favour of the project. Secretary Seward at leng
became disheartened at the long-continued delay, a
instructed his agent on May 8th to terminate negoti
tions and to return all correspondence regarding the ma
ter to the Department of State, in order that no pap
referring to the negotiations might remain in the archiv
of the Agency. Subsequently he notified Mr. Smith of t
new developments which had taken place elsewhere
the furtherance of his policy:

"I have now to inform you confidentially that the del
and apparent indisposition of the Dominican Governme
has rendered it expedient for the United States to op
parallel negotiations in other quarters. There is good reas
to expect that they will be successful and thus the ch
want of the United States be supplied. Those proceedin
would not have been adopted if there had been a reasonal
prospect of the acceptance of the offer made to Domini
It is impossible for the United States not to desire to co
tribute by moral influence to the stability and security
the republican system in Dominica, while the Unit
States are incapable of entertaining an ungenerous thoug
or design against that Republic. Influenced by those fe
ings, it has seemed to me that an acceptance of our prop
sition would be vastly more important to Dominica th
to the United States . . . It is possible, but rarely p
sible, that a proposition by Santo Domingo equivalent
that which we have withdrawn, if her Government shou

reconsider the question, might come in time to be accepted by us." [1]

The "parallel negotiations" referred to by Secretary Seward which resulted in the treaty providing for the sale by Denmark of the Danish West Indies, checked momentarily all further progress in the negotiations for the cession of Samaná, although the Commercial Treaty between the United States and the Dominican Republic the negotiation of which had been so many times commenced and so often postponed, was finally ratified by the United States Senate on April 30th, and by the Dominican Congress on May 16, 1867.[2]

7.

The disturbances which had distinguished the Provisional Presidency and the "Protectorate" of Cabral occurred with similar and ever increasing frequency during the course of his Constitutional administration. They had broken out, in fact, in localities where the supporters of the "Red" party were powerful, on the day of his inauguration; and although they were at first put down with rapidity, as time passed they acquired increased momentum. The political attacks to which the frustrated negotiations with the United States had given rise became more potent owing to the refusal which Cabral had encountered in his attempt to procure from the Holy See a concordat which would make possible the appointment of Padre Meriño as Archbishop of Santo Domingo.

Cabral's resultant loss of prestige, cleverly seized upon by the supporters of Baez as a means of spreading dissatisfaction with the Government, was rendered far more

[1] Secretary Seward to Mr. Somers Smith, July 1, 1867.
[2] Appendix "A."

serious by the fact that in the spring of 1867, the Go
ernment of President Geffrard of Haiti, upon whose su
port Cabral had counted to prevent the outbreak of rev
lutionary disturbances along the Haitian frontier, h
been overthrown by General Salnave, known to be
connivance with Baez. As soon as Salnave came in
power, the Haitian Government not only permitted t
return to Haitian territory of military leaders of t
Baez party, but actually lent the "Reds" effective assis
ance by placing at their disposal arms, money and amm
nition. In Cape Haitien, General Valentín Ramirez Ba
soon established his headquarters, and, gathering a co
siderable number of revolutionary troops, commenced
series of attacks against the Governmental forces ne
Monte Cristi. These disturbances, which included an u
successful attempt to land an expeditionary force con
posed largely of foreign filibusterers near Monte Cristi
the month of July, succeeded in convincing Preside
Cabral that should he desire to remain in the Governme
he must either enter into an arrangement with Salna
which would make impossible a continuation of t
attacks from the Haitian frontier, or else attempt
resume the interrupted negotiations with the Unit
States. Fearing, as it later was made evident, unnece
sarily, the opposition which had broken out against t
negotiations with the United States, Cabral determin
upon the former alternative as the lesser of two evi
Agreeing to enter into a pact with the Haitian Gover
ment for mutual support, Cabral consented to receive
delegation from Salnave headed by L'Instant Pradine a
General Ultime LaFontant, and on July 27, 1867, as t
result of negotiations between the members of the Haiti
mission and the commissioners appointed by the Domi

an President, a convention was signed providing for perpetual peace between the two Republics, for the mutual obligation to extirpate revolutionary activities, and for the settlement in general of all outstanding issues between the two countries. The significant feature of the convention was, however, contained in the fifth article, which read as follows:

"Both Contracting Parties assume the obligation to maintain with all their strength and power the integrity of their respective territories, and not to cede, pledge or alienate in favor of any foreign power either the whole or any part of their territories or of the islands adjacent to them."

The continuation of Salnave's open support of Baez brought Cabral speedily to an exact appreciation of the insincerity of the Haitian Government, and despatching a vessel to Jacmel to bring back his diplomatic agent, who had already commenced his journey to Port-au-Prince to exchange there the ratifications of the convention signed in Santo Domingo, Cabral reversed his policy completely, even authorizing the Commander-in-Chief of the Dominican forces to march to the frontier to render support to the Haitian faction which was opposing the government formed by Salnave.

But even at this point, with the revolution against his Government spreading throughout the Republic and the financial resources of his administration at their lowest ebb, Cabral was still reluctant to resume the attempt to obtain assistance from the United States. He preferred to seek financial assistance in Europe. An agent, Jacobo Herrera, sent to France for the purpose by Cabral, succeeded in obtaining an agreement from the banking house

of Emile Erlanger and Company of Paris, on November 1
1867, by which the French company was entrusted wi
the flotation of a loan to net 10,000,000 francs. Th
Dominican Government was to mortgage the entire cu
toms receipts of the Republic as collateral for the loa
Erlanger and Company to receive a commission payab
over a period of twenty-four years of approximately 16
for their share in the project. Cabral's attempt to obta
financial assistance in this manner, however, was fru
trated by the opposition of the Congress, which refus
its consent to the agreement negotiated.

Cabral now realized that his sole hope lay in the Unit
States. Early in November, by instruction of the Pre
dent, his envoy, Don Ramón Fiallo, requested the Amer
can Commercial Agent to ascertain whether Secreta
Seward would be inclined to renew negotiations for t
lease of Samaná. This tardy decision of the President w
likewise due in large part to the constant propaganda
the more important political leaders in the Cibao, wh
dreaded the return of Baez to the Presidency, and co
tinually urged the President not to lose the "opportuni
to obtain the civilizing current which might turn towar
the country should the North American Nation obtain
foothold in the Peninsula of Samaná." Cabral was st
hesitant in reaching any final decision as to the offers
be made to the American Government until he obtain
definite assurances from Generals Luperón and Pimen
and General Gaspar Polanco that they would support t
proposal. Upon receiving the confirmation which he d
sired, after the increasing spread of the revolution h
necessitated the declaration of martial law, Cabral,
December 7th, instructed General Pujol, who had be
from the outset one of the sturdiest supporters of t

American project, to proceed to Washington to negotiate the lease of Samaná. Pujol started upon his mission strengthened by the fact that the leaders in twelve of the principal towns of the Cibao had addressed a public letter to the President informing him that the situation was desperate and stating their opinion that unless the Government made an immediate proposal acceptable to the United States, anarchy might ensue throughout the Republic; and by the fact that the early opposition in the Congress to the project had been modified to such a degree that the Congress had confirmed by a large majority his appointment to negotiate in Washington the agreement now generally regarded as desirable by the "Blue" factions.

Secretary Seward, sceptical by reason of the failure of the former negotiations, was not inclined to view their resumption with optimism. He had been incensed at the proclamation issued by Cabral the previous summer which officially declared that the Dominican Government had no intention of negotiating the transfer of Samaná to the United States; and was still more indignant because of the "very extraordinary agreement with Haiti," as Seward termed it, which virtually made public the unwillingness of the Dominican Republic to agree to any of the proposals hitherto made by the United States. In instructions to Mr. Smith, as soon as he learned of the approaching visit to Washington of General Pujol, the Secretary of State announced that it would not be compatible with the self-respect of the American Government to discuss the matter further, unless he were first furnished with authentic evidence that the Government of the Dominican Republic had given their agent full powers to negotiate in its behalf; and that even so, the situation had now changed and the United States could not con-

sent to be a tenant to another foreign Power, since Cabral convention with Haiti, although not ratified, indicate the concurrence of the Dominican Government in the ol Haitian contention that Haiti was directly concerned i any concession made of Dominican territory. Seward conclusion was frankly aggrieved:

"I do not doubt that the Government of the Dominica Republic will soon come to the conviction that a transf by that Government of the Peninsula of Samaná to th United States would have been a harbinger of indepen dence and prosperity instead of a danger to that Republi I regret only that this conviction will come so late. Th independent States in the West Indies, in Central Ameri and South America will, in every case, find jealousy of th United States a policy less injurious to the United Stat than unfavorable to their own security and welfare." [1]

On the 8th of January, 1868, Pujol commenced h negotiations in Washington, communicating the bas agreed upon in principle by the Dominican Governmen In the proposal so tendered it was stipulated that th territory desired by the United States might only leased, but that the lease might run for a period between twenty and fifty years, the United States obtai ing "perfect and exclusive sovereignty and jurisdicti throughout that time over the territories and waters abo mentioned." In return therefor, the United States Go ernment was to pay "one million silver dollars down an $300,000 in cash every year during the time the lea might last, as well as such arms and ammunition as we later to be agreed upon, and was likewise to obligate itse to sustain the autonomy of the Dominican Republic, an

[1] Secretary Seward to Mr. J. Somers Smith, Commercial Agent, December 1867.

the integrity of its territory, should any difficulties arise with foreign nations in consequence of such agreement." Ten days later, having received in the meanwhile the counter proposals advanced by Secretary Seward, General Pujol agreed that the lease be extended to cover a period of ninety-nine years, and consented to reduce the total amount of the compensation demanded to the sum of $2,000,000, agreeing to submit any difficulty which might arise regarding the interpretation of the proposed treaty to the determination of the Supreme Court of the United States. On January 20th, Seward replied insisting that the amount of the rental be limited to $1,000,000 in cash and $1,000,000 in armaments, but expressed his willingness to request the United States Senate, in view of the political situation in the Dominican Republic, to agree that $200,000 be paid upon the signing of the treaty and its ratification by the United States Senate, prior to its ratification by the Constitutional authorities in the Dominican Republic. On the following day, the terms fixed by the Secretary of State were accepted by General Pujol on condition that they be likewise approved by the United States Senate.

Although the negotiations in Washington were proceeding with considerable rapidity, Cabral had delayed too long to make any assistance from the United States effective in preventing the overthrow of his own Government. By the beginning of January, 1868, the situation of his administration had become desperate. In the north, General Luperón and General Pimentel, discouraged by the lack of support which they had received from the capital, were obliged to give in before the increasing strength of the revolutionaries, and escaped from the Cibao. In the south, the rebellion had shattered the resist-

ance of the Government and the "Red" forces had su
ceeded in occupying the territory adjacent to the capit
including Baní and San Cristóbal. In December, a Pr
visional Government of the "Reds" had been installed
Santiago under the leadership of General Hungría, a
by the end of January the authority of Cabral had be
reduced to the uncertain control of the capital itse
The American Commercial Agent had by now little ho
that the Government of Cabral could maintain itself
power. His reports during the month of January ma
the situation plain:

"The greater part of the country have pronounc
against the Government, but the Government still hol
the Capital and its environments. The troops station
without the City were called into the Capital on Janua
3d and on that night the insurgents commenced an occ
sional scattering fire which was replied to from the wa
General Pimentel has arrived and will probably be ma
Commander in Chief of the army. The Dominic
schooner of war *Capotillo* has been captured by a Haiti
war steamer near Monte Cristi, this proceeding being d
to the Dominican negotiations respecting Samaná. Th
undoubtedly exists a perfect understanding between Pre
dent Salnave and General Baez to overthrow Cabr
Government, to sell Samaná and divide the money." [1]

Finally, having lost all hope of being able to sustain
Government through its own resources, and failing
receive any word from Pujol that an agreement had be
reached in Washington, Cabral determined to capitula

"On January 21st, Santo Domingo surrendered to
opposition army. No word being received from Señ

[1] Mr. Somers Smith, to Secretary Seward, January 6, 1868.

Pujol, General Cabral lost hope, the appearance of an epidemic of cholera at the same time causing many of the Government troops to desert. Generals Cabral and Pinentel, together with about 150 of the wealthier citizens of the Capital, embarked for Puerto Cabello, Venezuela, and the besieging army took possession of the City today." [1]

8.

On February 12th, General Hungría, the head of the Santiago Provisional Government, arrived in Santo Domingo. His Cabinet resigned three days later owing to the distaste of its members for the policy of persecution initiated by the revolutionary generals. Thereupon a Triumvirate composed of Generals Hungría, Gomez and Luciano was installed, which inaugurated the new régime by casting 100 political prisoners into the jail in the fortress of the capital. Enheartened doubtless by official congratulations from the Haitian Government upon the success of the revolution in overthrowing General Cabral, who "had endeavored to dispose of part of the national territory to foreigners," the Triumvirate sent to Curaçao to bring Baez to the country.

On March 29th, Baez returned once more to Santo Domingo, where he was welcomed with every manifestation of apparent popular delight. He was finally inaugurated on May 2d as President of the Republic, an office which, he announced, he had chosen in preference to that of Dictator, offered to him by the National Assembly. He condescended to accept, however, with every sign of gratification, the title of "Great Citizen" which the Assembly thrust upon him "in the name of a grateful country."

Even before his inauguration, Baez spared no efforts to

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, February 1, 1868.

make it evident that he would be glad to negotiate imm diately the lease of the territory of Samaná in accordan with the terms agreed upon by Secretary Seward wi Cabral's representative. He made it plain that he co sented to go still further, instructing one of his satellit Don Felix Maria Delmonte, to advise the American Cor mercial Agent, for the information of Secretary Sewar that he would raise no objection even to the sale of t whole Peninsula of Samaná, since the unconditional ce sion would doubtless reap a far greater financial rewar and with no greater risk attached to himself. He mere stipulated his hope that, in the latter event, the Unit States would despatch men of war to Santo Domingo a to Puerto Plata to support his Government.

With the change of Government in the Republic, t activities of General Cazneau and his partner, Colo Fabens, were redoubled. Before Baez reassumed the Pre dency, Fabens had reached Washington charged with t double mission of representing Baez and General Cazne In the letter of introduction with which the latter h provided him, General Cazneau informed the Secreta of State that Colonel Fabens bore with him "a plan f the complete realization of your patriotic and compr hensive views for the advancement of American intere in these seas." General Cazneau was almost exuberant his optimism, assuring the Secretary that he was

"fully convinced that if the negotiations be carried o with General Baez and the protection of our flag be e tended over any portion of this country, it will not on be hailed with joy and gratitude here but will give to o country a new and extended field for enterprise and a ve prolific source of national wealth."

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Seward, April 17, 1868.

The precarious conditions under which he returned to the Presidency could not be ignored by Baez. With his customary cynicism, he had replied to the words of the President of the National Convention when he informed the "Great Citizen" that

"the majority of the Dominicans believed that with his knowledge, his patriotism, and the coöperation of all good citizens, he would carry out with glory his difficult task and the acts of his administration would distinguish it from the preceding government by the august seal of justice,"

with the statement that he was returning to the Presidency

"without hate in his heart, without gall on his lips, to submit himself once more to the crushing burden which he must assume on Dominican soil, desirous solely of making one last attempt to save his country from its imminent ruin."

The "imminent ruin" which Baez foresaw was not that of his country, which never caused him concern, but the crumbling of his own life-long ambitions, since he realized fully that without support, which he could not find within the confines of Dominican territory, it would be impossible for him to control much longer the followers whom he had so often hoodwinked by the specious promise that his own return to power would bring with it for them days of peace and prosperity. To his limited vision, of which the scope had not widened with the years, although his native shrewdness had been sharpened by the vicissitudes he had undergone, only one resource presented itself, the resource which he had devised in 1843. This solution in another guise was now pressed upon him

by Cazneau and his associate, who had small difficulty convincing Baez that a closer connection with the Unit States would, in all probability, make it possible for hi to regain a preponderant influence in domestic affairs, a at the same time would assuredly, in any event, perm him to share in the profits which would be realized shou the protection of the United States be extended ov Dominican lands, and thereby make feasible the lucrati sale of concessions in return for good American mone

The solution determined upon by Baez was identical that reached by Santana seven years before. He dete mined to follow meticulously the precedent set by h great rival against which he had so long inveighed pu licly and privately. The barren state of the nation treasury, the ruin of commerce in the Republic, of whi the determination of the Government to fix the value Dominican paper at 400 to one silver dollar gave e quent proof, the early rise of concerted rebellion ma evident by the engagements resulting from Cabral's pr ence in the frontier Provinces, quickened the Presiden decision. Within six days after his inauguration, Ba again despatched Delmonte, now Minister for Forei Affairs, to the American Commercial Agent to tell h officially that the President had determined to accept t proposals made by the American Government for t purchase of the Samaná Peninsula and the waters Samaná Bay. At the same time agents were sent abro to attempt to obtain a loan to furnish the funds urgent required by the Government until such time as a defin agreement could be reached with the American Gover ment.

For the time being, no definite response was obtain from Seward, who was by no means ignorant of t

unsettled condition of the Republic. Although Baez had announced his determination to refuse the office of Dictator, which the National Convention had tendered him, and had confirmed his refusal by a decree issued on May 18th declaring officially his intention solely to govern as a Constitutional President, his early actions gave the lie to his public assurances, in the opinion of the Commercial Agent.[1]

"As to this country at present being a Republic, it is so only in name. Baez exercises despotic powers."

Persecutions, decrees of exile, imprisonments and executions were constant. For this policy the activities of the leading generals of the "Blue" party gave the President the needed excuse. Before the end of May, General Cabral had already entered Dominican territory from Jacmel, in Haiti. General Luperón and General Pimentel were daily expected to invade the north of the Republic. In the Seybo, revolution had been proclaimed by General Manzueta, and even in Azua rebellion threatened to break out at any moment, notwithstanding the presence in the Province of the President's relatives, Cárlos Baez and General Valentín Ramírez Baez, at the head of a considerable number of Governmental troops. In Haiti, the instability of the Government of Salnave, whose fortunes had been linked with those of Baez, gave cause for constant alarm lest the increasing activities of the Haitian revolutionists headed by Nissage Saget, who had openly espoused the cause of the "Blue" party in the Dominican Republic, might result in the overthrow of Salnave and the creation in Haiti of a government bitterly hostile to Baez and his partisans.

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, May 18, 1868.

9.

Consequently, on June 9th, urged on by Gener Cazneau, and feeling sure that the refusal of the Unite States Senate to ratify the treaty for the purchase of th Danish West Indies would induce the American Secretar of State to take renewed interest in the Samaná projec Baez once more sent his Minister, Delmonte, to th American Commercial Agent. The proposals now ten dered were more extensive than those made the precedin month, and conveyed in great detail. Baez now declare that his Government was prepared to sell the Peninsu and Bay of Samaná for $1,000,000 in gold and $1,000,00 in armaments; he suggested that full powers be sent the Commercial Agent in Santo Domingo to sign a con vention which he also suggested might well be prepar by the American Secretary of State himself; and final requested that three vessels of war be despatched the Dominican Republic, one to remain in Santo D mingo, one in Puerto Plata, and one in Samaná, to su tain his Government until the sale had been consum mated. The hope was likewise expressed that th American Government might be willing to advance least a few thousand dollars upon the ratification by th Dominican Government of the convention, to provi for the pressing needs of the Administration. This reque was made orally, since Baez feared that should the Unit States decline the proposal, and the matter be ma public, it would prove seriously prejudicial to his ov interests.

While awaiting Seward's decision, Baez attempted strengthen his own position temporarily by the public tion of arbitrary decrees declaring that any revolutio

ıries landing upon Dominican soil would be shot if cap-
ured, and that any vessels bearing them which might be
aken by Government ships would be confiscated. Re-
trictions upon personal liberty were at the same time
nade far more stringent, the Government going to the
xtreme of forbidding all Dominican citizens to enter
oreign Consulates no matter what their business might
e. To such an extent was this latter regulation enforced
hat even the domestic servants of the foreign Consuls
were not permitted to enter the Consulates without special
permits signed by the President himself. More concerned,
as each day passed, by the inability of his Government to
maintain order, Baez finally sent for the American Com-
mercial Agent, in the early morning of July 18th, to
inform him that General Luperón had joined General
Cabral upon the Haitian frontier for the purpose of
assisting the Haitian revolutionaries in overthrowing the
Government of Salnave, and that in return therefor
Saget's generals had promised help to the leaders of the
"Blue" party in a subsequent attempt to overthrow Baez
as well, upon the understanding that there should be no
alienation of Dominican territory once this had been
accomplished. Hoping to expedite negotiations by utiliz-
ing the knowledge he had gained from Cazneau of Secre-
tary Seward's fear of a repeated attempt by the Euro-
pean Powers to infringe the Monroe Doctrine, Baez de-
clared that should the United States provide him with
moral and material support in maintaining his own Gov-
ernment, the sale of Samaná could be carried out at once,
and the question of the compensation therefor, which
depended, as he realized, upon the consent of the United
States Senate, be postponed for future determination; but
hat should the United States refuse to accede to his pro-

posal, he would be obliged to make similar proposals eith
to England, France or Spain.

Notwithstanding the efforts of Baez to preserve enti
secrecy regarding his proposals to the American Goverr
ment, the fact that such propositions had been made w
soon generally known. The Department of State was
once flooded with protests. Among the first of them w
a protest dated August 1, 1868, which had been signe
at Guayubín by Generals Pimentel, Imbert, and Valer
and by Luperón's brilliant lieutenant, Ulises Heureau
denouncing the sale of Samaná, and calling Seward's atter
tion to the fact that General Baez had already bee
declared an outlaw by the chiefs of the revolution. Th
protest was further confirmed by General Luperón hir
self, who wrote to Secretary Seward from Jacmel
August 9th, declaring that the Dominicans had knowled
of the fact that Baez had sent Colonel Fabens to Wash
ington to negotiate the sale of Samaná, and expressed th
hope that the Cabinet at Washington would "scornfull
reject the rash proposals of Baez and Fabens." Luperón
protest likewise contained the warning that the party
which he declared himself the head would recognize r
act of the Dominican Government carried out subseque
to January 31, 1868.

Paying small heed to the protests with which he w
showered both from within and without the Unite
States against the annexation of any portion of th
Dominican territory, Secretary Seward finally advised th
American Commercial Agent that the proposals of th
Dominican President would be held under consideratio
and although he had been warned by Mr. Smith th
"the speculative characters of Cazneau and Fabens a
well known not only here but in the United States" . .

and that

"they are not entitled to the least consideration on the part of our Government,"

the Secretary of State continued to correspond with Colonel Fabens, who had now been for some three months in the United States representing himself as the Confidential Agent of President Baez. Fabens missed no opportunity of rendering himself agreeable to the Administration. In one of his letters to the Secretary of State he informed him:

"You will be pleased to hear that the friends of Mr. O'Sullivan, who is now enroute to Santo Domingo for the purpose of making proposals to President Baez for the establishment of regular steam connection at the ports of that Island, have purchased two steamers for the line and are now fitting them up in good style for passengers . . . This, I hope, will be the beginning of many American enterprises which will raise to new life the dormant resources of that fertile and beautiful island." [1]

He concluded by saying that he had that day been instructed by President Baez to seek a suitable occasion "to congratulate President Johnson, in the name of President Baez, on the triumph of Constitutional principles shown in the result of the recent impeachment trial."

10.

Whether Secretary Seward's sympathies were warmed or not by this evidence of Baez's interest in the "triumph of Constitutional principles" in the United States, notwithstanding the Dominican's total disregard of them in

[1] Colonel Joseph W. Fabens to Secretary Seward, September 5, 1868.

his own country, his interest was finally aroused by
despatch received from the American Commercial Age
in the autumn of 1868.

In this despatch he was informed that the Preside
of the Dominican Republic desired the President of t
United States immediately to publish a decree placing t
Dominican Republic under the protection of the Unit
States, and to make the proclamation effective by sendi
vessels of war to take possession of all the strategic poi
in the Republic.[1] Such a measure, Baez wished Seward
know, would impart great confidence to the people of t
country and likewise to foreigners who might wish
settle there; and since the overthrow of the Monarchy
Spain might lead to fundamental changes in the stat
of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the proposed declaration mig
induce many Spaniards to remove from those islands
Santo Domingo once the Republic had been placed und
American protection. The assurance was offered by Pre
dent Baez that should a protectorate be proclaimed by t
United States, the Dominican Republic would at on
apply for admission into the Union.

"The United States," Mr. Smith concluded, "are i
vited to take this Republic under their protection a
pave the way for annexation by Mr. Baez, who, althou
President in name, is virtually clothed with dictator
powers."

This despatch brought forth at length a definite stat
ment from Secretary Seward: [2]

"I have received," he wrote, "your very important co
fidential despatch of the 24th of October, last. You ha

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, October 24, 1868.
[2] Secretary Seward to Mr. Somers Smith, November 17, 1868.

ommunicated to me certain views and wishes which have een expressed to you by President Baez and by his con- dential Minister, Felix Delmonte. These views and desires re, substantially, that the United States shall immediately ublish a declaration placing the Dominican Republic nder the protection of the United States and shall sustain he proclamation by sending vessels of war to take posses- ion of Samaná and Manzanillo Bays and any other points hat military strategy may indicate and thus pave the way o annexation to the United States by Mr. Baez, who, lthough President by name, is virtually clothed with ictatorial powers. You have given me the considerations ut of which these views have arisen . . .

"President Baez and his Minister cannot be unaware hat the proceeding which they propose, however benevo- ent its purpose might be, would nevertheless in its nature e an act of war, and that as such it transcends the power f the Executive Government and falls within the exclu- ive province of Congress.

"In submitting such a proceeding to the judgment of nankind, it would be difficult to distinguish it from the ttempt which was made during our recent Civil War by pain to re-annex the Dominican Republic to her own ominions by means of an illegal arrangement made be- ween the Spanish Government and Santana, then Presi- ent of the Republic. There would, indeed, be this differ- nce that in the case proposed by President Baez the Dominican Republic would be virtually transferred to and ccepted by an American Republic whereas in the other ase it was an attempt to subvert a republican Santo Do- ningo and annex it as a province to one of the ancient European Monarchies.

"It may be doubted whether this distinction would be egarded as a moral justification of the proceedings.

"If, however, we lay that question aside, there still re-

main inherent difficulties in the case. To establish the pr
tectorate in Santo Domingo would be virtually annex
tion by act of war, not by the consent and agreeme
of the people of the Dominican Republic. The Congr
of the United States are always disinclined to forei
military conquests, perhaps more so now than at any tir
heretofore. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Congr
would entertain any other proposition for the annexati
of Dominica than one which should originate with a
have the sanction of the Dominican people, expressed
a regular Constitutional manner. Nevertheless, the subje
is a very important one and I reserve further considerati
of it until Congress shall have assembled, which will
on the first Monday in December.

"You may read this despatch confidentially to Preside
Baez and his Secretary."

To Baez the scruples of Secretary Seward must ha
appeared difficult of comprehension. Brushing them asi
he declared that his Government was prepared to obta
a national declaration in favour of annexation by popul
vote or by acclamation, or in any form that the Unit
States might indicate. But,

"It is necessary, however," and this consideration w
evidently far more important, "that the United States se
out to this City at once a vessel of war with a conventi
and the sum of $300,000." [1]

Whatever the doubts may have been which had ori
inally existed in Seward's mind as to the justification
acceding to the proposals made from Santo Domingo, a
in thus sanctioning the perpetration by the United Sta
of a fraud against which he had violently protested wh

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, December 19, 1868.

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t had been committed by Spain, it is certain that those loubts were overcome. It is equally certain that they were ıot overcome through any illusion that the will of the Dominican people could be any more fully expressed ınder the rule of Baez than it had been under that of Santana.

It is probable that the Secretary of State, smarting ınder the humiliations which the United States had suf-ered throughout the Civil War in the contemptuous dis-egard shown by Europe for a policy which it was lestined to resent for many years longer, had come to the conclusion that benefits arising from the rehabilitation of he Monroe Doctrine were of greater import to the American continent than was the evil occasioned by the proposed disregard for the "right of self-determination" of the smaller nations of that continent. The reaffirma-ion of the preponderant influence of the United States n the American continent had been Seward's chief pur-ose in remaining in Johnson's Cabinet, and to the chievement of that ideal his failing powers had been ledicated. In the carrying out of his determination he ıad been in great measure successful notwithstanding the obstacle presented by the complete breach in the relations etween the President and Congress. Alaska had been pur-hased from Russia; republican government had been re-stablished in Mexico; the treaty right had been obtained rom Nicaragua for the construction of an interoceanic anal. By all of these achievements the danger of the ncrease of European influence on the continent had been reatly diminished. But the keystone of his policy, the cquisition of a coaling and naval station in the West ndies, the strategic value of which at that time appeared onvincing to both military and naval authorities, Seward

had failed to secure. For the Senate, owing to its bitt hostility to the President, had resolutely refused to ratif the Danish treaty for the purchase of the Danish We Indies.

Presumably the disappointments to which he was ex posed by the attitude of the Senate were responsible some degree for the startling changes which Seward policy at length underwent. From his original, far-sighte and logical view that the prevention of the increase European dominion in the American continent, and th ultimate withdrawal of European Powers from Americ was, for the United States, a basic policy, grounded the need for self-preservation, he swiftly increased th scope of the doctrine to one of frank and radical expan sionism. His latter convictions were made known in the ex traordinary message sent to Congress by President Johnso on December 9, 1868, less than a month after Sewa received the final version of the Dominican proposals:

"The political and social condition of the Republics Haiti and St. Domingo is very unsatisfactory and painfu The abolition of slavery, which has been carried into effe throughout the island of St. Domingo and the entire We Indies, except the Spanish islands of Cuba and Porto Ric has been followed by a profound popular conviction of t rightfulness of republican institutions and an intense desi to secure them. The attempt, however, to establish r publics there encounters many obstacles, most of whi may be supposed to result from long-indulged habits colonial supineness and dependence upon Europe monarchical powers. While the United States have on occasions professed a decided unwillingness that any pa of this continent or of its adjacent islands shall be ma a theatre for a new establishment of monarchical pow

oo little has been done by us, on the other hand, to attach he communities by which we are surrounded to our own ountry, or to lend even a moral support to the efforts they re so resolutely and so constantly making to secure repub- ican institutions for themselves. . . .

"Comprehensive national policy would seem to sanction he acquisition and incorporation into our Federal Union f the several adjacent continental and insular com- nunities as speedily as it can be done peacefully, lawfully, nd without any violation of national justice, faith, or onor. Foreign possession or control of those communities as hitherto hindered the growth and impaired the influ- nce of the United States. Chronic revolution and anarchy here would be equally injurious. Each one of them, when irmly established as an independent republic, or when ncorporated into the United States, would be a new source f strength and power. . . .

"It can not be long before it will become necessary for his Government to lend some effective aid to the solution f the political and social problems which are continually ept before the world by the two Republics of the island f St. Domingo, and which are now disclosing themselves nore distinctly than heretofore in the island of Cuba. The ubject is commended to your consideration with all the nore earnestness because I am satisfied that the time has rrived when even so direct a proceeding as a proposition f an annexation of the two Republics of the island of St. Domingo would not only receive the consent of the people nterested, but would give satisfaction to all other foreign ations.

"I am aware that upon the question of further extend- ng our possessions it is apprehended by some that our olitical system can not successfully be applied to an area nore extended than our continent; but the conviction is apidly gaining ground in the American mind that with

the increased facilities for intercommunication between
portions of the earth the principles of free government,
embraced in our Constitution, if faithfully maintain
and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength a
breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influen
the civilized nations of the world." [1]

A letter was at once addressed by Baez and his Cabin
to the President of the United States expressing their pr
found gratification:

"Most Excellent Sir:

"The Government of the Dominican Republic fe
ineffable satisfaction at the ideas expressed by Your E
cellency in your last message to Congress in relation to t
great political measure that ought to be adopted imm
diately by the Cabinet at Washington with reference
the future of Santo Domingo.

"We have the honor to say to Your Excellency that t
sentiments of a nation were never so well interpreted
they were on that occasion by Your Excellency and th
such are the sentiments of an immense majority of t
inhabitants of our country, which has been depleted t
long by the oppression of anarchy.

"Your idea is preferable to any other policy for t
country, as it is highly honorable and is very acceptal
to all our people whose hopes and desires are to place the
selves under the protection of a powerful sister republ

"If the honorable Congress will assume the direction
the destinies of the Dominican Republic, we, its peop
will hasten to show our gratitude by a frank and op
ratification of the Resolution.

"Your Excellency will please accept the sentiments
high consideration, etc., etc.," [2]

[1] President Johnson's Fourth Annual Message to Congress, December 9, 1868
[2] President Buenaventura Baez to President Johnson, January 8, 1869.

Thus encouraged, Baez considered the possibility, as he informed the American Commercial Agent,[1] of causing the authorities in the different provinces of the Republic immediately to hoist the American flag, and to proclaim by acclamation that they placed themselves under the Government of the United States. Although Baez was advised by Mr. Smith "to wait a little," matters were further pressed by an official communication addressed to Seward by Don Manuel Maria Gautier, who had replaced Delmonte as Minister for Foreign Affairs, requesting that the protection of the United States be immediately extended to the Dominican Republic.

The hostility to President Johnson among the members of the United States Senate and in the House of Representatives was so great that Baez was constrained to realize that no definite steps could be taken until after the inauguration of General Grant. This impression was confirmed when, soon after the opening of Congress, General Nathaniel P. Banks, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, who had submitted a resolution authorizing the President of the United States, with the consent of the Dominican Republic, to extend protection to that Republic, obtained in support of his measure only forty votes. A further resolution, submitted on February 1st by Mr. Orth, a member of the same Committee, declaring the consent of Congress to the annexation of the Dominican Republic, with the consent of the people and Government of that Republic, had been tabled by a vote of 110 to 62. Notwithstanding the fact that Secretary Seward, in an instruction [2] to the American Commercial Agent for the advice of General Baez, had stated that the action of

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Seward, January 9, 1869.
[2] Secretary Seward to Mr. J. Somers Smith, February 5, 1869.

the majority in the House of Representatives had bee
due to the fact that the information in the possession
the movers of the resolutions, regarded as confidential b
the Department of State, had not been shared by th
majority of the members of Congress, Baez was force
to wait the short period intervening before the inaugur
tion of Grant before taking further action.

CHAPTER V

NEGOTIATIONS FOR ANNEXATION TO THE UNITED STATES

1.

THE Spring of 1869 found Baez confronted with domestic difficulties which appeared well-nigh insurmountable. The financial distress of the Government, which had scarcely been lessened by his recourse to his customary procedure in issuing paper, this time in the guise of "metallic bonds," soon depreciated to twenty cents on the dollar, Baez attempted to relieve by negotiation of a European loan. This loan, known as the Santo Domingo Government loan of 1869, was, Baez stated to the American Commercial Agent, merely a temporary measure to enable his Administration to maintain itself, pending the decision of the United States Government as to the course it would pursue with regard to the Dominican Republic.

The contract first provided for an advance of £757,700 sterling by a group of English bankers headed by Hartmont and Company, to be raised by the sale of Dominican national bonds to the public, or to friends of the syndicate, at prices ranging from 70 to 50 per cent of their nominal value, as the case might be. While Baez attempted to prove his unwillingness to mortgage unduly the resources of his country, by pointing out with pride that he had refused the insistent request of Hartmont to include in the loan contract a lease of the Bay of Samaná for fifty years, as a matter of fact the entire resources of the Republic, both real and hypothetical, were pledged, and the terms agreed to by the President were of so onerous a character as to be almost incredible. The terms of the contract specified that the bonds to be issued were to be redeemable at par

in cash after six months' notice, or at par by an accumu
lated sinking fund after twenty-five years by semi-annu
drawings;

"In addition thereto for repayment of the loan ar
interest thereon, being the first and only lien of the Stat
the general property and revenue of the Republic we
to be liable, and in addition thereto, the Government
the Dominican Republic specially hypothecated the enti
proceeds of the receipts of the export and import custon
dues of the ports of Santo Domingo and Puerto Plata . .
and in addition thereto the royalties produced from th
working and export of guano from the Island of Al
Vela. And the revenues arising from the coal and oth
mines and minerals as well as the mahogany and oth
woods from the forests of the Peninsula of Samaná we
specially hypothecated for the service of the loan." [1]

While the object of the Government in contracti
the loan was alleged to be its desire to secure the co
struction of highroads and railways, it was perfect
apparent to all that the prospectus was blatantly fal
since it was well recognized that Baez had not the slighte
intention of constructing either highroads or railwa
and desired to utilize the proceeeds of the loan solely f
the redemption of a portion of the outstanding paper cu
rency and thereafter for the personal needs of the mem
bers of his Government.

As the result of the intervention of the Senate, in th
instance less amenable than usual to the dictates of t
President, the original contract was later modified to c
the total amount of the loan down to £420,000 sterlin
but notwithstanding the attempt of the Senate further

[1] Mr. Somers Smith, Commercial Agent, to Secretary Fish, 1869.

modify the conditions originally agreed upon by the President's agents, the final contract, as it proved, provided that Hartmont and his associates were to receive "as a commission" £100,000 sterling, while the Government would obtain solely a possible cash advance of £320,000 sterling, and was bound to pay in return for that amount not only the sum of £58,900 annually for twenty-four years, but was likewise obligated to remit for the personal profit of Hartmont and the members of his syndicate, in addition to their original commission, an amount equivalent to the last interest payment due, as payment for "the first year's interest and the cancellation of the loan."

Confiding, apparently, in their belief that their outspoken and repeated protests against the realization of Baez's projects for annexation to the United States would render the incoming American Administration less inclined than its predecessor to further the ambitions of their antagonist, the leaders of the "Blue" party momentarily forgot their differences among themselves and renewed their activities in the early spring of 1869. Raising the cry that the consummation of the annexation to the United States would enslave the negroes in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, Generals Cabral, Luperón and Pablo Pujol entered into a joint agreement on March 11th at St. Marc, Haiti, under the benevolent auspices of the Haitian revolutionary leader, General Nissage Saget, providing for the continuation of joint support between the Haitian opponents of President Salnave and the leaders of the "Blue" party in the Dominican Republic. The pact was notable, moreover, in that its evident purpose was to prevent further discord between Cabral and Luperón in the event that the revolution which they were then

waging should prove successful, since it provided th
Cabral and Luperón were each to appoint executive junt
to determine upon a joint policy, the obligations incurre
by the two juntas to be subsequently recognized as oblig
tions of the Dominican Republic. The agreement furth
provided that General Luperón was to proceed to th
north to attempt to raise the standard of revolt again
Baez in the Cibao, while General Cabral was to continu
his operations in the south to strengthen the attac
against the Baez forces already initiated there by Gener
Andrés Ogando. While Cabral's attempt to increase th
authority of the revolution in the south proved gene
ally unsuccessful, the campaign of General Luperón,
was to be anticipated in view of his extraordinary qual
ties, was waged with far more vigour, and had it not bee
for the odds against him would presumably have met wit
success.

Gregorio Luperón, destined for some decades to play
preponderant part in determining the destinies of th
Republic, was in many ways a unique figure. A negr
born in Puerto Plata in the most humble circumstance
he had, by dint of strength of character and overpowerin
ambition, early obtained for himself a devoted followin
throughout the country. In the main self-educated, h
had acquired the rudiments of instruction at a missio
school in his native city, but his hold on the popul
imagination was due in the greatest part to the char
of his personality and to his unfaltering courage. Wha
Luperón has written of himself—

"No man has ever had more control over himself, mo
strength of will, nor more consistency in his ambitions" [1]

[1] Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. I, p. 82.

may appear to be a flash of almost childlike egotism, but an impartial study of his career will demonstrate that his self-estimate is not wholly unjustified; and while it may not be possible for the student of Dominican history to share to the full the other glowing appraisals which Luperón has written of himself, and one may deplore his venality and his unmasked jealousy of those who obtained the prizes on which his own heart was set, he still remains in his virility, his dominating love of liberty, and his unsurpassed valour, an attractive and at times an admirable figure throughout many dreary years when vacillation, self-interest and sordid ambitions appear to be the dominating characteristics of the Dominican scene.

Luperón had no illusions as to the ability of Cabral to maintain himself unaided against Baez. He moreover felt confident that were the opponents of the Baez Government to enter into a coalition the relatively small forces at the Government's disposal would necessarily have to be separated. For this reason he entered into the pact of St. Marc, but at no time had he any intention of identifying his own struggle for supremacy with the interests of Cabral whom he later termed, in no uncertain phrase, "narrow-minded, stupid and egotistical." [1]

Having purchased through his agents in St. Thomas a small steamer of some 500 tons, which as the *Redbird* had seen service as a blockade runner during the American Civil War, the steamer was re-christened the *Telégrafo,* and raising the American flag, Luperón sailed thereon with forty-five companions from St. Thomas about the middle of May. When the *Telégrafo* appeared in the port of Puerto Plata on June 1st, the Government forces were taken by surprise and for two days

[1] Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. II, p. 127.

the city underwent a hot bombardment. Realizing, how ever, that the approach of additional Government forc made it impossible for him to maintain his position, Lu perón steamed to Samaná. There he was disheartened t find the populace of the Province were reluctant t acclaim the revolutionary manifesto addressed to them and after intermittent fighting extending over man days, the *Telégrafo* was overtaken by two Govern ment schooners towed into position by the steame *Tybee,* an American vessel owned by the firm of Spof ford, Tileston & Company, of New York, which was run ning from New York to Santo Domingo, under a lucrativ concession granted some time previously by Baez. In th engagement which ensued, several shots from the *Tel grafo* grazed the American steamer, and heeding th counsel of his friends Luperón fled to the southern coa of the Republic, disembarking his forces to harry th Governmental authorities at Baní and Azua, and finall bringing an end to the expedition at Barahona, where th persistent refusal of Cabral to agree upon a joint plan c campaign obliged Luperón to abandon his original projec and to despatch the *Telégrafo* to the Island of Tor tola, where it was eventually sold.

2.

The spring of 1869 brought with it likewise, with th inauguration of General Grant, a new era in Washing ton—an era when the standards of honesty and decenc in government were to sink lower than they had eve sunk before, or have ever been destined since to sink From all parts of the country the lobbyists, the spoilsmen the concession hunters, the seekers of special privileg came flocking in. The President, unfitted by prior exper

nce to meet the exigencies of the situation, surrounded imself in the White House with a clique of officers who ad seen service with him, and upon whom he relied, and vith the members of a Cabinet composed, with but few xceptions, of as inefficient and untrustworthy officers as ave probably ever been appointed to an American Cabi- et. Unfortunately for his own good name, and still more nfortunately for the repute of the Government, the ndividuals upon whom General Grant most relied were oo frequently broken reeds. Only a few weeks had passed efore the rumour of corruption was rife, and the rumour vas destined to grow in extent until successive storms roke in the scandals of "Black Friday," of the "crédit nobilier," and of the "whiskey ring."

In such an atmosphere and amongst such surroundings he hopes and ambitions of Colonel Fabens were bound o prosper. Through his connections in New York an in- roduction to the President was secured. In addition to is immediate attempt to interest General Grant in the roject to annex the Dominican Republic, Fabens gained vithout delay the coöperation of the Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, who had replaced Secretary Seward on March 4th. As early as March 9th, Colonel Fabens ob- ained an interview with Secretary Fish and left with him memorandum which contained the following salient oints:

"The Dominican Government is disposed to enter fully nto the American Union as a free and sovereign state and prepared to assert that the question when submitted to he people will be approved with enthusiasm. Nevertheless cannot take the initiative. It appears most suitable that he United States Congress, advised of the true situation

of the Dominican Republic, should accept the Dominica Republic as one of its states;"

and doubtless recalling his own successful efforts at in perialism in the past, indicated that the Secretary of Sta should take

"The act providing for the annexation of Texas as model . . . This done, the execution of all that remai depends solely on the time which the President of t United States may take to place the Dominican Gover ment in a position to make a formal declaration."

Within a few days General Banks, the Chairman of t House Committee on Foreign Affairs, whose sympat Colonel Fabens had already gained some months prev ously, requested that Colonel Fabens be despatched Santo Domingo to draft a report for the benefit of t members of the Committee upon the financial and poli cal condition of the Republic. Colonel Fabens, to preser appearances, actually made the voyage, but remained Santo Domingo barely thirty-six hours, and upon return to Washington presented the Chairman of t Committee with a report which had been prepared lo in advance alleging that the total indebtedness of t Dominican Republic was not more than $600,000, a impressed upon the Committee that the Dominican pe ple as one man were longing for annexation to the Unit States. Soon after his return to Washington Fabens aga communicated with Secretary Fish, urging that t United States take immediate action towards leasing a naval station such portions of the Bay and Peninsu of Samaná as might be required, and adding:

This can now be obtained of the Dominican Govern-ient at an annual cost of $100,000." [1]

Surprised by the apparent reluctance of the American overnment to take immediately the action urged upon , Baez caused his Minister for Foreign Affairs to address communication to Colonel Fabens to urge greater activ-y upon him. In his note to Fabens Gautier pointed out iat the situation of his Government was precarious in iat all the southern and western Provinces with the ex-eption of Azua were already in the control of the "Blue" aders, and that the revolutionary forces commanded by abral, Luperón, and Pimentel were rapidly gaining round. Gautier complained that no action was being iken in the United States regarding the lease of Samaná, ie proclamation of a protectorate, or the project of an-exation; that the Dominican Government had requested ie sending of a commissioner and two vessels of war; and rminated with the plea:

"The vessels of war have not arrived—neither has the ommissioner—why? We know not.

"Now then, on your return to the United States, seek method of conferring with President Grant and with s influential friends there and expound these views. The our is propitious and the favorable moment should not e lost." [2]

Stimulated to renewed energy by the complaints of his nployers, and more particularly by the fact that Presi-ent Salnave, emulating his ally in the Dominican Re-ublic, had despatched an envoy to Washington to pro-

[1] Colonel Joseph W. Fabens to Secretary Fish, April 21, 1869.
[2] Manuel Maria Gautier to Colonel Joseph W. Fabens, June 22, 1869.

pose the cession to the United States of the Môle S
Nicolas, and by the alarming information that the rev
lution in the Dominican Republic had now spread to su
an extent that the "Blue" leaders had, by the end of Jun
obtained possession of San Cristóbal on one side of t
capital and of Los Llanos on the other, Colonel Fabe
advised the Secretary of State that should any more tin
be lost, the whole project which he had been sponsorin
might have to be abandoned.[1] Urging upon his attenti
the depredations of the steamer *Telégrafo* (official
declared by the Dominican Government on June 19th
be acts of piracy), and its reported interference wi
American shipping, Colonel Fabens, on July 9th, succeed
in having a conclusive interview with Secretary Fish. In
pressing upon the Secretary the fact that the busin
with which he had been entrusted by the Dominican Go
ernment was so secret that were publicity to be given
the negotiations for annexation they would be thwart
by the European Powers, Fabens expressed the hope th
some suitable person might be selected by President Gra
to proceed at once as Commissioner to Santo Doming
and suggested that the person so selected sail upon t
Tybee on the following 17th of July in order that th
agent might at once provide the Secretary with a bro
and accurate report of present conditions in the Islan
He himself was by no means reluctant to undertake t
mission, since he declared in a letter written to the Secr
tary upon the same date:

"In the matter of Samaná, if you will confide to me t
wishes of the United States Government I will use my b
efforts to aid in securing their acceptance by the D

[1] Colonel Joseph W. Fabens to Secretary Fish, July 1, 1869.

inican Government. Under all circumstances, you may ely upon my hearty co-operation in any plan you may ave to propose looking to the honor and welfare of the wo countries."

The persuasive arguments of Fabens were moreover upported by a communication received by the Secreary of State from his Dominican colleague:

"The enemies of peace and progress of the country, earful lest a change be made from this provisional state f affairs which favors so highly their shady projects, have nade every effort to overthrow this Government in which hey see a menace and a bar to their iniquitous plans. General Gregorio Luperón, a voluntary exile, a man of indictive spirit and very backward ideas, has declared hat the African race shall dominate in this Island and hat that race should unite in order to exterminate the ther races . . . In this situation, overcoming natural eluctance brought about by the idea of asking too much, ny Government has decided to ask most urgently of Your xcellency's Government that like a powerful and philanhropic sister it may be good enough to assist the Dominian Government in its difficulties.

"The acquisition of a steamer of 300 tons, with artillery, nunitions, and sufficient coal, would be our salvation, but ve could not obtain it except as the result of the munifience of the United States, which sending it immediately night be kind enough to await payment until better mes come along, which perhaps would not be far istant.

"I understand, Most Excellent Sir, that perhaps we are sking a great deal, but in the family of nations, as among ndividuals, there are relationships of proximity, of mutual nterest, of hope in the future, which make one their olitical and social necessities.

"His Excellency [Baez] hopefully believes that our so emn hope will not be defrauded and that this our reque will be granted." [1]

Persuaded of the advantages of the annexation projec as explained to him by Fabens, attracted by the glor which he imagined would ensue to his Administration b adding to the domains of the United States, and con vinced by the favourable reception given the propagand from the pen of Mrs. Cazneau and other interested pe sons which such influential papers as the New Yor *Herald* were publishing with increasing frequency tha public opinion was in accord with the opinions which h himself had formed, President Grant definitely com mitted himself to the annexation program.

The first step consisted in the issuance of instructio to the Secretary of the Navy to use the full power of th American Navy in capturing the *Telégrafo* and its re doubtable crew of forty-five revolutionaries commande by the "pirate" Luperón, and thus made immediately an practically evident the support which the Government o the United States intended to render Baez and his Admi istration. In accordance with these orders, the Secretar of the Navy, George N. Robeson, at once wrote the fo lowing despatch to Commander Owen of the U.S. *Seminole* to proceed immediately to capture the allege pirate:

"Navy Department, July 10, 1869.
"Sir:

"You will proceed without delay to the Bay of Samar in the Island of San Domingo and ascertain if there is steamer there present named the *Telegraph* under th

[1] Manuel Maria Gautier to Secretary Fish, July 9, 1869.

ommand of one Luperón or officers of his. This vessel has een interfering with American commerce and sailing pon the high seas without legal authority. You are irected to seize her and bring her in to the port of Balti- ıore . . . You will be particular to bring with the vessel ıe officers and crew and all papers found on board. ransfer a sufficient number of prisoners to your own essel to prevent re-capture. . . .

"If you do not find the vessel alluded to in Samaná Bay, arch for her along the coast until you find her. If she has allen into the hands of the Dominican Government or ıto the hands of a United States or English cruiser you ill touch at the several Dominican ports on your way to ey West, where you will proceed to report to Rear- dmiral H. K. Hoff for duty. . . ."

As the next step, in accordance with the urgent request f the agent of the Dominican President, General Grant nmediately selected one of his private secretaries, Gen- al Orville E. Babcock, as his Commissioner in the ominican Republic.

General Babcock was provided with full instructions y the Secretary of State:

"The President, deeming it advisable to employ a special gent to obtain information in regard to the Dominican reaty, has selected you for that purpose . . . You will ndeavor to obtain full and accurate information in regard o the disposition of the Government and people of the epublic toward the United States, the character of the overnment, whether it be military or civil, whether it be able or liable to be overthrown, . . . You will also ascer- in what the debt, foreign and domestic, of that Gov- rnment may be, how long it may have to run, the rate of terest, and where it is held . . . Generally, any informa-

tion tending to illustrate the condition and resources
that Republic and the character and influence of tho
charged with its destinies, will be acceptable." [1]

Sailing on the *Tybee,* whose owners, Spofford, Ti
ston & Company, had offered free passage to any Age
of the United States proceeding for the purpose of pr
curing the annexation of the country, General Babco
found himself accompanied by Colonel Fabens, anoth
American adventurer, Mr. O'Sullivan, and Senator Co
nelius Cole of California. He was welcomed with effusi
upon his arrival by General Cazneau who, in the words
the American Commercial Agent, together with Fabe
"never lost sight of him after his arrival." [2] General Ba
cock first proceeded to Azua, where Baez was engaged
military activities, and then returned to Santo Domin
where he was joined some ten days later by the Preside
During those ten days General Grant's Commissio
carefully abstained from obtaining any information fr
the Commercial Agent or from any other sources, limiti
himself to absorbing the projects expounded to him
his mentors, General Cazneau and Colonel Fabens.
such an extent did he become subject to their influen
that the plight of his fellow-citizen, Mr. Davis Hatc
who had been imprisoned and sentenced to death by Ge
eral Baez upon the ground that he had offered hospitali
to the revolutionary leaders when the *Telégrafo* p
in to Barahona, but in reality because of the represen
tions of Cazneau, whose enmity Hatch had incurred wh
he had prevented the confirmation of the latter's appoi

[1] Secretary Fish to General Orville E. Babcock, Brevet Brigadier-General,
13, 1869.
[2] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Fish, September 2, 1869.

ient as Minister Resident, left him indifferent, and he efrained from assisting the endeavours of the Amerian Commercial Agent in securing the release of the nprisoned American. The unwillingness of General Babock to agree to any move contrary to the desires of the artners, whose projects he found so attractive, went still irther. The U.S.S. *Tuscarora,* which arrived during ie course of General Babcock's visit to provide him, in ccordance with the phrase of Secretary Robeson, with the moral support of its guns," was requested by the Ameriin Commercial Agent to proceeed to Azua to endeavour o prevent the continued detention or at least the sumiary execution of Hatch. General Babcock refused, howver, to permit the vessel to proceed for this purpose, lleging as a ground for his refusal that he was convinced f Hatch's complicity in the revolution against Baez, and n particular that the Cabinet in Santo Domingo had ssured him that Hatch had attempted to mislead public pinion in the United States by openly opposing the roject of annexation.

When Baez finally returned to the capital he found the missary of General Grant entirely responsive to his deres. After brief discussions, at which Cazneau and Fabens ere invariably present, the former ostensibly as interreter and the latter as the friend of the Dominican Presient, a memorandum or protocol was signed by Don Ianuel Maria Gautier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, nd by General Babcock, to prevent, as the latter later leged, any subsequent divergence of opinion as to the greements reached by the representatives of the two overnments. The protocol contained the following unsual commitment on the part of an Agent of the Presient of the United States:

"Orville E. Babcock, aide-de-camp to His Excellenc General Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States America, and his Special Agent to the Dominican R public, contracted and agreed in the name and on beha of the President that he should use all his influence wi the members of Congress to popularize the idea of anne ing the Dominican Republic to the United States and th he would withhold from them all official communicatic on the subject until certain of its approval by a majority

The protocol further required the Government of t United States to remit forthwith to the Dominican Go ernment the sum of $150,000, $100,000 to be in cash a $50,000 in armaments. On September 6th, General Ba cock returned to the United States bearing with him t protocol, confident that his efforts would meet with t approbation of his chief.

In this he was not disappointed. Upon his return ascertained that President Grant and his Secretary of Sta were disposed to press the annexation proposal to a spee conclusion.

3.

As the first step in removing all persons from conne tion with the negotiations who might be suspected holding unfavourable opinions regarding the project, t American Commercial Agent in Santo Domingo was r called. He had been unwise enough to have reported to t Secretary of State that Cazneau and Fabens were "spec lators who stopped at nothing to bring about their ov selfish ends," referring to them as adventurers who we endeavouring to obtain the most valuable localities in t country, and to have remarked

"There has undoubtedly been a strong effort made he

to enlist the sympathies of our Government in favor of the Baez party and against the Cabral party, and if possible to entangle the United States in this revolutionary question. The better policy is not to interfere in the dissensions in this revolutionary country while the permanency of its government is so precarious. The prisons are filled with political offenders and several hundred of the most respectable men in this City are in exile." [1]

It was evident to Secretary Fish that an Agent more amenable would be a more useful tool in carrying out the policy determined upon by the President. His choice fell upon Major Raymond H. Perry, and the latter was, as Senator Carl Schurz later remarked, by one of those "absurd freaks of chance characteristic of our system of civil service, appointed Commercial Agent in Santo Domingo, which required just the opposite of the qualities he possessed," since the apex of Major Perry's ambitions had been his appointment as United States Marshal for the Western District of Texas. Major Perry had had a checkered career while in the army during the Civil War. As the result of one of the many "horse and mule cases," he had been tried by court-martial on charges of peculation and found guilty, and sentenced to be dishonourably discharged; but he had later been restored to active duty and at the close of the Civil War had received an honourable discharge. He had subsequently gone to Mexico where he had served in the ranks of the republicans against the Emperor Maximilian and later, under the orders of General Sheridan, had been on special duty in Louisiana and Texas.

In his instructions Major Perry was advised that General Babcock was to return to Santo Domingo to complete the final negotiation of the treaty of annexation, but that

[1] Mr. Somers Smith to Secretary Fish, September 2, 1869.

since, under the Constitution, General Babcock could no sign the treaty on behalf of the United States while he sti retained his rank in the United States Army, Major Perr was to sign the treaty as the President's Agent, althoug he was in all instances "to govern his course by the advic of General Babcock." The new Commercial Agent arrive in Santo Domingo on September 10th. Four days befor Perry's arrival, General Babcock's second set of offici instructions had been handed him by the Secretary o State. They were as follows:

"The President having directed you to meet Mr. Ray mond H. Perry in San Domingo and to advise with hi unofficially as to the execution of the powers with whic he is entrusted to conclude a treaty and a convention wit the Dominican Republic, and he also having furth directed you in case of the execution of such treaty an convention, then as an officer of the army of the Unite States to take steps to carry out the agreement of th United States contained in said treaty to protect the pe ple of that Republic against foreign interference whi the nation is expressing its will and also to protect th interest and rights which the United States may obta under such convention, I now place in your hands her with drafts of such a treaty and of such a convention the United States are prepared to enter into with th Republic . . . You will accordingly receive herewith . . a draft on New York for $100,000 and also a quantity arms and ammuntion valued at $50,000, of which schedule is annexed."

General Babcock was further advised that the Domin can Republic could not enter the Union as a State, sin the third section of the fourth article of the Constituti provided that new states might solely be admitted into t

nion by act of Congress, and the Dominican Republic ould therefore only be annexed as a territory. Moreover, ne loan contract known as the Hartmont loan was to e duly and legally cancelled and the amount of $50,000, eceived as an advance upon that loan by the Dominican overnment, was to be deducted from the sum of $150,000 ipulated by the draft treaty as the amount to be paid by ne United States to the Dominican Republic before any onvention or treaty was to be signed by the Dominican overnment. In conclusion, he was notified:

"The Navy Department will receive orders from the resident to place at your disposal in the harbor of San Domingo a force sufficient to enable the United States to omply with their agreement in the proposed treaty to rotect the Dominican Republic until the will of its people an be ascertained, and also to receive possession of the erritory and waters leased by the proposed convention to he United States. In case of the delivery to the Dominican Republic of the $150,000 and the execution of the pro-osed convention, the naval officer detailed for that pur-ose will proceed to Samaná Bay and take actual posses-ion of the lands, coasts, islands, waters, and property eased in the name of the United States. The President njoins that the fact and the object of your visit to San Domingo, as well as the provisions of the proposed instru-nents, are to be kept a secret as long as practicable." [1]

On November 18th, General Babcock appeared once nore in Santo Domingo, on the U.S.S. *Albany* accom-panied by General Ingalls and General Sackett. At the onferences which were at once undertaken with Don Manuel Maria Gautier, appointed as Commissioner by

[1] Secretary Fish to Orville E. Babcock, Brevet Brigadier-General, November 6, 869.

President Baez by a decree which stated that the appoin
ment was made as the result of the fact that

"Various individuals of importance and note, both
the provinces of the Cibao, as well as of the provinc
of the south, interpreting the sentiments and aspiratio
of the people, have splendidly manifested their desires th
the Dominican Republic join its destinies to those of t
United States of America,"

Cazneau and Fabens were once more invariably presen
For ten days the negotiations continued. At the latter co
ferences, Baez himself participated in the discussions.
the last moment a delay occurred, the American repr
sentatives being unable to ascertain the reasons for t
President's unexpected reluctance to sign the instrumen
upon the provisions of which they were apparently
accord. The difficulty was, however, soon cleared up, sinc
seizing an opportunity presented by the momentary a
sence of General Babcock, President Baez made the fo
lowing statement to General Sackett:

"I will tell you what we want. General Babcock w
very kind to us last summer. He sent Captain Queen wi
the *Tuscarora* to seize the *Telégrafo* and ran her into
place where she was tied up by the English . . . Aft
all of these things, showing great kindness on the pa
of General Babcock, we should like to make him a gra
of land in Samaná." [1]

Since Article VI of the proposed treaty provided that
further grants or concessions should be authorized sub
quent to its conclusion, Baez desired to tender this wort

[1] Howard's "Hatch-San Domingo Report."

compense before the opportunity for so doing should ave passed. While the offer of the President, when it was ommunicated to him, was rejected with great determina-on by General Babcock, his scruples did not prevent him om continuing his intimate association with Cazneau id Fabens, who had already procured the great majority f the concessions and grants authorized by the Domini-an Government, and who were in a better position to rovide President Grant's Agent with satisfactory com-ensation for his efforts than was the President of the Dominican Republic himself.

On November 29th, the treaty [1] of annexation was gned, as well as the convention [1] providing for the lease f the Bay and Peninsula of Samaná, which President Grant had determined would be ratified by the United tates Senate in the remote contingency, as he thought, hat the treaty of annexation was rejected.

The difficulties regarding the Hartmont loan were fully isposed of, in General Babcock's opinion, by the follow-ng communication which he received from President Baez n December 3rd:

"According to the best information which I have been ble to obtain relative to Mr. Hartmont's loan, I am con-inced that this gentleman is not in a situation to deliver he balance of the loan at the stipulated time, which is he 31st of this month.

"If, contrary to the information aforesaid, Mr. Hart-nont appear at the proper time with the money to fulfill is contract we shall receive it, refraining from making ny use of it until instructions reach us from Washington vith regard to the matter and until we know whether, in ase of our refusing to receive it, the Government of the

[1] Appendix "A."

United States will take upon itself the consequences
such refusal.

"As the contract for the loan expires on the 31st next,
is very important that a final resolution of the Gover
ment of the United States reach us before the 15th
January."

Oblivious of the fact that those interested in the Har
mont loan were now to become the most avid supporte
of the annexation project, since they realized that annex
tion would secure their speculation, while it was obvio
that any Dominican Government succeeding that of Ba
would be reluctant to abide by the usurious terms
the loan contract, General Babcock busied himself wi
thoroughgoing preparations to carry out the final steps
the annexation program. Proceeding immediately on t
steamship *Albany* to Samaná, he there took possessi
of the Province in the name of the United States. T
American flag was hoisted at Samaná and saluted by t
local authorities. Colonel Fabens was selected by Gene
Babcock to represent the United States in the town
Samaná, where he was entrusted with the custody of t
United States flag, and with various monies and propert
belonging to the American Government. The *Nantask*
was ordered to Jacmel, and its commander, Captain Bun
was instructed to proceed first to Puerto Plata, to f
upon the town in the event of any revolutionary outbre
against the Baez Government, and to inform the Haiti
authorities at Jacmel subsequently, that should they ren
any assistance to Cabral or any of the other leaders hea
ing the revolution against the authority of Baez,

"any hostile steps taken against the Dominican Repub
would be considered as an unfriendly act against t

Inited States Government, as the latter had guaranteed
iem protection against interference while certain negotia-
ons were taking place."

o far, the plans of Cazneau and Fabens had worked
noothly, and on December 10th, Major Perry was able
o inform Secretary Fish that President Baez was "in very
ood spirits and thus everything is working favorably."

With the parting injunction to Major Perry to use all
f his endeavours on the side of annexation and "always
o speak encouragingly of it in his communications to the
tate Department," General Babcock now returned to the
Inited States to transmit to President Grant the treaty
vhich he had been enabled to conclude. To General Caz-
eau and to Colonel Fabens the prospect could not have
een more promising. In a communication to Secretary
ish, Colonel Fabens was moved to expatiate upon the
dealistic aspect of the annexation to the United States.
Lelating his satisfaction at receiving the appointment
rom General Babcock as Agent of the United States Gov-
rnment in Samaná, he continued:

"The people, both native Dominicans and those of
American descent, are well satisfied with the proposed
hange of sovereignty, and I believe that if a vote were
o be taken today on the question of annexation, it would
e decided in the affirmative without one dissenting voice.
The accounts from the River Yuna, Santiago and Puerto
Plata are all highly favorable to the proposed change.

"On the Sunday following the raising of the United
tates flag, I attended services at the American Wesleyan
Chapel. The house was crowded with a well dressed, quiet,
nd devout congregation, who had come to return thanks
o God for the anticipated blessings of a good government

about to be conferred upon them . . . the chaplain, Re
erend Jacob James, expounding in a clear and forcib
manner the character of the great political change abo
to take place . . . The scene was very touching for t
whole congregation of several hundred were respondi
with tears and sobs of grateful joy."

The sole fault, in fact, which Colonel Fabens could fi
in the situation to report to Secretary Fish was the fa
that there was "no Sunday school among the native D
minican population in Samaná."

4.

Before President Grant had time to present the instr
ments signed by his Agent to the United States Senate f
its ratification, events had occurred which afforded co
vincing proof to Baez that he must move with rapidi
should he wish to maintain his own Government in pow
Toward the beginning of December, the President
Haiti, Silvain Salnave, had been obliged by the increasi
pressure of the revolutionary forces headed by Gene
Nissage Saget to abandon Port-au-Prince, and hopin
apparently, to effect a juncture with the forces of t
Dominican Government in the Province of Azua, h
attempted to cross the territory along that portion of t
frontier held by General Cabral and the other leaders
the "Blue" party, among them Generals Benito Ogan
and Ulises Heureaux. Unfortunately for his projects, t
Haitian troops were surrounded and defeated by the troo
of Cabral near Neiba, and Salnave and his chief follow
were taken prisoner by the Dominican revolutionis
Cabral at once turned over the captives he had taken
the representatives of his ally, Nissage Saget, whereup

any of the Haitian officers who had accompanied Sal-ave were executed on the spot and Salnave, being taken Port-au-Prince, was summarily executed by General get who, as a sign of his gratitude, even paid a consid-able bounty to the Dominican officers responsible for the pture of his adversary. The death of Salnave and the in-reased stability which his removal from the scene gave to eneral Nissage Saget, who now proclaimed himself resident of Haiti, made it evident that Baez could look longer for assistance in Haiti against the increasing tivities of the Dominican revolutionaries in Haitian ter-tory.

Baez therefore directed a cry for assistance to the overnment in Washington. In response to his request, he American Government despatched immediately to ominican waters an additional number of warships, and y the end of February, 1870, seven American vessels of ar were cruising in Dominican or Haitian waters, their mmanders, by order of the Secretary of the Navy, recting their operations in accordance with the indica-on of the President of the Dominican Republic. Rear-dmiral Poor, in command of the naval detachment, rived at Port-au-Prince on the U.S.S. *Severn* on Feb-uary 10th, and directed by order of President Grant the llowing communication to President Nissage Saget:

Sir:

"The undersigned avails himself of the arrival at this ort of the *Severn*, flagship of the United States North tlantic Fleet, accompanied by the monitor *Dictator*, inform His Excellency that he, the undersigned, has structions from his Government to inform His Ex-llency that negotiations are now pending between the nited States Government at Washington and the Gov-

ernment at Santo Domingo and that during the existen
of such negotiations, the United States Government h
determined, with all its power, to prevent any interferen
on the part of the Haitians, or any other Power, with t
Dominican Government.

"Any interference or attack, therefore, by vessels unc
the Haitian or any other flag upon the Dominicans duri
the pendency of such negotiations will be considered an a
of hostility to the flag of the United States and will pr
voke hostility in return."

As soon as Baez was reënforced by this unprecedent
support rendered by the United States Navy, which n
only succeeded in intimidating the Haitian Governme
but also prevented the outbreak of any sporadic acts
protest in the Dominican ports, he proceeded to carry o
the plebiscite to which he had in advance committed
country. Proclaiming on February 16th that the plebisc
was to be held on February 19th, he issued the followi
decree:

"In view of the manifestations which the people of t
Dominican Republic have been making in different ma
ners concerning their firm resolution to unite their destin
to the destinies of the great Republic of North Amer
and to form a part of that powerful union, it is hi
time that the Government should take legal steps to assu
itself that the desired purpose is in truth the real expressi
of the national will. Bearing in mind that the municip
authorities are the legitimate representatives of the peo
and are called upon to receive the expression of their v
when they, in these crucial moments, resolve through
plebiscite to determine the important questions wh
affect the future destinies of the Nation, and in accorda

ith the advice of the Secretaries of State and with the onsent of the honorable Senado Consultor, I decree

"From the publication of this proclamation, that the oting booths are to be open in all the provinces, communes and military posts of the Republic in order that ne inhabitants may come one by one to cast their votes, xpressing definitely their desire to be united to the great epublic of the United States of America and to form a art of its territory and political entity."

On the day the voting commenced, the *Boletín Oficial* published an appeal to the Dominican people ndicative of the propaganda which Baez had spread widely hroughout the country. The Government paper announced that the United States were in reality a collection of free and independent republics united by a ommon bond, each state possessing its own religion, language, habits and customs; entirely free to select its own udges, legislators, and municipal officials; and in fact, it as declared,

it can be said that they govern themselves except when, affairs in which all the states are interested, the National Congress may take action . . . Santo Domingo gains verything and loses nothing . . . Annexation means salation because it will oblige Haiti to respect Dominican ights and to maintain a decent conduct and because it ill persuade all Dominicans to renounce political disutes." [1]

But the persuasive methods of Baez were by no means mited to newspaper propaganda. Having obtained the espatch of American war vessels to all the important orts of the Republic during the time the voting was

[1] *Boletín Oficial*, Santo Domingo, February 19, 1870.

taking place, he made it known through his agents th any open opposition to the annexation project would me with imprisonment or banishment or an even mo stringent punishment. According to Major Perry, the a nouncement of the opening of the plebiscite in San Domingo was made known by bands of music sent throu the streets. Thereupon

"a list was opened in the police headquarters for citize to register their names. Baez and Delmonte have told several times that if any man opposed annexation th would either shoot him or send him his passports. Th have also told me that it should be a free vote of the peo but such has not been the case. There was much feeli throughout the Island kept in check and the people w not permitted to express any opposition to annexation have seen Baez himself shake his fist in the face of some his nearest friends, amongst whom were officers of t army, in Baez's own house, and tell them he would ban them from the Island if they opposed annexation. T conduct on the part of Baez made many who were favor of annexation opposed to it and also to him. . The prisons are filled with political prisoners." [1]

As the result of these tactics it is not surprising that of a total of some 16,000 votes cast, only eleven were nounced as having been cast in opposition to the proje and these were recognized as having been cast at the Pr dent's instance by his agents in order to prevent the p ceedings from appearing too farcical. On March 16th, Senado Consultor adopted a resolution declaring that

"The people of the Dominican Republic have dem strated their desire to be united to the United States America,"

[1] Major Raymond H. Perry to Secretary Fish, June 7, 1870.

nd consequently approved unanimously this determina-
on, considering it "most proper and most efficacious in
rder that liberty and democracy might be preserved in
ne country."

On the following day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs,
a communication to Secretary Fish, expressed his belief
nat the American Government would be as gratified as he
the large percentage in favour of annexation, and
ssured him that

"The desire is great with which this country almost
nanimously is burning to see the conclusion of its annexa-
on to the United States." [1]

Although the constant presence of the American war-
ips had rendered temporarily quiet the revolutionary
ctivities of the leaders of the "Blue" party, a group of
oreign merchants and residents of Puerto Plata, among
nem the British Vice Consul, had contributed the sum
f $8,000 to assist Generals Cabral and Luperón in their
ampaign. When the American Admiral learned of this
act from President Baez, who magnified the report by
ne statement that General Luperón, "at the head of an
rmy of Haitians was established in Capotillo and was
bout to invade the Cibao," his indignation knew no
ounds. The U.S.S. *Swatara* was ordered to proceed
once to Monte Cristi "to render such aid as it can to
ne loyal citizens and frustrate, if possible, the aims of
uperón," and the *Nantasket*, at the same time, departed
or Puerto Plata

o inform the people of that place who entertain hostile
elings towards the United States of the determination

[1] Don Manuel Gautier to Secretary Fish, March 18, 1870.

of her Government to protect Santo Domingo and i present administration and to inform them of the nav force in these waters and its instructions to carry out t plans of the United States Government."

Baez and his accomplices, General Cazneau and Color Fabens, were enabled, moreover, to find equally firm su port in quieting the unexpected hostility suddenly ev denced by the American Commercial Agent, who th had hitherto had every reason to suppose was complete submissive to the instructions which General Babcock h left with him to "write encouragingly to the Departmer keeping back facts regarding the election and Cabra party and the discontent of the people of the Island," a to "stand by Cazneau and Fabens since they represent large interests in the Island in which he participated. Fabens and Cazneau were all the more grieved since Fabe had promised Major Perry that if he proved friendly Cazneau and to himself "he would have a great oppo tunity for making a rapid fortune," and the latter h assured the Commercial Agent that he could provide h with "a fine plantation and opportunities to handle mon for men in New York City."

The knowledge which gradually dawned upon t American Commercial Agent that the whole annexati project had been hatched by Cazneau and Fabens with t connivance of Baez solely to further their own intere and the interests of General Babcock and his associates, a later the interests represented in the Hartmont loan, which Spofford, Tileston & Company had recently come the agents, had aroused Major Perry to a de indignation at the proceedings.

[1] Major Raymond H. Perry to Secretary Fish, June 7, 1870.

At first he had kept his indignation to himself, although he had early broken off his personal relations with General Cazneau. Upon asking President Baez why General Cazneau had so much influence in the decisions which the President reached, Major Perry was answered that it was because General Cazneau was a personal friend of General Babcock, and in direct communication with the President of the United States, and that in the event the annexation project was successfully concluded Cazneau would become a very wealthy man and the first Governor of the Island. That, Baez stated, he knew was the intention of General Babcock. But Perry's distrust reached its culmination when word came to him in April, 1870, that Cazneau and an associate, an American named Schumaker, in open violation of the terms of the sixth article of the treaty signed on November 29th, had with the support of Gautier applied for two concessions from the Dominican Government, the former for a grant of 200,000 acres of land, ostensibly for colonization purposes, and the latter for a concession to build a railroad between Santo Domingo and Azua.

Requesting information regarding the accuracy of these reports, Major Perry was assured by both the President and the Minister for Foreign Relations that no such concessions had been requested, and that they would not be granted should they be requested. Since the American Commercial Agent had first received his information from two members of the Senate, before a secret session of which the concessions were pending, he thereupon addressed a further communication to the President of the Senate, Don Pedro García, asking what truth there might actually be in the matter. Realizing that public knowledge of these proceedings would ruin their chances of success, the Presi-

dent of the Senate was instructed by Baez to reply tha the American Commercial Agent should limit himself t addressing his communications to the Ministry of Foreig Relations, and, indignant at the sudden obstacle which th attitude assumed by Major Perry had interposed in h plans for his own financial advantage, the President in structed Gautier to demand the recall by Secretary Fis of his Agent in Santo Domingo. As soon as word reache General Babcock of the interposition of the America Commercial Agent in a matter which, according to th latter, General Babcock and General Ingalls knew all abou since they "had in fact taken copies of the desired con cessions with them to the United States," [1] Major Perr was ordered to return to the United States.

In a short interchange of letters which took place befo Major Perry's departure from Santo Domingo with Ge eral Cazneau, the former stated that he was well awa of the business of Cazneau and Fabens thus far; an added:

"You may rest assured that inasmuch as it lies within m power I shall do all I can to prevent injury or intrigu against the interests of my Government and to defend th name of President Grant, which name I have every reaso to fear has already been used by a financial ring for the selfish ends."

In his reply to this arraignment, General Cazneau brushe the matter aside with the statement that the insinuatio that President Grant's name had been used by him or b any of his associates for private speculations was too ridicu lous for serious notice. Adding that there was not "a cand gentleman in this community who would not treat suc

[1] Major Raymond H. Perry to Secretary Fish, June 7, 1870.

charge as the wild fancy of a distempered brain," he concluded with the statement that Mr. Perry's lack of due official reticence had brought on a "premature disclosure of facts that for the public interest should have been strictly confidential for the present."

Availing himself of the support rendered him by the fact that his partner had been appointed by Baez, in April, as Dominican Minister Plenipotentiary in Washington, General Cazneau reënforced the protestations which he had no doubt Colonel Fabens would make by a communication addressed to Secretary Fish, in which he alleged that his motives in the matter reported by Major Perry had been of the most patriotic character.[1] The whole project had been merely an effort to settle the troublesome border question by settling a line of immigrants from the United States along the Haitian frontier. For that purpose, he claimed he had surrendered to the Dominican Government "a valuable mining and colonization charter," and a new plan had been drawn up "to induce large capitalists having the necessary steamers and other appliances at their command to undertake the accomplishment of our project of border settlements." It was perfectly understood, he assured Secretary Fish,

"in the Baez Cabinet that the whole plan should be submitted to our Government and in no way acted upon if disapproved by President Grant."

Mr. Perry's interference,

"owing to his reckless and violent impulses . . . brought the affair before the public in a partial and dangerous light."

[1] General William L. Cazneau to Secretary Fish, May 17, 1870.

To the Secretary of State, Major Perry could necessaril be no longer a satisfactory Agent, inasmuch as he had b now earned the bitter antagonism of General Babcock who had, not unnaturally, succeeded in prejudicing Presi dent Grant against him. Replying to Major Perry's com plaint that he had not been treated by the Department o State with frankness, inasmuch as when he went to Sant Domingo "everything was involved in mystery," Majo Perry was advised that his complaint was "an uncalled fo and unwarranted charge, totally without foundation an improper to be introduced in an official despatch," an that his compliance with the instructions of General Bab cock in not previously communicating the facts regardin the annexation plebiscite which he now reported, was " subject for regret and a cause for censure," and that whi his efforts to prevent the granting of the concessions re quested by General Cazneau and his associates "were we intended and would have been approved by the President, his representations towards that end had been made neithe in a correct nor tactful manner.[1] It was evident tha Major Perry's usefulness was at an end, and he was per mitted to tender his resignation some days later.

5.

Notwithstanding the hold upon Congress which Gener Grant's widespread personal popularity had given hi when he assumed office, the project for the annexation o the Dominican Republic, which had by now become th cardinal feature of the Administration's foreign polic had encountered stubborn resistance. In the President first message upon the subject to Congress, he had expresse the belief that the Island (having in mind the annexatio

[1] Secretary Fish to Major Raymond H. Perry, June 16, 1870.

oth of the Dominican Republic and of Haiti) would eld to the United States all the sugar, coffee, and tobacco d other tropical products which the country could con- me. The message glowed, in fact, with a series of plati- des worthy the pamphlet of a tourist agency. The Presi- nt declared that

The production of our supply of these articles will cut f more than $100,000 of our annual imports besides gely increasing our exports . . .

"With such a picture it is easy to see how our large debt road is ultimately to be extinguished. With the balance trade against us (including interest on bonds held by reigners and money spent by our citizens in foreign nds) equal to the entire yield of precious metals in this untry, it is not easy to see how this result is to be other- ise accomplished . . . The acquisition of San Domingo ill furnish our citizens with the necessaries of every-day fe at cheaper rates than ever before; and it is in fine a pid stride towards that guidance which the intelligence, dustry, and enterprise of our citizens intended this untry to assume among Nations."

Thoroughly as the Administration was committed to e proposed treaty, and notwithstanding the manner in hich the President had identified his own political for- nes with its ratification, the great influence of Senator harles Sumner, the Chairman of the Senate Committee Foreign Relations, was thrown against it. During the rly days of the Administration, Senator Sumner, who d been one of General Grant's strongest backers in his al break with Andrew Johnson, had continued to be e of the strongest supporters of the President, but the nest convictions which he had reached concerning the

proposed measure made it impossible for him to continu
to coöperate with the leaders of his own party. The resu
of his own investigations, and his peculiar knowledge
conditions in the Caribbean, had proved to his satisfactio
that there existed no spontaneous desire for annexation
the part of the Dominican people themselves, and he ha
become assured that the stimulus behind the project, apa
from Baez's own ambitions, had been the machinations
the ever-increasing group of speculators and promote
headed by Cazneau and Fabens, with whose past caree
Senator Sumner was fully acquainted. An even strong
motive for the opposition of Senator Sumner was the im
plied threat in the policy of the Executive that the annex
tion of the Dominican Republic would necessarily enta
the eventual annexation of Haiti. In the destinies of th
negro Republic Senator Sumner was profoundly interest
as the foremost remaining member of the New Englan
Abolitionists, whose original and commendatory sympath
with the negroes during the long years of their oppressio
and slavery had evolved into the fanatical concept of th
negro as a superior being fitted by nature to participa
instantly in all the higher manifestations which centur
of modern civilization had produced. That the experime
involved in the sovereign Republic of Haiti could be co
sidered unsuccessful or could be arrested by pressu
from without was unthinkable; it was a contingen
which Sumner would not countenance, and the prospe
of the forcible annexation of Haiti was not only a prop
sition contrary to his own peculiar prejudices but o
which likewise was revolting to the spirit of justice wi
which his character was instinct.

The opposition of the Chairman of the Committee
Foreign Relations should have been sufficient in itself

ve the President pause. Execrated in the South, Sumner's estige and personal popularity were equally widespread the North.

His written arguments were the anti-slavery classics of e day and they were read more eagerly than speeches hich produced greater effect on the hearer . . His guments went to the millions.

They produced widespread and prodigious effect upon ublic opinion and left an indelible impression on the history of the country." [1]

The opposition of Sumner to the treaty, in which he was ined by many of the prominent Republicans in the Sen-e—among these Senator Carl Schurz, Senator Ferry, and umner's colleague, Senator Wilson of Massachusetts—roved to be sufficient to defeat the project by a wide argin. When the treaty came up for a vote the Admin-tration, instead of obtaining the two-thirds vote re-uired by the Constitution, was able to muster only venty-eight votes, an equal number of votes being cast gainst it.

During the summer of 1870, the additional knowledge hich came to him concerning the activities of the Ameri-n promoters of the project strengthened Senator Sumner his refusal to compromise. In this determination, com-unications which were repeatedly addressed to the United ates Senate both by the leaders of the "Blue" party in nto Domingo, and by prominent exiles from the Re-ublic such as Mariano A. Cestero and José Gabriel arcía, had a considerable share. Before long the cry of rruption was raised. Schurz demanded that the thieves President Grant's Administration should be driven out

[1] James G. Blaine, "Twenty Years of Congress."

of the public service, and imputed to the Administrati of President Grant even greater corruption than that wi which he had charged the Administration of Preside Johnson. Before the New Year, Senator Sumner's anta onism had reached such a point that he was publicly asse ing that the President himself was financially interest in the proposed deal. In an interview given to the cor spondent of the New York *World* in Chicago, Sumr declared that a friend of his who lived in Santo Domin had told him that the coast of Samaná Bay was stak off into lots marked "Baez," "Cazneau," and "Babcock and that some of the largest ones were marked "Grant."

Resolved, nevertheless, to overcome the oppositi which he had encountered in the Senate by all the gr strength which his powers of patronage bestowed up him, and infuriated by the doubts cast upon his perso integrity, General Grant rushed to the attack. On D cember 5, 1870, in his annual message to Congress t President declared:

"I now firmly believe that the moment it is known th the United States have entirely abandoned the project accepting as a part of its own territory the Island of S Domingo, a free port will be negotiated for by Europe Nations in the Bay of Samaná and a large commercial c will spring up, to which we will be tributary witho receiving corresponding benefits. Then will be seen t folly of rejecting so great a prize . . I believe the su ject has only to be investigated to be proved."

And he concluded with the recommendation that

"By joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress Executive be authorized to appoint a commission

[1] New York *World*, November 22, 1870.

gotiate a treaty with the authorities of San Domingo r the annexation of that Island and that an appropria- n be made to defray the expenses of such a commission."

So intense was the opposition that even the most out- oken of the adherents of the Administration feared to rmit the measure proposed by the President to be dis- ssed. At length Senator Morton of Indiana introduced a olution empowering the President to appoint three Com- issioners to make a visit of inquiry to Santo Domingo, the ommissioners to have no compensation, although their penses were to be paid and a secretary who spoke the anish language was to be appointed. Even in this form, wever, the resolution was hotly opposed. It was then at Senator Sumner delivered his most famous address on the annexation scheme to the Senate:

"The resolution before the Senate commits Congress a dance of blood. It is a new step in a measure of vio- nce. Already several steps have been taken and Congress now summoned to another. . . The object of the reso- tion, and I will demonstrate it, is to commit Congress the policy of annexation . . It is a new step in a meas- e of violence which so far as it has been maintained s been upheld by violence ever since . . As senator, as triot, I cannot see my country suffer in its good name ithout an earnest effort to save it. Baez . . is sustained power by the Government of the United States that may betray his country . . The Island of San Domingo, uated in tropical waters and occupied by another race . never can become a permanent possession of the nited States. You may seize it by force of arms or by plomacy, where an able squadron does more than the inister; the enforced jurisdiction cannot endure . . It

is theirs by right of possession; by their sweat and blo
mingling with the soil; by tropical position; by its bur
ing sun and by unalterable lines of climate. Such is t
ordinance of nature which I am not the first to reco
nize. San Domingo is the earliest of that independe
group destined to occupy the Caribbean Sea toward whi
our duty is plain as the Ten Commandments. Kindne
benevolence, assistance, aid, help, protection, all that
implied in good neighborhood, this we must give free
bountifully; but their independence is as precious to the
as is ours to us and it is placed under the safeguard
natural laws which we cannot violate with impunity."

Notwithstanding this powerful arraignment and the c
termined opposition of the antagonists of the treaty, t
resolution was finally adopted, although the House
Representatives refused to concur except with the prov
that "nothing in this resolution shall be held, understo
or construed as committing Congress to the policy of a
nexing San Domingo."

That the Presidential Message immediately awaken
alarm in Haiti was made evident by the protest of t
Haitian Minister in Washington, M. Stephen Presto
Announcing to the Secretary of State that the message
the President had caused him very deep and painful su
prise inasmuch as it appeared to him to contain a form
menace to the independence of Haiti, the Minister
quested assurances which would enable him to calm
legitimate anxieties of his Government.[1] To his protest
Haitian Minister received, however, no further satisfact
than the frigid statement by the Secretary of State th
the message of the President was strictly and exclusiv

[1] M. Stephen Preston, Haitian Minister in Washington, to Secretary Fish, De
ber 8, 1870.

domestic document to which no foreign Power could ke exception, and that consequently until the recom- endations referred to had become law the Minister's terference in the matter must be regarded at least as rematurе.[1]

On January 16th, the three Commissioners appointed ursuant to the resolution by the President—all of them recognized standing, Senator Benjamin F. Wade of hio, Andrew D. White, and Samuel G. Howe—arrived Santo Domingo upon the U.S.S. *Tennessee*. The embers of the Commission and their secretary traveled roughout the Republic obtaining such sparse informa- on as they were enabled to gather from the inhabitants, ending altogether approximately two months in the untry. As regarded by President Grant, their report ore than sustained all that he had said

"in regard to the productiveness and healthfulness of e Republic of San Domingo, of the unanimity of the eople for annexation to the United States and of their aceful character."

In his message of April 5, 1871, transmitting the report the Commission, the President stated to Congress that e mere rejection by the Senate of a treaty negotiated by e President only indicated a difference of opinion among fferent departments of the Government, without touch- g the character or honour or pride of either;

ut when such rejection takes place simultaneously with harges openly made of corruption on the part of the resident, or of those employed by him, the case is dif-

[1] Secretary Fish to M. Stephen Preston, Haitian Minister in Washington, Decem- 12, 1870.

ferent. Indeed, in such case the honor of the Nati
demands investigation. This has been accomplished by t
report of the commissioners herewith transmitted, whi
fully vindicates the purity of motive and action of the
who represented the United States in the negotiations
My task is finished and with it ends all personal solicitu
upon the subject . . I gladly hand over the whole ma
ter to the judgment of the American people. . . . M
opinion remains unchanged; indeed, it is confirmed
the report that the interests of our country and of S
Domingo alike invite the annexation of that Republic.'

In accordance with the suggestion which the Preside
himself had made, the report of the Commission was mer
ordered to lie upon the table, and no further action w
destined to be taken regarding the treaties which Pre
dent Grant's emissary had concluded.

General Grant had undergone his first defeat in t
Presidency, the bitterness of which was no doubt in p
assuaged by his success in at length obtaining the remo
of Senator Sumner from the Chairmanship of the Co
mittee on Foreign Relations. Senator Sumner, submitti
silently to the indignity inflicted upon him as the result
the voicing of his honest convictions, died soon aft
General Babcock, having found his position as Priv
Secretary to the President so agreeable and so lucrati
retained it for some years longer, until in 1876 an
vestigation unfortunately undertaken by Benjamin Br
tow, the incoming Secretary of the Treasury, disclosed
close connection with General McDonald, the Supervi
of Internal Revenue for St. Louis, convicted of complic
in the frauds perpetrated by the "whiskey ring" in t
district. When the scandal become too great for ev
General Grant to withstand, General Babcock was

ıissed as the Private Secretary to the President and pro-ıoted to be Superintendent of Public Buildings. Cazneau nd Fabens soon thereafter removed themselves from the)ominican stage.

6.

Although the hopes of Baez had by no means yet been :ifled by the turn which events had taken, the opposition f the American Congress, which had brought with it the vithdrawal of most of the American war vessels from)ominican waters, had encouraged a recrudescence of evolutionary activity. With the early summer of 1871 he western provinces were overrun with Haitian troops penly assisting the scattered forces of the "Blue" party. \ccording to the American Commercial Agent,

'the whole country between Bánica and Cachina was illed with Haitian troops." [1]

\pproximately 4,000 of the Government troops were onsequently stationed at Dajabón to check the expected dvance of three regular regiments of the Haitian army. General Luperón, who had obtained authority from the Haitian Government to impress Haitians in order to form n army of invasion, was momentarily expected to head he expected assault.

Confronted with this emergency, the Dominican Gov-rnment was placed in an extremely embarrassing position, ince the liberal grants which Baez had promptly made rom the funds provided by the payment of the first in-tallment of the rental for Samaná under the rejected reaty with the United States, had left him with barely 3,000 in the treasury with which to keep his troops in

[1] Mr. Fisher Ames, American Commercial Agent, to Secretary Fish, June 3, 1871.

the field. Still deluding himself that the treaty of annex
tion would be ratified by the United States Senate, Ba
had refused to accept the proposal of the Hartmont i
terests to continue payments upon their loan, and wh
the Department of State, owing to the refusal of t
United States Senate to ratify either the treaty of annex
tion or the convention for the lease of Samaná, was unab
to pay the second installment due, Baez found hims
without money and without credit. Although Secreta
Fish, officially, was still hopeful, as was President Gra
that the treaty of annexation, or the convention sign
at the same time, might yet obtain the approbation of t
United States Senate, he was unable to take further acti
beyond that of instructing the Commercial Agent
Santo Domingo to extend for a period of one year the li
of the convention providing for the lease of Samar
which had expired, by the terms of its fourth article, wh
the United States Senate had refrained from ratifying
within four months from the date of its signature.[1] Th
act, which was as far as Secretary Fish could go under t
circumstances, was hardly sufficient to prove of mu
assistance to Baez in his difficulties, particularly since t
protocol reviving the original convention contained
stipulation that the further obligation of the United Sta
Government to pay the rental agreed upon must depe
upon a Congressional appropriation.

On July 17th, brought to the realization that the acti
ties of his former associates, General Cazneau and Colo
Fabens, would no longer be welcomed by the Americ
Government in view of the disclosure of the nature of th
participation in the annexation project, Baez addressed
letter directly to President Grant. Referring to the di

[1] Secretary Fish to Mr. Fisher Ames, June 28, 1871.

ilties of his Government occasioned by the open hostility
the Haitian forces, he stated:

"I should much regret it if to the warmth with which
ne propriety of annexation has been regarded in the
nited States there should now succeed a glacial indiffer-
ice on the part of your people, since that would cause
ie general belief here that a solution contrary to the
ishes of the inhabitants of this Republic would ensue.
would be sad, if after so many efforts and sacrifices,
ter so much time employed in the arrangements con-
ected with that grand project, the vanity of one haughty,
etulant man and the gratuitous calumnies of the de-
actors of Your Excellency should triumph at length by
reventing Your Excellency from realizing a political
rogram of peculiar utility and one of philanthropy
behalf of a sister people not unworthy of its
mpathies." [1]

To this appeal Baez received no reply beyond a bare
cknowledgment, and thereafter, lest the American Gov-
rnment might lose interest in the project, President Baez
gain wrote to President Grant advising him of the ap-
ointment of his Minister for Foreign Affairs, Don Manuel
Iaria Gautier, as Special Envoy to Washington in order
iat he might advise the Chief Executive of the United
tates of the "actual situation in the Republic and the
ability of the present Dominican Government," and
tempt to obtain an amendment to the protocol suggested
y Secretary Fish for the extension of the life of the con-
ention for the lease of Samaná.[2] In the opinion of Baez
id his Minister, should some satisfactory amendment not
e found, the Dominican Government might be forced to

[1] President Buenaventura Baez to President Grant, July 17, 1871.
[2] President Buenaventura Baez to President Grant, Aug. 22, 1871.

return the sum of $150,000 which it had received as
anticipated installment on the first year's rental of Sama
As an added stimulus, therefore, Baez informed the Ame
can Commercial Agent that the Prussian Governme
proposed to acquire the Bay and Peninsula of Samaná w
a view to the eventual annexation of the whole Republ

The alarm which may have been occasioned the Sec
tary of State by this evidence of Prussian ambition co
not have been long lived, since he was informed with
two months that the Prussian proposals had been reject
by the Dominican Government.[1] Notwithstanding
gradual abandonment of hope of obtaining the offic
protection of the United States Government, Baez w
still enabled to stay the increasing tide of the revoluti
for the time being by resorting to the issuance of additio
paper money, since on May 4, 1872, in accordance w
his recommendation the Dominican Senate had authoriz
him to issue $100,000 paper acceptable for the payme
of one-fourth of customs duties.

The farce still went on. In his yearly message to
Senate on January 27, 1872, Baez advised that body th
upon his recent trip to the Cibao he had been struck
the sincere and cordial reception which had awaited hi
He evidenced deep regret that the administration of just
was in such a deplorable condition, adverted to the nec
sity of the creation of two additional judicial departme
in order that the course of justice might be facilitated, a
expressed his determination to decree the holding of el
tions for a Constitutional Convention to revise the Co
stitution of 1868.

This Constitutional Convention assembled in Augu
1872, and revised the qualifications of the electorate, wh

[1] Acting Commercial Agent to Secretary Fish, October 27, 1871.

ere now fixed so that the voter must possess full civil and olitical rights, be a resident of the commune where he oted, and be either a land owner, an employee of the overnment, an officer in the army or navy, have author- y to pursue some profession or to engage in industry, be the tenant for at least six years of agricul- ral holdings. Under the presidency of General Valentín amírez Baez, the President's half brother, the Conven- on concluded its labours on September 14, 1872, having rst granted the President a term of six years' duration, ith almost dictatorial powers, and having created the ice Presidency, stipulating that elections for the Presi- nt and the Vice President be held three years apart.

Having succeeded in stemming the disorder within the epublic, and having obtained, by virtue of the new Con- itution, the selection as Vice President of a supporter in hom he felt implicit confidence in the person of General Ianuel Altagracia Cáceres, Baez felt strong enough to rn his attention towards repairing the damage wrought s ambitions by the definite refusal of the United States agree to the annexation of the Republic.

7.

On January 2, 1873, Baez addressed a message to the nate advising it that the necessity for annexation to the nited States or for the lease of Samaná Bay and Samaná eninsula to that country had ceased, and assured the nators that he regarded it as far more in keeping with e progress of civilization and the true ideals of the ominican people to enter into an agreement with a ivate company for the lease of that territory. He there- re transmitted to the Senate a contract which his repre- ntative, Don Manuel Maria Gautier, had entered into

with an association composed of various New Yo financiers incorporated as the "Samaná Bay Company Santo Domingo." Among the members of the Board Directors were many individuals of reputed standing a financial integrity, whose consent to figure upon the Boa of Directors was doubtless accounted for by the terms the seventh article of the contract which provided th the Company could obtain all the privileges, rights a immunities granted Colonel Fabens in the concession a corded him July 3, 1868.

The proposed activities of the Company were broad a far-reaching. In general, they were stated to be the fu nishing of assistance to the Dominican Republic in orc that it might increase its commerce, establish direct sh ping communication with foreign countries, build ra roads and other public works and obtain desirable imm gration. The Company was authorized to acquire prope of any nature in any part of the world, and by the ter of Article IV of the contract acquired all the rigl privileges and immunities granted the United States in t proposed convention signed November 29th, 1869, as w as absolute sovereignty over the Peninsula and adjace islands in Samaná Bay, the Company being specifica authorized to appoint all authorities, executive, legislati or judicial in the territory. The Company was further p mitted to establish a bank of issue, deposit and discount Samaná, to build and administer railroads, canals, te graphs and highroads, to utilize free of charge for th purposes any public lands as well as all timber on su lands, and to expropriate any private lands in any port of the Republic by paying compensation to the own therefor after appraisal. Furthermore, for every mile railroad or canal and for every three miles of telegra

ıe or of highroad constructed within five years by the ompany, it was to receive from the Government without ɔst a square mile of the public lands adjacent thereto, and ıe Dominican Government obligated itself to accord no ɔncessions in the future to any individual or company ithout permitting the Samaná Bay Company to deter- ine whether it desired to obtain such privileges itself.

In return for the monopolistic privileges so acquired by ıe Company through a concession which was to continue ɔr ninety-nine years, the Company was solely obligated ɔ pay to the Dominican Government the sum of $150,000 early. By the terms of its incorporation, the Company ɔmmenced operations with an authorized capital of 800,000, having the right to issue bonds and stock, pro- ided merely that the total value of the issues should not ceed $20,000,000 in stock and $10,000,000 in bonds. he affairs of the Company were to be entrusted to a Board f Directors who might be citizens either of the Dominican epublic or of any other nation, who were protected in ıe event of any disagreement between the Dominican overnment and the Company by the stipulation that in ıy such case the disputes were to be referred to two bitrators, one chosen by the Republic and the other by ıe Company, and in the contingency that the arbitrators selected could not agree, the dispute was then to be ttled by its submission to some "political personage" in urope.

On the day following the receipt of the Presidential essage, this unique contract was ratified by the Senado onsultor, and on January 4th, the Dominican people ere called to a plebiscite to pass upon the contract, which ıe President in his decree of convocation lauded in the ghest terms. By the use of the same coercive methods

which had proved so satisfactory three years before, t
concession was approved in the popular vote by a majori
even greater than that cast in favour of the annexati
project. On February 22, 1873, President Baez official
announced that the votes cast in the plebiscite had result
20,496 in favour of the contract and only 19 oppos
thereto, and that consequently the contract was to be co
sidered in effect as a law of the Dominican Republic.

Frustrated in his early ambitions to make of his count
a French province, outmaneuvered by Santana in his lat
desire to make the Republic a colony of Spain, defeat
in the opportunity which he believed within his grasp
annex the Republic as a territory to the United State
Baez had at length been successful in selling the sovereign
of his nation to a group of speculators. It is not impossib
that the eminent directors of the Samaná Bay Compa
of Santo Domingo had learned a useful lesson from t
history of those British chartered companies which had
devious ways so often increased the territorial limits of t
British Empire.

CHAPTER VI

FROM BAEZ TO HEUREAUX

1.

THE year 1873 marked the recurrence in the Republic of that social and political phenomenon which has riodically made itself felt in Dominican history—a congious feverish desire to obliterate the past, and to fashion new era under new leaders and under new auspices. It s ever been a longing dissociated from the selfish aims the instigators of the revolutions continuously fermentg. It has rather been the result, as it was in the present se, of the utter weariness and disgust of the petty leaders each community, the formers of public opinion, with e havoc and devastation wrought their country by the lers foisted upon them. This longing, noticeable at first the part of a few groups in various parts of the couy, gradually infiltrated itself throughout the great iterate masses subservient to them.

The extremes to which the tyranny of Baez had at ngth gone, the utter disregard on the part of the "Great itizen" for life and private property, had no small part w in hastening the eventual climax, but the manifestaon even at this time was explicable mainly as a general vulsion of popular feeling against the past and all the agedy of lost opportunity that the past implied, together th an overwhelming longing for something new, new en, new measures and new ideals; with which feeling ere existed the certainty that life in no event could be ore unendurable than it had been under the old régime. This impulse, engendered, as always, in the Cibao, ached its culmination in the early autumn of the year. first discussed secretly by small groups of prominent

citizens in the Cibao cities, the movement at length b
came vocal, and included among its chief supporters ma
who were prominent as members of the "Red" party. I
the latter it was agreed that Baez must be discarded a
forever. No less radical, the leaders of the "Blue" par
participating in the project made known their willingn
to abandon their chieftains, Cabral, Pimentel and Luperó
But once these cardinal principles were established, t
rival interests of the antagonistic parties came once mo
into play, the prime movers among the "Reds" insisti
that one of their own group should be selected to capta
the struggle for "regeneration," while the leaders of t
"Blue" party remained equally insistent that some lead
identified with their own political interests be chosen f
the task. The former clamoured for General Cáceres, t
Vice President, and the latter resolutely opposed him.

While the dispute continued, at first underground a
later openly, Baez made strenuous efforts to suppress t
opposition which he saw was constantly increasing. Befo
it was possible for the President to take effective actio
however, the opportunity was grasped by General Ignac
Maria González, who had been appointed some time prev
ously Governor of Puerto Plata by the President fro
among the ranks of the supporters upon whom he mo
relied.

On November 25, 1873, in Puerto Plata, before a gre
public meeting called to protest against the tyranny
Baez, composed of representatives of both parties, Gene
González proclaimed himself leader of the revolutio
Within a month the feeble resistance which was all th
Baez had been able to interpose was crushed, and on Ja
uary 2, 1874, Baez resigned his office to the Congress a
sembled in the capital, and fled from the country.

2.

The avowed purposes of the new government of González could not have been more laudable. Although González, referred to by Luperón as a "general of the ance and of the salon," was accused by his great detractor f being an inveterate schemer and a selfish intriguer, it ems far more probable that he undertook the leadership f the movement for regeneration in all sincerity, his spirit tuned to the eloquent words publicly addressed to him y Don Ulises Espaillat—

"One sole necessity has made itself felt—the belief, the onviction, the need of uniting in one body all parties, f bringing new men to the government . . Those who ejoiced in the anticipation of shedding the blood of the ibao; those who had composed for their own satisfaction a poem of the anticipated lament of their victims nd of the tears of their desolate families; those, finally, ho deliriously were seeking blood and more blood were estined to fall without a struggle before the cry of Jnity, Fraternity and Concord.' "

hat González lacked personal ambition cannot be asserted his subsequent career is kept in mind, but there is no evience, beyond that attributable to the rancour of his dispointed rivals for the Presidency, to prove that he accepted the Provisional Presidency with other than a wholearted desire to benefit his country and his people.

The members of the new Cabinet appointed by the rovisional President were men of recognized standing rom the Cibao, among them Don Tomás Cocco, Don defonso Mella, and General Pablo Lopez Villanueva, the tter of whom as Minister for War led the victorious oops of the revolution into the capital on January 3rd.

No sooner, however, had the Provisional Governme established itself firmly throughout the Republic than t inevitable rivalries between the parties which had su ported the revolution began to make themselves appare Since he had rapidly come to the conclusion that t popular reform movement of which he was now the reco nized leader could only be successfully carried out unde constitutional government with himself as President, Go zález sought to eliminate the sole opposing candidate w had any chance for success in the popular elections whi the Provisional Government had decreed. Baez had f into exile; Cabral, Pimentel and Luperón had been exil by decree of the Provisional Government. There remain as his sole rival General Cáceres, behind whose candida the "Red" leaders had grouped themselves. By dint tactics which were not altogether to his credit, Gonzá finally succeeded in ensuring his own election, after a Co stitutional Convention had once more revised the natio charter of liberties, and he was consequently inaugurat Constitutional President of the Republic on April 6, 18

In his inaugural address the new President reiterated t assurances offered the people when he had assumed t Provisional Presidency—

"To bring peace to the Republic and guarantees to l sons; to respect and to enforce the respect of the rig of all and the freedom obtained by the revolution November; to ensure the power of the law and the f action of justice; to stimulate progress, industry, a commerce; to increase public instruction and to un under the national flag all Dominicans."

The measures adopted by the González Government at fi evidenced the sincerity of the President's protestatio

n amnesty was declared to all, and invitations were ex-
nded even to Generals Luperón, Cabral and Pimentel,
ho had at first been exiled, to return to the country. All
olitical prisoners were released and liberty of the press
d the right of free speech were guaranteed.

One of the first acts of the Government and one
stined to increase its popularity, was the cancellation of
e concession granted by Baez to the Samaná Bay Com-
ny of Santo Domingo on the valid ground that the
ompany had failed to make its annual payments upon
e dates set by the terms of the concession, and had, in
ct, expressed its inability to meet those payments by
questing a reduction of the payments due and an exten-
on of the time limit set for paying such installments.
r a few months the popularity of the Government con-
nued, evidenced to the satisfaction of General González
mself by the manifestations of popular approval which
eeted him at first upon his frequent visits to the various
ties of the Republic. The President's belief in his own
pularity received a rude setback, however, when early
August General Cáceres with a few supporters, com-
ising largely a number of the disgruntled friends of
ez, attempted to commence a revolution in Santiago.
ne movement was rapidly crushed, to the satisfaction of
e populace in general, but the threat made was sufficient
cause in General González a sudden revulsion of feeling.
aring, apparently, that his Government had been too
eral, he determined to adopt dictatorial methods, com-
etely overlooking the lesson taught by the disasters which
d met his predecessors in office. Adopting the most
ingent measures of repression, he formally requested
e Congress to authorize a further revision of the Con-
tution and this time a revision intended to grant greater

powers to the President, which, in his own words, shou be "more adapted to local necessities."

Once the course of his Administration was set in th direction, González's failure was inevitable. To govern force rather than through popular support necessarily r quired greater resources in the national treasury. T President announced his intention of seeking a loan $3,000,000 in Europe. While the negotiations to this e were in progress, González sought to recoup the Gover ment for the loss of the annual installments which t cancellation of the Samaná Bay contract concession h brought with it. This he accomplished in a peculi manner.

One of the features of his program of administrati and one, in fact, which he was destined throughout public life to seek to carry out, was the formation of clo economic and social ties with the neighbouring Repub of Haiti. In his inaugural address he had urged the nec sity of a treaty of peace and commerce with Haiti. In a cordance with this recommendation a Commission was se by the Dominican Government to Port-au-Prince to neg tiate a treaty with the Government of President Dominqu which had recently succeeded that of Nissage Saget. November 9, 1874, a Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commer Navigation and Extradition was signed. Articles I and provided that solely the Dominican Republic and the R public of Haiti possessed sovereignty over the Island, a that both parties obligated themselves jointly to mainta the integrity of their respective territories and not to ce mortgage, or alienate the whole or any part of their lan They likewise obligated themselves not to solicit nor agree to the annexation or the foreign domination of a portion of their possessions. Both Governments likew

GENERAL IGNACIO MARIA GONZALEZ

eed to negotiate a concession for the construction of a
road to link the capitals of the two Republics. In
dition to these provisions and the articles customarily
und in treaties of amity and commerce, there were in-
ded, however, the agreement that

"The High Contracting Parties formally bind them-
es to establish, in the manner most in accord with
ity and the common interests of the two peoples, the
undary lines which separate their actual possessions,"

l a stipulation for the establishment of free trade in
urn for the yearly payment to the Dominican Gov-
ment by Haiti of $150,000 over a period of eight years.
e loss in the Dominican Government's revenues was
reby recouped, but the proviso for free trade carried
h it the economic ruin of the Dominican border Pro-
ces, permitting at the same time the infiltration of great
mbers of Haitian emigrants; whereas the phraseology of
provision concerning the boundary lines diminished in
future the opportunity for the Dominican Govern-
nt to regain the territory on the frontier which it
imed lay within the boundaries of the Spanish colony of
nto Domingo, and which Haiti had occupied illegally, it
ged, subsequent to the Haitian evacuation in 1844.
t is worthy of remark that the conclusion of this treaty
t with the formal felicitation of the British Govern-
nt, which still maintained its original policy of fostering
identification of the interests of the neighbouring Re-
blics. During the weeks preceding the signing of the
aty, the British Minister in Haiti, Mr. St. John, had
n actively engaged in the Dominican capital in urging
on the members of the Dominican Government the
otiation of closer economic ties with the Haitian Re-

public. It was commonly reported that by instruction his Government he was exerting his efforts in the inter of the Haitian Government with a view to the event formal consolidation of the two Republics.[1]

3

Although for a while subsequent to the adoption of new Constitution upon which he had insisted in the spr of 1875, the new policies adopted by González appea to meet with success, measures to which the Governm had had recourse in the preceding autumn incur clamorous disapproval. Because of the scarcity of its fin cial resources, the Government reached the determinat in October, 1874, to suspend payments upon its obli tions. This implied the discontinuance of the payme which were being made upon many of the revolution claims from the Cibao, notably the claim of Gen Luperón, who had returned to the Republic who was pressing the Government for the payment him of some $170,000 which he alleged represented total of the debts he had incurred in the course of revolutionary activities during the six years of the G ernment of Baez. Although Luperón insisted that President had assured him that the payment of these cla met with his full approval, when the claims were fin presented to the Congress González made evident opposition to their settlement. The financial policy of Government met with open opposition, as was to be pected, throughout the Cibao, and prompted the c solidation of the opponents of the Government within "Blue" party, and added increased strength to the opp tion which existed among the Baecistas. The storm fin

[1] Mr. Paul Jones, American Consul, to Secretary Fish, September 11, 1874.

oke when González's Governor of Puerta Plata, General ncisco Ortea, evidenced an excess of zeal in ordering e arrest of General Luperón on the ground of the latter's en opposition to the Government. The leaders of the lue" party, even those who had been originally opposed Luperón, rallied to his support. The "Red" leaders mo- ntarily forgot their differences and joined the con- racy, and General Gonzáles was left with only a few rsonal followers to confront the situation. A revolution s speedily proclaimed in Santiago by a political organ- tion of widespread influence somewhat paradoxically own as the "League of Peace." Generals Benito Monción d Ulises Heureaux, together with Don Juan Isidro ménez, seized the town of Monte Cristi. General Luperón ok possession of Puerto Plata. The revolution rapidly read through all portions of the Republic.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Congress in the pital had, on February 21, 1876, declared unfounded the arges of corruption, tyranny and treason levelled by the eague of Peace" against the President, General González, lizing that he lacked the means wherewith to with- nd the opposition to his Administration which had w become almost universal, determined to heed the vice tendered him by representatives of both the "Blue" d the "Red" factions, and resigned his office. He there- on entrusted the Executive power to the members of Cabinet until a new Government could be organized, d prior to his resignation proclaimed the holding of neral elections in order that the people might once more afforded the opportunity of selecting their Chief gistrate.

On the day following the resignation of the President, neral González's Minister for War, General Villanueva,

called upon his fellow-members of the Cabinet to t measures to protect the city from invasion. This, howe they declined to do until the Minister for War had s rounded the Palace, where the Cabinet was in session, w armed soldiery. Alarm guns were fired and intense exc ment prevailed in the capital.

"Soldiers and civilians were running through the str armed, parents and servants were engaged in gather to their houses the school children, and doors and w dows of all buildings were hastily closed and secur fastened, and in fifteen minutes not a solitary individ was to be seen on the streets except here and ther belated soldier." [1]

From February 24th until March 7th, General Villanu assumed entire control of affairs with the intention of p paring the way for the return of Baez. At length, March 7th, realizing that public opinion, and more es cially the opinion of his colleagues in the Cabinet, overwhelmingly against him, and learning that troops w marching on the city from east and west, Villanueva c cluded to resign and fled from the capital to Haiti. mediately thereafter the capital city was peacefully s rendered to the control of the leaders of the revolution forces.

4.

The result of the elections of March, 1876, proved t the general longing for a reform government had spent itself as the result of the ill success of the Gonzâ Administration. The choice of the populace, gui thereto, it must be admitted, by the admonitions

[1] Mr. Paul Jones to Secretary Fish, March 30, 1876.

perón, fell upon a man who had never been an active
tisan in politics and who had no claim to military
ry beyond his participation in the overthrow of Spanish
nination. By an overwhelming majority, Don Ulises
ncisco Espaillat was elected President and took office
he capital on May 29, 1876.

n many ways one of the greatest men whom his country
produced, Espaillat possessed preëminent qualifications
the Presidency. He had been born in 1823 in Santiago
os Caballeros, where his family, of pure Spanish origin,
long established. A student by nature, profoundly in-
sted in scientific research and in natural history, he was
more attracted by the study of his fellow-men. Lack-
fundamentally all love of profit or of power, it had
uired the appeal to his patriotism, which was the dom-
ting force of his life, to rouse him to prominent partici-
ion in the revolt against Haiti, and to the holding of
ce in the revolutionary Government which overthrew
authority of Spain. Fearless where his sense of right
concerned, unwilling to remain silent when he was
ed by the evidences of injustice or corruption, his public
ignment of the dictators and spoilsmen who succeeded
mselves in power had brought him repeatedly persecu-
, exile and imprisonment.

When the call to office came, Espaillat had long since
ermined the course which spelled salvation for his
ntry—the Republic, he believed, must remain utterly
from all foreign entanglements. In his earlier years
ervent admirer of the United States, the negotiations
ween Grant and Baez had destroyed his faith in the
nterestedness of American statesmanship. It was to him
e most bitter disillusion," he once wrote,[1]

[1] J. F. Espaillat to General Gregorio Luperón, January 10, 1876.

"—the hope that the small Latin-American peop might have conceived of the logical protection of a gr and powerful nation . . we were now sadly forced the realization . . that we must in the future live un the shadow of fear and constant alarm by reason of policy of conquest of the Great Republic. Can you und stand how bitterly they have suffered who had thou to find in the United States their perfect ideal of politi institutions? Can you appreciate how sad and at the sa time how repugnant a spectacle it has been to those w have admired the achievements which have created political life of that great people to see one of their Pr dents negotiating a "deal" with the Government o small Republic—following the example proffered by European Monarch, and without even having, as had latter, for excuse the force of selfish interest?"

In the realm of domestic policy Espaillat's convicti were equally clear-cut. In his own words, "that pec which views the exercise of its own rights with indiff ence, is preparing itself to become enslaved"; and " 'to-morrow' . . . never dawns, and it is always until morrow that we postpone our accomplishments." prime necessities, and the chief aspirations, of the D minican people, Espaillat felt confident, were absol political freedom, an incorruptible and efficient judicia and universal education. He saw clearly furthermore t the political system which had prevailed in the Domini Republic since the date of its independence from Ha inasmuch as it was a system of political parties based so upon the personality of the party leaders, was fundam tally vicious. He was convinced, likewise, and made convictions public, that no Dominican Government co be stable until the finances of the country had been pla

on a healthy basis—until the resources of the Governnt were real and not theoretical, and until the national dget could actually be balanced. His concept for the ution of the financial situation lay in economy and in imposition of legitimate taxation, implying necessarily determined opposition to the issuance of paper money l the negotiation either of foreign loans or of foreign ncessions destined to stifle the natural growth of the tional resources.

Espaillat came to office with the approval of all, and at was most important, with the devoted support of h leaders as General Luperón, who was in part responle for overcoming Espaillat's reluctance to accept the sidency. That Espaillat had no illusions regarding the herent difficulties of his task was evident. He realized ly the fact that the popularity he commanded upon his tallation would quickly vanish when the Government und itself obliged to impose measures affecting the ckets of its citizens, and that the support of many of military leaders at first spontaneously tendered him, uld rapidly be withdrawn when it was found that the vernment had no special favours and no pecuniary ivileges to offer them. While the practical side of his ture undoubtedly grasped the well-nigh insurmounte obstacles which confronted him, it was the visionary e of his character, confiding in the latent genius of the minican people for self-government, which rendered paillat willing to assume the Presidency. His proclamaon to the people when he took office makes this in:

"The time perhaps is not far distant," he said, "when Dominican people, as exploited and outraged as it has

been badly led and badly governed, will heed the voice reason and render homage to justice."

Naming a Cabinet composed of the ablest men that co be selected in the country—Manuel de Jesús de Pe Manuel de Jesús Galván, José Gabriel García, Maria Antonio Cestero—as Secretaries of the Interior, Forei Affairs, Justice, and Finance, respectively, and Gene Gregorio Luperón as Minister for War, the Presid undertook his arduous task.

But the country, lamentably enough, proved unfit for the experiment which Espaillat proposed. The s constructive measure which Espaillat had time to off the creation of local banks of issue under Governm supervision, to stabilize the national credit, was misund stood, misconstrued, and died abortive. The President h hardly been in office two months before the intrigues General Baez, manipulating from his headquarters Curaçao, and the propaganda of General González, w had established himself in Mayaguez, proved effective creating the outbreak of revolutionary movements alo the Haitian frontier. These early attempts at rebell were crushed by General Eugenio Valerio and Gene Ulises Heureaux, but by midsummer the revolution h spread, and the Cibao eventually fell into the control armed adherents of General González while the south Provinces were dominated by the forces of the Baecis The energetic measures adopted by Espaillat's Minis for War, which had instilled new life and more especia new discipline into the Governmental armies, for a ti controlled the situation. The President himself eviden a sturdy determination to maintain the Constitution a his Government.

In letters written to his loyal friends one can read the adually increasing sense of discouragement which beset paillat, and the feeling of bitter loneliness which came er him as one after the other of those who had at first pported him in his work of reform deserted his Adminis-tion. One of these letters, written to General Cabral late the month of July, is worthy of quotation:

"You already know, doubtless, that what was in the ginning the insignificant foray of a small gang has day assumed the proportions of a formal insurrection ich the legitimate authorities of the Cibao are strug-ng with all their power to suppress.

"That means that I, who made the immense sacrifice accepting the Presidency because of the compelling gument that my acceptance of the office was absolutely ential if public order was to be preserved, have now consent that the force of arms, civil war, be the means maintaining me in power; power of which I never was amored and which I am exercising with profound taste.

"And if in offering my name, until now respected as at of a man of worth, lacking unworthy ambition, as at of an honored patriot—if in offering this name, ich is the sole legacy which I desired to bequeath to children, as a sacrifice upon the altar of the duty of ublic man, I could have the assurance that I was doing as a tribute to that portion of the Dominican people o still have some esteem for honor and the dictates of en of order,' I would make the sacrifice in all resigna-n; but when there is not a day that passes since I umed the fatal presidency which does not bring with a bitter disillusion from those from whom I least ex-cted it; when I see that instead of comprehension of situation and instead of loyal and vigorous assistance

I encounter only unjustifiable demands, unfounded d
content, indifference and aversion on the part of the m
whom I truly esteem and upon whose loyal coöperati
I most counted; when I find, in place of the assistar
necessary to save the country and to obtain its welfa
that to these very men public misfortunes are a mat
of indifference, and when I find that upon invoking th
aid to put out the conflagration which is commenci
they turn their backs upon me as if the conflagrati
were only going to destroy me, and as if my Administ
tion were alone interested in restraining it, then, my d
General, a feeling of absolute hopelessness gains possessi
of my soul. What, after all, can I think or hope of su
insanity, such madness?

"Two months ago the presence of these men in t
north, once Gabino (Crespo) was defeated by Gene
Heureaux, made triumph sure, and would have calmed
passions, implanting confidence in our friends and resp
among our enemies. Today, it is necessary to ruin t
Republic, calling upon the south to rise against th
egotistical and factious rebels. What an aftermath
deplorable consequences can one foresee!

"I do not know what excuse they can offer to pub
opinion, to God, to their own conscience, those very m
who not three months ago raised me to the Presidenc
and I without giving them the least motive, witho
changing in the slightest degree either my program
administration or my principles, both of which were fu
known beforehand; today it seems as if they took pleas
in discrediting me and in bringing about my downfall,
if they had solely wished to elevate me in order to obt
the satisfaction of casting me down.

"I have the right to count upon the men of wor
General, my friend, and the men of worth have not
right to turn their back upon my necessity. Let me kn

you think that I am right and then act in accordance th your own convictions."

In the early Autumn the President made public a final peal to the leaders of all parties to overlook their per- nal ambitions and to forget their party strife in order at the Government might have the support of all.

Dominicans, of all parties," he besought them, "help me reëstablishing order, and seek by supporting the law e road to the salvation of the country and the honor our national fame. To this end you may resort to all gal methods, when, after peace is restored, elections are ssible, and through the press or in public assembly you ay determine upon the candidate whom you may desire succeed me in the Presidency in accordance with the nstitution. But, otherwise, no usurper shall impose him- f by violence, unless those who rejoice in soaking our cred land with blood first pay for their dastardly enter- ise as they deserve.

"Fellow Citizens! I call you all, not excepting the lead- s of the Revolution nor my opponents, to my side to feguard law and order, liberty and civilization. I appeal your patriotism, which you have so often demonstrated der a thousand adverse circumstances, and I promise to the first to contribute to the return of peace and of neral well-being."

The situation, however, had gone far beyond the possi- ity of controlling it through an appeal to reason. On ctober 5th, a group of malcontents in the capital seized e seat of Government and proclaimed themselves a tional Dictatorship, announcing their intention to main- n their posts until General González could return. paillat was thus forced to resign. On December 20th,

Espaillat issued a farewell message to his people, a returned to his home in the Cibao where he died so after, profoundly disillusioned, a broken-hearted man.

5.

González's return to power lasted barely forty days.

"González and his gang were no more than the spid which ensnared Espaillat; Baez was the hawk. Gonzál and his followers were the rats which ran to devour t skeleton of the Republic; but behind them came Ba who was the cat." [1]

Immediately after his return to the capital, General Go zález had sent his Minister for War, General Villanue to the Cibao, where the latter entered into a conspira with General Cáceres and other Baecista leaders, w declared themselves supporters of Baez rather than González. Puerto Plata was captured by these chieftai the revolutionary troops marched upon the capital, a González again fled from the country. Then, for the l time, Buenaventura Baez, the "Great Citizen" return to power.

Installed as Dictator on December 27, 1876, Baez on more formed a Government in which there figured t familiar names of the same men who had so long be associated with him. In March of the following year was declared elected President of the Republic by National Convention, selected *ad hoc*, on the dubio constitutional ground that

"The heroic Dominican people, in the exercise of th inherent sovereignty, had unanimously proclaimed t

[1] Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. II, p. 354.

eat Citizen, Buenaventura Baez, President of the public."

ez's inaugural address was, as ever, replete with assurces. Among other specious promises, the people were aranteed exemption from imprisonment, exile or other nishment for political offenses; a free press; the right free speech; assembly in public meetings; religious tolation; the inviolability of private correspondence. That e Dictator did not place entire reliance upon the "unanious proclamation of the heroic Dominican people" was ade apparent by a confidential message sent the American cretary of State by his Agent in the Dominican capital:

"In private conversation General Baez says the only vation for the country is annexation and is still hopeful its accomplishment." [1]

As was to be anticipated, a general revolution broke out most immediately. The first signs of revolt were manisted at Juana Méndez on the Haitian frontier, where eneral Benito Monción and Don Maximo Grullón comenced a guerrilla warfare. The revolution gained added petus from the support given the Dominican "emiados" by the President of Haiti, General Boisrond nal, who had been persuaded of the mutual advantages hich lay therein by General González who had taken fuge in Port-au-Prince. Appeals for assistance were at ce directed by Baez to the American Government, upon e ground that the Haitian authorities were supporting e revolution because of their belief that the Great Citin desired to sell his country to the United States, and at, since in that contingency Haiti would eventually

[1] Mr. Paul Jones to Secretary Fish, January 16, 1877.

likewise be absorbed, the Haitian Republic would not
safe so long as Baez remained in power.

As the result of repeated representations, made bo
through Baez's Agent in Washington, Don Joaquín Mo
tolio, and through the American Commercial Agent
Santo Domingo, the Department of State at length i
structed the American Minister in Port-au-Prince to ma
plain to the Haitian Government that, while there w
no purpose on the part of the United States to revive t
plan for the annexation of the Dominican Republic,
was hoped that the Haitian Government would restra
marauders from entering Dominican territory. Small i
portance was attached to these representations, and t
assistance lent by the Haitian authorities to the increasi
number of Dominican revolutionaries became more op
and effective as the weeks passed.

Baez's next move was an attempt to convince Sec
tary Evarts, who in the Hayes Administration, had su
ceeded Hamilton Fish as Secretary of State, that t
Government of the United States was indebted to t
Dominican Government to the amount of some $300,0
for the occupation of the Bay and Peninsula of Sama
under the rejected treaty of 1869, the amount claim
being the sum of the payments due the 1st of January
each of the years 1870, 1871, and 1872, deducting the a
vance originally paid by General Babcock. The claim co
tinued to be pressed not only throughout Baez's tenure
office but during the term of his successor as well, and w
only dropped upon receipt of the final conclusive sta
ment of Secretary Evarts that

"It is obvious that the convention pursuant to whi
a claim is made for money due from the United States

e Dominican Republic was never completed as its con-
ions required, and consequently no such claim has any
lid or legal vindication." [1]

As soon as the revolt commenced, Baez at once had
ourse to the acts of cruelty and repression which had
tinguished his previous periods of authority. In May,
e President caused the arrest of fifty of the leading
abitants of the capital, and upon their discharge by
e courts on the ground that no commission of crime
uld be proved against them, the President announced his
tention of substituting more pliant individuals for the
dges who had flouted his wishes. All guarantees granted
the Constitution were then formally suspended, and
th nationals and foreigners were indiscriminately arrested
d imprisoned without any cause being assigned or
arges preferred. In November, over one hundred per-
ns—among them the Peruvian Consul, an old man dying
consumption, as well as three citizens of the United
ates—were sent from Puerto Plata to be thrust into the
eady overcrowded prison in the capital. The army was
creased by daily drafts upon the rural population. The
pular reaction was depicted in a further despatch from
e American Commercial Agent to the Secretary of State:

"All classes unite in attributing economic conditions to
e bad management of Baez. If it were not for the fear
hich he inspires owing to his malignant character and
e savage vengeance he inflicts upon his enemies he would
t be suffered to remain in the country forty-eight hours
I have never known such intense bitterness and hatred
is expressed against Baez." [2]

[1] Secretary Evarts to the Dominican Minister for Foreign Affairs, April 2, 3.
[2] Mr. Paul Jones to Secretary Evarts, July 20, 1877.

Although temporarily the revolution died down f
want of unity among its leaders, with the first month
the year 1878, it broke out again with renewed fu
Padre Meriño, at the time Vicar of the Province of Seyb
was instrumental in fomenting the rise of the inhabitar
of that Province against the Dictator, and a great numb
of Seyban troops headed by General Cesareo Guillerr
marched against the capital. Soon after, the Province
Azua, so long responsive to the behests of the Baez fami
joined the movement. The Cibao was already under arr
During the first week of February the contending part
were attacking the Government armies on all sides of t
capital, and on February 18th, the Governmental detac
ment in Pajarito, across the Ozama River from the ci
of Santo Domingo, was almost annihilated by the troc
under Guillermo. Baez now reached the conclusion th
he had not the wherewithal to hold out any longer. D
laying for a few days the final negotiation of his capitu
tion with the leaders of the insurgents, the Dictator c
lected all the customs revenues which he could force t
local merchants to pay in advance, amounting to so
$70,000, and then, on March 2nd, abdicated his author
and set sail once more for Puerto Rico. During this l
period in the Presidency the Great Citizen was enabled,

"by withholding the salaries both from civil officials a
the soldiers in the field, to accumulate a sum of more th
$300,000, which was sent abroad for deposit." [1]

6.

On March 3rd, the revolutionists commanded by Ge
eral Guillermo marched into the capital, where a Pr

[1] Mr. Paul Jones to the Secretary of State, March 19, 1878.

ional Government headed by their chieftain was at once ablished. For a while an anomalous situation existed, ce at the same time that the Provisional Government General Guillermo was functioning in the capital and ntrolling the more important seaports of the Republic, econd Provisional Government of which General Gonez had been proclaimed the chief was functioning in ntiago, and controlling the Cibao.

Had the desire of the people for peace not been so eat—for the struggles of the preceding year had reduced country to a condition of misery commensurate only th that which existed subsequent to the revolt against ain—a new outbreak of civil war might have at once sued. But the destitution of the populace and the coun- of such leaders as General Luperón contributed to a aceful solution of the dispute, and it was determined resort to the polls in determining the choice for the sidency. A reconciliation was likewise effected between neral González and General Luperón, resulting in a nt manifesto addressed by them to the people, urging support of all classes and of all parties for the candiy of the Chief of the Santiago Government. Consently, in the general elections held in May of the same r General González was once more elected Presint.

Immediately after his inauguration, which occurred in first days of the month of July, 1878, General Gonez attempted to secure the continued support of Gen- l Luperón by offering him any post in the Government ich he might desire. Upon Luperón's refusal to accept ce, the President, apparently fearing an implied threat inst his supremacy, refused to carry out the promises ich he had made previous to his election to the redoubt-

able chief of the "Blue" party, among them the prom to appoint General Heureaux as Governor of Puerto Pla Indignant at this disregard of his wishes, General Luper at once resorted once more to revolution, and on Aug 3rd captured the fort in Puerto Plata and took possessi of the city. A Provisional Government was once m constituted in Puerto Plata under the control of Luperó adherents, among them Alfredo Deetjen and Gener Heureaux and Federico Lithgow. When he learned of outbreak in Puerto Plata, President González despatch a small body of soldiers to that city on the Americ steamer *Tybee*. As soon as the insurgents were appri of the presence of Governmental troops on board the v sel, which had anchored some three miles outside the h bour, they demanded the delivery of the soldiers on boa and the Government war vessel held by Luperón, enforced by eighty men fully armed, was sent to capt the *Tybee*, but the latter, steaming swiftly for C Haitian, arrived in safety before it was overhauled by insurgent vessel.

Steps were then promptly taken by the Provisio Government to march upon the capital, but not swif enough to prevent the prior arrival there of Gene Guillermo, who himself had lost no time in proclaimi a revolution against González after his defeat in elections.

By August 24th, Guillermo's forces had invested capital both from the east bank of the Ozama River a from the western side of the city. On the following d an engagement resulted, but as the President had o some 200 men to defend the city and no prospects obtaining additional forces, he was forced on Septem 2nd to abdicate, and sailed for Curaçao. On Septem

, General Guillermo entered the city, to quote the erican Commercial Agent,

the head of some 600 of the most villainous looking ans it was ever my misfortune to behold." [1]

or the time being, the Chief Justice of the Supreme rt was permitted to hold office as Provisional Presi-t, General Guillermo assuring his own control of the ation by seizing the Portfolio of War in the Provisional inet; and finally, as the result of further elections held January 26th, 27th, and 28th, General Guillermo ed his own election as Constitutional President, and inaugurated on February 27th, 1879.

General Luperón, who had not unwisely declared his rmined refusal to accept election to the Presidency iew of the fact that General Guillermo had already red possession of the capital, left the country and arked for Europe. The only other rival momentarily ed by General Guillermo, General Manuel A. Cáceres, removed from the scene through assassination. Seated evening in the house of his friend, Don Juan de la z Alfonseca, he was shot from the street through the n door.

or a while the country sank into the uneasy rest of uestion. The new President evidenced neither interest he welfare of his country, nor desire for reform in national Administration, nor did he manifest even that tude for dictatorial government shown by his more erful predecessors in office. A mulatto from the Prov- of Seybo, he had served during many years the dic- of Baez, and had been, with his father, a leader in extermination of all those who had remained faithful

[1] Mr. Paul Jones to Secretary of State, April 2, 1878.

to General Santana during the years of the latter's strug against his chief rival. He had distinguished himself a "ferocious and pitiless persecutor of all who were not herents of Baez and had made himself feared as a n without scruples and without pity." [1] Utterly lacking education, he possessed no ambitions beyond the lust power and the desire to obtain as much profit as he mi during the days that he remained in office. During months of his Administration the country lay prostr beneath the repeated atrocities of his subordinates found itself, if possible, in a worse plight than that wh had existed during the last months of the Dictatorship Baez.

The movement for Guillermo's overthrow was in gated by Luperón, who returned from Europe in autumn. Proclaiming a new revolution in Puerto Plata October 6, 1879, Luperón constituted a Provisional G ernment and called to his support his chief adhere appointing as members of the Provisional Cabinet G erals Heureaux and Lithgow, Alfredo Deetjen and brothers Maximiliano and Eliseo Grullón. Protesting aga the reëstablishment of a dictatorship, the Provisional G ernment openly accused Guillermo of responsibility the murder of General Cáceres, of having converted public treasury into the private property of his follov and of himself, and proclaimed that the revolution led by

"the soldier of democracy, Gregorio Luperón, who ne unsheathed his sword but to safeguard the independe of the Nation and to protect the liberties, the securi and the rights of his fellow-citizens."

[1] Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. III, p. 23.

The contest against the Dictator commenced immedi-
y thereafter. President Guillermo, who was at least not
cient in personal valour, went out in person at the head
is troops to meet the rebels. Establishing his headquar-
on the southern side of the pass known as San Pedro,
ch commanded the highroad from the capital to
uy, he was there surprised by the revolutionary troops
mmanded by Heureaux and routed, being compelled
all back in utter disorder upon Santo Domingo. One-
d of the Dictator's troops reached the capital; the
ainder deserted. After fortifying the capital, Gen-
Guillermo marched swiftly to the Seybo, which he
posed remained still loyal to him. There he succeeded
recruiting some 800 men, but being again taken by
prise was once more defeated, and, deserting his own
iers, returned to Santo Domingo on November 10th
h only ten men.[1] The capital was immediately sur-
nded by the revolutionary forces and all communica-
s and means of supply were thus cut off. After the
had been reduced to the point of starvation, Presi-
t Guillermo realized that his time had come, and, fail-
to obtain the assistance from the Spanish Captain-Gen-
of Puerto Rico for which he had secretly negotiated,
ook refuge on December 6th upon a Spanish man-of-
which lay conveniently outside the harbour of Santo
mingo and fled to Puerto Rico.

The Government of the Republic was now vested
the hands of General Luperón, who insisted upon
ining the seat of his authority at Puerto Plata, dele-
ng General Heureaux as his representative in the
ital.

[1] Mr. Paul Jones to the Secretary of State, December 8, 1879.

7.

The first steps taken by the Provisional Governm were indicative of Luperón's honest desire to pacify country and to accomplish what he might, during limited time the Provisional Government should rem in office, to bring order out of the chaos which the s of anarchy of the preceding years had produced. Provisional President himself at once announced his de mined refusal to accept the Constitutional Presidency the Republic. A Constitutional Convention was su moned to meet in the capital to amend the Constitut and the electorate was officially informed that gen elections would be held as soon as the Constitution once more been revised. In the meantime, General Lup and his Ministers set themselves to the task of reform the administrative machinery of the Government, in ticular that of the Department of Finance.

A law of conscription was passed and the national a was completely reorganized; measures were adopte improve local administration in the various provinces, military and civil; and the national arsenals, deplete the result of the successive revolutions, were repleni with modern arms and ammunition. The salaries of employees of the Government, which had remained un during the three previous Administrations, were prom paid by the Provisional Government, although their t amounting to some $200,000, was a severe strain the limited resources of the national treasury. Ad ments of the pending foreign claims were reached concessions granted by the previous Administrations canceled wherever it was shown that the terms of concessions had not been strictly complied with. The

nal President, who had inveighed against the treaty tiated by General González in 1874 with the Haitian ernment, made evident his continued disapproval of agreement entered into by refusing to accept from dent Salamon all installments offered on the amounts l to the Dominican Republic by Haiti under the isions of the treaty.

nally, General Luperón rendered official tribute to an rrence which had signalized the last Administration aez and which the latter had neither the inclination the opportunity to commemorate.

n September 10, 1877, during the course of repairs e near the High Altar of the Cathedral of Santo ingo, the leaden coffin containing the bones of Chris- er Columbus was discovered under the pavement of Cathedral. It had been previously assumed that the n had been removed from Santo Domingo to Havana 796 by the Spanish authorities, but since the records archives of the Cathedral had been destroyed some s before, it was evident that the ecclesiastical authori- at that time exercising authority over the Cathedral, usted to the Spanish officials, through error, the coffin aining the remains of Columbus's son, Don Diego n. As soon as the discovery of the true coffin was e the remains were exhumed and examined in the ence of the ecclesiastical authorities, the officials of Government, and the Consuls of the foreign Powers, idst the booming of cannon and the music of the tary band."[1] Subsequently, they were again enclosed wooden box covering the original leaden coffin, sealed the official seals of the Consuls and other authorities, entrusted to the custody of Padre Francisco X.

r. Paul Jones to Secretary of State, September 29, 1877.

Billini in the Church of the Regina Angelorum. F
that day, no further importance had been attributed
the discovery, and General Luperón, by a decree issue
Puerto Plata April 1, 1880, allotted $10,000 from
public treasury of the Dominican Government as the
portion of a fund destined towards the erection o
monument in Santo Domingo to the memory of the
coverer of the American continent, and by official c
munications addressed to the Governments of all
American Republics and to those of Spain and I
requested further assistance towards the erection of
monument. While the Governments so addressed, v
the exception of that of Spain, which still mainta
that the remains transferred in the 18th century
Havana were the true remains of the Great Adm
expressed their gratification at the discovery, no fur
action was taken for a long period. At length, the rem
were once more removed to the Cathedral and t
deposited under a monument, erected solely with fu
raised in the Dominican Republic, which stands within
main entrance of the edifice.

During the months in which General Luperón
laying, with notable success, the foundations for st
government in the Republic, he was at the same
endeavouring to obtain a candidate, satisfactory to h
self and responsive to the requirements of the nation
succeed him as Constitutional President of the Repu
His first selection was Don Pedro Francisco Bonó of
Francisco de Macorís. Señor Bonó was a citizen of pr
patriotism, of the highest personal integrity, gene
esteemed by reason of the prominent part which he
taken in the Restoration. A planter and merchant, t
had been no sacrifice too great for him to make tow

liberation of his country from the rule of Spain, and ough he had never consented to take an active part overnmental affairs, he had ever assisted so far as he ht as a private citizen in promoting the establishment lemocratic government. He proved utterly unwilling, ever, to accept the honours which the Provisional ident desired to have conferred upon him, protesting ack of personal ambition and his fear that he did not ess the necessary strength to undertake the arduous which the assumption of the Presidency implied. erón then turned, for second choice, to Padre iño.

ernando Arturo de Meriño had for many years been a inguished figure in the life of the Republic. An out- ding patriot even before the cession of the Republic Santana to Spain, he had gained widespread influence his fearless opposition to the barter of his country's ereignty, as the result of which he had been forced to the country. An orator of extraordinary eloquence, mposing presence, a man of the greatest force of per- l character, dominating, intolerant, he had become tified with that small group in the Republic who had isted in their opposition to all infringements of the on's liberties, and he had opposed with all the force is command the tyranny of the series of Dictators had despoiled the land to their own profit. A politi- more than a priest, Padre Meriño had for many years yed the intimate friendship of Luperón, and had not aturally become identified with the political aspira- s of the leaders of the "Blue" party. Although at times rgence of opinion threatened to disrupt the close ndship which existed between these two arrogant men, erón's true estimate of the man whom he now selected

as the one to replace him in office was later written do in his memoirs:

"It is men like Meriño who represent the moral fo of this world. Inspired by noble sentiments and suppor by their own courage, they are the center of all progress social renascence." [1]

There is no better indication of the sincere desire Luperón for his country's well-being, and no better pr of his ability to sink his own interests in his efforts the Republic's salvation, than in this decision to ref office himself when he could so easily have retained it, in his selection of two such outstanding patriots as Pe Francisco Bonó and Padre Meriño as fit elements to furt the true welfare of the nation.

On May 29, 1880, General Luperón addressed a pu manifesto to the Dominican people urging upon them election as their President of Padre Meriño. Granted immense support, Padre Meriño was elected without op sition, and was inaugurated President of the Republic September 1, 1880. In view of the favour bestowed u Padre Meriño by the Provisional President, two ca dates who had at first presented themselves—Gen Heureaux and General Francisco Gregorio Billini—w drew their candidacy prior to the election, and w rewarded by their appointment by the new Presiden Ministers of the Interior and of War, respectively, in new Cabinet. The other Ministers whom the Presi selected were General Casimiro N. de Moya, Don E Grullón, and Don Rodolfo Roberto Boscowitz as Mi ters of Foreign Affairs, Fomento and Hacienda. Clo in his clerical robes, Padre Meriño took the oath of o

[1] Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. I.

nd read his inaugural address, but if any malcontents elieved that the clerical garments in which their new resident was garbed covered any weakness, any pity for ie evil-doer, or any reluctance to punish the insurgent, ney were grievously mistaken. No more vigorous rule, no nore decisive sway, had ever previously been exercised by ny Dominican President.

8.

During the first year of the new Government there rere two attempts at revolution. The first, headed by General Braulio Alvarez, who led an uprising near the apital, was mercilessly crushed by General Heureaux. The second, which threatened to become more serious— landing of insurgent forces near Jovero in the east under he leadership of General Cesareo Guillermo, who had em- arked his troops from Puerto Rico with the connivance nd assistance of the Spanish authorities—was likewise peedily put down, and the ringleaders of the rebellion, vith the exception of Guillermo, who succeeded in mak- ng his escape, were executed without pity. Prisoners, the vounded, even boys of fifteen, captured under arms, uffered the extreme penalty. During the remainder of President Meriño's term of office he had no valid cause o fear rebellion.

The peaceful months under the Provisional Govern- nent of General Luperón and the firm control exercised y President Meriño brought, as a natural result, an imme- iate return of material prosperity to the Republic. Im- orts rapidly showed a great increase, and it was during his period that the extensive planting of the sugar estates n the southern shores of the Republic, which now form a naterial portion of the country's natural wealth, was com-

menced. Immigrants from Cuba and from Puerto Rico entered the country in considerable numbers, and the activities of these settlers added renewed impetus to the development of the agricultural resources of the country.

Perturbed by the first attempt at revolution which had been perpetrated, and induced thereto by the rumour of the imminent insurrection of Guillermo, and likewise incensed by the antagonism of the Senate, which was insistent that his Administration render a public accounting of its disposition of the public monies, President Meriño, on May 30, 1881, issued a decree announcing his assumption of power temporarily as Dictator of the nation. On the same day, a proclamation was issued abolishing the right of asylum in foreign Consulates, as the result of which many suspected malcontents were arrested and incarcerated in the prisons of the capital. The energetic measures taken by the President were probably responsible for the failure of a conspiracy against him engineered by followers of the ex-Presidents, Baez and González, although the time lost by the conspirators in wrangling over the question of whether Baez or González should be entrusted with the Government, were the revolution to prove successful, was presumably of no small assistance to the chief executive.

The vigorous measures adopted by the President were openly supported by General Lithgow and other leaders of the "Blues," who organized a series of public meetings throughout the Republic in commendation of the steps taken. General Luperón himself, absent in Europe as diplomatic emissary of the Government, and engrossed, as he recounts in his memoirs with somewhat naïve satisfaction, in conferences with Lord Granville and Mr Gladstone, with the Duque de Fernan Núñez, and with

FERNANDO ARTURO MERIÑO

President of the Dominican Republic 1880-1882
and later Archbishop of Santo Domingo

-ominent statesmen in France, in an attempt to solve
ıe outstanding difficulties between his Government and
ıose of Great Britain, Spain and France, had no words
= censure to direct against the energy displayed by the
.an whom he had been instrumental in placing in office.

At length the time came for the Government to pre-
ıre for the national elections in which Padre Meriño's
:ccessor in the Presidency was to be selected. On May
1, 1882, the President promulgated a decree convoking
ıe elections for the following July 1st, 2nd and 3rd. In
:cordance with the custom then existing, the voting took
lace in the various ayuntamientos, the votes cast each
ay being counted by the members of the ayuntamiento
: five o'clock in the afternoon. In those localities where
o ayuntamiento existed, the Alcalde and two fellow-
itizens appointed by him computed the returns, and all
eturns made were sent directly to the Congress, a copy
eing sent to the Minister of the Interior, and a third
opy being retained in each ayuntamiento or alcaldía.
ıasmuch as the candidacies of General Ulises Heureaux
: President and of General Casimiro N. de Moya as Vice
resident were supported both by President Meriño and
y General Luperón and his adherents, the Governmental
cket was naturally elected by a great majority.

On September 1, 1882, the new President and Vice
resident were inaugurated, and immediately thereafter
Cabinet composed of personal partisans of the new
resident, General Wenceslao Figuereo, General Segundo
nbert, General Generoso Marchena, Don Alejandro Woss
Gil and Don Juan Tomás Mejia, was appointed. Thus,
or the first time in the history of the Republic save one,
President was regularly elected and installed in accord-
ıce with the Constitution.

CHAPTER VII

THE DICTATORSHIP OF ULISES HEUREAUX

1.

THE date, September 1, 1882, marks the commencement of an epoch of seventeen years during which the interests, the development and even the fate of the Dominican people as a sovereign and independent nation were obscured and merged in the destinies of one man, the negro Ulises Heureaux. The absorbing interest of the period lies not alone in the vicissitudes of the Republic which came to pass in consequence of the Dictatorship. It lies as well in the human drama evolved from the protracted struggle of one man to maintain himself in power by every means known to his ingenuity; in Heureaux's gradual consolidation of his authority; in his attempt to quench through terror the last sparks of the longing for liberty which lingered in the souls of those whom he oppressed, until his swift, violent death brought with it the end of the most pitiless tyranny known to the Republics of the American continent.

The intrinsic viciousness of Heureaux's rule, it must be clearly realized at the outset, lay not so much in the oppressive character of his Government, in his efforts to betray the sovereignty of his people for his own profit, nor in his gross corruption; not in his cold vindictiveness, nor in the blood-lust which ravaged the man; the history of democracy, and the democracy of the Western Hemisphere not excepted, bears spread upon its pages lives of those as evil as Heureaux. The significant threat to the fundamental health of the Dominican nation, the danger which increased with each month of Heureaux's domination, lay in his appeal, so frequently successful, throug

ar, through the hope of personal advancement, or rough vulgar bribery, to the basest instincts of the tural leaders of public thought. The latent patriotism the nation's manhood became corrupted; and what as infinitely more tragic, and of far graver import to e country's destiny, in the hearts of the future genera- on the ideals of valour, integrity, liberty and freedom, r which the founders of the Republic had sacrificed emselves, became adulterated and perverted.

The narration of the history of Heureaux's dictator- ip constitutes the depiction of a period lacking all that hich is most inspiring in western civilization, save for ose brief and futile struggles of a few patriots to raise eir land from its long-continued subjection. The sensa- on of the times can only be compared to the ominous rtent of one of those black, hot, tropical nights in the ictator's own country when the atmosphere is charged ith the oppression of the approaching cyclone. The cer- inty exists that eventually the lightning will flash and e storm will break and the sun will rise again; but even ter the dawn the horror lingers. So in the hearts of eureaux's countrymen, after his assassination the horror his times still persisted.

2.

The origin and antecedents of Ulises Heureaux are to me extent shrouded in obscurity. That he had no ominican blood in his veins has always been well estab- hed, and that fact was responsible for the modification, uring the Presidency of his predecessor, Padre Meriño, the Constitution, which had previously provided that ly those who were Dominicans both by birth and par- tage could aspire to the Presidency. It is, however, like-

wise possible that he was born in the Island of St. Thomas and not in Puerto Plata as he himself claimed. The date of his birth is also uncertain. It is generally accepted, however, that he was born on October 21, 1845, in the city of Puerto Plata, the illegitimate son of a Haitian, d'Assas Heureaux, by a negress of St. Thomas named Josefa Lebel. In his earliest years, in accordance with the common Dominican custom, a nickname was bestowed upon him by his mother—that of "Lilis"—and it was by that nickname of his early childhood that Heureaux was destined to be known so long as he lived.

Such education as Heureaux obtained in his childhood he gained at a school maintained by an Englishman, a Methodist missionary, pastor in the city of Puerto Plata. Apprenticed for a brief period in the store of a French merchant, the future Dictator soon freed himself from a restraint to which he felt himself in no wise suited, to undertake a career which promised more adventure. Fortunately for him, he early attracted the attention of General Gregorio Luperón, to whose fortunes he attached himself until the time arrived when he concluded that the patronage of that patriot and popular hero was no longer necessary to enable him to fulfill his own ambitions. At the age of eighteen he took part in the war of the Restoration with conspicuous valour, a quality which distinguished him among his fellows throughout his whole career. General Luperón, notwithstanding the utter ingratitude which Heureaux displayed in after life to the man who had made possible his own rise to power, later penned this tribute to him:

"Heureaux, with loyalty and decision, accompanied his chieftain in all of his campaigns, through all his exile

ough all difficulties and dangers, and never showed in conflict the least discouragement. Devoted to his rk, he displayed such ability that eventually he was the ef of the General Staff of his General and the officer whom the latter placed most confidence when the most icult tasks had to be carried out." [1]

terly fearless, he displayed throughout the revolution- campaigns waged by General Luperón during the re of years subsequent to the Restoration such energy l enterprise, such marked intelligence in military affairs, h popularity among the Dominican troops, that his pointment by President Meriño as Minister, granted relations with General Luperón, was a foregone con- sion.

The activity which Heureaux displayed as the Minister Meriño might readily, however, have given pause to se who were about to elevate him to the Presidency, even ough they lacked prophetic vision. It was Heureaux who ecuted the notorious decree which the President was luced to promulgate, dubbed by popular sarcasm the cree of San Fernando, which provided that all those zed under arms would suffer the penalty of death. It s by virtue of this decree, when the two rebellions of riño's first Presidential year broke out, that Heureaux petrated, without the President's knowledge, the first the long series of legalized executions which were later make his name execrated. Among the rebels captured der arms when the unsuccessful revolt of General sareo Guillermo in the Seybo was crushed, were his agonist of long standing, General Juan Isidro Ortea, l his own brother-in-law, Luís Pecuña, against whom

[1] General Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. III.

Heureaux bore an especial grudge for some reason n
then disclosed. It is related that Pecuña, confident th
his life would be spared because of his close relationship
the leader of the Government forces, was called after h
capture before Heureaux. His confidence rendered mo
secure by the apparent kindliness of his brother-in-la
in ordering that he be brought food, and a change
clothes to replace the garments worn by the exposures
a long and arduous march, Pecuña was appalled when
was coolly informed by Heureaux that the orders ha
been given solely in order to make it possible for him
bear himself with more composure and thus not disgra
his family when he was brought before the firing squa
His protestations unavailing, he was then summari
despatched, immediately after the execution of Ortea.

Notwithstanding these and many other instances
the savage cruelty peculiar to the man, possibly becau
of the faith which they placed in his sponsors, Luperó
and Meriño, Heureaux came to the Presidency with th
enthusiastic acclaim of his fellow-citizens. Rendered qu
escent by the tranquillity and the increasing prosperi
which the preceding governments of Luperón and Meri
had bestowed upon them, they little knew what th
assumption of the Presidency by Ulises Heureaux he
in store.

At the time Heureaux became President he had lo
since emerged from the chrysalis of his barefoot days
Puerto Plata, and from the transition state of his arduo
wanderings with Luperón. The time was far past when h
need was such that he had had his own arm shattere
and had murdered one of his companions, in a strugg
to retain possession of a blanket with which to cover hi
self. He had by now become the resplendent figure of h

r period. In the prime of life—for he was then some
ty-seven years of age—he was already affecting ex-
ne elegance in his dress and personal appurtenances.
rdinately vain of his personal appearance, he was ever
dful of the completely negroid aspect of his face,
ch he attempted to mitigate so far as Nature made it
ible by resorting to the most elaborate uniforms, to
most immaculate clothes. Tall, with splendid carriage,
body was beautifully proportioned, being that admir-
welding, often found in the African race, of a suave,
ost feline, surface under which there rippled the mus-
and sinews of an immensely powerful resilient frame.
physique was untiring and untirable, and his nerves
r under the most perfect control, due in part, no
bt, to his life-long abstinence from both alcohol and
acco. His sole weaknesses, if so they can be termed,
e those of the savage—his domination by his sexual
ions, which never were satiated, and his lust for blood.
rageous in the highest degree, confident of his own
vers, astute with native shrewdness, possessed of the
ate suspicion of the savage, polished with the veneer
civilization which he had acquired, rapacious, merci-
pitiless, filled with unquenchable dæmonic energy,
n was the figure which was now for so long to domi-
e the scene.

3.

The first Presidential term of Heureaux may be termed
ost uneventful. The Dictator, convinced of the truth
the old adage, "Il faut reculer pour mieux sauter,"
ed his part with consummate guile. There was liberty
peech and liberty of the press. Deferent to the advice
he prominent leaders of his party, he was conciliatory
ll. The two years of this first term passed like a pleasant

dream. The Administration, in a financial sense, was more fortunate than its predecessors, since the revenues the nation continued to increase, and the President, the result doubtless of his immediate efforts to concili the Government of Haiti by entering into flattering l futile negotiations for the conclusion of a new treaty w the neighbouring Republic, was the recipient of a sec donation from the Haitian President, General Salamon, the sum of $50,000 with which to pave the way for own return to power. Claims of Dominicans against th own Government were rapidly paid off, and if upon termination of his Administration it was found that n withstanding that the annual expenditures of the Gove ment had amounted only to some $800,000, and yearly income had exceeded $3,000,000, there still mained a total deficit of some $300,000, surely the fa could not be attributed to the President nor to his Sec tary of Hacienda, General Generoso Marchena, proclain loudly by Heureaux to be the greatest economist of whole Republic. But few probably possessed the pessimi or perhaps the good sense, of Luperón when he wr regarding Heureaux's Minister:

"There exists in the Dominican Republic the mistal theory that any man who can figure must be an eco mist, and it is for that reason that almost alwa through some fatality, Governments appoint a Minis of Hacienda who has failed in his own business and w fails consequently to a greater degree in the business the State." [1]

Only one brief outbreak marred the peaceful course events. On November 16, 1883, a revolution was p

[1] General Luperón, "Notas Autobiográficas," Vol. III.

med in the town of Moca by General Cartagena. ching immediately at the head of his troops to the ne of the rebellion, the President by vigorous measures mptly suppressed it and thereafter continued his march ough the Cibao to Puerto Plata, where a magnificent ption rewarded his triumph.

n the spring of 1884, the time arrived when Heureaux nd it necessary under the Constitution to make plans the selection of his successor. Although his own pres- and his authority had been greatly enhanced during term of office, and his personal popularity was great, did not yet feel himself sufficiently secure to risk the ve dangers which would undoubtedly have arisen had attempted so early to undertake a revision of the Con- ution in order to permit his own retention of office. d such an attempt been made at the time, Heureaux s sure that the immense influence of General Luperón l of the other outstanding figures in the "Blue" party uld most certainly have been exerted against him. ere existed still unity and cohesion among these leaders. e fruition of his own ambitions, he realized, must de- d upon the breaking up of the leadership of the party ich had placed him in power. What more satisfactory l facile method could there be than his utilization of thirst for power among these leaders in order to troy the force in the country which that party resented?

His first open step towards that end, after months of et intrigue, was taken on March 24, 1884, when he mmoned to his private house the members of his Cabi- ; the Governors of the Provinces; the ex-President, lre Meriño; General Francisco Gregorio Billini, one of outstanding aspirants for the Presidency; the more

prominent military and civil officials of his Administ
tion; and the editors of the Dominican newspapers
most importance. With consummate shrewdness, He
reaux proposed—and did not omit to cause the public
tion of his proposal—that in the coming elections for t
Presidency his party support but one candidate in orc
that a diversity of candidates, bound to create perso
enmities fatal to the country, might be avoided, and fu
ther volunteered the assurance, that were his propo
unfortunately not to be accepted, his Government wou
in any event maintain the strictest neutrality. The co
ference resulted in no decision, as Heureaux had well fo
seen, as the prospective candidates—with the exception
Padre Meriño, who resolutely refused under any con
tions to return to the Presidency—having each secre
been advised by the President of the favour with wh
he looked upon their aspirations, were unwilling to aba
don their ambitions. The scheme so far had work
admirably.

It now became necessary to undermine the influence
General Luperón who, although he had announced
own unwillingness to assume office, had already declar
his intention to support Don Pedro Francisco Bonó as
first choice for the Presidency. Upon the repeated refu
of the latter to accept office under any conditions, t
field narrowed down to the following prominent leade
the Vice President, Don Casimiro N. de Moya; Gene
Billini and General Segundo Imbert. The first, the re
resentative of a family which had long held the Provin
of La Vega as a satrapy, was a leader of marked abil
supported not only by his feudal province but likewise
many of the more prominent leaders of the Cibao; t
second had been advanced by Padre Meriño as a man

gnized integrity, whose administration of govern-
atal affairs would prove a valid guarantee to all; the
d, General Imbert, a valiant military leader of the
toration, was vociferously acclaimed by General Benito
ación, the cacique of Monte Cristi, and finally secured
support of General Luperón upon the refusal of his
ier candidate, Don Francisco Bonó, to accept the dis-
tion which Luperón desired to bestow upon him.

The increasing rivalries between the candidates, and the
cerbation of the tempers of their supporters as the cam-
gn progressed, created exactly the situation for which
ureaux had plotted. Traveling to Puerto Plata upon the
nsible pretext of obtaining the advice of Luperón,
ureaux called a meeting of all the prominent leaders
he party to assemble on May 14th. As the result of the
berations of this assembly the famous "Capitulations"
Puerto Plata were agreed upon both by the President
General Luperón, and by the three candidates for the
sidency. The agreements so signed could not have
ved more satisfactory to Heureaux. They provided
the three candidates might continue without restric-
their respective campaigns; the candidates announced,
sonally or through their representatives, that they
uld jointly support the candidate elected and would
oloy their utmost efforts to secure the support of their
ective followers for the President-elect; the successful
or in the elections was obligated to appoint to his
ministration individuals who had supported the oppos-
candidates, and the President agreed to guarantee the
artiality of the Government authorities during the
tions, and, jointly with General Luperón, to see that
"Capitulations" should be carried out.

As soon as Heureaux ascertained that Luperón was

definitely committed to the candidacy of General Imbe
he announced, with apparent reluctance, his own supp
of the candidacy of Meriño's favourite, General Billi
Subsequently, General de Moya withdrew his candida
for the Presidency and consented to run for Vice Pre
dent upon the ticket with General Imbert. General A
jandro Woss y Gil was thereupon selected by the spons
of General Billini as the Vice Presidential candidate up
the latter's ticket.

The issue was now squarely launched. Luperón's pr
tige as leader of his party was at stake. Notwithstandi
this first move in opposing the desires of his form
chief, Heureaux felt that the time had not yet come wh
he could afford an open break. Hence the following let
to Luperón written during the course of the elections:

"My dear General:

"By Tuesday's mail I wrote to you under the impu
of the impression that your letter of June 25th caused

"Today I write you again to communicate to you
sincere desire for peace. If Imbert triumphs in the el
tions I will support Imbert, who will be served by
if Billini triumphs and you consider that the victory
this General might become a pretext for disorder, ad
me immediately and he will resign the same day that
is proclaimed elected by the Congress. Give me befo
hand your orders regarding the candidacy which sho
be presented and the manner in which you wish me
have it done. I await your instructions . .

"Here everything is quiet. The election returns
beginning to come in but we do not yet know e
approximately the result of the elections in the Ciba

"Your affectionate son,

"U. HEUREAUX."[1]

[1] President Heureaux to General Gregorio Luperón, July 3, 1884.

GENERAL ULISES HEUREAUX

: is unnecessary to add that the chieftain at Puerto
a was not greatly mollified by this communication,
e he had already received the information that Heu-
ux, through his agents, had stuffed the ballot boxes in
ıy of the districts where the election was close. Even
n the capital, where every measure was resorted to in
er to defeat the Imbert ticket, Billini received a sparse
ority of 400 votes. In the final returns the Billini
et was announced as obtaining 35,000 votes, while the
ert ticket was declared defeated with a total of only
00 votes. The fact that, because of the delay in com-
nications, the supposed triumph of General Imbert
being celebrated in Puerto Plata, Santiago and Monte
sti, where he had outdistanced his rival at the polls,
he same moment that Billini's victory was proclaimed
the capital, did little to quiet the passions aroused
ing the electoral period.

4.

Upon the inauguration of General Billini as President
September 1, 1884, the unity of leadership in the
ue " party which had persisted without serious impair-
ıt during a period of twenty years had been shattered.
ow remained for Heureaux to obtain the confidence of
leaders of the various factions into which his party
been split, and then to cause the disappearance from
scene of General Billini, who, he soon found, was not
ractable as he had supposed. Upon becoming convinced
General Billini would not prove subservient to his
res, and assisted in his enterprise by the absence from
Republic of General Luperón, Heureaux seized upon
decree of amnesty promulgated by the President soon
r he assumed office to stir up dissatisfaction with the

existing régime. Under guise that the amnesty which l
permitted the return to the Republic of General Cesa
Guillermo was a measure aimed against General Lupe
and his political friends, a vicious campaign was wa
under cover against the President. The success of t
propaganda was almost immediately reflected in the a
tude of Congress, which promptly refused to coöper
with the Executive, and rendered sterile a considera
part of the commendable initiative which General Bil
displayed, particularly in his efforts to improve the c
dition of the agricultural classes and in attracting emig
tion to the Republic from Spain. Within six months
President was forced to the realization that he had
make his choice between suppressing the insurrect
which had by now become inevitable, and resigning
high office. Primarily a man of peace he selected the la
alternative, and on May 16, 1885, presented his for
resignation to the Congress which immediately accep
it. He was immediately succeeded in office, in accorda
with the Constitution, by the Vice-President, Gen
Woss y Gil, who appointed a new Cabinet composed
the partisans of Heureaux and of the adherents of G
eral Luperón.

One more obstacle had thus been removed fr
Heureaux's path. The continued presence in the coun
of General Cesareo Guillermo next claimed his attenti
Upon his instigation a detachment was sent by the G
ernment on the night of June 28th, to seize the ex-Pr
dent in the hotel where he then was lodging in the capi
Guillermo, who was seated in the patio of the hotel w
the soldiers entered, instead of surrendering when orde
to do so, dashed the lamp under which he had been sitt
to the ground, and made his escape, shooting at the

s who had been sent to arrest him. An innocent tander, an American named Platt, was shot and in- ntly killed, a casualty for which the Government was r forced to pay an indemnity to his heirs of some ,000. Making his way to Azua, Guillermo lay in hid- for some months, and in the first days of the following tober, challenged the Government by proclaiming a olution which obtained the support of many Azuans o had small cause to support the Administration.

Thereupon Heureaux displayed his accustomed energy. king command from the President as Commander-in- ief of the Government troops, he at once chartered American steamship *Santo Domingo,* of the Clyde e, and arrived at the head of 400 men at the port of ua on the night of October 11th. At the same time, neral Marchena was sent to Baní, and General Espaillat San Cristóbal, at the head of considerable reënforce- nts. Upon finding that the road from the port to the vn of Azua, which lies some half mile distant from the st, was blocked by revolutionary forces, Heureaux de a strategic move and landed the troops under his mmand on the following morning at Boca Villa. The hting commenced immediately upon the beach where Government forces landed, the revolutionists soon ng surrounded by Heureaux's troops. The former were idly routed; Heureaux was enabled to take possession the town of Azua itself without firing a shot, and oceeded thereafter to arrest those who he surmised re the ringleaders of the movement. At first Guillermo s believed to have escaped into Haitian territory, but November 8th, it was learned by officials of the Gov- ment who had remained in Azua that he was in hiding far from Orégano where he had attempted to procure

food and water at a countryman's hut. Surrounded twenty men of the Government forces and ordered surrender, the fugitive committed suicide. When Guillermo died he was stark naked, his clothing torn from his body by the cactus jungle through which he had been forced to flee; his feet were bandaged with the sleeves of his shirt, and his body was lacerated terribly by thorns. Disinterred from the rude grave into which it had at first been thrown, his decomposed corpse was later brought to the town of Azua in order that Heureaux might assure himself of its identity and rest certain that he had no more to fear from this opponent. Again an obstacle had been removed.

Confident now that he himself might once more safely return to power, he awaited the Presidential elections which were scheduled to take place in the first days of July, 1886. To Luperón, who had once more returned to Puerto Plata, there could be only one solution were he to regain the authority which had so rudely been shaken in the previous elections—the "Blue" party must present but one ticket to the public. Won over, apparently, by the specious professions of loyalty on the part of Heureaux, to which Heureaux's extermination of their common enemy, Guillermo, had inclined him, Luperón resolved to support the candidacy of Heureaux and to urge the candidates of the previous election, who had once more come to the fore, to eliminate themselves in Heureaux's favor. This General Imbert proceeded to do, and was consequently rewarded with the place of Vice President on Heureaux's ticket; but General de Moya, to whom the Vice Presidency had first been offered, stubbornly refused to accede to the repeated urgings of his leader. His opposition to Heureaux had now become intense, and gaining

support of General Billini, he persisted in his own
lidacy for the Presidency, with General Billini as his
Presidential candidate. The Cibao was in a ferment,
excitement throughout the Republic was intense.
otwithstanding, the elections passed off quietly, result-
as his opponents should have anticipated from past
rience, in the election of General Heureaux by a
ority of more than 20,000 votes. In the capital the
ion of de Moya was so far in the minority that on the
day of the elections, after polling only 500 votes,
leaders of the party protested, and abandoned the con-
. Fearing a resort to violence, President Woss y Gil
nediately after the elections traveled to La Vega to
mpt to induce General de Moya to give in to the in-
able, and to return to the capital with him to offer
support to the President-elect. Failing in his mission,
President left La Vega on the 20th of the month, and
nediately thereafter the revolution was proclaimed by
adherents of the defeated candidate. The revolution-
at first met with success, but after repeated struggles
were driven back from Santiago, which they had at
seized, and took refuge in La Vega, awaiting the
lts of the campaign commenced by General Monción,
, after he had announced his support of the revolu-
in Monte Cristi, had established himself securely in
yubín. At the end of August, General Heureaux, once
e appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Government
es, succeeded in capturing La Vega, whence General
Moya and General Villanueva, his principal associate,
ceeded in escaping to the Haitian frontier.

ince the Congress, because of the revolution, had been
ble to assemble in special session to go through the
ial form of counting the votes cast and proclaiming

the validity of the elections, September 1st, the date up which the new President should have been installed, pass and no proclamation of the new Administration co constitutionally be made. The Government of Gene Woss y Gil consequently, in disregard of the Consti tion, announced its own continuance in power until opportunity might be afforded the Congress to procla officially the election of Heureaux. By the middle November, the last signs of revolution in the front Provinces had been obliterated with the defeat of Ge eral Monción. On November 22nd, General Heurea made his way back to the capital by way of Samaná, a refusing to receive a public ovation which was tende him, repaired to the Cathedral to prostrate himself gratitude for his victory, and subsequently retired quie to his home to receive there the homage of a group of supporters.

On November 25th, the Congress met to proclaim President and Vice President elect legitimately elect and on January 6, 1887, General Heureaux once more inaugurated, this time to hold office for the remain of his life.

The appointments to Heureaux's new Cabinet were dicative of the new policy upon which he had determin Henceforward racial lines and party lines were to m nothing to him. His supporters were to be chosen from ranks. Thus, Don Manuel Maria Gautier, a man of p Spanish descent, for decades identified with the inter of General Baez and willing, notwithstanding his c spicuous ability, to serve the dictates of any tyrant, appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Gen Miguel A. Pichardo, one of Heureaux's most determi adversaries in the recent revolution, agreed to accept

t of Minister for War. The other portfolios were nted to men representing all factions and all classes. e Dictator, when questioned as to the reasons for his xpected selections, delivered himself of this sententious citude:

> Patriotism and love of country demand that in civil there be no victor and no vanquished; all are brethren one good family who should be willing at all times to sp each other's hands across the bloody chasm of war order to bring lasting peace and tranquillity to the tion." [1]

This estimable sentiment provided but a scant screen for campaign which Heureaux now consistently carried throughout the period of his tenure of office. Overes were made to all the important leaders in the "Blue" ty; to the chieftains of the remnants of the "Red" ty which still existed after the death of Buenaventura z, which had occurred some five years before; and to se constituting the small group which had remained hful to the fortunes of General González. Were the e of public office not to prove sufficient, bribery was rted to. So successfully had this latter policy been ried out during the de Moya revolution that the saying ame general: "Although Lilis could not have put down Moya's revolution with lead, he was signally successful quelling it with gold." Were neither appointment to ce nor corruption to prove successful, decrees of exile e promulgated, or did the opportunity present itself, ssination was resorted to. It was not only with the outding figures in the country that Heureaux occupied

[1] Mr. H. H. C. Astwood, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, January 887.

himself, however; as soon as the Dictator learned that member of the younger generation showed exceptio talent or gave promise of becoming a man of prominer an agent of the President invariably approached him attempt to secure his support for the Dictator. Those who refused to become sycophants and who resisted, s were taught the bitter lesson of long imprisonment or c tinued persecution. The policy of the Dictator proved the whole effective; one by one the men of promine and ability either accepted the inducements offered were swiftly removed from the local scene.

5.

There remained to Heureaux two essential requirem still to be satisfied. The first of these—the assurance of own continuation in office—was relatively simple. Thro his agents, and by appealing to the weaknesses of pop opinion, Heureaux commenced the creation of an ar cial demand for a revision of the Constitution in or that the Presidential term might be extended from one two years' tenure to a term of four years. Submis apparently to this demand on the part of the public, in reality to the orders given by the President, a Con tutional Convention, in November, 1889, promulgate new Constitution which fixed the commencement of next Presidential term as from February 27, 1889, lengthened the term in accordance with the Dictat desires. In the same Constitution, the system of di election which had previously existed was replaced that of the election of the President by an electoral lege, bound in the future to facilitate the indefi reëlection of Heureaux to the Presidency.

The second requisite was the removal of all element

ger to his Administration from those foreign Powers
fly concerned with the Dominican Republic. After a
years in office, domestic politics had lost their flavour
n all danger of open opposition had been safely
oved. But the great game of international relations
er lost its fascination for Heureaux. It was, moreover,
ame in which he showed conspicuous ability. There is,
fact, no more interesting chapter in the modern his-
y of the Americas than the chapter which contains the
ount of the manner in which the Dictator of a small
ntry, with but small resources and of but potential
portance, played off, one against the other, the United
tes of America and the great European Powers.

n his first Administration Heureaux early gained the
husiastic support of the American Consul in the Do-
ican capital, a negro named Astwood appointed by
sident Hayes. Although Astwood was subsequently dis-
sed by President Cleveland on the double ground of
having purloined funds entrusted to the Consulate and
his having initiated the "indecent proposal" by which
and his partner would have toured the United States
h the bones of Columbus as a side-show in circuses and
positions, Heureaux was no less successful in obtaining
friendship of Astwood's more reputable successors. At
t his overtures to the American Government were
newhat hesitant. They consisted of assurances that
ough General Luperón favoured the lease of Samaná
to a French syndicate to be utilized in the event that
Panama scheme of Ferdinand de Lesseps were to prove
ccess, he himself was determined to thwart the scheme,
would lease the territory once more to the defunct
naná Bay Company of San Domingo should the
erican Government so desire, and of vague requests

that he be assisted in obtaining a loan in the Uni States.[1] He soon went further. In October, 1883, Dominican Government officially requested the Ameri Department of State to consent to a revision of the Co mercial Treaty of 1867 between the two countries negotiating a reciprocity convention which would per free entry into the United States of the principal arti of export from the Dominican Republic, in return the free entry of four or five classes of American pr ucts into the Dominican Republic. These negotiati were undertaken in the early summer of 1884 throu the Agent of the Dominican Government in Washingt Don Manuel de Jesús Galván. On June 16th, the latter c cially communicated to Secretary Frelinghuysen the dr of the reciprocity convention proposed by the Domini Government. In his reply, the Secretary of State assu the Dominican envoy of his willingness to enter into negotiations proposed, which evidenced in his opinio

"The promptings of good-will as well as a convinc sense on the part of the Government of the Domini Republic of its true relationship with this country."

The Secretary referred to the fact that the draft propo followed substantially the lines of the convention c cluded between the United States and Mexico, although he accepted in principle the establishment reciprocal commercial privileges he expressed himself yet unprepared to determine upon the detailed list.

The close supervision exercised by Heureaux over progress of negotiations was evidenced by a letter addre

[1] Mr. H. H. C. Astwood, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, Feb 26, 1883, and March 8, 1883.

[2] Secretary Frelinghuysen to Señor Manuel de Jesús Galván, July 9, 1884.

him to the President of the United States two days
ore the expiration of his first term of office:

"Only a few days remain before the term is concluded
ing which I have held power as Constitutional Presi-
t of this Republic, and before leaving office I have
med it to be a high duty on my part to send Your
ellency the expression of my gratitude and appre-
ion for the favorable welcome which the Minister
ipotentiary of this Republic, Citizen Manuel de Jesús
ván, has received, as well as for the kindness with
ch his negotiations for a limited reciprocity treaty
ween the United States and the Dominican Republic
e met." [1]

uring President Arthur that the negotiations initiated
his Government were supported by the great majority
the Dominican people, as a means of increasing their
mmerce and of drawing closer their relations with the
ited States, Heureaux urged him to receive his letter as
additional proof of his earnest desire that the negotia-
s be brought to a successful conclusion during President
hur's Administration. The negotiations continued in
shington in accordance with the hope expressed by
ureaux, and were eventually brought to fruition in the
clusion of a reciprocity convention between the two
ntries during the last weeks of President Arthur's Ad-
inistration. The treaty was not destined to become effec-
, however, since it was withdrawn from the Senate by
sident Cleveland soon after he assumed office.

t was not only in direct negotiations with the Ameri-
Government, however, that Heureaux manifested his
re to secure the good-will of the United States. Ameri-

[1] President Ulises Heureaux to President Chester Arthur, August 29, 1884.

can enterprise of all descriptions was sought. Concessic to American citizens were granted for the building railroads, for the establishment of a national bank, and f the construction of public utilities. Unfortunately bo for the Dominican Government and for the credit of t United States, the concessionnaires were, in the words the American Consulate, mainly

"adventurers who are dissipated, dishonest, and immor who come to have a good time generally, spending free in the gambling dens and drinking saloons the hard earn cash of some capitalist, and who return to the Unit States bankrupt with some exaggerated statement det mental to the interest of both countries to cover up th own debauchery." [1]

But notwithstanding the discouragement which Heurea must have encountered when the concessions so libera granted so rarely materialized into banks, railroads, public utilities, he continued to be, so far as the Americ Consul at the time was concerned,

"a great friend of Americans and American enterprise a holds out every inducement to American capitalists a is desirous of infusing the progressive spirit of our ins tutions into those of this Republic." [2]

Appeals both to the American capitalist and to t American colonist were frequently resorted to throu the American press. The response to such propaganda v generally, however, of the character of which the follo ing communication, addressed to the American Consul a typical example:

[1] Mr. Astwood, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1886.
[2] Mr. Astwood, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, June 10, 1886.

norеd Sir:

I see from the New York *Sun* an invitation from His ellency Generąl Heureaux, President of the Dominican ublic, to the colored people of the United States to le in San Domingo. I have written by this mail to His ellency for some information respecting the invita-. I wish to say here, if the Dominican Government will loy an agent for the purpose of engaging intending migrants, the immigration scheme from this section ld be made a grand success. There are fully 5,000 -to-do farmers in this section who would willingly grate to San Domingo if they knew the true condition he country. I have suggested to the President that an nt should be employed . . I am selling a life-sized pic- of Toussant L'Ouverture, which sells at sight here. you think it would sell well in San Domingo? I also e the noted silver plater. Do you think I could do ch in the Island with it . .

"(Sgd) . . .

San Marcos, Texas.

S.—The Separate Coach Bill has passed and I am ious to get out of Texas." [1]

6.

The liberal manner in which Heureaux had early accus- ed himself to expend the resources of the national sury soon brought his second Administration to dire its, although the crisis had been keenly felt during the rvening Administrations of General Billini and General ss y Gil. The national revenues were barely sufficient neet current expenses, and consequently revolutionary ms, readily admitted, were disregarded, and salaries ; overdue remained unpaid. The Government's sole

[1] Mr. Durham, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, June 23, 1891.

recourse lay in obtaining loans from local merchants, domestic "credit companies," in return for which it obligated to pay interest of frequently 10% monthly. the time that his overtures to the American Governm for assistance were first made, Heureaux was even th endeavouring, without success, to obtain a loan in Euro in order to pay off the growing mountain of the natio floating indebtedness. The imposition of extra duties; increasing of import duties by 10%; the levying of du on materials for the use of sugar plantations already op ating, while still exempting machinery and mater required for the construction of new sugar centrals; were resorted to, without creating any material impro ment in the situation.

During the Administration of General Woss y Heureaux had persuaded the President to formulat more concrete request for the assistance of the Uni States Government than had previously been made. It determined, therefore, to resort once more to the tir worn inducement of the lease of Samaná. Calling American Consul to a conference with President Wos Gil and with his Secretary of Hacienda, Don Robe Boscowitz, General Heureaux outlined the proposit which the Administration would be willing to mal The Consul was requested to advise his Government c cially that the Dominican Government would be will to lease, under conditions of absolute temporary sov eignty, for a term of years to the United States, the of Samaná with all its keys, in return for a loan not exceed $4,000,000, at a rate of interest to be subsequer determined by the two Governments. But the same pr ect which had elicited so enthusiastic a welcome fr

[3] Mr. Astwood, American Consul, to the Secretary of State, January 21,

vious Administrations in the United States, met with response from President Cleveland. Negotiations, like-e, between Heureaux, when he had once more returned he Presidency in 1887, and representatives of certain ncial interests in New York, finally came to nothing, ough the Dominican Government agreed to issue 00,000 of bonds, and to grant American capitalists power to undertake the direct collection of 30% of of the national revenues to cover interest and amortiza- charges, in return for the advance of $1,350,000 gold. At length General Generoso Marchena was sent to rope as the President's Agent to secure the financial stance without which, Heureaux appreciated, his Ad-inistration could not endure. The prime impediment in rchena's efforts to obtain aid lay in the opposition red by the holders of the outstanding bonds of the old rtmont loan. Although the Dominican Government never received more than the initial installment of loan—the sum of approximately $150,000, promptly andered by Baez in 1869—and the Dominican Senate canceled the loan contract in 1870, bonds totaling 0,000 had been issued and sold in London by the rtmont syndicate. In 1872 the loan had gone into ault. It was now maintained by the bondholders, sup-ted by the British Government, and by the British rests in the Dominican Republic, notably those rep-nted by Sir Alexander Baird, constructor of the naná-Santiago Railway, that no further lien might timately be placed upon the nation's revenues, until claims of these bondholders had been satisfied.

After repeated efforts, Marchena finally met with onse from Westendorp and Company, of Amsterdam, secured a contract. By the terms of this contract the

Dominican Government was to authorize the creation
£770,000 thirty-year 6% gold bonds. Of this amou
£142,860 was to be employed in the conversion of t
outstanding bonds of the Hartmont loan at the rate
one to five, £151,660 was to be expended in the payme
of the interior floating indebtedness, while the remaind
was to be bought by Westendorp and Company at 78
of the bonds' nominal value.

The sole method by which the Dominican Governme
was enabled to obtain this contract was by indicating
willingness to secure the loan by making its interest a
amortization charges a first lien upon the customs re
enues. It was moreover compelled to go much farther,
agreeing to authorize the issuing firm to collect direc
through its agents all the national customs duties, to reta
such amounts as might be necessary to meet the lo
charges, and thereafter to turn the remainder over to t
Government. These agents appointed by Westendorp a
Company, organized into a board known as the "Caja
Recaudación," or "régie," were to commence their dut
upon the 1st of November, 1888.

The constitution of the "régie," implied that althou
Dominican officials, headed by the "interventor," or "c
lector," were still to continue in each custom-house, fr
now on the authority was in reality to be vested in t
hands of foreign deputies, since it was to them that
customs payments must be remitted for transmission
the Director of the "régie" in Santo Domingo.

By this alien board of officials, therefore, it was pr
vided by the terms of the loan contract, the annu
charges upon the loan, amounting to some 30% of t
total revenues of the Republic, were to be collected a
transferred to the issuing company; by it a monthly d

:$75,000 was to be paid to the Government from the toms duties; and its own expenses and compensation re assured by the monthly retention of $3,000, as well by an added commission should the yearly customs enues exceed a certain figure.

n his message to the Congress urging the immediate ification of the contract signed by General Marchena, ureaux recommended that, once the proceeds of the loan re available, the unpaid salaries and all other obligations his Administration be paid at par; and that the internal ot and the unpaid salaries of prior Administrations be d off at fifteen cents on the dollar. With this induce- nt the contract was ratified on October 26, 1888.

The Westendorp loan at this time saved the situation for ureaux. The increasing clamour of the claimants against Government, the rise of general dissatisfaction due the non-payment of Governmental employees, he had n unable to still because of the increasing pressure ought to bear by the British Government to prevent Dictator from continued default upon the Hartmont n. For a time a breathing space was afforded him. It is remarkable that he continued to acclaim General rchena as the greatest financial talent the country had own, and to welcome him upon his return to the public with every sign of distinction. For the Domini- Republic, however, the ratification of the Westendorp ntract implied a radical departure, and by the admis- n of extraneous intervention in the collection of its toms revenues there was inaugurated a system which prevailed until the present day and which will prob- y continue for some years to come. Had this infringe- nt of the nation's sovereignty been adopted as a sacri- required imperatively in the public interest, or as the

sole method by which the latent resources of the nati might be developed, the end might have justified t means; but this sacrifice, forced upon the Dominic people, was made solely in order to fortify Heureaux's ov position, and to secure the stability of the Dictatorship.

7.

For a brief period in the autumn of the year 1888, t Dictator was forced temporarily to devote himself on more to domestic politics. The danger which threaten his own prestige so long as General Luperón remained ali came constantly to the fore. Urged thereto by those his closest friends whom Heureaux's Government had a tagonized, Luperón at length consented to proclaim own candidacy for the Presidency for the term beginni in the following year. A large group rallied about the leader of the "Blues" and for a time Heureaux's author was shaken. Acting, however, with his usual wit, the D tator maneuvered the situation in such a manner that made it appear that his own candidacy was forced up him, against his will, by those of his new satellites w had in the past opposed Luperón, and who now feared t latter's return to power. He even induced Luperón to jo with him in signing a manifesto addressed to the publ announcing that the two leaders had reached the friend decision to present their opposing tickets in the comi elections, and that they had obligated themselves mutua to countenance no fraud or coercion during the electo period. If Luperón was in fact taken in by the assu ances so readily given by Heureaux, he was rapidly d illusioned. Luperón's followers in various towns, amo them Matanzas and Samaná, were soon thrown into pris by the orders of the President, and the situation harbou

elements of danger that Luperón, who had lost some-
t the intrepidity of his earlier years, finally determined
withdraw his candidacy, which he did by means of a
clamation which contained the most bitter charges of
oyalty and corruption against Heureaux.

lthough the resort to revolution was resolutely decried
uperón, it was apparently impossible for him to con-
his partisans. Revolutionary movements broke out in
rto Plata and later in other parts of the Cibao. The
llion in Puerto Plata was almost immediately crushed,
the leader, General Almonte, imprisoned by order of
Dictator, was summarily assassinated in the prison into
ich he had been cast. The second effort at revolution,
ich broke out in Santiago on the 17th of February,
9, and in La Vega under the leadership of General
nuel de Moya on the following day, was likewise sup-
ssed, this time by the Dictator in person. Placing some
enty of the more conspicuous leaders of the rebellion
rons, he cast them into the hold of the Government
iser *Presidente* and brought them with him to the
ital where upon his return they were incarcerated in
fortress. Once more, and for a considerable number of
rs, all serious opposition to the continuance of the
nny had been crushed.

he new Administration was inaugurated on March
889, again in the absence of the President-elect, who
engaged in stamping out the last remaining signs of
llion in the Cibao district, with the Vice President,
n Manuel Maria Gautier, assuming the Presidency tem-
arily. Gautier appointed, in accordance with the
rs of his chief, a Cabinet composed of the most rep-
ntative men of all affiliations who could be selected in
Republic. General Ignacio Maria González, proclaimed,

almost twenty years before, the hope of those who desi reform and honest administration, consented to take of under the Dictator as Minister for Foreign Affairs; G erals Alejandro Woss y Gil and Federico Lithgow, pro nent representatives of the "Blues" and for years app ently devoted to the ambitions of their leader, Gene Luperón, received appointments as Ministers of Fome and of War; Don Genaro Pérez, an outstanding fig in the Republic, known for his personal integrity and undoubted ability, consented to serve as Minister of J tice; while General Juan Francisco Sánchez, son of famous "Trinitario," was appointed to the Department Hacienda, and General Wenceslao Figuereo, an elde mulatto ever subservient to Heureaux's interests, appointed Minister of the Interior.

8.

His financial needs amply satisfied for the time be by the Westendorp loan; all signs of domestic rebell utterly crushed; the principal leaders of all parties sconced within his Cabinet, General Heureaux could n once more devote his preferential attention to the fore relations of his Government.

The situation in Haiti gave him well grounded ca for alarm. At the time two parties were struggling for ascendency in the neighbouring Republic. In Cape Hait the partisans of General Hippolite were struggling to place General Légitime, installed in Port-au-Prince. latter, resenting the material assistance advanced Hip lite's party by Heureaux, had permitted the Hait capital to become the rallying place of the Domini partisans of General Casimiro N. de Moya, who had ta refuge there. Despatching a commission headed by Gen

ızález, his new Minister for Foreign Affairs, Heureaux
eeded in reaching an agreement with Légitime, as the
lt of which de Moya and his Dominican fellow-exiles
e expelled from Haitian territory, and a convention
negotiated similar to the agreement entered into by
neral Salamon with the Dominican Government in
0, providing that each Government would maintain
ct neutrality so far as the internal politics of the other
e concerned, and would take effective measures to
vent the fomenting within its territory of revolu-
ıs against the Government of the neighbouring Re-
olic.

Upon the subsequent overturn of Légitime and the
ımption of the Presidency by Hippolite the same tac-
were pursued, and by means of a personal conference
ween Heureaux and the Haitian President, which
urred upon the Haitian frontier near Cape Haitian,
orking agreement was again reached between the chiefs
the two Governments. Notwithstanding his repeated
open protests, so often made for public consumption,
inst the intrigues and treachery of the Haitian authori-
, there was no time throughout his long term of office
en Heureaux ever had valid ground for fearing the hos-
y of his Haitian neighbours. In fact, Haiti was to him
ine to be exploited. Were the Government of the ad-
nt Republic in straits, he would wrest from its officials
e sums as payment for his neutrality or his secret sup-
t; were the Government of Haiti, on the contrary, to
table temporarily, and his own position threatened by
olution organized on Haitian soil, he would assure that
vernment's benevolent neutrality to himself by means
ribery. And the alarm of an imminent war with Haiti
ved invariably a ready means of distracting the atten-

tion of the Dominican people from the iniquities of
own Administration.

For some years, Heureaux, resentful of the fact that t
Government of the United States had established a dipl
matic mission in Port-au-Prince, whereas it had refrain
from doing so in the Dominican Republic, had been pre
ing the Department of State through his agents in Was
ington to maintain a diplomatic mission in Santo Doming
The desires of the Dominican President were finally a
ceded to by the appointment of the Minister in Port-a
Prince as American Chargé d'Affaires in Santo Doming
The first American Chargé d'Affaires, Frederick Dougla
appointed in 1889, arrived in Santo Domingo on Februa
23, 1890. Owing to the fact that General Heureaux w
on the eve of his departure to confer with President H
polite, the Chargé was received by the Vice Preside
Don Manuel Maria Gautier. Mr. Douglass, who had v
ited Santo Domingo some nineteen years before as sec
tary to the Commission of Inquiry sent there by Preside
Grant, was impressed with the growth of the capital c
and

"with its well built and well-kept market, its street ra
ways, its well-regulated police and its prevailing qu
and order." [1]

In a despatch to the Secretary of State, he related th
notwithstanding the fact that he had been officia
received by the Vice President, since President Heurea
was about to leave for the Haitian frontier, no sooner h
he returned to his hotel from the Palace than he receiv
a note from the President inviting him to come to

[1] Mr. Frederick Douglass, American Chargé d'Affaires, to Secretary Bl
February 26, 1890.

ate house in the afternoon. Upon arriving at the dent's residence, he found Heureaux at the door of his e engaged in sending off the luggage he was to take him on his trip to Haiti.

t was pleasant to see a man in his position attending ie carting of his own luggage instead of leaving it to rs, as he might have done without touching it with of his fingers . . He is a tall slender bright-eyed of dark complexion and well defined negroid fea-s. He gave me his age as forty-two,[1] but he looks younger than that. He is of wiry make-up and has arently a large capacity for work. He has a military ing . . Beside his native language he speaks French English, the latter remarkably well. He is a man of gy and intelligence and his history proves him to be versed in statesmanship." [2]

uring the conversation, which lasted an hour, the ident appeared especially desirous of disarming criti- for having omitted to represent the Dominican Re-ic in the Pan-American Congress which had taken e in Washington under the auspices of Secretary ne, and gave as his main reason for not having done ne alleged neglect of the United States in failing to y the reciprocity treaty negotiated in 1884. Stating that treaty overshadowed in importance the delibera-s of the Pan-American Congress, Heureaux declared no department of the United States Government had communicated to him the reasons for the withdrawal ne treaty, and in view of this neglect he said that he

lises Heureaux was forty-five years of age at this time.
r. Frederick Douglass, American Chargé d'Affaires, to Secretary Blaine, Feb-26, 1890.

felt the proper attitude for his Government was one
aloofness.

Touching upon the earlier proposals he had made c
cerning Samaná, and

"Speaking of the principle of progress and natu
development, of the ever increasing power of the la
States and their disposition to encroach upon the sma
States, he told the story of the rich cacique who, refus
to disclose and surrender his riches to the Spaniards,
finally induced to do so by his wife, who was wiser th
he, and thus consent to give up what would be tak
from him anyway by force. 'If,' said Heureaux, 'you t
ten years to decide whether you will make a request
me, you must give me a little time in which to dec
whether I can grant it.' When a hint was thrown ou
to the possible needs of coaling stations in different pa
of the world, a thing likely to be created by the grov
of commerce and the extensive use of steam navigati
President Heureaux's eyes flashed with animation as
spoke of the proceedings of the English in Egypt
gave other instances to show that strong governments
likely to take by force what they need if it be den
and withheld." [1]

As the result, no doubt, of the feeling displayed by
Dominican President regarding the treatment accor
the reciprocity treaty previously concluded with
United States, and owing, doubtless, as well to the s
den interest displayed by the Harrison Administration
the Samaná proposals, negotiations were once more ta
up between the two Governments. Don Manuel de Je
Galván was again sent by Heureaux to Washington w

[1] Mr. Frederick Douglass, American Chargé d'Affaires, to Secretary Blaine,
ruary 26, 1890.

approval of the Congress, to negotiate a commercial vention on the basis of reciprocity between the two ntries. This time negotiations proved more successful, on June 4, 1891, the new treaty was concluded and ratified, by virtue of which the United States ac- ed the privilege of free entry to certain Dominican ducts, notably sugar, molasses, coffee and hides, the minican Government in return therefor granting free y to certain American exports enumerated in twenty- classifications.

Due to the failure to secure from the Haitian Govern- t the cession of the Môle St. Nicolas, coincident with conclusion of the new Dominican Reciprocity Treaty Cabinet of President Harrison determined to press rously for the lease of Samaná Bay. A proposed con- t was thereupon entrusted to the Dominican Chargé ffaires, Señor Galván, in order that the latter might etly present it to General Heureaux, as secrecy, in the ion of the Dominican Dictator, was essential. But in of the same summer, due to the mysterious visit of American worship to Samaná, rumours of the negotia- s leaked out. So much popular agitation was raised nst the project, and Heureaux was consequently so nsed, that he caused the *Gaceta Oficial* to publish fficial statement denying that overtures had been made either the American or Dominican Governments for sale or lease of Samaná Bay. His complaints to the erican Consul were vigorous:

The great difficulty is your American press. When- a Dominican editor writes anything objectionable or my picture in his paper as a caricature I put him in on. That settles it. In the United States, the writers

abuse their privileges and your ruling men do nothi
That article in the *Gaceta Oficial* will quiet the p
ple. Then Mr. Blaine can send instructions. We can go
work some months in the future secretly. If we succeed
will be done before anybody can make any noise. If
obtain no good result, there will be no bad feeling. T
great difficulty about the Môle St. Nicolas was that yo
papers gave it more importance than it deserved and th
put weapons into the hands of Hippolite's enemies.
became frightened and the people of the United Sta
became his enemies. I want no such result." [1]

Although Heureaux insisted upon discontinuing neg
tiations for the time being, he reiterated his willingness
consider any proposition which might be made to h
privately the following year,[2] and even communicated
the American Consul his own proposals modifying
American project which had originally been commu
cated to him, as follows:

"1. No sum to be paid by the Government of
United States for the lease of Dominican ter
tory;

"2. The two Republics to enter into an offensive a
defensive alliance; the United States to en
the privilege of establishing stations in Domi
can ports and of fortifying them;

"3. Should the Dominican Republic make war up
Haiti, the Government of the United Sta
should then determine whether the reasons
the Dominican aggression were justifiable a
should it deem them so, to supply two ves
of war and a loan of $1,000,000.

[1] Mr. Durham, American Consul, to General John W. Foster, July 22, 1891
[2] Mr. Durham, American Consul, to General John W. Foster, August 25, 189

. The Dominican Government would seize the Môle St. Nicolas as security for the funds due it by the Haitian Government under the treaty of 1874, the United States to agree to hold the said harbor in the name of the Dominican Government." [1]

'hile the negotiations for the lease of Samaná con-ed secretly throughout the winter of 1892, public ıtion was distracted from them by reason of the fact the German, British and French Governments had official protests against the reciprocity agreement cluded with the United States, which they claimed inged upon their rights under the most-favoured-na- clauses of their respective treaties with the Dominican ublic. In a letter addressed by Heureaux to General ı W. Foster on October 6, 1891, the Dominican Presi- expressed his gratitude for the opinion rendered by eral Foster that any unfriendly attitude displayed by European Powers towards the Dominican Government use of the reciprocity agreement would be regarded as ttitude unfriendly to the United States; but rendered sy by the violence of the French Consul (notwith-ding the assurances proffered by the French Premier, Ribot, that no ulterior consequences might be expected ı the Consul's protests), he continued to request the ial communication of Secretary Blaine's opinion as to course the Dominican Government should pursue, and sed for the statement of the position which the Ameri- Government would definitely take in the event that protests of the European Powers materialized into on.

r. Durham, American Consul, to Secretary Blaine, January 16, 1892.

In February, the British, French and German Gover ments were joined by the Governments of Italy and t Netherlands, and in April, 1892, the situation took alarming trend, so far as Heureaux's own position w concerned. The German Government, which had pre ously limited its protestations to formal admonitions, n threatened tariff reprisals against the Dominican Gover ment. Such action on the part of Germany would ha gravely prejudiced the sale of the Dominican tobac crop, which at the time ranged annually from 175,0 cwt. to 70,000 cwt., most of which was sold to Germa and for which no other market had ever been establish The German menace held political significance, and t the German officials with their habitual knowledge political affairs in Latin-America well understood. Sin the whole of the Cibao depended upon the marketing its tobacco and its cacao, for which latter crop Germa likewise provided the market, and since unrest had alrea been occasioned in the Cibao provinces by the rumo of the negotiations with the United States regardi Samaná, German tariff reprisals were bound to cre such general agitation that a revolution would undoul edly ensue. In this emergency, Secretary Blaine's sugg tion that the Dominican Government defend itself counter reprisals was worse than futile, since Heurea found himself face to face with conditions which mig provoke an uprising at any time.[1] The only solution in the hope that the United States would consent to ma some arrangement for the acceptance of Dominic tobacco, and of this there seemed no likelihood.

For a time, General Heureaux contemplated giving t year's notice required by the commercial treaties betwe

[1] Mr. Durham, American Consul, to Secretary Blaine, April 16, 1892.

Dominican Republic and the European Powers look-
towards their abrogation, but he hesitated, hoping still
obtain assistance of one kind or another from the
erican Government with which he could stave off the
opean Powers. Time and again the French, German,
Italian Consuls reiterated their protests to the Do-
ican Government. Invariably they were put off by the
tator, who asked them what authority they had to
up the matter; what instructions they had received
n their Government; or urbanely replied that their
ests had been received and would be considered, that
answer would later be sent, and so on.[1] Finally, an
matum was delivered, and the Dominican Government
forced to promise to reply by July 1, 1892, as to
ther or not it would accede to the claims advanced.
Once more Heureaux turned to the United States:

President Heureaux begs me to say to you that he is
very difficult position and that he begs you to use
r good offices to procure the settlement of this reci-
city trouble. He reproached me this morning pri-
ly. He says that but for our assurances he would
have made the reciprocity arrangement. He had a
close shave about three weeks ago and had it not been
the promptness of his people in that district, the
cco people in the Cibao would have been in open
llion. Many prisoners were brought here." [2]

On June 7th, Mr. Durham was summoned to attend a
inet meeting considering the German protest. While
t satisfaction was expressed at Secretary Blaine's prom-
f "moral support and friendly intervention," President

[1] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, May 3, 1892.
[2] Mr. Durham to General John W. Foster, May 23, 1892.

Heureaux interposed in the conversation in his "charact
istic practical way":

"When we accepted the assurances of Washington a
made the treaty, the European Nations protested; and
we get from the United States is a reply four months la
in which we are made friendly promises and in the me
time Germany threatens an ultimatum which will ca
the ruin of the whole Cibao . . Germany's course d
nitely indicates her purpose in combating the growth
American influence in the Republic. She has raised
mission in Santo Domingo to a legation and intends
make her influence felt both in Santo Domingo and
Port-au-Prince." [1]

Finally, the Dominican President received from
United States Government the assurances which he
been seeking. He was officially advised on July 2nd, t
should he take a firm stand against the European Pow
in the reciprocity matter he would be sustained by
United States Government. Consequently, when the C
suls of Italy and Germany, on the same day, addresse
joint note to General González, the Dominican Mini
for Foreign Affairs, reminding him that they had b
promised a reply to their protests on the reciprocity qu
tion on July 1st, and threatening to notify their Gove
ments accordingly, were no reply immediately for
coming, they were advised in a communication addressed
them on July 12th that the Dominican Government
fused to accede to the contention of the European Pow
and that it was unable to grant the European nations
advantages already granted the United States, unles
received equivalent benefits from them. They were assu

[1] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, June 14, 1892.

ever, that the Dominican Government would attempt
range an agreement with the United States for a
ification of the reciprocity treaty, so that those bene-
esulting from that agreement, which the Dominican
ernment could not extend to other nations, would
in the case of the United States. And there the
er dropped.

hroughout these months when the support of the
erican Government was so essential to him, the nego-
ons regarding Samaná had progressed most amicably,
gh to the eyes of the American Consul,

e more President Heureaux reflects upon the proposi-
, the more is he inclined to magnify its importance
he United States and to increase his terms." [1]

here were two major reasons, however, which
npted Heureaux's desire to postpone any definite
clusion, and without offending the susceptibilities of
ident Harrison and Secretary Blaine, whose friendship
at the time so necessary, he prolonged negotiations
made no definite commitment. The basic causes for
policy lay in the fact that a Presidential election must
ncountered within a few months, and the fact that
he financial necessities of the Government once more
ired the making of a new loan, additional to two
dy negotiated with Westendorp and Company, the
of Samaná Bay might prove an invaluable trading
t in such negotiations. Consequently, negotiations were
uently checked by such statements from Heureaux as:

or Galván had no authority to propose a draft of a
ract for the lease of Samaná;

[1] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, January 16, 1892.

or

"If your Government wants a station it must permit to study the question;" [1]

While General Heureaux made many inquiries abo the possibility that the United States would advance la sums to meet the Dominican Government's expenses "smoothing the way" for the lease of Samaná, or conce ing the possibility that the United States might be will to guarantee the service of the foreign debt, the Ameri Consul warned the Secretary of State that although G eral Heureaux wanted money for his Government could not forget that an American company had o contracted to pay $150,000 a year for the privilege leasing Samaná. Finally, the Dictator made the follow proposition:

" 'Personally and as President' Heureaux engages hi self to call a special session of Congress in July or Aug 1892, and to cause legislative ratification of the Sam contracts proposed at Washington for the establishm of a coaling station for the United States, providing can receive on account of the first instalment of $250,0 the sum of $200,000 immediately after the Domini Congress shall have effected the ratification. He des me to explain that he fears a revolutionary movemen soon as Congress acts on the Samaná matter and that will require money immediately thereafter to provide preserving peace." [2]

Advised by the Consul of the constitutional diffic which prevented the American Executive from advanc

[1] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, March 27, 1892.
[2] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, in a private letter dated April 25, 1892.

ney not authorized by act of Congress, the Dictator ied with undeniable logic:

"You know my situation. I cannot ask insurgents to u until I receive money from the United States with ch to fight them." [1]

That Westendorp and Company were by no means rse to the conclusion of the rumoured negotiations for lease of the Samaná Bay territory to the United States soon made known:

"On my arrival in Santo Domingo in March, 1891, . Dentex Bondt, the superintendent of the Company, ted me at Santo Domingo and asked me whether the ited States still wanted Samaná Bay. He stated that he pected the reason for my visit to Santo Domingo and t he would help me if I would help him. He confessed t his Company's affairs were almost hopeless and that y wanted to get out. He outlined a plan and I told him see Heureaux, who agreed to encourage him while he ked over the ground. The proposition of Mr. Dentex ndt was that the United States guarantee the payment he interest on all the debt of the Dominican Republic, return for which it would have a lien on the customs enues of the Republic and obtain a lease for the period esired, of Samaná Bay." [2]

On condition that his letter be regarded as strictly vate and be shown to no other individual, not even General Foster, General Heureaux, on April 25, 1892, ressed a letter to Secretary Blaine offering definite ditions for the lease or cession of Samaná to the United tes. Upon favourable consideration by the Harrison

[1] Mr. Durham to Secretary Blaine, in a private letter dated April 25, 1892.
[2] Mr. Durham to General John W. Foster, July 1, 1892.

Administration of this communication, Mr. Durham ceived final instructions in the matter on August 6th. these instructions he was reminded that he had alrea been apprised of the informal negotiations conduct during the preceding year for the lease by the Unit States of a coaling and naval station in the Bay of Sama and that the terms of this lease had actually been agre upon by General Foster and the Dominican Envoy, D Manuel de Jesús Galván, in Washington; that Heurea had later expressed his willingness through confident communications to carry out immediately the terms the lease on condition that the initial cash payment pr vided for in one of the articles be made immediat upon the ratification of the lease by the Dominic Congress; that the United States Congress had theref been applied to for an appropriation equivalent in amou to that necessary to meet this condition, that Congr had made the appropriation, and that the money had be placed at the disposal of President Harrison. Mr. Durha was therefore instructed to proceed at once to San Domingo, and should he find the Dominican Governme prepared to carry out the proposals advanced by Gene Heureaux he was to sign the convention for the le under the terms agreed upon, with the understanding th the Dominican Congress should be called immediately ratify it. An engrossed copy of the convention was ev entrusted to Mr. Durham. The convention proposed re as follows:

"Article I. The Dominican Republic grants to t United States exclusive possession and occupation for purposes of a coaling and naval station in the form o lease of the Island of Carenero in the Bay of Samaná

Dominican Republic further grants to the United tes of America the right to construct upon the land in the waters adjacent to the above described Island atever wharves or other improvements the latter may m necessary; the right of free use and occupancy of of the waters and shores of the Bay of Samaná and right to erect whatever defenses it may deem neces- y for the protection, occupancy and use of the afore- d station and waters.

"The United States shall have the right to possess and upy the above described territory during a term of ety-nine years from the date of the proclamation in ashington of the present convention with the privilege the part of the United States of a renewal of the lease a like term of years, upon an annual rent to be agreed on by the two Governments or by an arbitrator in cordance with the methods stated in Article V, and at expiration of said term the territory and premises ove described, with all the permanent improvements ereon, exclusive of supplies, materials, and armaments, ll be delivered to the Dominican Republic without mpensation therefor.

"It is understood that the Dominican Republic does not le its right to the control and free navigation of the ters of said Bay, except as herein expressly stated.

"Article II. The United States shall pay, as a considera- n for the rent and occupation of said territory, within rty days after the proclamation of the present conven- n, to the Dominican Republic, the sum of $250,000, d annually for the first five years after said date the n of $50,000, and annually thereafter until the expira- n of the term of lease and occupancy the sum of 5,000 . . .

"Article III. It is agreed on the part of the Dominican public that, so long as the lease and privileges herein

stipulated shall remain in force, it will not lease or othe
wise dispose of or create any lien upon or grant any speci
privileges or rights of use in or to any of the waters of t
Bay of Samaná or any of the territory in the maritin
district of Samaná to any other Power, State, or Gover
ment.

"And it is further agreed by and between the Hi
Contracting Parties that in case the Dominican Republ
may become involved in a civil or foreign war, the wate
of the Bay of Samaná shall be held to be neutral territor
and the Governments of the Dominican Republic and
the United States shall have the right jointly or several
to enforce such neutrality.

"Article IV. The Dominican Republic agrees that du
ing the existence of this lease it will . . arrest and su
render . . all deserters from the Service of the Unit
States found within the territory of said Republic. . .

"Article V. The two Contracting Parties agree that t
doubts which may arise on the interpretation or executi
of this convention shall be submitted when the means
adjust them directly by friendly accord may have faile
to the arbitration of a single arbitrator to be selected
mutual agreement.

"Article VI. This convention shall be ratified by t
two Governments in accordance with their respecti
Constitutions but it is understood that it shall not
binding on either Government until the necessary appr
priation of money for the first payment herein provid
for has been made by the Congress of the United States.

"The ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington
soon as possible after this appropriation."

Immediately after the receipt of these instructions, M
Durham started for Santo Domingo, where he arriv
August 20th to find the President absent "conciliatin

llic opinion in the Cibao. Upon Heureaux's return, the
rgé d'Affaires advised General Foster that

t to offend González and the Vice-President, I have
ı going through the motions of conferring with them,
nothing will be done until Heureaux's return." [1]

The inopportune publication by the New York *Herald*
this time of reports to the effect that the Westen-
p loan was to be transferred to the Government of the
ited States through the agency of a private corpora-
ı created a storm of excitement in the Republic. The
ter of the protests lay in Santiago, and the President
med it advisable to return there immediately from the
ital in order to assure the public that his Government
uld not permit the rumoured transfer. Rendered more
ignant than ever against the American press, General
ureaux refused to permit Mr. Durham to join him in
tiago, as he had intended, in order to avoid gossip.
urning finally to the capital on September 15th,
ureaux insisted upon postponing negotiations on the
text of ill-health. While the Dictator stated to Mr.
rham that were he well he would not hesitate a mo-
nt to conclude negotiations, but that since he was sick
had to move with caution, Mr. Durham advised his
vernment that he had gained the impression that the
l reasons for postponing the decision lay in the Presi-
t's desire to secure money from the syndicate in New
rk, which had already been negotiating for the transfer
it of the Westendorp loan.[2]

Four days later, the American Agent was convinced
t negotiations had failed. Several days later his hopes

[1] Mr. Durham to General John W. Foster, August 25, 1892.
[2] Mr. Durham to General John W. Foster, October 6, 1892.

were again partly raised by a letter which he receiv
from the President:

"Esteemed Friend:

"As I offered you the day before yesterday, I have tod
taken up very carefully the matter to which I referr
in my note, and although I have not obtained the resu
which I hoped to reach, at least something has be
accomplished.

"It is imperative to give heed in these moments in whi
the lack of agreement may easily cause one's best effor
to fail, so I am of the opinion that it will be better to l
things go along little by little. If you are in agreeme
with me and wish to follow my premonitions, wait.

"I have in addition to this matter another to place und
your protection. My city properties located in this Ci
have a total value of about $200,000 in gold. Knowin
as I do, things in my country, and having to foresee th
dangers which may affect my own person and perhaps m
interests as well, I should be glad to place the latter und
the protection of the American Nation, leaving to yo
judgment the manner and the form in which that desi
may be realized.

"It is unnecessary for me to tell you that you merit a
my confidence in this matter . . .

"I have complied with your requests and I rema
always,

"Your affectionate friend,

"U. HEUREAUX"

By the end of October, Mr. Durham had once mo
reached the conclusion that it was impossible for him t
make any advance in the Samaná negotiations. The ma
ter had been fully discussed in the meetings of Heureaux
Cabinet and it had been determined that in view of th

ent revolutionary movements, of the ill feeling in the acco districts created by Germany's threatened tariff liation, and because of the general ferment caused by approaching Presidential elections, it was inexpedient conclude the proposed agreement. This, in fact, was the clusion of the President himself, and although the nister for Foreign Affairs, General González, asked Mr. rham to write an official note requesting the formal ision of the Dominican Government, Mr. Durham de- mined to withdraw all papers informally, and there- e no entry remained upon the official records of the minican Government. The decision so arrived at was firmed three months later when the Department of te was once more advised that by reason of Haitian cation, opposition in Europe, conspiracy in Santo Do- go, and general popular apprehension, General Heu- ux was unable to complete the Samaná negotiations at t time.[1]

9.

The Dictator did not lack other irons in the fire. Within two years after the first Westendorp loan had n obtained, Heureaux had been forced once more to n to the same company for further assistance. His eal resulted in the contraction of the so-called "rail- l loan," calling for the emission of bonds amounting ll to £900,000, redeemable in fifty-six years and bear- an interest rate of 6%. The contract specified that the was to be secured by a first mortgage upon the rail- l to be built from Puerto Plata to Santiago with a ion of the loan proceeds, and by a second lien upon customs. The "régie" was again entrusted with the

[1] Mr. Durham to General John W. Foster, January 28, 1893.

collection of the funds to meet the service of t loan, which amounted to an additional charge of £57,0 annually upon the scant revenues of the Gover ment.

With the approach of the year 1893, the ready fun obtained by Heureaux from this second operation h already been dissipated. His secret expenses constantly r ing, as the pay-roll upon which were carried his paid su porters, his agents and his spies, lengthened, he appli again for advances to the local merchants. When t market became glutted with his paper, he resorted to ingenious arrangement by which, in return for cash a vances, local importers were exempt from the payme of customs dues. It was scarcely surprising, therefore, th in 1892 the customs revenues remaining after the bu getary requirements had been met proved far less th the sum necessary to meet the service of the forei bonds. The Government promptly defaulted.

Although to remedy this situation a compromise w later reached whereby the Government agreed to pern the "régie" to retain 35% of all port revenues to me the charges upon the defaulted bonds, when Heurea once more applied for additional advances to Weste dorp and Company, he was met by a blunt refusal. Th source of supply had run dry.

Consequently, while the advantages offered by t projected Samaná Convention with the United Sta were eminently satisfactory in so far as they implied t open support of his Administration by the American Go ernment, financially they seemed far from alluring. Du ing the very period that the State Department w anticipating the successful outcome of the negotiatio Heureaux was undertaking conversations for furth

ncial assistance, in which he believed the lease of
aná might prove a strong card, not only with the
nt of Westendorp and Company, as reported by Mr.
ham, but likewise with a financial syndicate supported
John Wanamaker, Postmaster General in the Harrison
inet, and with a group in New York headed by
srs. Smith M. Weed and Charles W. Wells.
was from the syndicate headed by these two, later
anized under the laws of New Jersey as the San Do-
go Improvement Company of New York, that Heu-
ux was at last enabled to obtain further financing.
uiring the rights and assuming the obligations of West-
orp and Company in May, 1892, the new Company
eed to undertake two new loans, both guaranteed by
customs revenues; one for £2,035,000 for the purpose
efunding the prior obligations of the Dominican Gov-
ment; the second for $1,250,000, to meet various items
ndebtedness incurred by Heureaux, aggregating but
-third of the amount so authorized, or $438,000. The
gie" was continued, under the direction now of the
rovement Company, although it was provided, as a
ns of enhancing the Republic's credit, that in the event
efault the "régie" was to be controlled by an Interna-
al Commission composed of bondholders, appointed,
from each nation, by the Governments of the
ted States, Great Britain, France, Holland and Bel-
n.

he facility of the operations so provided for, author-
by the Dominican Congress on March 23, 1893, led
reaux to repeat them within a few months by con-
ting for a new loan almost identical in purpose and
unt to the second loan negotiated with the Improve-
t Company. To the Dictator it was a matter of

supreme indifference that under the new agreements th
Government received but $90,000 silver a month fro
the customs revenues, and still less that the "régie" wa
saddled upon the Republic for a term of sixty-six year

Armes de l'Isle Espagnole.

Azua

S.anjuan

Puerto de Plata

Buenaventura

Bonao

Larez de Guahaba



Puerto Real

Salvatierra de la Savana

Santa Cruz de Icayagua



Salv Hi



L'ISLE ESPAG
ou DE SAINT-DOM

Représentée suivant les anciens Etab
des *ESPAGNOLS*

Dressée sur Oviedo *et* Herrera.

Armes de
Christophle Colomb

PAR LE S^R D'ANVILLE
Geographe Ord^re du Roi.
Fevrier 1731.

ECHELLE

Lieues Espagnoles pour l'etendue d'un Degre.

Lieues Françoises de même

Lieues Marines de même



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